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Surrogate motherhood is one of the most controversial issues 
of our time. The increase in infertility and the shortage of 
babies available for adoption, have provided an incentive 
for research in assisted reproductive techniques. Rapid 
advances in this field have caught the legal system 
unprepared in many ways.
The object of this thesis is to investigate the legal 
aspects of surrogate motherhood. A background is provided 
by an in depth examination and analysis of the practice of 
surrogacy in foreign jurisdictions. For this purpose a 
selection of interdisciplinary, medical and juridical 
reports, court decisions and legislation is analysed.
The surrogacy agreement is affected by principles of both 
public and private law. As the agreement is based on 
consensus between the parties, Roman Law principles of the 
law of obligations, provided a valuable point of departure 
in establishing a theoretical basis for the classification 
of surrogacy agreements. Having determined the nature of the 
agreement, the content is analysed with due regard to 
statutory and other relevant considerations, such as the 
boni mores, and submissions made regarding the 
enforceability and legality of such agreements.
A surrogate mother agreement model is proposed and analysed 
in the light of existing South African law. The various ways 
in which surrogacy contracts may be breached are examined 
and recommendations put forward regarding possible delictual 
or contractual remedies.
The legal relationship between the surrogate child and its 
gestational (birth) mother and her husband on the one hand 
and the intended parents on the other is investigated.
The role of the courts in custody issues - related to 
surrogacy - is examined and recommendations put forward as 
to how they may be included in the process by determining 
the best interest of the surrogate child prior to artificial 
insemination.
The civil and criminal liability of medical practitioners 
involved in assisted reproductive technology and 
specifically surrogacy are expounded. Key issues in the 
practice of surrogate motherhood are interpreted in the 
light of existing statutory and common law principles. 
Recommendations are put forward on these issues and a bill 
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CHAPTER 1 ASSISTED REPRODUCTION AND SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD
1 INTRODUCTION
The problem of infertility is as old as civilisation itself 
and the despair often associated with the condition is 
captured in the desperate plea of Rachel to Jacob in the Old 
Testament in the Bible: "Give me sons or I shall die!"^
In our socioty children are often seen as a gift from God
and it is therefore not surprising that the inability to
have children is sometimes experienced as punishment.
Receiving the news of infertility can be emotionally
devastating for a couple and responses may vary from denial,
isolation, anger, guilt and feelings of unworthiness,
2depression and grief to acceptance,
1 Genesis 30:1. Another example from the Bible is that 
of Sarah, who, approximately 4 000 years ago, when she 
was unable to conceive, sent her husband Abraham to the 
Egyptian slave, Hagar, so the she could have a child 
for Abraham (Gen 16:2).
2 For a discussion of the effects of infertility see 
Andrews L B 1984 New Conceptions - A Consumer's Guide 
to the Newest Infertility Treatments 96 - 101; De Jongh 
van Arkel J T “Die Pastorale Perspektief" in 1982 Die 
Proefbuisbaba : Toekomsskok of Nuwe Burger? Pieterse H 
J C (ed) 25 - 26; Wood C and Westmore A 1983 Test-tube 
Conception 35 - 38.
2The biotechnological revolution and the discovery of new and
better artificial reproductive techniques have created hope
for childless couples who, previously, could only rely on
adoption as an alternative method for obtaining a baby.
Irfertility clinics have been set up in most of the major
centres in the world and in South Africa alone there are
several at the large Medical Schools and a few ; rivate
3ones.
The reason for the constant research incentive in this 
exciting yet sensitive field, is primarily due to the
3 Bernstein J 1989 Tes We Can Have a Baby - A Positive 
Guide to Infertility 48 provides the following 
information: During 1989 the following infertility 
clinics were operative in the provinces and academic 
hospitals:
Transvaal:
Baragwanath Hospital, Soweto 
Coronation Hospital, Coronationville 
GaRankuwa Hospital 
H F Verwoerd Hospital, Pretoria 
Hillbrow Hospital, Johannesburg 
Johannesburg Hospital 
Orange Free State
Universitas Hospital, Bloemfontein 
Cape Province
Groote Schuur Hospital, Bellville 
Tygerberg Hospital, Bellville 
Natal
King Edward VIII Hospital, Durban 
Addington Hospital, Durban.
3increase in infertility^ and the shortage of babies
5available for adoption.
Couples to whom the advances in modern birth technology are 
beneficial are those with a medical history of genetic 
disorders, such as Tay-Sachs, Huntington's chorea or 
haemophilia, to name but a few. For those who marry or 
remarry late in life, but still have aspirations of having 
their own children, the new technological development may 
also be beneficial. Surgical procedures on either the male 
or female partner may al :> have reduced the possibility of 
having children and in some instances may even have resulted 
in total sterility - an inability of ever having children.
4 The causes for the increase in infertility vary widely. 
Some of the most common causes are drugs, oftea used 
for other purposes, such as DES (di-ethyl-stilbestrol), 
prescribed by doctors in the mid-1950's to prevent 
miscarriages. The daughters of these women are 
increasingly found to be infertile. Another drug, used 
for the treatment of ulcers, causes a suppression of 
the sperm count in men. Other causes are the use of 
IUD's in women to prevent pregnancy, a variety of 
infections; abortions performed under unsanitary 
conditions; pollution and environmental hazards such as 
chemical pollutants, which are responsible for lowering 
sperm counts in men and workplace hazards, such as 
contact with radio-active materials. For a detailed 
discussion see Andrews 1984 New Conceptions 16 - 31.
5 The shortage of children for adoption can be attributed 
to the fact that both abortion and contraceptives are 
more readily available. Single parenthood is also 
socially more acceptable than in the past. In South 
Africa it was estimated that approximately 150 000 
people were infertile in 1981 while only 1 200 
adoptions took place. See 1982 Die Proefbuisbaba 
Pieterse (ed) 28.
4For childless couples who are hesitant to adopt children, 
either on account of sociological or other factors or merely 
because of the long waiting periods involved, the new birth 
technology provides the possibility of having a child who is 
biologically related to at least one of them within a 
reasonable time.
The parties' choice of procedure will depend largely on 
their physical, emotional, social and religious background.
1.1. INFERTILITY
Infertility is an inability to conceive children. This may
be due to numerous factors attributed to the male or female
partner or a combination of factors.6 It may also be limited
to a certain period of time. The term "sub~fertility” is
used to describe a reduced state of fertility, for instance
7a low sperm count an the male or blockage of the Fallopian
6 For a detailed discussion on the causes of infertility 
see: Fishel S and Symonds E M (eds) 1986 In Vitro 
Fertilisation - Past Present Future 18 - 26. See also 
Palm M T and Hirsh H L “Infertility and Sterility: 
Legal Implications of Artificial Conception" 1982 Med 
Law 43.
7 The uterine tube that conveys the egg, fertilised or 
unfertilised from the ovary to the womb.
5tubes in the female, which may be rectified with medication 
or surgical procedures.8
If conception is still absent after one year of regular 
sexual intercourse, a doctor may diagnose a state of
9infertility.
1.1.1 CAUSES OF INFERTILITY10
There are multiple causes for infertility. These are 
normally divided into causes for male and female 
infertility. Infertility can be attributed to male causes in 
approximately 40% of the cases, cervical causes in 15%, 
uterine causes in 10% and tubal and peritoneal causes in 
30%, ovarian causes in 20% and miscellaneous causes in 5%. 
The total incidence is greater than 100% because in some 35% 
of couples, infertility is of multiple etiology.11
8 Wood C W and Westmore A 1983 Test Tube Conception 14.
9 Ibid.
10 See also indications for using artificial reproductive
techniques infra.
11 Palm and Hirsh "Infertility and Sterility - Legal
Implications of Artificial Conception" 1983 Med Law 43 
with reference to Shane J Schiff I and Wilson E 1976 
The Infertile Couple: Evaluation and Treatment 28 Clin 
Symposia 5:2 8.
6The causes of infertility are not dealt with in detail as 
the subject is primarily of a medical nature and the 
objective of the thesis is to investigate the legal aspects 
of a particular curative procedure - artificial insemination
or in vitro fertilisation linked to a surrogate gestational
12 .(birth) mother. The causes of infertility indicating this
procedure are linked to female infertility. They are
primarily the absence of a uterus or inability to carry a
baby to term - either because of a congenital disorder or
surgical removal of the uterus.
Although statistical data may not be absolutely accurate as 
all cases of infertility are not recorded, it is
13estimated at approximately 10 - 15% of all couples.
12 The causes of infertility are discussed by Fishel and 
Symmonds 1986 In Vitro Fertilisation - Past Present and 
Future 17 - 26; Wood and Westmore 1983 Test Tube 
Conception 22 - 29.
13 Mallory T E and Rich K E "Human Reproductive 
Technologies: An Appeal for Brave New Legislation in a 
Brave New World" 1986 Washburn L J 460 with reference 
to Kramer "Last Chance Babies, the Wonders of In Vitro 
Fertilization" Aug 1985 New York Mag 34. Cappucio M S 
"Surrogate Motherhood in Ohio: A Dangerous Game of Baby 
Roulette" 1985 Cap U L Rev 93, who is of the opinion 
that it occurs in one out of every seven couples. 
According to Andrews 1984 New Conceptions 2, 
infertility is estimated at approximately 15%, while it 
was only 10% in 1976. For her statistical data, she 
relied on research conducted by the National Centre for 
Health Statistics in 1965 and 1976. There is a 83% 
increase in infertility in married couples where the 
woman is in the age group 2 0 - 2 4  years. According to 
Condie K T "Surrogacy as a Treatment for Infertility"
(Footnote Continued)
7In 1981 infertility affected approximately 150 000 of the
South African white population of approximately 4,8 million
i 15 people.
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1.2 ARTIFICIAL REPRODUCTIVE TECHNIQUES
1.2.1. ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION
The term artificial insemination in a narrow sense, refers 
to a certain procedure, whereby gametes^ (sperm) of the 
male are placed into the reproductive organs of a female 
with a procreative intent ("voortplantingsdoel"). In a 
broader sense, it includes in vitro fertilisation and 
denotes all forms of insemination which is not affected by 
sexual intercourse between a male and female.
(Footnote Continued)
1986 J of the Law Society of Scotland 469, 
approximately 1/3 the problem of infertility may be 
traced back to either the male or female partner while 
approximately 1/3 of the causes of infertility is a 
combination of in both the male and female or as a 
result of unknown factors.
14 De Jongh van Arkel MDie Pastorale Perspektief" in 1982 
Die Proefbuisbaba Pieterse (ed) 28. Dr C Sevenster 
formerly associated with the infertility clinic at the 
H F Verwoerd Hospital quoted similar figures for 1984 
during a lecture on 26 January 1988 at the Glen 
Methodist Church Pretoria.
15 Population statistics obtained from 1987 This is South 
Africa, Bureau for Information Publication 12.
16 A gamete is defined in s 1 of the Human Tissue Act 65 
of 1983 as: "either of the two generative cells 
essential for human reproduction".
8The Human Tissue Act regulates both forms of artificial
reproduction and "artificial insemination of a person" is
18defined in s 1 of the Human Tissue Act as:
"The introduction by other than natural means of a male 
gamete or gametes into the internal reproductive organs of a 
female person for the purpose of human reproduction, 
including:
(a) The bringing together outside the human body of a male 
and a female gamete or gametes with a view to placing the 
product of a union of such gametes in the womb of a female 
person; or
(b) the placing of the product of a union of a male and a 
female gamete or gametes which have been brought together 
outside the human body in the womb of a female person."
Another distinction may be drawn between artificial 
insemination with sperm from a donor (AID) and artificial, 
insemination with the sperm from the husband. (AIH). 
Artificial insemination with sperm from the donor is
17
17 65 of 1983 as amended by Act 106 of 1984. In 1989 the 
word "insemination" was substituted with 
"fertilization" in the English version of the Act (s 
27) .
18 Ibid.
9frequently utilised in the practice of surrogate motherhood.
In such instances the donor is the husband of an
infertile/sterile woman end the recipient of the sperm is
19the surrogate mother.
The first artificial conception was performed in England by
John Hunter as long age as 1799 and in the United States of
20America in 1866 by Dr J Marion Sims. At present birth by
21this method accounts for approximately 3% of all births.
1.2.2 IN VITRO FERTILISATION
In this procedure, ripe ova are collected from the female
22patient with a needle using a laparoscopy procedure.
19 This is discussed in chapter 2 under the Parties to a 
Surrogate Motherhood Agreement.
20 Smith G P and Araola R "Sexuality, Privacy and the New 
Biology” 1984 Marq L Rev 263 n 2.
21 Davies I "Close encounters in a Test Tube" 1985 Med L J 
166.
22 The laparoscopy procedure used for egg pick-up is 
normally performed under general anaesthesia. A small 
incisions is made in the umbilicus (belly button) 
through which a telescope-like instrument - capable of 
transmitting light in curved or irregular paths and of 
producing images by means of accessory lenses and 
mirrors - the laparoscope - is passed to view the 
ovaries. Another small puncture site is made in the 
lower abdomen along the hairline, through which fine 
forceps are passed to allow manipulation and 
positioning of the pelvic organs. A third puncture site 
is made between the first and second incisions which
(Footnote Continued)
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These are fertilised with semen (either from a donor or her
husband) in a laboratory (petri) dish, containing a growth
medium. Fertilisation is thus effected outside the human
body - in vitro. The embryos - three or four are ideally
23used - may then be transferred to the donor's own uterus 
or to a surrogate/host mother. If the procedure is 
successful, one or more of them will attach to the uterine 
wall and the embryo will develop and grow in the ordinary 
fashion and the baby delivered in due course.
The pioneers in this field are R G Steptoe and P Edwards who 
were responsible for the birth of the first in vitro ("test
tube") baby, Louise Brown, in England in 1978. The USA
24 . . .followed in 1981 and in South Africa, the fust m  vitro
baby, Falcon de Vos, was born on April 29 1984 at the
25Tygerberg Hospital.
(Footnote Continued)
enables the surgeon to pass a teflon-coated needle into 
each mature follicle and to remove the fluid and the 
egg it contains. See Wood and Westmore 1983 Test-tube 
Conception 66 - 67; Grobstein C 1981 From Chance to 
Purpose: An Appraisal of External Human Fertilization
22 - 23.
23 Edwards R G "Use and Abuse of Research on Human 
Embryos" 1986 Gynaecology and Obstetrics Ludwig H and 
Thomsen K (eds) 700 - 701. This number was confirmed 
to be ideal by Drs M Jacobson, C Michaelo and C 
Sevenster (personal communication).
24 Smith and Iraola "Sexuality, Privacy and tlic New 
Biology" 1984 Marq L Rev 263 n 3.
25 Kruger T "Die Etiese Aspekte van In Vitro Bevrugting" 
1986 S Afr Med J 593 - 594.
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Nowadays the procedure whereby Louise Brown was born is
sometimes referred to "old fashioned" in vitro
fertilisation (although it was barely a decade ago) as her
own mother was both donor and gestational (birth) mother and
2 6semen from her own father was utilised. In vitro
fertilisation has introduced many possibilities regarding
the donors of gametes or ova as well as the gestational
27mother and prospective or social parents.
1.2.3 OOCYTE DONATION
2 8This procedure involves the donation and transfer of ova
to the uterus of a woman who is incapable of producing them
29 30herself or where the produced oocytes lack the mobility
26 Sperm and ova of "outsiders" may >^e used and after 
successful artificial insemination or in vitro 
fertilisation, the embryo may also be transferred to a 
host or surrogate mother. In some instances, as many 
as five people may have some form of parental rights to 
the child. See in general Wallis C "The New Origins of 
Life" Time 10-09-1984 cited by Dalgety and Prior in 
"Law and the Biological Revolution : Changes in 
Attitutes, behaviour, Medical Standards and Technology
1986 N Z L J 25.
27 Wallis cited in 1986 N Z L J 25.
28 The term ova is often used to denote fertilised
oocytes, but it also denotes mature oocytes before 
fertilisation.
29 For instance in cases of genetically absent ovaries or
premature menopause; see Fishel and Symonds 1986 In
Vitro Fertilisation - Past Present and Future 25.
30 Egg cells as produced in the ovaries.
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to reach the uterus or contain some form of abnormality or
32potential abnormality which makes pregnancy undesirable.
The possibility of oocyte donation is enhanced by the 
stimulation of oocyte production in women undergoing 
fertility treatment. If the woman becomes pregnant, she may 
want to donate surplus ova. The possibility of 
cryopreservation of excess or surplus ova in liquid nitrogen 
further facilitates this procedure. Women may also consider 
donating ova when they no longer want their own children and 
opt for sterilisation.
1.2.4 EMBRYO FLUSHING (LAVAGE) AND TRANSFER
This technique is primarily used where a female patient has 
a healthy uterus but damaged or no Fallopian tubes. There 
are numerous causes for this condition for example following 
surgery, congenital disorders or diseases of the Fallopian 
tubes.
31
31 Andrews 1984 New Conceptions 245.
32 Fishel and Symonds 1986 In Vitro Fertilisation - Past 
Present Future 25, distinguish between patients who are 
menstruating and those who are not. In the former 
category are, for instance, carriers of genetically 
transmitted diseases while congenital absence of the 
ovaries or premature menopause cause the absence of 
menstruation and inability to produce oocytes.
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The requesting or commissioning couple conclude an agreement
with a fertile woman whereby she is artificially inseminated
with sperm from the commissioning male partner. If
insemination is successful, the embryo is flushed from the
33uterus of the host or intermediate mother and transferred 
to the wife of the commissioning couple who carries the baby 
in the ordinary way and gives birth in due course.
Another form of embryo transfer is where a woman is capable 
of producing oocytes, but is able to carry the baby only for 
a short period. Insemination may be effected in vivo (inside 
the reproductive organs), and the embryo then flushed out 
and transferred frcui the genetic to the surrogate or host 
mother. This is also referred to as SET (surrogate embryo 
transfer).
1.2.5 EMBRYO DONATION
In the ordinary course of an in vitro programme, due to
34super ovulation, the possibility exists of so called
33 For an explanation of the term "host" or "intermediate" 
mother see the discussion in chapter 2.
34 The technique is sometimes employed by the 
administration of a hormone, clomiphene citrate or 
human menopausal gonadotrophin, which induces the 
female to produce a larger than usual number of ova; 
Trounson A and Leeton J et al “Pregnancy Established in 
an Infertile Patient After Transfer of a Donated Embryo
(Footnote Continued)
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"supernumerary" or "spare" embryos. In most in vitro
programmes, the number of spare embryos is restricted, but
with the introduction of a freezing programme at some in
vitro clinics, embryos may be kept frozen for future use by
the infertile couple. If they, however, decide that they do
not intend going on with the programme, or when the
implantation resulted in a successful pregnancy, such
35embryos may be donated if they are healthy.
1.2.6 GIFT POST AND VISPER
These techniques have been developed over the last couple of 
years to help infertile couples. They can only be utilised 
in a woman with healthy Fallopian tubes. GIFT refers to 
Gamete Intra-Fallopian Transfer, POST to peritoneal oocyte 
and sperm transfer and VISPER to vaginal intra-peritoneal 
sperm transfer. In GIFT and POST eggs are collected and 
together with sperm from the husband or donor put directly 
into the woman's Fallopian tubes (GIFT) or into the 
peritoneum (POST). In VISPER only sperm is transferred 
directly into the woman’s peritoneal cavity.
(Footnote Continued)
Fertilised In Vitro" 1983 B M J 835; Edwards R G "Use 
and Abuse of Research on Human Embryos" 1986 
Gynaecology and Obstetrics 691 - 692 Wood and Westmore 
1983 Test Tube Conception 60.
35 See Edwards 1986 Gynaecology and Obstetrics 691 - 692; 





One of the meanings of "surrogate" in the Concise Oxford
Dictionary is "substitute," whereas according to Webster’s
New World Thesaurus it is synonymous with an agent
(intermediary) or a delegate. Used in the context of modern
birth technology, the term is a new one and was practically
unknown a decade ago. Linked to the word "mother" it has the
meaning of a woman who has agreed to bear a child for
3 6another woman who is unable to do so herself. The
surrogate mother is sometimes also referred to as a "host"
mother, especially where she merely carries the foetus for a
37while (embryo flushing) or carries a foetus for a full 
pregnancy period and gives birth to the baby. The embryo may 
be conceived in vitro with gametes from t-he commissioning 
couple or with gametes from donors. If this is the case, the 
surrogate makes no genetic contribution to the child. The 
word, "gestational" mother is sometimes used to refer to the 
woman giving birth to the baby. Various possiblities thus
36 Referred to in Afrikaans as "instaan-moeder, '* 
"gasmoeder" or even "leenma."
37 This situation does not give rise to the typical 
problems associated with surrogate motherhood, which is 
the subject of this the is- A problem which may, 
however, occur is where Hushing is unsuccessful and 
the host mother is saddled with an unwanted pregnancy.
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exist with regard to the type of surrogacy utilised. Unless 
specifically otherwise indicated, this thesis is concerned 
with partial surrogacy, where the surrogate is inseminated 
with sperm from the commissioning father - also referred to 
as "surrogacy in its original form” and full surrogacy where 
the sperm and ova utilised are obtained from the 
commissioning couple and no genetic link exists between the 
child and the surrogate mother. This is often referred to as 
"gestational surrogacy". In both instances there will thus 
be a genetic link between the commissioning couple and the 
child.
The basic surrogate motherhood agreement involves an
3 8agreement between a commissioning couple (intended 
parents) and a surrogate mother whereby the surrogate agrees 
(i) to be artificially inseminated with sperm from the 
commissioning male (intended father) and to carry the baby 
to term and hand it over to the commissioning couple 
(intended parents) after birth or (ii) agrees that embryos 
resulting from fertilisation of the commissioning couple's 
own genetic material (sperm and ova) in vitro, be 
transferred to her uterus.
38 Referred to in Afrikaans as “wensouers,"
"kontrakterende egpaar” or “kinderlose egpaar".
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In the former instance, the surrogate mother is also the 
genetic mother of the child.
1.3 INDICATIONS FOR UTILISING ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION
TECHNIQUES
1.3.1 ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION
Although artificial insemination is employed in surrogate
motherhood cases, it is normally utilised as an alternative
reproductive method for male infertility, such as impotence,
azoospermia (absence of sperm) and oligospermia (low sperm
count). Blood (Rh)-incompatibility and genetically
transferable diseases such as Huntington's chorea or
Tay-Sachs disease are also important factors in considering
artificial insemination as an alternative reproductive
39method. It may also be used if antibodies are formed by 
the female partner acting against the sperm of the male and 
as a final resort when conventional infertility treatment 
fails.
Infertility in males may be caused by environmental factors 
such as excessive radiation, for instance, from cancer 
treatment, exposure to certain chemicals such as the 
so-called "agent orange" used for military purposes or drug 
abuse.
39 Andrews 1984 New Conceptions 162.
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In vitro fertilisation is specifically indicated for females
suffering from Fallopian tube disorders or who have no
Fallopian tubes. In fact, in vitro fertilisation has been
used to respond to all causes of female infertility, except
for anovulation (inability to produce oocytes) and the
40absence of a uterus.
It is estimated that approximately 40% of infertility in
females can be traced back to Fallopian tube disorders, and
in the USA alone it is estimated that approximately 490 000
41females fall within this category. The causes are varied, 
but may be ascribed to infections, genetic and other 
diseases, post-surgical complications or complications 
resulting from utilisation of intra-uterine devices (IUD's) 
for birth control purposes.
1.3.2 IN VITRO FERTILISATION
40 See Johnson et al 1981 In Vitro Fertilisation: The
Challenge of the Eighties 36 cited in the 1985 Report 
on Human Artificial Reproduction and Related Matters - 
Ontario Law Reform Commission Vol 1 24 n 42; Van der
Merv/e J V Irsigler U M et al ”In Vitro Fertilization 
and Embryo Transfer in Pretoria” 1984 S Afr Med J 641 
citing Lopata A Kellow G N Johnston W I H et al "Human 
Embryo Transfer in the Treatment of Infertility" 19 81 
Aust N Z J Obstet Gynaecol 156 - 158.
41 Andrews 1984 New Conceptions 123.
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Certain forms of infertility do not respond to any form of
conventional treatment, such as medication or surgical
intervention. In vitro fertilisation may then be utilised as
a final alternative. In vitro fertilisation and embryo
transfer are also sometimes employed in the treatment of
male infertility, where the number, movement or structure of
42the sperm is considered abnormal.
1.3.3 SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD
The surrogacy procedure is discussed in detail in chapter 2.
The services of a surrogate mother may be utilised if the 
commissioning or infertile female is unable to carry a 
foetus - either for a short period or at all - as a result 
of a congenital or other abnormality or surgical removal of 
the uterus. It may also be the only alternative where 
pregnancy is too risky, for instance blood 
(Rh)-incompatibility, severe high blood pressure or 
diabetes. Other important factors are genetically 
transferable diseases such as Huntington’s chorea, Tay Sachs 
disease, Down’s syndrome or haemophilia.
42 Leeton J F, Trounson A and Wood C "IVF and ET: What it 
is and How it Works” in 1982 Test-Tube Babies Walters 
W and Singer P (eds) 3.
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1.4 OVERVIEW AND OBJECTIVE OF THE THESIS
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the legal 
aspects of the practice of surrogacy as an alternative 
method for infertile couples of acquiring a baby who is at 
least related to one of the parents.
The subject is approached in the following manner:
Chapter 2 consists of an examination of surrogate motherhood 
as a new reproductive alternative. A distinction is drawn 
between the various forms of surrogate motherhood. The 
parties to a surrogacy agreement are discussed and special 
attention is given to the motivations of potential surrogate 
mothers. Suitability and screening of the parties to such 
an agreement as well as the role of psychiatrists, are 
examined. In the second part of chapter 2 the practice of 
surrogacy in foreign jurisdictions is examined with special 
reference to major governmental or state reports on 
human-assisted reproduction. Guidelines issued by medical 
societies or associations are also examined. Court decisions 
in certain foreign jurisdictions such as Britain and the 
United States of America are discussed and legislation and 
proposed legislation on the subject in certain foreign 
jurisdictions, such as Britain, some states in the United 
States of America, some states in Australia and Germany are 
analysed.
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In chapter 3 delictual and contractual aspects are examined. 
The surrogacy agreement in its present form is analysed in 
the historical context of the classification of contracts in 
Roman law in an attempt to establish a sound theoretical 
basis for the agreement in our legal system. The nature of 
the agreement as well as the legality and enforceability of 
such an agreement, with special attention to the boni mores, 
is examined. Breach of contract: and possible remedies - 
delictual and contractual - are discussed.
In chapter 4 a proposed surrogacy agreement model is 
analysed.
Other private law aspects - particularly affecting the law 
of persons - are discussed in chapter 5. These include 
common law and statutory law issues. Genetic and legal 
relationships between parents and children are discussed in 
the light of new technological developments related to 
assisted reproduction, which may enable as many as five 
persons to claim some form of parental rights to one child. 
The mater semper certa est statement and pater is est quern 
nuptiae demonstrant maxim are examined ±.n the light of their 
validity with regard to new developments in this field. 
Parental power and its termination - especially in surrogacy 
arrangements - are discussed. The welfare principle or best 
interest of the child criterion and its application in our 
courts are analysed.
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In chapter 6 the role and possible civil and/or criminal 
liability of medical practitioners in assisted reproduction 
technology and surrogate motherhood are examined. The 
doctrine of informed consent and the extent of its 
applicability in surrogacy is examined. The nature of the 
"rights" to gametes, zygotes and embryos is analysed on a 
comparative law basis, to determine the rights of donors as 
well as persons who have zygotes or embryos in storage 
(cryoconservation). As these aspects have received scant 
attention in South Africa, recommendations are put forward 
for the management of the cryoconservation of 
zygotes/embryos and the content of the agreement which 
should exist between the storage facility and the intended 
parents.
In chapter 7 various theoretical approaches regarding the 
practice of surrogacy aro analysed in an attempt to find an 
approach suitable for the regulation of surrogacy in South 
Africa. Key issues are addressed separately and 
recommendations put forward regarding each issue. In the 
final instance a bill, the Surrogacy Agreement Bill, is 
proposed for the regulation of surrogacy in South Africa.
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CHAPTER 2 SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: AN INTRODUCTION AND A
COMPARATIVE EVALUATION OF SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD IN 
FOREIGN JURISDICTIONS
1 INTRODUCTION
Surrogate motherhood as an alternative to adoption was
42virtually unknown before 1978, when Louise Brown, the 
first in vitro baby was born. This event sparked renewed 
interest in modern birth technology and opened the door to 
new possibilities of obtaining babies related to at least 
one of tnt? parents. What was previously considered science 
fiction has now become a medical reality.
Although it is difficult to ascertain the number of children
born by utilising surrogate motherhood, it was estimated at
43approximately 500 during the period between 1978 and 1985.
Amore recent estimate has put it at 1 200 children since
441978.
42 Handel W and Sherwyn B A "Surrogate Parenting: Coming 
to Grips With the Future" 1982 Trial 56.
43 Gelman and Shapiro "Infertility: Babies by Contract 
Newsweek 04-11-1985 74, cited by Dalgety D J and Prior 
rf in "Law and the Biological Revolution: Changes in 
Attitude, Behaviour, Medical Standards and Technology"
1986 N Z L J 25.
44 Special report on surrogacy in The Detroit News 
17-09-1989.
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Surrogacy raises many ethical, medical/ religous and legal 
questions. There are serious pitfalls inherent to such an 
agreement and couples considering this option of 
childbearing should be alerted to potential problems.
The future of surrogate motherhood is still uncertain in 
many countries as very few legislatures have addressed the 
issue directly* Legal precedents are limited and common law 
principles do not provide adequate answers to all the 
problems raised by the procedure.
In this chapter the emphasis is on an analysis of the 
parties to a surrogate motherhood agreement and the state of 
surrogate motherhood practices in foreign jurisdictions. For 
this purpose, reports of the major commissions which 
addressed surrogate motherhood specifically, are examined as 
well as the views of the medical profession in foreign 
jurisdictions as stated in reports and published guidelines. 
Court decisions in the major jurisdictions, such as Britain 
and the USA are examined in an attempt to analyse the 
criteria used by judges in the absence of direct legislation 
on the issue. Finally, legislation and proposed legislation 
are examined and evaluated. Here and there reference will 




The indications for surrogate motherhood have already been 
touched on briefly in chapter 1.
Surrogate motherhood may be used where a female is unable to 
produce oocytes or to carry a baby to term. This may be due 
to the congenital absence or other abnormalities of the 
uterus or to the surgical removal of the female reproductive 
organs.
In situations where pregnancy carries an abnormally high 
risk, such as blood (Rh)-incompatability, severe high blood 
pressure or diabetes, surrogacy may also provide an 
alternative. For carriers of genetic diseases such as 
Huntington's chorea, Tay Sachs disease, Down's syndrome or 
haemophilia, surrogacy may also be indicated.
3 FtJLL AND PARTIAL SURROGACY
In an ordinary surrogate motherhood contract; an agreement 
is reached between a couple who are not capable of producing 
their own children in the normal way, and the surrogate 
mother who undertakes to bear a child for them and to hand 
it over to the commissioning couple after birth, terminating 
any parental power she may have over the child.
tFor practical purposes a distinction is drawn between full
and partial surrogacy. As indicated in chapter 1, the
genetic material (sperm and ova) are provided by the
commissioning couple (intended parents) in full surrogacy
and the surrogate merely acts as a host or gestational
mother. In partial surrogacy the surrogate is artificially
inseminated with semen from the commissioning husband
(intended father) and thus contributes genetically to the
child. The majority of surrogacy cases before the American
and English courts, were cases of partial surrogacy and only
45two American cases on full surrogacy could be traced.
As far as procedure is concerned, partial surrogacy may be 
accomplished without medical expertise or specialised 
hospital facilities. In full surrogacy on the other hand, in 
vitro fertilisation is utilised. This delicate procedure 
requires professional skill, special equipment and 
sophisticated hospital facilities. Theoretically, it may
26
45 Smith v Jones 85-532014 DZ (3rd Jud Dist Mich 14 March 
1986; reported by Annas G J "The Baby Broker Boom" 1986 
Hastings Center Rept 30; "Parentage Decided for Unborn 
Child of Surrogate Mother" American Medical News 
04-04-1986 19 as quoted by Eaton T E "Comparative 
Responses to Surrogate Motherhood" 1986 Neb L Rev 686 
690 n 10; De Marco D "The Conflict Between Reason and 
Will in the Legislation of Surrogate Motherhood" 1987 
Am J Juris 26 - 27; Johnson/Calverts reported in 
Newsweek 27-08-1990; Time 27-08-1990.
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therefore be easier to prohibit or regulate the practice of
46full surrogacy than partial surrogacy.
Full surrogacy may also be more beneficial to the child from 
a psychological point of vi^w as it is genetically related 
to both parents. On the other hand, the child in partial 
surrogacy is genetically linked to the surrogate mother who 
undertakes to hand the child over after birth, terminating 
her parental power over che child. The genetic or 
biological parents in partial surrogacy are therefore from 
two different families - a fact which has the potential of 
creating problems similar to those experienced by adopted 
children. This leads one to the assumption that it will 
probably be easier for the gestational mother in full 
surrogacy to hand the child over to the commissior-ing couple 
at birth than for a genetic mother.
3.1 THE PARTIES TO A SURROGATE MOTHER AGREEMENT
47The parties to a surrogacy agreement are the commissioning 
or childless couple on the one hand, and the surrogate
46 See in general Singer and Wells 1984 The Reproductive 
Revolution: New Ways of Making Babies 128 - 130. See 
also chapter 7.
47 For practical purposes the commissioning couple are 
referred to as the intended parents, once a surrogacy 
agreement has been concluded.
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mother and her husband, on the other.
Although the commissioning couple is sometimes referred to
as the infertile couple, this is not necessarily the case as
the husband of the commissioning couple is generally
fertile, and genetic father of the child in both partial and
48full surrogacy.
The commissioning wife is either sterile or experiences some 
fertility problem which precludes her from either 
contributing ova or carrying a foetus to full term.
The surrogate mother is generally a married woman,
although unmarried women are not precluded from being
49surrogate mothers m  most of the American states. (Reg
508(1) of the South African Hvuu*.n Tissue Act Regulations 
clearly provides that artificial insemination may only be
performed on married women with their husbands' written
4-V 51 consent).
48 Mady T M "Surrogate Motherhood: The Legal Issues'* 1981
Am J L & Med 323 at 338.
49 For a detailed discussion on the subject see
Kritchevsky B "The Unmarried Woman's Right to 
Artificial Insemination: A Call for an Expanded
Definition of Family" 1981 Harv Women’s L J 1 - 42.
50 R1182 GG 10283 - 20-06-1986.
51 This aspect is dealt with in chapter 6 under Informed 
Consent.
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The husband oJ. the surrogate mother is also a party to the
contract as he has to consent to the medical procedures and
52the termination of parental power.
4 THE QUESTION OF MOTHERHOOD
This aspect is discussed in more detail in chapter 5 where 
legal problems relating to the law of persons are discussed. 
This is, however, one of the most problematic aspects of 
surrogacy and therefore demands some preliminary reflection.
53 .Whereas the mater semper certa est statement in our common
law, previously provided the assurance that the mother is
54always certain, this is no longer the case. Hypothetically 
it is now possible for at least three women to claim some
52 Termination of parental power is dealt with in detail 
in chapter 5.
53 As Schutte M Die Hervorming van die Regsposisie van 
Buite-egtelike Kinders met Besondere Verwysing na die 
Status van Kinders deur Kunsmatige Bevrugting Verwek 
LLD Unisa 1986 147 points out, this was merely a 
statrinent of fact in our common law, as there was no 
possibility at that stage that anyone other than the 
gestational mother, could be the genetic mother of the 
child. It is therefore not a rebuttable presumption 
such as the presumption of paternity. It precedes the 
well-known presumption of paternity in Digesta 2 4 5 of 
the Corpus Iurie Civilis: *quia sempter certa est. 
etiam si vulgo conceperit: pater vero is est, quein 
auptiae demonstrant*.
54 See in general Van Wyk A H "Mater Hodie Semper Incerta 
Est? 'n Evaluasie van Artikel 5 van die Wet op die 
Status van Kinders van 1987" 1988 TSAR 465 - 476.
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form of parental rights to a child. If Mrs A is infertile 
and Mrs B agrees to provide ova to be fertilised in vitro 
with semen from Mr A, and embryos are transferred to Mrs C, 
who agrees to carry the baby to term and hand it over to Mrs 
A and her husband after birth, the situation becomes 
extremely complex and the basic tenets of family law 
uncertain. Who is the legal mother of the child? Is it Mrs 
A whom the legal and medical literature refers to as the 
commissioning, infertile or social mother? Is it Mrs B, the 
genetic mother? Or is it Mrs C, the gestational or birth 
mother?^5
This example provides adequate proof of the confusion in
parental roles created by the advances in modern birth
technologies such as artificial insemination, in vitro
fertilisation, embryo transfer and surrogate motherhood. We
are faced with the possibility or numerous persons claiming
parental rights to a child and our traditional definitions
56of mother and father are no longer adequate. Courts are
55 See also Lupton M L The Legal Consequences of 
Artificial Insemination and Embryo Transplantation in 
Humans D Phil Univ of Natal 1982 108; Schutte 1986 
Hervorming 146 - 147 and 149 - 150.
56 See the discussion in chapter 5 under Common Law 
Statements and Maxims. See also Wadlington W 
"Artificial Conception: The Challenge for Family Law"
1983 Symposium on Bio-Mecical Ethics 1983 Va L Rev 465 
- 514; Stumpf A "Redefining Mother: A Legal Matrix for 
New Reproductive Technologies'* 1986 Yale L J 187 - 207;
(Footnote Continued)
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increasingly faced with novel legal problems and unguided by 
direct legislation, incline to rely on traditional legal 
principles which may no longer be adequate.
In South Africa, parenthood has traditionally been
57determined on a biological basis. It is submitted, 
however, that the psychological intent of the parents in a 
surrogacy arrangement transcends the notion that biological 
ties should be the only criterion for parenthood (in the 
absence of legislation). The psychological (and legal) 
intent of the parties to such an agreement are that the 
commissioning couple (intended parents) should be considered 
the legal parents of the child. The intent of the parties is 
a fundamental element recognised in our law and should also 
be recognised in surrogacy agreements.
Another common law principle which has created a number of 
legal problems is the transfer of parental power. Although 
this issue is discussed in depth in chapter 5, a few 
preliminary comments are necessary. As a result of modern 
birth technology, as many as five persons may claim some
(Footnote Continued)
Barnett D L "In Vitro Fertilization: Third Party 
Motherhood and the Changing Definition of Legal Parent"
1985 Pac L J 231 - 259.
57 South African Law Commission report Project 38
"Ondersoek na die Regsposisie van Buite-egtelike 
Kinders" Oct 1985 55; Lupton 1982 Legal Consequences 
224 and 230; Schutte 1986 Hervorming 144.
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form of parental rights to one child. Both the British and 
American courts have been faced with requests for 
determining or terminating parental power and in some 
instances have avoided the issue or have refused to do so on 
the strength of traditional legal principles in the absence 
of clear legislation. This may be detrimental to the child, 
as the duty of maintenance of the child and other 
obligations can definitively be established only once the 
legal parents of the child have been ascertained. It is 
submitted that parenthood should be established prior to the 
birth of the child.
5 THE QUESTION OF PATERNITY
Paternity is also discussed in greater detail under legal 
problems relating to the law of persons in chapter 5 where 
the presumption of paternity or pater is est quem nuptiae 
demonstrant is discussed.
It must be noted however, that the common law presumption of 
paternity complicates surrogacy arrangements, as the husband 
of the surrogate, if ohe was married, was presumed to be the 
father of the child and not the intended father. This
5 8
58 See Wallis C ‘’The New Origins of Life" Time 10-09-1984 
cited by Dalgety & Prior 1986 N Z L J 25.
59 See the Recommendations in chapter 7.
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presumption was rebuttable under common law, but
61legislation in several jurisdictions have entrenched the
presumption and the South African legislature has followed
62suit in enacting s 5 of the Children's Status Act.
6 0
6 THE MOTIVATION OF SURROGATE MOTHERS
Tie attitudes motivating women to act as surrogate mothers
are varied and in some instances, complex. I,i an American
6 3survey 125 prospective surrogate mothers were interviewed 
and data collected and tabulated in an attempt at "helping 
participants in the process and policy makers to make 
reasonable and informed decisions about the process".
Some of the most interesting facts that caii.o to light are 
the following:
60 Van Lutterveld v Engels 1959 2 SA 699 A.
61 This is enacted in the American Uniform Parentage Act 5
9A ULA 592 (1979) which has so far been adopted by 16 
American states according to Clark N L "New Wine in Old 
Skins: Using Paternity Suit Settlements to Facilitate 
Surrogate Motherhood" 1986 - 1987 J Fam L 483 484 n 2. 
See also s 27 of the British Family Law Reform Act of
1987 and s 5 of the Status of Children (Amendment) Act
1984 of Victoria, Australia. See in general Dickens B M
"Artificial Reproduction and Child Custody" 1987 Can 
Bar Rev 67 - 69 for the position in the Canadian 
provinces.
62 82 of 1987. See the discussion in chapter 5.
63 See in general Parker P J "Motivation of Surrogate
Mothers: Initial Findings* 1983 Am J Psych 117 - 118.
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The average age of women ranged between 18 and 38. Of the 
applicants 56% were married, 20% divorced and 24% had never 
been married. Of the first 50 applicants, slightly more 
than 20 (40%) were unemployed at the time of the interview 
and were receiving some form of financial aid. Almost 60% of 
the applicants were working or had a working spouse. The 
total annual income of the families ranged from $6 000 to 
$55 000. Of the first 50 interviewed, the majority (54%) had 
graduated from high school or received a General Equivalency 
Diploma, while 18% had not completed high school. Twenty six 
percent had received College or University education.
The basic motivation for some women are sentimental or basic 
maternal instincts. These women claim that they enjoy the 
being pregnant and giving birth to a child. Others are 
prompted by altruistic reasons, based on a genuine desire to 
help an infertile couple or family members to have a child 
of their own. Some engage in surrogacy to resolve internal 
psychological conflicts such as feelings of guilt stemming 
from a prior abortion. In fact, the survey revealed that 35% 
of the women either previously had a voluntary abortion or 
had relinquished a child for adoption. Others are merely 
motivated by the prospect of financial reward. In the 
American survey the majority of women (89%) required a fee 
for their participation in a surrogacy programme. None of 
the women, however, stated that the fee alone was a prime 
motivation and in most cases it was accompanied by
35
therapeutic or altruistic motivations. During 1983 the 
average compensation for a surrogate in the United States 
varied between $10 000 and $30 000. It has also been 
reported that between 1978 and 1989 approximately $33
million had been spent on surrogacy arrangements in the USA
, 64alone.
The results of the survey provide adequate proof that very 
few women will be prepared to act as a surrogate mother 
without compensation. This is perfectly understandable if 
one considers the basic expenses involved in pregnancy such 
as maternity wear, transport, regular medical examinations, 
laboratory tests and hospital fees which can amount to a 
considerable sum of money. For these reasons, it is 
submitted, that should surrogacy practices be allowed, the 
surrogate mother should receive some compensation to cover 
her basic expenses (and possibly also loss of income) 
analogous to compensation of a sperm donor for necessary 
expenses. A maximum amount may be determined legislatively. 
The aspect of compensation is, however, dealt with in more 
detail in the discussion of the boni mores in chapter 3, 
since that is also one of the crucial issues in surrogate 
motherhood.65
64 The Detroit News 17-09-1989.
65 For a detailed discussion, see chapter 3.
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7 SUITABILITY OF THE PARTIES TO A SURROGACY AGREEMENT 
AND SCREENING
7.1 INTRODUCTION
The mental and physical suitability of the parties is one of 
the most important aspects of the surrogacy agreement as the 
ultimate success and protection of the interest of the child 
depend largely upon the attitudes and maturity of the 
parties. In moBt instances the commissioning couple, who 
request surrogacy, have been through a long period of 
infertility testing, which should provide a medical 
practitioner some time to assess their attitude and 
suitability to enter into a surrogacy agreement.
Medical practitioners, psychiatrists and other health-care 
workers play an increasingly important ro-le in the 
evaluation and screening of potential surrogates and 
infertile couples.®®
At present the suitability of the parties is in the main 
determined by medical practitioners who are sometimes 
assisted by social workers or other health-care workers.
66 See in general Slovenko R “Obstetric Science and the 
developing Role of the Psychiatrist in Surrogate 
Motherhood*' 1986 J Psychi^.ry 6 L 487 - 518.
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Interdisciplinary ethics committees or a supervisory 
surrogacy tribunal, could play a significant role in the 
evaluation process. Should surrogacy legislation be adopted 
at a future stage in South Africa, a legal criterion will 
have to be formulated for suitability, and information 
derived from medical experience will be invaluable.
7.2 ASSISTANCE BY PSYCHIATRISTS/PSYCHOLOGISTS
The eligibility for infertility treatment received
67considerable attention in the Warnock Report in Britain.
It was concluded that, in general, everyone should be
entitled to seek expert advice and appropriate investigation
68of their fertility. Where a medical practitioner 
experiences problems in reaching a decisior whether a 
patient should receive infertility treatment, he/she should 
consult with psychiatrists, psychologists or social workers. 
As stated in the Warnock report^ situations could be 
envisaged where infertility treatment would not be in the 
best interest of the patient, the child that may be born or 
the patient's immediate family. The decision not to treat a 
patient is not always a purely medical one and other
67 At 2.5 et seq of the report.
68 At 2.12 and 2.13 of the report.
69 At 2.12 of the report.
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professionals in related fields could alleviate the burden 
of reaching a decision on this aspect. Counselling could, 
for instance, be provided by a psychiatrist or psychologist: 
and recommendations be made to the medical team. This may 
be particularly helpful where the infertility specialists 
are not well acquainted with the patients. It is, of 
course, preferable that both parents and the surrogate 
mother have stable marriages and that they are emotionally 
equipped to cope with the stress inherent in assisted 
reproduction procedures. In surrogacy arrangements the 
experience and skill of a psychiatrist or psychologist could 
be helpful in the screening of the intended parents and the 
surrogate mother.
70In the Baby M II case in the USA the absence of 
counselling, prior to termination of parental rights, was 
specifically addressed. The court found that the contract
did not proviae for counselling, independent or otherwise,
71 72of the natural mother. According to Rothenberg the lack
of counselling reinforced the court's determination to void
the agreement. The surrogate mother, Mrs Whitehead, had
70 In re Baby M 14 FLR 2007 N J Sup Ct (1988).
71 At 2016 of the report.
72 "Baby M, the Surrogacy Contract, and the Health Care
Professional: Unanswered Questions“ in 1988 Law, Med & 
Health Care 113 - 120.
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apparently been "screened" two years prior to the agreement.
The "examiner" had some misgivings at that stage about her
ability to hand over the child at birth. He apparently
suggested that this aspect be explored in more depth, which
never happened. She was nevertheless recommended as an
"appropriate candidate" and the commissioning couple, the
Sterns, in fact relied on this information when they signed
73the contract.
The role of psychiatrists in surrogacy arrangements has 
received considerable attention in legal and medical 
publications in the United States of America. Suggestions as 
to their role ir surrogacy agreements have been made. 
Possibilities mentioned included the following: (1) 
facilitator of informed consent, (2) "gatekeeper", (3) 
protector of the foetus, (4) therapist, and (5) 
researcher. Parker71* provides a detailed analysis of the 
possible role of the psychiatrist in surrogacy arrangements. 
According to him, the principal task of the psychiatrist is 
to assist the intended parents and the surrogate mother in
73 At 2008 of the report.
74 Slovenko 1986 J Psychiatry & L 487.
75 "Surrogate Motherhood: The Interaction of Litigation, 
Legislation and Psychiatry" 1982 Int'l J L & Psychiatry 
341 - 354 and "Surrogate Motherhood, Psychiatric 
Screening and Informed Consent, Baby Selling, and 
Public Policy" 1984 Bull Am Acad Psychiatry L 21 - 38.
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reaching a “competent, voluntary and informed choice
(consent or refusal) with respect to their participation in 
7 6 77the process". Slovenko is concerned that "(g)iven the
7 8legal ambiguity, and the negative stance taken by the AMA, 
the psychiatrist or other mental health professional who 
gets involved in the process is likely yet again to be made 
a scapegoat". The major decisions (in surrogacy), according 
to him, are not psychiatric but societal. Slovenko's advice 
to mental health professionals is to "stay out of the 
picture at least until his or her role is clarified or 
supported by legislation or ethical standards of the 
profession”. Although this is undoubtedly good advice in a 
situation of legal uncertainty, it is a pity that childless 
couples, who already experience considerable anguish 
resulting from infertility/ should be denied the help of 
mental health professionals. It is therefore suggested that 
provision chould be made for them to assist a couple or a 
surrogate, should it be required.
If Parker 1982 Int‘1 J L & Psychiatry 352.
77 1986 J Psychiatry & L 487.
78 American Medical Association. The views of this
Association on surrogacy have, however, shifted from a 
conservative to a much more liberal approach as is 
evident from the 1990 guidelines, published by the 
organisation regarding surrogacy. See the discussion 
infra.
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An examination of the practice of surrogacy in the United
States of America reveals that screening of the parties is
regarded as of the utmost importance. In William Handel's
Californian law practice, screening of potential surrogates
and childless couples is performed by a qualified
psychologist, Hilary Hanafin. She rejects approximately 80%
of surrogates and some commissioning couples as
7 9unsuitable. This is practically unheard of m  other 
programmes. Handel's practice has been extremely successful 
so far, as his surrogates honour their agreements. This can 
be attributed partially to the fact that screening plays 
such an important role in the programme.
If surrogacy were to be permitted as an option for childless 
couples in South Africa, screening of all the parties will 
undoubtedly play an extremely important role. The framework 
of the Artificial Insemination Regulations, which already 
provides for exte.isive screening of donors and recipients, 
could serve as a sound basis to extend screening to all the 
parties to the agreement.
79 Andrews L B 19 89 Between Strangers 8.
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7.3 DETERMINATION OF THE SUITABILITY TO ACT AS A 
SURROGATE MOTHER
In South Africa artificial insemination and in vitro
fertilisation are procedures that are lawful provided the
medical practitioners performing them operate within the
80framework of the Human Tissue Act as amended and the
81Regulations thereunder. In terms of the Regulations
medical practitioners performing in vitro fertilisation and
artificial insemination must ensure that the recipient is
biologically, physically, socially and mentally suited for
82the artificial insemination.
Donor and recipient files must be kept containing
information on the family history v/ith reference to possible
8 3genetic or mental disorders as well as an evaluation of
84psychological suitability.
80 65 of 1983.
81 No R 1182 GG 20-06-1986 No 10283.
82 Reg 9(e)(ii). See also the discussion in chapter 6
under Criminal Liability in Terms of the Human Tissue 
Act and Regulations.
83 Reg 6(l)(a)(iii) and 6(1)(b) with regard to the donor
and Reg 10(1)(a)(ii) and (iii) with regard to the 
recipient.
84 Reg 6(1)(c) with regard to the donor and Reg 9(e)(ii)
with regard to the recipient.
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It is submitted that in most instances physical suitability 
can more easily be determined than psychological or mental 
suitability. Important physical considerations regarding the 
surrogate are, amongst other things, age, weight, general 
physical health and medical history. Factors which should be 
considered with regard to the intended parents are age, 
medical history and the stability of their marriage. Each 
infertility clinic normally has its own guidelines or relies 
on those formulated by the organisations under whose 
authority it functions.
Who, if any, should be precluded from acting as a surrogate 
mother on the basis psychological factors such as emotional 
instability and how should this be determined?
Infertility specialists and other medical practitioners
involved in infertility treatment are increasingly faced
with these and other very important questions. Determining
psychological suitability is a complex matter and a leading
American psychiatrist in this field concedes that "(w)e
really do not know enough about what makes a woman a good
surrogate to begin screening women out", adding that the
role of the professional is not to screen people out but to
8 5help people to screen themselves out. An adequate
85 Parker 1982 Int'l J L & Psychiatry 341; Parker 1984 
Bull Am Acad Psychiatry Law 23.
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knowledge and understanding of the procedure ;'.s therefore an 
important prerequisite.
In a surrogacy agreement, the surrogate concludes the 
agreement with the understanding that it is expected of her 
to relinquish the child to the commissioning couple after 
birth. The contract normally also contains an undertaking by 
her that she will not form or intend to form a bond with the 
child and will hand it over to the commissioning couple 
after birth. The surrender of the child is probably the most 
complex and controversial aspect of the procedure and has to 
date been the cause of most of the legal battles on the 
issue of surrogacy. Parker's survey in the United States of
g gAmerica revealed that most surrogate mothers had given 
87birth before and therefore presumably understood the 
implications of pregnancy and birth. Yet, it seems 
impossible to predict with absolute certainly how the 
surrogate mother will react once the child is born. The 
argument raised - especially by feminist groups - is that it 
is impossible for a surrogate mother to give truly informed 
consent, because a woman, even if she has had children
86 See discussion supra.
87 Of the 125 women interviewed 114 (91%) had had at least 
one previous pregnancy and 101 (81%) had had at least 
one live birth.
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before, cannot predict her feelings towards a specific child
88once it has been born.
89According to Slovenko there seems to be no empirical basis 
upon which to adopt a categorical approach to the 
eligibility of women to serve as surrogate mothers, except 
that minors should be excluded because of the surgical risks 
involved and concerns about the genuineness of their 
consent.
90Since the much publisised Baby M (Stern/Whitehead) case m
New Jersey, USA, several states Viave proposed surrogate
91motherhood legislation. The issue of screening of the
88 Macklin R MIs There Anything Wrong With Surrogate 
Motherhood?" in 1990 Surrogate Motherhood Gostin (ed) 
142; Andrews L "Surrogate Motherhood - The Challenge 
for Feminists" 1990 Surrogate Motherhood Gostin (ed) 
172.
89 1986 J Psychiatry & L 503. This is also the 7iew of 
Parker 1982 Inti J L & Psychiatry 341.
90 The Baby M case has evoked a flood of legal literature. 
See "Colloquy: Jn Re Baby M 1988 Geo L J 1719 - 1837;
1987 N Y L J 305 - 332, 653 - 665 and 997 - 1015; Moss 
C D “News: Surrogate Parent Debate" 1987 ABAJ 24 - 25; 
Moss C D ”Surrogate Contract Ok'd" 1987 ABAJ 32; "At 
Issue: Surrogate Parenthood1' 198 7 ABAJ 38 - 39; Rust M 
"Whose Baby is It? Surrogate Motherhood After Baby M” 
1587 ABAJ 52 - 56; Bacin J F “A Matter for Solomon: 
Rights an-J Obligation of Surrogate Mothers After Baby 
M" 1987 W St Cl L Rev 297 -317.
SI See the discussion infra. For a discuss Lou on the 
proposed Iegislat -.on -;a■>;!':.J. see Andrews L "The 
Aftermath of Baby . .*'rr*yC\spd i’tsir.e on Surrogate
{rootiote Continued)
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participants to a surrogacy agreement has, however, been
addressed only marginally in some of the proposed surrogacy
bills. Some bills, however, contain a detailed description
of the surrogate's qualifications, generally focussing on
92psychological and medical requirements. In some of the 
bills the surrogate, and in some instances also her husband, 
if she is married, is required to undergo counselling by a 
mental health professional about the psychological
93consequences of the termination of parental rights. Some 
require a statement from the professional that all parties
are capable of consenting and that they have received
94 95appropriate counselling. In some states psychological
assessments is at the discretion of a judge, while one
9 6bill requires a stipulation in the contract that the 
surrogate will be reguired to submit to such evaluation, and 
if necessary counselling, should this be requested by the
(Footnote Continued)
Motherhood" 1987 Hastings Center Rept 31 - 40; Donovan 
P "New Reproductive Technologies: Some Legal Dilemmas"
1986 Fam Planning Persp 57 - 61; Katz A “Surrogate 
Motherhood and the Baby Selling Laws“ 1986 Colum J L & 
Soc Probs 41 - 53.
92 Andrews 1987 Hastings Center Rept 35.
93 District of Columbia, Michigan and Illinois as 
discussed by Andrews 1987 Hastings Center Rept 36 and 
Donovan P 1986 Fam Planning Persp 59.
94 District of Columbia.
95 Massachusetts, New York an^ Pennsylvania.
96 Maryland.
47
biological father and his spouse. A proposed Californian
bill requires psychological counselling for all the parties
involved 30 days prior to entering into the contract and
ending no earlier than two months after the birth of the 
97child. Several bills, in an attempt to foster an informed 
decision, require the parties to review the results of 
medical genetic and psychiatric or psychological 
examinations of the surrogate to decide if she is
Q Qacceptable. Several of the proposed bills forbid unmarried
99women to enter into surrogacy arrangements. This is 
considered discriminatory and unconstitutional by those 
writers*^ who campaign for unlimited procreational freedom. 
In several of the proposed bills surrogacy may only be used 
for medical reasons, such as infertility or a threat to the 
health or life of the intended mother or her child were she 
to conceive, or the fear of transmitting genetic diseases to 
the child.
97 Andrews 1987 Hastings Center Rept 36.
98 California, District of Columbia, Illinois, Michigan
and Missouri.
99 Florida, Illinois, New Jersey and South Carolina.
100 Kritchevsky B "The Unmarried Woman's Right to 
Artificial Insemination: A Call for an Expanded 
Definition of Family" 1981 Harvard Women's L J 41-42. 
Anon "Reproductive Technology and the Procreation 
Rights of the Unmarried" 1985 Harvard L Rev 685.
101 California, District of Columbia, Illinois,
Massachusetts, Michigan, New York Pennsylvania and New 
Jersey.
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In South Africa, although no direct regulation of surrogacy
exists at present, it is a prerequisite in terms of the
Human Tissue Act Regulations on Artificial Insemination that
artificial insemination and in vitro fertilisation only be
1 0 2performed on a married woman-with her husband's consent.
Section 19 of the Human Tissue Act 65 of 1983 stipulates 
that gametes withdrawn from a living person, may be used 
only for "medical" purposes.*1'03 Schutte1 0 4 interprets this 
section as precluding a single, unmarried woman from 
utilising artificial insemination or in vitro fertilisation 
in the absence of a clear medical indication. For the same 
reasons, he also suggests that a fertile couple, who request 
the procedure and embryo transfer to a surrogate mother for 
convenience or to enable the female partner to pursue a 
professional career, for instance, a ballerina, are also
102 Reg 8 . See the discussion in chapter 6 under Informed
Consent. See Schutte 1986 Hervorming 82 n 82 who
supports the idea that artificial insemination be made 
available only to married women, but suggests that it 
should be part of the Human Tissue Act and not the 
Regulations as this prerequisite is a matter of policy,
decided by Parliament as supreme legislative authority.
103 For non-compliance with the Act, a doctor performing 
artificial insemination or in vitro fertilisation may 
face criminal sanctions in terms of s 34 of the Human 
Tissue Act and reg 14 of the Regulations. This aspect 
is discussed under Liability of Third Parties in 
chapter 6 .
104 1986 Hervorming 75 - 76.
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precluded, as is a widow who requests posthumous artificial
insemination with her husband's (frozen) .sperm after his 
105death. It is submitted that artificial insemination and 
in vitro fertilisation should only be performed if there is 
a clear medical indication. This should, however, not be 
interpreted to exclude third parties from the benefit of 
this procedure. A surrogate mother, who is healthy but 
consents to undergo artificial or in vitro fertilisation for 
the benefit of the intended parents should be permitted to 
do so . 1 06
Our courts have not had the opportunity of examining the 
precise meaning of the words “medical purposes” in s 19 of
105 As happened in France in 1984, when a young couple fell 
in love only to find out shortly afterwards that the 
male partner had cancer of the testicles and had to 
undergo chemotherapy treatment, which could result in 
sterility. He deposited sperm in a bank for later use 
by his wife, whom he married a few days before his 
death. Her request for the sperm from the sperm bank 
was refused by the bank on the ground that sperm should 
not be considered an object returnable under a normal 
deposit arrangement. The district court denied Mrs P ’s 
claim as her husband had not specifically mentioned the 
sperm in his will. This decision was, however, later 
overruled by a suburban court in Creteil on 1.8.1984 
(4225/84), which granted her the right to obtain the 
sperm. For a discussion see Deutsch E "Parpalaix et al 
v C E C O S: Right of the Widow of a Sperm Donor to 
have the Sperm of Her Late Husband Handed Over to Her”
1985 Med Law 299 and 1985 Versicherungswirtschaft 700; 
also discussed in “Current Topics'* 1984 Austl L J 627 . 
See also the discussion in chapter 6 under Proprietary 
Rights to Gametes/Embryos.
106 See the Recommendations in chapter 7.
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the Human Tissue Act. The Act itself also fails to define
the meaning clearly. If a narrow interpretation is accorded
to this section, a bereaved widow who suffers from severe
emotional stress or depression, may not, in the absence of a
physical disability, be inseminated with (frozen) sperm from
her deceased husband, even where clear instructions to this
effect were stipulated in a will and she desperately wishes
to do so. Even though she will, strictly speaking not
qualify as she is no longer a "married woman" in terms of
the Artificial Insemination Regulations, it is submitted
that her position in our law is unsatisfactory at present.
Although posthumous artificial insemination is not to be
encouraged because of the adverse effects it may have in the
107fields of inheritance and succession, it is submitted 
that a more equitable result could be obtained if the 
practice is restricted to cases where the deceased expressed 
his wish for the release of the frozen genetic material in a 
valid will and only within a limited time after the death of 
the spouse.
107 See 1987 Ethical Considerations in Medical Research of 
the SAMRC 28 where it is suggested that the long-term 
freezing of gametes is not recommended - at least not 
for longer than the expected reproductive life of the 
donors. See also the Warnock Report par 10.9.
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It is submitted that all the parties to a surrogacy 
agreement be carefully evaluated and screened for 
biological, physical, social and mental suitability, similar
1 no
to screening of the parties in adoption proceedings. For
the benefit of the child, it is essential that the stability 
of the commissioning couple's relationship be determined 
prior to the insemination to ensure that they can fulfil the 
physical and emotional needs of the child.
It is submitted that surrogacy should only be utilised as a 
final option for those couples for whom no other alternative 
exists and only in the presence of a clear medical 
indication.
8 A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD IN 
CERTAIN FOREIGN JURISDICTIONS
In recent years there has been renewed interest in the 
subject of artificial conception and related matters such as 
embryo freezing, research and human genetics. This interest 
has not been restricted to those directly involved such as
7.4 RECOMMENDATIONS ON SCREENING
108 It is, however submitted that surrogacy, although
analogous to adoption, is different in the sense that 
one of the intended parents is usually alsc the genetic 
parent of the child. See in general Atwell B L 
"Surrogacy and Adoption: A Case of Incompatibility"
1988 Colum Hum Rts L Rev 15 - 16.
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medical practitioners, lawyers and law and policy makers,
109but has spread to women's organisations, church groups,
governmental and related committees and many other groups.
The media have played a major role in the process -
especially in influencing public opinion. Examples are
numerous, but the sensational media coverage of the Baby
110Cotton case m  Britain and the Baby M case m  America and 
even of our own Ferreira-Jorge triplets provide adequate 
proof.
In several countries commissions have been appointed and 
work groups set up to study the various aspects of 
artificial conception and related research. It is 
impracticable for the purposes of this thesis to consider 
all the results and recommendations. For the purpose of this 
thesis, some of the major reports in the field of artificial 
insemination and related matters have been selected for an 
evaluation. Guidelines and recommendations by some of the 
most important medical institutions, especially in the 
United Kingdom and the United States of America, are also
109 Some feminists, for instance, oppose the practice of 
surrogate motherhood on the grounds that a woman is 
merely used as a “breeder". See in general Corea G
1986 The Mother Machine 213 - 249; Ince S "Inside the 
Surrogate Industry" in 1984 Test Tube Women: What 
Future for Motherhood? Arditti R and Klein R D (eds) 99
- 116.
110 See discussion infra under Court Cases.
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incorporated into the discussion as medical practitioners 
and infertility specialists have, to a large extent, relied 
on these in the absence of direct legislation. The South 
African situation is discussed separately in chapter 7,
8.1 THE UNITED KINGDOM
8.1.1 THE WARNOCK REPORT
In the United Kingdom artificial conception and related
matters have been considered by numerous study groups and
committees. The most important is the Department of
Health and Social Security's report on the Committee of
Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology, chaired by
112Dame Mary Warnock known as the Warnock Report.
111 Department of Health and Social Security; Scottish Home
and Health Department and Welsh Office; the British
Medical Association; Board of Science and Education, 
Panel on Human Artificial Insemination; British Medical 
Association, Working Group on In Vitro Fertilisation; 
Medical Research Council; Royal College of 
Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, Ethics Committee on 
In Vitro Fertilisation and Embryo Replacement or 
Transfer; the Law Commission; the Law Society Standing 
Committee of Family Law, Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology; the Law Society of Scotland and the 
Department of Health and Social Security Committee of 
Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology.
112 Cmnd 9314 (1984). The Warnock Committee consisted of
sixteen appointed members under the leadership of Dame
Mary Warnock. Its terms of reference were "to consider 
recent and potential developments in medicine and 
science relating to human fertilisation and embryology;
(Footnote Continued)
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The majority view regarding assisted reproduction expressed
113 .in the report is that AIH is an acceptable form of
114 115treatment which need not be formally regulated. AID
was considered in irore detail and recommendations put
forward that the procedure be regulated and performed under 
116licence. It was also recommended that the resulting child
should be the legitimate child of the mother and her husband
117if they both consented to the procedure. The Commission
also recommended that on reaching the age of eighteen, the
child should have access to some basic information regarding
118the ethnic origin and genetic health of the donor. They 
further recommended that no parental rights or duties should
(Footnote Continued)
to consider what policies and safeguards should be 
applied, including consideration of the social, ethical 
and legal implications of these developments; and to 
make recommendations". For a discussion of the findings 
and recommendations of the Warnock Report in general
see Craig N F "The Warnock report: A Precis of the
Council's Observations" 1985 J L Soc Scotland 136 - 
139; Walsh E "Warnock and After" 1985 Fam Law 138 - 
139.
113 Artificial insemination of the wife with sperm from her 
husband.
114 At par 4.4 and 4.5 of the report.
115 Artificial insemination with sperm from a doner.
116 At par 4.16 of the report and with regard to licensing,
par 13.7 of the report.
117 At par 4.17 of the report.
118 At par 4.21 of the report.
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vest in sperm donors and that there should be a gradual
120move to compensate donors for (necessary) expenses. The
Warnock Commission was also supportive of in vitro
fertilisation, provided it is regulated and performed under
121an approved licence.
Ova donation was also considered an acceptable procedure in
122infertility treatment. Analagous to sperm donation and
in vitro fertilisation, it was recommended that it should be
carefully regulated and subjected to licensing and other
123controls. According to the Commission, embryo donation,
where semen and ova from donors are fertilised in vitro and
the embryo transferred to a woman who would otherwise be
unable to have a child, was also acceptable, subject to the
same licensing and regulation recommended for AID, IVF and 
124ova donation.
Chapter 8 of the Warnock report deals with surrogacy and in 
their recommendations, the investigators acknowledge that
119
119 At par 4.22 of the report.
120 At par 4.26 of the report.
121 At par 5.10 of the report.
122 At par 6 . 6 of the report.
123 At par 6 . 6 of the report.
124 At par 7.4. of the report.
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the question of surrogacy presented them with some of the 
most difficult problems encountered. 125 Although the 
Committee did not regard surrogacy practices as such 
unlawfu1 126 it nevertheless recommended that "legislation be 
introduced to render criminal the creation or the operation 
in the United Kingdom of agencies whose purposes include the 
recruitment·of women for surrogate pregnancies or making 
arrangements for individuals or couples who wish to utilise 
h . f . h ' 127 t e services o a carrying mot er'. This recommendation 
was incorporated into s 2 of the Surrogacy Arrangements Act 
1985, which attempts to prevent third parties, especially 
commercial surrogacy agencies, from deriving financial 
benefit from surrogacy agreements. 128 This is also a 
deterrent to any professional involvement in surrogacy. 
The Commission rejected criminal liability for the parties 
to a surrogacy agreement (surrogate mother and commissioning 
125 At par 8.17 of the report. 
126 At par 8.4 of the report. 
127 At par 8.18 of the report. 
128 In terms of s 2 of the Act any person who acts on 
behalf of a body of persons or who takes part in 
negotiating or facilitating the making of a surrogacy 
arrangement in the United Kindom and who receives 
payment for such services is guilty of an offence and 
can face a fine or imprisonment of up to three months 
(s 4). In terms of s 4(2)(a) the consent of the 
Director of Public Prosecutions is essential for any 
prosecution. 
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parents) for fear of tainting the child with the parents'
129criminality. As private agreements may still be
concluded, the Commission recommended that it be provided by
statute that all surrogacy agreements are illegal contracts
130and therefor3 unenforceable in the courts.
131The Warnock Commission al3o recommended that should an
oocyte or embryo be donated, the gestational mother and her
husband should be the legal parents of the child and the
rights and obligations of donors should be terminated. If
legislation to this effect is adopted, the Commission
recommended that it should be wide enough to cover
132gestational surrogacy. Should a child, however, prefer to
live with its genetic rather than its gestational mother,
the adoption laws should be made more flexible to allow for
133the adoption of the child by its genetic mother.
129 At par 8.19 of the report.
130 At par 8.19 of the report.
131 At par 6 . 8 and 7.6 of the report.
132 S 27 of the Family Lav Reform Act 1987 now provides
that the woman giving birth and her husband are the 
legal parents of the child if the child was conceived 
by artificial insemination with donor semen, provided 
that the husband consented to the insemination. No 
mention is made of donated oocytes or embryos.
133 At par 8.20 of the report.
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8.1.2 STATEMENTS BY MEDICAL SOCIETIES/ASSOCIATIONS IN
THE UNITED KINGDOM
8 .1.2.1 BRITISH MEDICAL ASSOCIATION (BMA) WORKING GROUP ON
IN VITRO FERTILISATION
This working group was established in 1982 and published an
134interim report in 1983. The issue of surrogate motherhood
was only touched on briefly and doubts were expressed as to
135whether the procedure would ever be acceptable. No
reasons were given for this statement. This viewpoint was
later reiterated in the 1983 - 1984 Annual report of the
Council where it was stated that the Council considered it
unethical for a doctor to become involved in techniques and
1 *3 fiprocedures leading to surrogate motherhood.
In 1987 it was reported that the British Medical Association
137Council had again objected to surrogate motherhood. 
Objections raised were potential psychological damage to the 
child, commercial exploitation and utilisation of the 
procedure for mere convenience in the absence of a clear
134 British Medical Association working group on In Vitro
Fertilisation Appendix vi: Interim Report on Human In
Vitro Fertilisation and Embryo Replacement and Transfer 
1983 British M J 1594, discussed in the 1985 Ontario
Law Reform Commission Report vol II 315.
135 1594.
136 British Medical Association Annual Report 25 discussed 
in the Ontario Law Reform Commission Report 317.
137 'Doctors Against Surrogacy*’ 1987 Fam Law 372.
59
medical indication. However, at the actual general meeting
in July 1987, f^e anti-surrogacy lobby was narrowly defeated
138and a more liberal approach adopted.
During 1990 the BMA published an extensive and much more
liberal Surrogacy Report, 1 39 including guidelines1 4 0 to
medical practitioners in the handling of surrogacy cases.
Unlike the previous reports, medical practitioners are
advised that they may assist infertile couples who want to
have a child by a surrogate mother. The guidelines are only
applicable where a medical practitioner is consulted for
assistance during a surrogate pregnancy. Tne working party
warned medical practitioners to work within the framework of
141the Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985.
In the guidelines, medical practitioners are alerted to the 
unenforceability of surrogacy agreements as one of the many 
risks of the procedure. It is suggested that surrogacy 
should be considered only as a final resort in infertility
138 Ibid.
139 Published in the 1990 Pract Child L Bull 105 - 107.
140 The guidelines were drawn up by a working party chaired
by Sir Malcolm MacNaughton of the University of Glasgow
and are set out in the BMA Annual report of the Council
for 1989 - 1990 and was approved by the Annual 
Conference of the BMA on 26 June 1990.
141 See the discussion of the Act infra.
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treatment and it is reiterated by the Council that it would 
be unethical to utilise the procedure for mere convenience, 
in the absence of a clear medical indication.
The general risks involved in surrogacy arrangements are 
delineated, especially the effect it may have on the members 
of the respective households and existing children as well 
as children yet to be born. Medical practitioners are 
advised that only women who have partners and who have 
already had one or more children should be considered as 
potential surrogates. The Council considered it advisable 
that the parties be unaware of each other's identity.
Proper counselling and screening are advised. Medical 
practitioners should ensure that the parties are fully aware 
of the kind and degree of all the risks associated with such 
an arrangement. Two categories of risks are distinguished, 
namely those generally associated with pregnancy and those 
which are specifically related to surrogacy. Details of the 
latter are provided in the guidelines and cover a wide field
ranging from legal implications resulting from 
non-compliance with the agreement to psychological and 
social risks and even a warning that the media may get hold 
of the story and harass the parties - including the child. 
The BMA expressed the opinion that it would be unethical for
medical practitioners to initiate the process, if they are
not entirely satisfied that the parties understand all the
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risks and implications of the procedure and have voluntarily 
accepted and consented to it.
It is also recommended that a lawyer be consulted prior to
the initiation of the process - specifically to assist the
i 42intended parents during adoption proceedings.*
8 .1.2.1.1 EVALUATION OF THE BMA REPORT
The 1989 - 1990 BMA Surrogacy Report provides a lucid 
illustration of the continuing progress in the field of 
assisted reproductive technology. Whereas surrogacy was once 
viewed with scepticism and extreme caution, it has now 
become a real option for childless couples in Britain. 
Medical practitioners admittedly still carry a serious 
responsibility to ensure that the right decisions are 
reached, but for those who are in favour of the procedure, 
the doors are now open.
142 During the discussion of the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Bill before Parliament, it was suggested 
that an additional clause be included to provide an 
alternative to adoption in cases of full surrogacy. The 
procedure bears a resemblance to adoption, but is less 
complicated. See the discussion of the Bill infra.
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8 .1.2.2 ROYAL COLLEGE FOR OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNAECOLOGISTS 
(RCOG) ETHICS COMMITTEE REPORT
In March 1983 the Ethics Committee on In Vitro Fertilisation 
and Embryo Replacement or Transfer of the Royal College for 
Obstetricians and Gynaecologists published its report.
Paragraph 7 of the report deals with the issues surrounding
surrogate motherhood. Medical indications for surrogate
motherhood are recognised in the case of a "bad producer"
143(sic). The Committee is, however, opposed to the practice
as "it carries important legal and psychological
difficulties, especially in relation to the child". Other
objections are: the stress which relinquishing the child may
cause for the surrogate, and the results of non-compliance
144with the contract for the commissioning couple. The 
Committee draws attention to the inability of the surrogate 
mother to predict whether she will be able to relinquish the 
child at birth. It is also stated that an agreement to give 
up a child is not an enforceable legal contract. The legal 
mother, according to the Committee, is the "person from 
whose body the child emerges". However, should the surrogate 
relinquish the child so that it may be adopted by the
143 At par 7.1 of the report.
144 At par 7.3 of the report.
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commissioning couple, such an action is not per se illegal, 
provided statutory requirements are met.
8 .1.2.3 COUNCIL FOR SCIENCE AND SOCIETY1 4 5
A report published by the working party of the Council for 
Science and Society entitled Human Procreation: Ethical 
Aspects of the New Techniques contains interesting 
information based on thorough research. S 7.3.12 deals with 
surrogate motherhood to which approximately five pages are 
devoted. Commercial surrogacy, as practised in some American 
states is examined and it is concluded that the 
enforceability of commercial surrogacy contracts in the 
United Kingdom is doubtful and not recommended as parental 
rights may not be transferred without interference from the 
courts in terms of s 85(2) of the Children Act 1975. The 
payment of money for adoption also constitutes a criminal 
offence in terms of s 57 of the Adoption Act 197 6 . There is, 
however, nothing which prohibits a father of an illegitimate 
child from approaching the court with an application for
145 This Council is a registered charity with the object of 
“promoting the study of, and research into, the social 
effects of science and technology, and of disseminating 
the resuits thereof to the public". Major studies are 
conducted by ad hoc working parties, composed of 
experts in the respective fields together with lawyers 
and philosophers. The prime task is seen as one of 
stimulating informed public discussion in the field of 
"the social responsibility of the scientist".
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legal custody of the child as provided by s 9(1) of the 
Guardianship of Minors Act 1971 in which case the outcome 
would be determined by what would be regarded as being in 
the best interest of the child.
The working party concluded that it is undesirable to impose
criminal sanctions as such offences may be difficult to
prove and it “may operate harshly on those who do not
deserve to be branded as criminals when they are seeking to
satisfy deeply felt needs in what they see as a responsible
146way". The working party recommended that criminal
sanctions be employed against groups attempting to develop
these practices for commercial gain, but observed that this
may have the negative effect of driving people into less
formal and unsatisfactory arrangements over which there is
147no control. They therefore recommended that such
contracts be made unenforceable unless social attitutes
148change. An unsatisfied party is still free to apply to 
the court for custody. The court in awarding custody, will 
consider the welfare of the child as paramount 
consideration.
146 At par 7.3.24.
147 At par 7.3.24.
148 At par 8.7.
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It is concluded that surrogate motherhood should not be
encouraged, but doubts were expressed as to whether it
149should be legally prohibited.
8.2 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
8.2.1 STUDY COMMISSIONS
Although several states have appointed commissions to 
consider the viability of surrogacy, as far as could be 
ascertained only one state has released a comprehensive 
report on the procedurs. In May 1988 the New York State Task 
Force on Life and the Law released a report, Surrogate 
Parenting: Analysis and Recommendations for Public Policy.
8 .2.1.1 RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE N Y STATE TASK FORCE
The Task Force was chaired by the Commissioner of Health in 
the State of New York. Task Force members included medical 
practitioners, lawyers, members of the nursing profession, 
academics, representatives of numerous religious groups, 
philosophers and psychologists.
De. pite the diversity of its members, the Task Force 
concluded unanimously that public policy should discourage
149 At par 8.7(g)
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surrogate parenting. It was pointed out that children are 
placed at risk and that the practice is not in their best 
interest, neither is it in the interest of society at large. 
It has the potential of undermining the dignity of women, 
children and human reproduction by commercialising 
childbearing.
The report contains recommendations on many issues and 
includes a legislative proposal on how the proposed goal 
should be achieved.
Under existing legislation in the state of New York, there
are no barriers to non-commer«-ral, surrogacy arrangements.
It was recommended that the community should not interfere
with voluntary choices by adults and such arrangements were
151not condemned. It was specifically stated in the report
that proposed legislation would greatly reduce the practice 
of surrogacy, but would not eliminate it. The proposed bill 
would not override existing statutes in the state under 
which artificial insemination, embryo transfer, adoption and 
the payment of reasonable expenses to women arising from
150
150 At 125 of the report.
151 At 126 of the report.
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pregnancy are permitted even when such expenses are paid as
152part of an adoption.
The Task Force evaluated and rejected upholding the contract
under regulatory models proposed in some states on the
grounds that the practice should be discouraged rather than
being accepted. Assistance should, accordingly be provided
153by the legislature and the courts. It recommended that
legislation be enacted declaring the contract void as
against public policy and prohibiting the payment of fees
154(over and above reasonable expenses) to surrogates.
Surrogacy brokers should also be prohibited from operating
155in the state.
The members of the Task Force expressed their sympathy with
infertile couples, but felt that initiatives should be taken
15 6to prevent infertility rather than to support surrogacy.
152 At 126 of the report.
153 At 126 of the report.
154 At 125 of the report.
155 At 127 of the report.
156 At 127 of the report.
68
8.2.1.1.1 EVALUATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE N Y 
STATE TASK FORCE
Considering the experience with commercial surrogacy in the
United States of America, and specifically the much
. . 157publicised Baby M case m  New Jersey, it is not
surprising that the Task Force expressed itself strongly
against commercial surrogacy. Barring surrogacy agents from
operating in the state, also comes as no surprise as that is
an effective way of restricting commercial surrogacy and
preventing third parties from making large profits.
The recognition of and recommendation that non-commercial 
surrogacy should not be prohibited, is also to be welcomed 
as it serves no purpose to punish aduits for voluntary, 
non-coerced procreative choices which pose no harm to 
society.
8.2.2 POLICY STATEMENTS
Policy statements on surrogacy have also been published by 
the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the Institute 
of Women and Technology. The ACLU specifically addresses the 
constitutional rights of all the parties to the agreement as 
well as those of the surrogate child. The policy statement
157 See the discussion under case law in the USA infra.
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by the Institute of Women and Technology on the other hand, 
focuses primarily on sex discrimination and the possible 
"social and political exploitation of women". They favour 
federal legislation prohibiting contractual surrogacy 
arrangements rather than regulating the procedure.
Important statements and guidelines, which merit discussion, 
have also emerged in the medical field.
8.2.3 MEDICAL GUIDELINES
8.2.3.1 THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OP OBSTETRICIANS AND 
GYNAECOLOGISTS (ACOG) 1 5 8
A policy statement and guidelines were issued in May 1983
15 9under the title Ethical Issues in Surrogate Motherhood 
The College expressed "significant reservations" about the 
procedure of surrogate motherhood.
Risk factors were pointed out, such as the possibility cf 
psychological stress on the parties involved, on the
158 Published as Ethical Issues in Surrogate Motherhood 
ACOG Statement of Policy 56 Washington, D C -  American 
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (1983).
159 Discussed in 1983 The Hastings Center Rept 31; Ontario 
Law Reform Commission Report on Human Artificial 
Reproduction and Related Matters Vol II 370 and 
Surrogate Motherhood Gostin (ed) 300 - 303.
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marriage and possibly also on the resulting children. 
Specific difficulties such as anonymity of the parties and 
legal status of the children were touched upon. The College 
expressed deep concern about the commercialisation of the 
procedure and pointed out the difficulty of differentiating 
between the payment for a service and payment for the child. 
Commercialisation may, according to the College, also open 
the door to exploitation of the parties involved.
The view of the College is that the decision to participate
in surrogacy arrangements should be left to the individual 
160practitioner. Medical practitioners are, however, 
cautioned that they should carefully weigh the ethical, 
legal, psychological, societal and medical factors involved 
in reaching their decision. Guidelines were suggested for 
medical practitioners who participate in surrogacy 
agreements. In the first place there should be a full 
discussion of ethical and medical risks, benefits and 
alternatives. Medical practitioners are under no obligation 
to take part in surrogacy, but if they decide to do so, they 
should follow the following procedures:
1 the parties should be properly screened (for instance
160 See also Slovenko 1985 J Psychiatry & L 494 and Hirsh H 
L "Surrogate Motherhood: the Legal Climate for the 
Physician" 1986 Med Law 165.
161 See 1983 Hastings Center Rept 31; Surrogate Motherhood 
Gostin (ed) 302.
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infertility studies and genetic screening);
2 medical practitioners should receive only the usual 
compensation for their services;
3 medical practitioners should not participate in an 
agreement where the financial arrangements are likely to 
exploit any of the parties.
8.2. 3. 2 THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION 
(JUDICIAL COUNCIL)
In a report, the Judicial Council of the American Medical
162Association warned physicians that they may place 
themselves in legal and ethical jeopardy by participating in 
surrogacy arrangements. Some legal, ethical and 
psychological risks were pointed out by the Council, and on 
the strength of the report the American Medical Association 
opposed surrogacy.
Specific concerns were raised about the possibility of the 
birth of a defective child, which would be rejected by both 
the surrogate mother and the intended parents. Other 
concerns raised were refusal by the surrogate to give up the 
child and the possibility of the surrogate obtaining an 
abortion.
162 "Surrogate Motherhood Opposed” 19 84 American Medical
News 3 quoted by Hirsh L 1986 Med Law 154 and 167 n 44; 
1990 Surrogate Motherhood Gostin (ed) 304 - 306.
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A Council spokesman emphasised that the report did not
163declare surrogacy per se unethical. Medical practitioners 
may still perform the usual services required in caring for 
a pregnant surrogate mother. It suggested, however, that 
alternative procreation methods are preferable, for instance 
the utilisation of sperm or ova donors and artificial 
insemination and adoption, where possible.
8 .2.3.3 THE AMERICAN FERTILITY SOCIETY (AFS)
In 1980 the Board of Directors of the Society, approved 
guidelines on artificial insemination in their report 
entitled: Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Artificial 
Insemination
164In 1986 the Ethics Committee of the AFS published Ethical
165Considerations of the New Reproductive Technologies. In 
1987 the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith issued a 
report with the title Instruction on the Respect for Human
163 Hirsh 1986 Med Law 165 with reference to the 1984 
American Medical News.
164 Members of the Committee consisted of lawyers, medical 
practitioners, biologists, a moral theologian and 
ethicists.
165 September 1986 Fertility and Sterility Supplement 1 
46:3
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Life in its Origin and on the Dignity of Procreation1*0,
which conflicted with the report by the Ethics Committee on
a number of issues. In reply the American Fertility Society
was convened and subsequently published another report in 
1 fi 7February 1987. The document deals with issues such as
1 go
homologous artificial insemination and in vitro
169fertilisation, the use of heterologous gametes, 
biomedical research and respect for the pre-embryo, the role 
of the law in regulating reproductive technologies, and a 
summary and conclusions. Surrogacy as such received scant 
attention apart from a condemnation of the view expressed in 
the Instruction that the utilisation of all forms of 
assisted reproductive technology should be made a punishable 
offence. The views expressed in the 1986 report were 
reiterated.
The 1986 report which contains detailed information on the 
results of, and thorough research into the subject of new 
reproductive technology, warrants a more detailed 
discussion. The issue of surrogacy is dealt with
166 Also referred to as the Vatican's Instruction of 
Respect for Human Life.
167 Ethical Considerations of the New Reproductive 
Technologies 1986 - 1987.
168 Artificial insemination without utilising donors.
169 Utilising donor sperm and ova.
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comprehensively and evaluated on a cautious yet rational 
basis. The focus is on the potential effects of surrogacy on 
the surrogate, the couple, the potential child and society 
in general, and each aspect is discussed separately.
170In their recommendations the Committee stated that the 
issue of surrogate motherhood requires intense scrutiny and 
the Committee expressed its dismay at the shortage of 
empirical evidence available regarding the process and its 
effects on those involved.
The Committee stated that surrogacy should only be utilised 
for medical reasons and not merely for convenience.
According to the Committee, it is up to the individual 
members of the medical profession to decide whether they 
want to participate in such arrangements. The Committee 
recognises that surrogacy offers the only solution to some 
forms of infertility (eg the absence of a uterus in the 
female, inability to produce oocytes or the fear of passing 
a genetic defect to children), but warns against widespread 
clinical applications of the procedure because of inherent 
legal, ethical and health concerns.
170 On 62 S.
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It is the view of the Committee that there are not adequate 
reasons for the recommendation that surrogate motherhood be 
legally prohibited. The Committee, however, expressed 
~ 
serious ethical reservations as to the desirability of the 
procedure until such time as appropriate data are available 
for a reasonable assessment of the risks and possible 
benefits of the procedure. The Committee suggested that 
thorough research (in the form of a clinical experiment) be 
undertaken if surrogate motherhood is pursued. Suggested 
issues for research include: 
(a) psychological effects of the procedure on the 
surrogates, the couples and the resulting children; 
(b) the effects, if any, of bonding between the surrogate 
and the fetus in utero; 
(c) the appropriate screening of the surrogate and the sperm 
donor; 
(d) the likelihood that the surrogate will exercise 
appropriate care during the pregnancy; 
(e) .the effects of having the couple and the surrogate meet 
one another; 
(f) the effects on the surrogate's own family of her 
I 
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participation in the process;
(g) the effects of disclosing or not disclosing the use of a 
surrogate mother or her identity to the child and
(h) other issues that shed light on the effects of surrogacy 
on the welfare of the various persons involved and on 
society.
Special attention should also be accorded the issue of 
voluntary and informed consent, screening for infectious 
diseases of the surrogate and genetic father, and genetic 
screening of the surrogate.
On the complex issue of compensation the Committee suggested 
the following:
(a) professionals involved should receive only their 
customary fees (to avoid potential conflicts of 
interest or exploitation) and
(b) it is preferable that compensation of the surrogate be 
limited to necessary expenses and compensation for 
inconvenience.
Finally, the Committee suggested that should surrogacy prove 
to be a viable option, the law should be amended to provide
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that the commissioning couple be regarded as the legal
171parents.
8.2.3. 3.1 EVALUATION OF THE REPORT OF THE AFS
The report by the Ethics Committee of the American Fertility
Society is comprehensive and practical and could serve as a
suitable basis for medical practitioners utilising assisted
172reproductive technology.
171 One the eleven members of the Committee dissented, 
expressing the view that the risks outweigh the 
benefits taking into consideration the smali number of 
couples who qualify as candidates. For this reason he 
believed that in-depth research is unlikely.
172 The author was informed by prominent infertility 
specialists that there are indeed a number of 
practitioners in South Africa who rely on the 
guidelines provided in this report.
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8.3 AUSTRALIA
Several Australian states1 7 3 and governmental bodies1 7 4
have published reports on artificial conception and related
175matters.
With one exception, the Australian reports are opposed to 
the practice of surrogate motherhood in general. The most
17 3 E g  Victoria The Committee to Consider the Social 
Ethical and Legal Issues Arising from In Vitro 
Fertilization -Interim report Melbourne (1982), Report 
on Donor Gametes in In Vitro Fertilisation Melbourne
(1983); Surrogate Mothering, Melbourne (1984); Report 
on the Disposition of Embryos Produced by In Vitro 
Fertilization Melbourne (1984). South Australia - 
Report of the Working Party on In Vitro Fertilisation 
and Artificial Insemination by Donor Adelaide (1984); 
In Vitro Fertilization and Artificial Insemination by 
Donor - Proceedings of the South Australia Health 
Commission. Queensland Report of the Special Committee 
appointed by the Queensland Government to Inquire into 
the Laws Relating to Artificial Insemination, In Vitro 
Fertilization and Other Related Matters Brisbane
(1984). Tasmania - Committee to Investigate Artificial 
Conception and Related Matters: Final report Hobart 
June (1985) and reports in Western Australia - 
Committee to Enquire into the Social, Legal and Ethical 
Issues relating to In Vitro Fertilization and its 
Supervision: final report (1986). New South Wales - New 
South Wales Law Reform Commission Report: Human 
Artificial Insemination Sydney (1986).
174 For instance the National Health and Medical Research 
Council (NHMRC) of the Commonwealth of Australia.
175 The Australian reports are discussed by Thomson C J H 
1987 Freiburg Symposium on Crimiual Law and Bio-medical 
Techniques (unpublished report) 5. For a comparative 
discussion of the Australian reports see Giesen D 
"Probleme Kunstlicher Befruchtungsmethoden beim 
Menschen" 1985 Juristen Zeitung 641 - 692.
79
important objections were raised against commercial
surrogacy and the placing of advertisements in newspapers by
176surrogacy agencies.
One of the most important reports to date is the Victoria
Commission of Inquiry’s report. The Commission was appointed
by the Victoria Government in 1982 to examine the legal,
social and ethical issues resulting from in vitro
fertilisation. The Commission was chaired by Professor Louis
Waller, chairman of the Victoria Law Reform Commission. The
report is thus referred to as the Waller Commission
177Report. Reports were issued m  1982 (the Interim report), 
1983 (Issues Paper on Donor Gametes and Report on Donor 
Gametes and In Vitro Fertilization) and 1984 (Report on the 
Disposition of Embryos Produced by In Vitro Fertilisation) .
The Waller Reports firmly opposed the practice of surrogacy. 
Commercial surrogacy is, according to the report, totally 
unacceptable and surrogates should not receive compensation. 
They concluded that an agreement for the adoption of the 
surrogate child by the intended mother, amounts to a 
criminal conspiracy to violate the provisions of the 
Adoption of Children Act 1964 (Vic). It was recommended that
176 "Current Topics" 1984 Austl L J 684.
177 See in general "Current topics’* 1985 Austl L J 306.
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"the Victorian criminal law be strengthened to make it 
clearly an offence to enter into, or contribute in any way 
to, a commercial surrogacy agreement".
The recommendation that participation in a surrogacy
arrangement should be a punishable offence, was
178criticised - and it is submitted, rightly so - because it 
does not solve the problems surrounding surrogacy. The 
status of children born from such arrangements remains 
uncertain and they are the ones who suffer as a result of 
the procreative decision of their parents. Criminal measures 
are also to a large extent ineffective as desperate 
childless couples are forced to conclude the agreement in 
countries were surrogacy is legal.
The abovementioned reports formed the basis of subsequent 
legislation in Victoria - the Infertility Medical Procedures 
Act of 1984 - which is discussed under legislation, below.
Another important committee, the Asche Committee of the 
Commonwealth Family Law Council on reproductive technology 
also issued a report entitled Creating Children: A Uniform 
Approach to the Law and Practice of Reproductive Technology
178 “Current Topics" 1984 Austl L J 683 - 685.
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in Australia. This report was tabled in the Federal
Parliament on 21 August 1985 by the Commonwealth Attorney
180General. The thrust of the report is aimed at tackling
the issues involved in reproductive technology on a national 
basis and not on a "fragmented" state by state approach.
179
One of the major recommendations in the report is the 
banning of all surrogate motherhood arrangements. This is 
consistent with the prohibition of surrogacy in s 30 of the 
Victorian Infertility Medical Procedures Act of 1984, which 
is discussed in greater detail under legislation.
In 1989 the National Bioethics Consultative Committee
181 1 ft n (NBCC) issued a draft report on surrogacy * in which it
179 Information obtained from 1986 Austl I J 6 - 7 .  During 
* conference on "Ethical Implications in the Use of 
Donor Siperm, Eggs and Embryos in the Treatment of Human 
Fertility" held at Monash University and discussed in 
1983 L Institute 0 716, Asche J condemned the practice 
of surrogacy because it poses the danger of duress and 
blackmail. Duress because the surrogate may only 
conclude the agreement for financial benefits, and 
blackmail because she may threaten to keep the child 
unless the original price agreed upon is increased.
180 The background of the Commission and some 
recommendations are discussed in 1986 Austl L J 6 .
181 This body was established to advise Health Ministers 
on, amongst other things, the social, ethical and legal 
issues arising from reproductive tecnology and 
bio-medical and health related research; 1989 Reform 
(Australian Law Reform Commission) 207.
182 Discussed in 1989 Reform 206 - 209.
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recommends that surrogacy arrangements should not be 
legislatively prohibited but rather be controlled by uniform 
legislation. The reason provided for the recommendation is 
the autonomy of the parties in making procreative decisions, 
provided the full and informed consent of all the parties 
is obtained. It was also stated that surrogacy is neivher 
immoral nor antisocial and is utilised by a limited number 
of people. The Committee recommended that surrogacy 
arrangements should not be prohibited legislatively, but 
should also not be positively encouraged.
8 .4 CANADA
One of the most important reports on Human Artificial
Reproduction and Related Matters is undoubtedly the one
issued by the Ontario Law Reform Commission in two volumes
in 1985. This report contains an in-depth and rational study
18 3of the subject based on thorough research. The 
recommendations on surrogate motherhood alone comprises
183 See Eaton T A "Comparative Responses to Surrogate
Motherhood” 1986 Neb L Rev 686 - 727 who praises the 
report for addressing the issue of surrogacy sensibly, 
sensitively and comprehensively" and states that "it 
provides the basis for a legislative package that 
accommodates the legitimate aspirations of childless 
couples while addressing the fear* of those concerned 
with exploitation and commercialization of 
procreation*'.
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seventy-three pages of the report in which a detailed 
regulatory scheme of the whole process is proposed.
Xt is submitted that this report could serve as a basis for
the regulation of surrogacy in South Africa for several
184reasons.
1 There is a clear analogy between the regulatory scheme 
suggested by the Commission and adoption proceedings, 
which is a well-established procedure requiring
a careful assessment of the suitability of the
-r q  c
intended parents.
2 The welfare of the child is of paramount importance.
3 The rules of procedure and evidence in the Canadian
courts are similar to those in our courts as a result
1 86of our corresponding common law background.
4 The procedure could take place in courts where
the newly appointed official - the family advocate -
184 See Lupton M L "The Right to * 2 Born: Surrogacy and the
Legal Control of Human Fertility 1988 DJ 50 - 51; 
Pretorius R “A Comparative Overview and Analysis of a 
Proposed Surrogate Mother Agreement Model" 1987 CILSA 
293.
185 As the Commission pointed out at 234, the Child Welfare
Act is useful as a model, but not ideal in surrogacy
arrangements.
186 Van Zyl D H 1981 Beginsels van Regsvergelyking 195;
Hahlo H R and Kahn E 197 3 The South African Legal
System and its Background 128.
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can play a major role in assisting the court during the 
initial application.
8.4.1 SUMMARY OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE ONTARIO
LAW REFORM COMMISSION REPORT
The majority members of the Ontario Law Reform Commission
agreed that the practice of surrogacy is not immoral and
found it an ethically accepted response to the problems of
187infertility. A comprehensive regulatory model was 
recommended, designed to legitimise and regulate the 
practice of surrogacy.
It was recommended that participants to a surrogacy
arrangement, should first obtain the approval of tne
Provincial Court (Family Division) or the Unified Family
188Court. The agreement should be in writing and the court
should approve the terms of the agreement to ensure that
they provide adequate protection for the child and the
189parties. Mandatory minimum legislative standards should 
apply regarding:
1 surrender of the child;
2 payment to the surrogate mother;
187 Vol II 229 - 233.
188 Vol II 285.
189 Vol II 281.
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3 birth of a handicapped child and
4 abortion and the surrogate mother.
The parties are free to include terms of their choice in the
agreement, but should include terms on the following
190issues:
1 health and life insurance for the prospective surrogate
mother;
2 arrangements for the child should any one or both of 
the intended parents die or cease to live together;
3 arrangements regarding the manner in which the child 
should be surrendered after birth;
4 the right, if any, of the surrogate mother to obtain 
information regarding, or to have contact with the 
child after birth;
5 regulation of the surrogate mother's activities before 
and after conception, including dietary obligations and
6 conditions under which prenatal screening of the child 
may be justified or required, for example, ultrasound, 
fetoscopy or amniocentesis.
Detailed provisions are made for assessing the suitability
of the intended parents and the surrogate mother. It was
190 Vol II 284.
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suggested that children's aid societies could play a role in
this assessment. Notice of application for approval of the
agreement should be served upon the appropriate children's
aid society, which should have locus standi during the
proceedings, but ruay only intervene if its records disclose
information demonstrating the unsuitability of either of the 
1 9 1parties. * Prior to approval, the court should be satisfied
192that there is a medical need for the procedure.
Anonymity of the parties should be maintained as well as
'93confidentiality of the court records.* Proceedings should 
be heard in camera.
Review of the approval by the court is possible should there
be a change in circumstances or if new information becomes
available which could have a bearing on the suitability of
194the intended parents. The judge should be empowered to
rescind the agreement in such an event. Legislation should 
provide that no payment be made in relation to the agreement 
without prior approval of the court.
191 Vol II 283.
192 Vol II 282.
193 Vol II 283.
194 Vol II 283.
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The Law Reform Commission of Saskatchewan has recently 
published Tentative Proposals for a Human Artificial 
Insemination Act (1987)
8 .5 GERMANY
8.5.1 THE BENDA REPORT
In 1984 the Minister of Justice and Minister of Research and
Technology of the Federal government established a working
group under the leadership of Prof Dr Ernst Benda. They were
instructed to study the ethical and legal aspects of new
technological developments and to make recommendations. In
1985 the Bericht der Arbeitsgruppe: In Vitro Fertilisation,
Genomanalyse und Gentherapie was published, popularly
195referred to as the Benda report. Unlike the Ontario Law 
Reform Commission Report, the German Report is opposed to 
all forms of surrogacy.
The report addresses the problems surrounding surrogate
196motherhood directly, focusing on commercial aspects, 
transfer of parental power, the possibility of a physical or
195 Another Commission has been appointed - the 
Enquete-Kommission - to examine Chances und Risiken der 
Gentechnologie. This report could however, not be 
obtained by the author.
196 At 37 of the report.
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mental abnormality of the child and the potential
psychological identity problems facing the child in later
life. The working group voted against surrogate motherhood
in principle and recommended that it should be legislatively
prohibited, but recognised that there might be exceptional
197cases for which regulations may be formulated.
Major concerns were the transfer of the child to the
intended parents at birth and the potential conflict which
198could occur, should the surrogate refuse to do so.
8.5.2 THE 3UNDESARZTEKAMMER (GERMAN BOARD OF PHYSICIANS)
The German Board of Physicians took a much firmer stand on 
the issue of surrogacy. The Scientific Council - the 
official federal body which represents medical practitioners
- published two sets of guidelines. The one addresses in 
vitro fertilisation and embryo transfer as a method for 
treating human infertility (Richtlinien zur Durchfuhrung von
In-vitro-fertilisation and Embryonentransfer als
199Behandlungsmethode Menschlicher Sterilitat), while the
197 At 42 of the report.
198 At 39 of the report.
199 Published in the 1985 Deutsches Arzteblatt 1691 and
reprinted in 1985 Aktuelle Medizin 1 - 7 .
89
other addresses Research on Human Embryos (Richtlinien zur 
Forschung an Fruhen Menschlichen Embryonen) . 200
In an addendum to the guidelines on in vitro fertilisation,
surrogate motherhood is briefly mentioned. The well-being of
the child is, according to the Bundesartztekammer, the
paramount consideration in a decision on whether or not
surrogacy should be allowed. The possibility of harm to the
child as a result of such an agreement, is according to the
Bundesartztekammer great enough to cond^n all forms of
201surrogacy.
It therefore seems clear that on the issue of surrogacy, the 
opinion of the Benda Commission and the medical profession 
are that s.;~h agreements are unenforceable.
8 . 6 THE NETHERLANDS
The Health Council in the Netherlands issued an interim
. . . 7 07Report on In Vitro Fertilisation m  1984 and 1986. The
Council distinguishes between medical and social grounds for
200 Published in the 1985 Deutsches Arzteblatt 3757.
201 Aktuelle Medizin op cit at 6 .
202 See *S Gravehage: Gezondheidsraad 17-10-86 cited by 
Jorg N in 1987 Freiburg Symposium on Criminal Law and 
Modern Biomedical Techniques (unpublished report) 19.
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utilising artificial procreation techniques. Priority is
accorded to treatment on medical grounds and not, for
instance, for mere convenience. With regard to surrogacy,




The most important court decisions’ on surrogate motherhood
204 205in the United Kingdom are A v C, In re a Baby ("Baby
2 0 6Cotton") and recently, In re Adoption Application.
The facts in A v C were briefly that an unmarried couple o£ 
which the female partner was infertile, concluded an 
agreement with & surrogate to conceive a child by artificial 
insemination with the male partner's sperm and bear it for 
them. They offered her 3 000 pounds sterling as 
compensation. At birth, the surrogate mother, however,
203 At 18 of the report, cited by Jorg 1987 Criminal Law 
and Modern Biomedical Techniques 21.
204 (1978) 8 Fam Law 170 and 1984 Fam Law 241 C A later 
reported as (1985) FLR 445 - 461.
205 (1985) NLP Rep 106.
206 Reported in 3 WLR 19-06-1987 31 - 38 and discussed in
1987 Fam Law 259 - 260.
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refused to hand the child over to the couple. The ge: ic
father instituted a court action for care and control under
the Guardianship of Minors Act 1971. Later he contented
himself with a claim for weekly access for a period of two
207hours. His claim was denied. Comyn J considered the
contract to be contra bonos mores and decided that "the
purported contract (was) for the sale and purchase of a
208child". Although the validity of surrogacy agreements in
general was not considered by the court, there was no 
hesitation in condemning such agreements. Ormrod J regarded 
this agreement as "bizarre and unnatural" giving rise to a 
"miserable" and "deplorable" story. Cumming-Bruce J also 
condemned this agreement as "a kind of baby farming
209operation of a wholly distasteful and lamentable kind".
2 1 0In In Re a Baby no reference was made to A v C and Latey 
J did not address the validity of surrogacy agreements, but 
treated the matter as a custody suit of an illegitimate
207 At 457 of the report.
208 At 448 E of the report.
209 At 459 of the report.
210 This case is discussed by Brahams D (Editorial) 1985
Medico-Legal J 3 - 5; Eaton T A "The British Response 
to Surrogate Motherhood: An American Critique" 1985 Law 
Teacher 165; Montgomery J "Surrogacy and the Best 
Interest of the Child" 1986 Fam L 59; Freeman M D A 
"After Warnock - Whither the Law?" 1986 Current Legal 
Probs 33 - 55 and Grubb and Pearl "Medicine, Health, 
the Family and the Law1* 1986 Fam L 232 -233.
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child. The facts of the case were briefly that a childless
couple concluded a surrogacy agreement with a surrogate
mother, Kim Cotton. When the baby was born on 4 January
1985, the local authority attempted to obtain an order under
the Children and Young Persons Act 1969, preventing the baby
from leaving the hospital. The commissioning father issued
a wardship summons asking that the child be made a ward of
the court and permission to take the baby home with them to
America. In this case, the commissioning couple were
qualified professionals who, according to the judge, were
excellently equipped to meet the baby's emotional and
financial needs. He rejected the notion that by merely
entering into a surrogacy agreement, they were rendered
2 1 1unsuitable as parents. Custody was granted to the natural 
father as it was considered to be in the child's best 
interest.
212In June 19 87 In re Adoption Application (payment for 
adoption) was heard by Latey J. In this case the family 
division had to decide whether payments made to a surrogate 
constitute payment for adoption, which is unlawful in terms 
of s 50(1) of the Adoption Act,1958 (as amended) and if so,
211 At 848 - 849 of the report.
212 Supra.
S3
whether the court could authorise the payments made under s 
50(3) of the Act.
The facts of the case were briefly that Mr and Mrs A
213concluded a surrogacy arrangement wit;i Mrs B. Mrs B 
received 5 000 pounds sterling to cover her loss of wages 
and expenses during the pregnancy. After he birth of the 
baby, it was relinquished to the commissioning couple who 
applied for adoption. The court granted the adoption order 
and concluded that there was no commercial transaction and 
the payments to the surrogate were not compensation contrary 
to the terms of the Adoption Act. The court stated that if 
"commercial" connotes a profit or financial reward, it was 
absent in this case. There was no written contract and no 
lawyers were consulted until after the baby had been born. 
The arrangement was, according to the court, one of trust 
which was fully honoured on both sides. If the payments had, 
however, been made as a reward, which the court doubted, it 
nevertheless had jurisdiction in terms of s o0(3) of the 
Adoption Act subsequently to authorise the compensation and 
would do so since it was in the best interest of the child.
213 This is the first reported case in which the child wr*s 
not conceived by artificial insemination, but by sexual 
intercourse.
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In regard to surrogacy agreements in general the court
stated the following in an obiter dictum: "Other than those
(surrogacy agreements) outlawed by the Surrogacy
Arrangements Act 1985, surrogacy arrangements are not
against the law as it stands. But those contemplating taking
this path should have their eyes open to the kind of
pitfalls, obstacles and anxiety that they are likely to
214meet.1' ’ The court also stated: "One cannot c.it in these 
courts and hear all the multitude of professionals and 
others without knowing well the depth of longing in couples, 
devoted to each other, who cannot have a child through no 
fault of their own". The court however warned that before 
couples embark upon the path of surrogacy "they should know 
very well what it may entail... it is not a primrose 
path" . 2 1 5
9.1.1 EVALUATION OF COURT DECISIONS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
The English courts have demonstrated a progression from an 
outright condemnation of surrogacy, especially if 
compensation is involved, to a gradual tolerance of the 
procedure. In A v C the surrogate refused to hand over the
214 At 37 F - G.
215 At 38 B - C of the report. See also Chalmers D R C "No 
Primrose Path - Surrogacy and the Role of the Criminal 
Law" 1989 Med Law 595 - 606.
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child at birth, which was not the case in In Re a Baby (Baby 
Cotton). The courts were hesitant to address the validity of 
the agreement and in In re a Baby it was merely treated as a 
custody suit with the best interest of the child as a 
paramount consideration. Latey J, who also presided in In re 
a Baby, was even more lenient in In re Adoption Application 
in allowing the adoption even though compensation was 
involved.
One should bear in mind that these surrogacy agreements were 
concluded before the Surrogacy Arrangements Act of 19 85, 
which declared commercial surrogacy agencies and 
negotiations illegal, became operative.
9.2 COURT DECISIONS IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Surrogate-related cases have enjoyed the attention of the 
courts in Michigan, Kentucky, District of Columbia, New 
York, New Jersey and California.
9.2.1 MICHIGAN
Some of the earliest cases on surrogacy were decided by 
Michigan courts, probably due to the activities of the 
Michigan attorney, Hoel Keane, who established one of the 
first commercial surrogacy practices in the United States in 
Dearborn, Michigan - Surrogacy Parenting Services. Despite
96
this, there is still uncertainty as to the legality of the 
contract as none of the courts squarely declared surrogacy 
arrangements illegal. There were, however, indications in 
certain decisions that commercial or paid surrogacy 
contracts would be invalid.
9 1 fi 717Doe v Kelly and Doe v Attorney General dealt primarily
with the constitutional right to procreate, as acknowledged
218in Roe v Wade. In Doe v Kelly the applicants petitioned
219the court to declare the so-called •baby-selling" statute 
unconstitutional as an impermissible interference With their 
right to procreate. The trial court in Doe v Attorney 
General rejected the argument and stated that the 
prohibition on payment for adoption is applicable as the 
state has an interest to see to it that financial 
considerations do not interfere with family relationships.
If the contract provides for compensation of the surrogate
216 106 Mich App 169 307 NW 2d 438 (1981).
217 6 Fam Law Rep BNA 3011 Wayne Cty Cir Ct (1980) aff'd
106 Mich App 169 N W 2d 438 (1981) cert denied, 459 US 
1183 (1983). See Katz A "Surrogate Motherhood and the 
Baby-Selling Laws" 1986 Colum J L & Soc Probs 2 6 - 2 7 
for a discussion of the case. See also Anon "Surrogate 
Parenthood - An Analysis of the Problems and a 
Solution: Representation for the Child" 1986 Wm 
Mitchell L Rev 160.
218 410 US 113 (1973).
219 Mich Comp Laws Ann 710.54 and 710.69 West Supp (1983 - 
1984). The statute in question was 710.54 discussed by 
Katz 1986 Colum J L & Soc Probs 26 n 125.
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and adoption is part of the contractual obligations, they
forfeit the protection of their right of privacy and even if
they still have the right, it is not absolute as the court
may uphold state regulations in the presence of a compelling
state interest. The court then paid attention to public
policy issues underlying baby-bartering and concluded that
220surrogacy contracts were against public policy.
221In the Michigan Court of Appeals the decision of the 
trial court was confirmed, but on narrower grounds. The 
court acknowledged the right to privacy of the couple and 
held that the Michigan statute does not prohibit surrogate 
motherhood per se; compensating the surrogate during 
adoption proceedings is prohibited, however', and should the 
couple use adoption proceedings, they are subject to 
reasonable government regulation.
220 The court stated that "mercenary considerations used to 
create a parent-child relationship and its impact upon 
the family unit strikes at the very foundation of human 
society and is patently and necessarily injurious to 
the community. It is a fundamental principle that 
children should not and cannot be bought and sold. The 
sale of children is illegal in all states”.
221 106 Mich App 169 307 NW 2d 438 (1981) cert denied 459 
US 1183 (1983).
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In a more recent Michigan surrogacy case, Syrkowski v
222Appleyard, another aspect of a surrogacy agreement was
examined as compensation for adoption was not at issue. The
plaintiff, who had entered into a surrogacy contract with Ms
A, brought an uncontested action under the Michigan
223Paternity Act seeking an order of filiation declaring his
paternity. The proceedings were rejected by the trial court
on the ground that such an order would sanction surrogacy
arrangements, which according to the court, is against
public policy.22  ^ The intermediate appellate court affirmed
225the decision of the court a quo without determining the 
validity of the agreement. In the final appeal to the 
Michigan Supreme Court, the decision was reversed and the 
proceedings allowed to continue. The court stressed that 
paternity had to be determined prior to a determination of 
support obligations. The court found it unnecessary to 
determine the legality of the surrogate motherhood contract.
222 First heard by a trial court and later by the Michigan 
Court of Appeals 122 Mich App 506 333 NW 2d 90 (1983); 
the case finally reached the Michigan Supreme Court in 
1985 420 Mich 367 cited as 362 N W 2d 211 Mich (1985). 
This case is discussed by Katz 1986 Columb J L & Soc 
Probs 2 8 - 29 and in the Wm Mitchell L Rev 161 -162.
22 3 Mich Comp Laws 710.33 Supp (1985).
224 At 370 of the report.
225 122 Mich App 506 (1983).
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9 *7 fiIn Smith v Jones a lower Michigan coart addressed an 
uncontested claim of maternity in a full surrogacy case 
where gametes of the commissioning couple were fertilised in 
vitro and the embryo transferred to the host or gestational 
mother who was to hand the baby over to the commissioning 
couple after birth. The court held that the woman who 
provides the egg to be fertilised and implanted in the womb 
of the surrogate, is the legal mother of the child.
227In Teats v Keane , a circuit court judge in Gratiot
county, Michigan, ruled that commercial surrogacy contracts
are invalid and unenforceable as they are contrary to public 
22 8policy. In the case in question a surrogate mother
refused to hand over surrogate twins which she bore for an
Arkansas couple under a commercial surrogacy contract. It
229was, however, later reported that the surrogate mother 
had given up her court battle and that she had agreed to
226 85-532014 DZ 3rd Jud Dist Mich (14 March 1986) cited by 
Eaton 1986 Neb L Rev 690 n 10; 695 n 34; 723 and 724 n
156 first reported by Annas 'The Baby Broker Boom'* 1986 
Hastings Center Rept 30.
227 Mich Cir Ct Gratiot Cty Nos 9758 S. 9772. 21-01-87 14 
Fam Law Rep BNA 1160 (1988). Discussed in 1988 ABAJ 29; 
Russel I "Within the Best Interests of the Child: the 
Factor of Parental Status in Custody Disputes Arising 
from Surrogacy Contracts” 1988-1989 J Fam L 589.
228 Moss D C "Michigan Surrogacy Fight Ends" 1988 ABAJ 29; 
Detroit Free Press 22-01-1988.
229 Ibid.
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settle the dispute on the ground that the commissioning 
couple were in a better position to care for the children. 
The surrogate mother did not receive the $10 000 specified
in the original contract and had to pay some of her hospital
and maternity costs. The surrogate mother and her family 
were allowed six supervised visits totalling 15 days per 
year with the twins in Arkansas.
From the Michigan cases, three aspects emerge clearly:
1 the court may recognise a natural father's paternity in 
a surrogacy agreement but,
2 should the commissioning couple file for adoption (by
the wife of the genetic father in partial surrogacy
cases), compensation is prohibited, and
3 full surrogacy contracts are less troublesome than 
partial surrogacy, as adoption is not necessary if the 
court recognises the genetic mother as the legal mother 
of the child.
9.2.2 KENTUCKY
230In In re Baby Girl a surrogate mother and her husband 
petitioned the court seeking voluntary termination of their 
parental rights so that the genetic father in a surrogacy
230 9 Fam L rep BNA 2348 Jefferson City Cir Ct (1983);
discussed by Katz A 1986 Colum J L & Soc Probs 31 - 32.
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agreement could obtain custody and have his name placed on 
the birth certificate. The court denied the petition based 
on the presumption of paternity in favour of the husband of 
the surrogate and lack of evidence by the commissioning
father to prove his paternity as he merely filed an
231affidavit. The court proceeded further by stating that 
even if the presumption could be rebutted, termination of 
parental rights is still an inappropriate procedure in this 
case. The purpose of the termination statute is to provide 
a mechanism by which a natural parent can terminate his 
rights and place the child with a licensed child-placing 
agency and in casti such a placement had been circumvented 
and the child had already been placed privately.
The second Kentucky case involved one of *;he first 
commercial surrogacy agencies, Surrogate Parenting 
Associates established by Dr Richard Levin in Louisville, 
Kentucky in 1979.
In January 1981 the Attorney-General of Kentucky concluded 
in an opinion that surrogate motherhood contracts were 
illegal under the state's adoption laws and also contravened
231 At 2348 of the report.
232 Cappucio M S "Surrogate Motherhood in Ohio: A Dangerous 
Game of Baby Roulette" 1985 Cap 0 L Rev 10/.
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233the public policy of the state. This opinion was severely
234criticised by some writers and led lawyers involved in
drafting the contract to stipulate that the surrogate is
compensated for hospital and maternity expenses (and not for
2 3 5termination of her parental pover or adoption). The
state subsequently instituted an action against Surrogate 
Parenting Associates (reported in the lower court as
23^Kentucky v Surrogate Parenting Associates Inc) " in which 
it was alleged that the agency operated in contravention of 
the following statutes:
1 KRS 199.590(2) which prohibits sale, purchase or
procurement for sale or purchase of "any child for the
237purpose of adoption,"
2 KRS 199.601(2) which prohibits filing a petition for
voluntary termination of parental rights "prior to five 
days after the birth of a child", and
3 KRS 199.500(5) which specifies that a "consent for
adoption" shall not "be held valid if such consent for
233 Ky Op Att'y Gen 81 18.
234 Phillips J W and Phillips S D “In Defense of Surrogate 
Parenting: A Critical Analysis of the Recent Kentucky 
Experience” 1980 - 1981 Ky L J 877 - 931.
235 Griffin M K "Womb for Rent" 1981 Student Lawyer 31; 
Brophy K M “A Surrogate Mother Contract to Bear a 
Child" 1981 - 1982 J Fam L 270 - 272.
236 10 Fam L Rep BNA 1105 Ky Cir Ct (1983).
237 This statue was amended in 1984.
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adoption is given prior to the fifth day after the 
birth of the child".
Judgment in the circuit court was in favour of the 
corporation, but this was reversed by the Court of
nogAppeals. On 6 February 1986 the case was finally brought
239before the Supreme Court wH.ch, m  a majority decision, 
upheld the decision of the circuit court and found in favour 
of Surrogate Parenting Associates.
The court distinguished clearly between surrogate motherhood 
agreements and the purchase and sale of children as 
prohibited by the statute in question. ^ 40 The court stated 
that the purpose of the statutory prohibition on 
compensation was intended "to keep baby brokers from 
overwhelming an expectant mother or the parents of a child 
with financial inducements to part with the child”. The 
central fact in the surrogate parenting procedure is, 
however, that the agreement to bear the child is entered 
into prior to conception. The surrogate thus enters the 
agreement voluntarily and free from coercion. The court
238 Kentucky ex rel Armstrong v Surrogate Parenting Assoc.
11 Fam L Rep BNA 1359 - 60 Ky Ct App (1985) rev'd 
Surrogate Parenting Assoc v Kentucky ex rel Armstrong 
704 S W 2d 209 Ky (1986).
239 Surrogate Parenting Assoc v Kentucky ex rel Armstrong 
704 S W 2d 209 211 Ky (1986).
240 At 211 of the report.
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pointed out that surrogate motherhood is biologically the 
reverse situation from AID, where the husband is
24iinfertile and the wife conceives by artificial 
insemination.
9.2.3 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
242In in re R K S surrogacy was merely referred to m  a case 
dealing with the adoption of a surrogate baby by the wife of 
the childless couple. Details of the procedure were not 
discussed.
9.2.4 NEW YORK
243In Matter of Adoption of Baby Girl the court was asked to
approve a private placement adoption of a surrogate baby and
the payment of $10 000 to the surrogate for her services. In 
the absence of judicial precedent and statutory authority, 
the court applied conventional legal principles in reaching 
its decision. The court stated that the adoption law takes
241 At 212 of the report.
242 10 Fam L Rep BNA 1383 Fam Div D C Super Ct (1984).
243 L J 505 N Y S 2nd 813 Sur (1986). This case is 
discussed by Moss "Surrogate Parenting Debate" 1987 
ABAJ 25 and in the New York State Senate Judiciary 
Committee Report Surrogate Parenting in New York: A 
Proposal for Legislative Reform 1986 at 36 - 8 .
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precedence over contractual terms and should these violate
statutory requirements, the court may declare the contract
244illegal and deny the petition. The adoption and payment
was, however, approved by the court which considered it to
be in the best interest of the child. The court stated that
a denial would not prohibit future surrogacy agreements and
would be a declaration that such contracts are against
public policy - a decision which should be left to the
legislature as "judicial” legislation by the court is 
245impermissible.
9.2.5 NEW JERSEY
The legality and enforceability of surrogate motherhood
agreements were specifically addressed for the first time
by Sorkow J in 1937 in the Supreme Court, Hackensack, New
Jersey in the much publicised, Baby M (Whitehead/Stern)
246case. In this case the court held that a surrogate 
motherhood contract is valid and does not constitute selling 
a child as it is impossible for a father to purchase what
244 At 97 8 of the report.
245 At. 979 of the report.
24fi Alfoo referred to a& the- Baby M I case 217 N J Super 313
h 2d 112S 1132 Ch Div (1987 ) rev’d in part, 109
K v -:'5 b37 A 2d 1?27 1S86). For an in-depth
'.Csc'.ssion, sec S'. ..m I 1938 - 1989 J Fam L 587 - 671. 
See di .-io tho discussion in chapter 5 under Law of 
t’c rrsons .
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already belongs to him. Sorkow J agreed to an order for 
specific performance only after the court was satisfied that 
it would be in the best interest of the child. Hr Stern was 
awarded custody and the court then allowed the baby to be 
adopted by Mrs Stern.
The Baby M case was heard on appeal in the New Jersey
247Supreme Court (Baby M II). The court held that although 
the contract was invalid and unenforceable, as payment of 
money was impermissible in adoption cases, it was in the 
best interest of the child to stay with the commissioning 
couple and not be handed back to her surrogate mother, who 
was merely granted visitation rights.
9.2.6 CALIFORNIA
~ 248In Huro v Munoz a Mexican cousin of a (Mexican) American 
couple acted as surrogate mother for them. This case 
provides an apt example of the problems which can arise if 
legal counselling is not obtained and language barriers
247 In re Baby M 109 N J 396 410 - 11 537 A 2d 1227, 1234 
(1988). For a detailed discussion, see Stern 1988 -
1989 J of Fam L 585 - 671. Sea the discussion in 
chapter 5 under Law of Persons.
248 Discussed in detail by Andrews L 1989 Between Strangers
113 et seq; Charo R A "Legislative Approaches to 
Surrogate Motherhood" in 199 0 Surrogate Motherhood 
Gostin (ed) 95.
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prevent consensus between the parties. In casu the surrogate
mother, who spoke no English, understood that she was to
249undergo in vivo fertilisation, embryo flushing and 
transfer to the commissioning wife. The commissioning 
couple, on the other hand, asserted that a full-term 
pregnancy was contemplated. They relied on a handwritten 
contract and oral communication as proof of their 
intentions. In exchange for the services of the surrogate 
mother, the couple were to provide clothing, food, health 
care and assistance in obtaining a visa for permanent 
residence in the USA. It was apparently further agreed upon 
that the couple would provide housing for the Mexican 
surrogate in violation of immigration regulations.
When the baby was born, the surrogate was unwilling to hand 
her over to the intended parents, but eventually did so 
under duress. In the subsequent court battles, Pate J 
expressed the view that as a general rule, surrogacy 
contracts entered into with appropriate safeguards were 
valid. This particular agreement was, however, concluded 
under duress as the surrogate was already pregnant and was 
forced to sign the contract. In the absence of a valid 
contract, family law principles were applicable to decide 
custody and visitation rights. Joint custody - which is
249 Inside the body - as opposed to in vitro (outside the 
body), performed in a petri dish in laboratory.
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favoured in custody disputes in California - was awarded to 
the parents. Pate J, however, expressed his hope that the 
parties would come to a decision they could live with 
regarding custody and visitation. Unlikely as it may seem, 
this indeed happened and the child’s custody is still shared 
by the surrogate (her genetic mother) and the- commissioning 
couple.
250In the unique case of Johnson v Calvert a Californian 
surrogate who agreed to carry the foetus of a Californian 
couple to term, sued for custody, child support and damages, 
alleging that the couple had lost interest in the pregnancy 
and failed to provide the agreed financial and emotional 
support. Ms Johnson was to receive $10 000 for her services.
Parslow J concluded that the surrogate mother had no right
to a role in the upbringing of the child and that she was a
"genetic and hereditary stranger” to the child. Custody was
awarded to the Calverts (genetic parents) and the
251surrogate's visitation rights terminated.
9.2.7 EVALUATION OF COURT DECISIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA
250 Reported in Time 27-08-1990 52; Newsweek 27-08-1990
66 .
251 Detroit News 23-10-1990; New York Times 23-10-1990.
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It is difficult to evaluate court decisions in the USA, 
because of the diversity of approaches and the differences 
in interpretation of public policy in individual states. 
However, it is clear from the court decisions, that the best 
interest of the child remain the paramount consideration.
2529.3 GERMANY
Surrogacy-related issues have been addressed by the German 
courts on two occasions. In the first - a custody suit - 
the contract was declared void and custody was awarded to 
the surrogate mother. In the second case, it turned out 
that the surrogate’s husband was the genetic [rather of the 
child. The court ordered re-payment of expenses to the 
commissioning father.
252 Information obtained from Garrison M "Surrogate
Parenting: What Should Legislatures Do? Special Issue 
on Surrogacy 19 88 Fam L Q 159.
110
10.1 UNITED KINGDOM
The Surrogacy Arrangements Act w^s enacted in 1985. It was 
based on the recommendations of the Warnock Commission
pci(1984) and possibly also as a result of the controversial
254"Baby Cotton case."
The Act is divided into four mai sections. Section 1 
contains definitions. In terms of s 1(2) “surrogate mother" 
means a woman who carries a child in pursuance of an 
arrangement -
(a) made before she began to carry the child, and
(b) made with a view to any child carried in pursuance of 
such arrangement.
"Payment" in terms of the Act means payment in money or
255money s worth.
Section 2 of the Act is entitled “Negotiating surrogacy 
arrangements on a commercial basis, etc".
10 LEGISLATION
253 Discussed under United Kingdom Court Decisions supra.
254 Ibid.
255 S 1(8) of the Act.
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Although the Warnock Committee did not consider surrogate
256practices as such to be unlawful, it nevertheless
recommended that "legislation be introduced to render
criminal the creation or the operation in the United Kingdom
of agencies whose purposes include the recruitment of women
for surrogate pregnancy or making arrangements for
individuals or couples who wish to utilise the services of a
25 7carrying mother". This recommendation was incorporated
into s 2 of the Surrogacy Arrangements Act, which attempts
to prevent third parties, especially commercial surrogate
agencies, from deriving financial benefit from surrogacy
agreements. Any person or agency which initiates, takes
part in or agrees to negotiate or compile information with
the view of using it in surrogacy arrangements on a
2 59commercial basis, will be held criminally liable.
256 At par 8.4 of the report.
257 At par 8.18 of the report.
258 In terms of s 2 of the Act any person who acts on 
behalf of a body of persons or who takes part in 
negotiating or facilitating the making of a surrogacy 
arrangement in the United Kingdom and who receives 
payment for such services is guilty of an offence and 
can face a fine or imprisonment of up to three months 
(s 4). In terms of s 4(2)(a) the consent of the 
Director of Public Prosecutions is essential for any 
prosecution.
259 S 2(1)(a) (b) and (c).
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Surrogates as well as commissioning couples are, themselves, 
exempt from criminal liability.
Section three is entitled "Advertisements aoout surrogacy".
The Act specifically prohibits the recruitment of women as
surrogate mothers in a number of ways. Examples are
newspaper or periodical advertisements and advertisements
through telecommunication systems. Those who are
responsible for such advertisements, commit an offence in
terms of the Act. The same applies to editors of .newspapers
262and periodicals who publish them.
S 4 of the Act contains "Offences". The Act itself does not 
provide for penalties but refers to "standard scales" 
contained s 75 of the Criminal Justice Act 1982.
Certain conclusions may be drawn from omissions in the
9 *3Act, for instance that surrogate agreements as such are 
264not prohibited and that they are not declared
260 S 2(2)(a) and (b).
261 S3(2) (3) (4) and (5).
262 S 3(2).
263 Freeman 1986 Current Legal Probs 39; Condie “Surrogacy 
as a Treatment for Infertility" 1986 J Law Society of 
Scotland 47 2.
264 The recommendation of the Warnock Commission (par 8.18
(Footnote Continued)
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unenforceable. In fact, s 1(9) states that the Act "applies 
to arrangements whether or not they are lawful and whether 
or not they are enforceable by or against any of the persons
c c .making them". Contracting parties may use the services of
a person or agency as long as no compensation is involved.
The commissioning couple may, however, compensate the
surrogate as long as the transaction is not handled on a
2 66commercial basis by a person or agency. It is thus clear
that the thrust of the Act is to prevent commercial
0 fi 7agencies, similar to those in the USA from operating in
Britain. Altruistic or family arrangements, on the other 
hand, seem to be legal.
(Footnote Continued)
of the report) that it be provided for by statute that 
all surrogacy agreements be illegal contracts and 
therefore unenforceable in the courts, was not followed 
in this regard.
265 This section of the Act has been criticised for being
ambivalent on the legal status of surrogacy agreements. 
Eaton “The British Response to Surrogate Motherhood: an
American Critique” 1985 Law Teacher 171. On 7 November
1990 an amendment or this section became operative. S
36 of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 
provides that "(n)o surrogacy arrangement is 
enforceable by or against any of the persons maKing
it”.
266 S 2(1) and 2(5) .
267 For a list of the surrogate mother programmes in the
United States of America see Andrews 1984 New 
Conceptions 317 - 318.
268 Freeman 1986 Current Legal Probs 40 mentions that the 
Act had limited aims, namely to “rid society of the 
perceived evil of commercial surrogacy".
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The Surrogacy Arrangements Act has been described as a
269"stop-gap measure" or a result of "moral panic" after the
270 271"Baby Cotton" controversy. Both Freeman and Condie are
of the opinion that the Act is not operating effectively and
272 273 274that too many loopholes exist. Sloman and Eaton
criticise the Act for avoiding all the major issues relating
to surrogacy, especially birth registration and the status
275of the child, and Payne suggests that the Act may create 
even more problems than it solves.
Despite the fact that the Act was enacted expressly to 
prohibit commercial surrogacy agencies, these agencies still 
operated a year after the implementation of the Act. An 
organisation which apparently paid women acting as surrogate
10.1.1 EVALUATION OF THE SURROGACY ARRANGEMENTS ACT
269 Freeman 1986 Current Legal Probs 38 and 51 n 40.
270 1986 Current Legal Probs 41.
271 J Law Society of Scotland 472.
272 Freeman 1996 Current Legal Probe 40 also expresses his
doubts as to whether the Act covers complete surrogacy,
where the genetic material of the commissioning couple 
is used and the surrogate is a mere carrier.
273 "Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985" 1985 New L J 980.
274 1985 Law Teacher 171.
275 “The Regulation of Surrogate Motherhood" 1987 Fam L
179.
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mothers, was not prosecuted because the company claimed that
women were paid to keep diaries of their pregnancies and not
27 6for carrying babies.
10.1.1.1 THE IMPLICATIONS OF S 2 OF THE SURROGACYARRANGEMENTS ACT ON PROFESSIONAL INVOLVEMENT
A careful and objective analysis of the Surrogacy 
Arrangements Act and its implications, is required for an
277assessment of local options. According to Freeman and 
? 7 flEaton the wording of s 2 of the Act is so wide that even
a doctor or lawyer assisting the parties, or merely
providing legal advice for a fee, may run the risk of being 
279prosecuted. If altruistic surrogacy is allowed, it seems 
unsatisfactory not to provide parties to the agreement with
276 For a discussion see Condie J Law Society of Scotland 
472; Freeman 1986 Current Legal Probs 41 with reference 
to The Guardian 12-11-1985.
277 1986 Current Legal Probs 39.
278 1985 Law Teacher 172.
279 When the question of professional involvement arose
during the passing of the Bill through Parliament, the 
Minister of Health at that stage, Kenneth Clarke,
sought to reassure the members of the House of Commons.
According to him, a lawyer may provide general legal 
advice to clients about surrogacy. In cases where 
consensus has already been reached on both sices, a 
doca-'^  ’t may be drafted setting out the agreement in 
legat language, as this excludes the possibility of the 
lawyer "negotiating" the contract. However, he 
cautioned lawyers to avoid any actions which could be 
construed as "taking part in negotiations" or offering 
or agreeing to negotiate." For a discussion see Sloman 
S "Surrogacy Arrangements Act" 1985 New L J 979.
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the help of professionals in both the legal and medical
2 8 0fields. Eaton points out that the Act as it stands, "may
encourage amateurish agreements" and "the couple and
surrogate are left to stumble through the process without
the help of experts". It is furthermore unreasonable to
expect professionals in such a specialised field, not to be
2 81compensated for their services. As stated by Sloman, it 
seems that "in seeking to stop third parties profiteering, 
the draftsman has failed to deal satisfactorily with the 
position of those who would provide such services for a 
fee".
10.1.1.2 FURTHER LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
Towards the end of 1985 the Surrogacy Arrangements
282(Amendment) Bill was introduced as an attempt to extend 
the existing Act. In terms of the Bill it would have been an 
offence for any person knowingly to take part in, or assist 
in the establishment of a surrogate pregnancy. It was also 
aimed at outlawing non-commercial bodies or agencies 
negotiating or establishing surrogacy arrangements and to
280 1985 Law Teacher 172.
281 1985 New L J 980.
282 Condie 1986 J Law Society of Scotland 472/ Morgan D 
"Legislation - Who to Be or Not to Be: The Surrogacy 
Story" 19 86 Mod L Rev 365.
117
remove the present immunity from prosecution of the parties 
to the contract. This Bill was, however, never implemented. 
It was decided to determine public opinion prior to the 
enactment of legislation on the issue. For this purpose 
a document entitled Legislation on Human Infertility
2 83Services and Embryo Research: A Consultation Document,
was produced in December 1986 and circulated to a wide range
of organisations for response before 30 June 1987.
The purpose of the consultation document, according to
284 .Parker , seems to have been primarily "to elicit more
detailed comments in respect of recommendations of the
Warnock Committee which have so far, received relatively
little attention, but a secondary purpose is, apparently, to
reopen certain controversial areas, presumably in the hope
of establishing greater consensus".
Responses were invited on infertility treatment in general, 
especially the possibility of instituting a separate 
licensing authority, counselling of the parties, regulating 
the legal status of children born as a result of certain
283 DHSS Cm 259 HMSO. Also discussed by Parker D "White 
Paper on Human Fertilization and Embryology'1 1988 Fam L 
303 - 305.
284 "Legislation on Human Infertility Services and Embryo 
Research" 1987 Fam L 168 - 171.
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infertility treatments such as surrogate motherhood, 
record-keeping and enforceability of surrogacy contracts.
When the consultation period ended in 'une j 987 , the 
Government reaffirmed its intention of introducing 
comprehensive legislation in Parliament and promised a White 
Paper on the form it would take. The White Paper was 
discussed and opened for debates in both Houses of 
Parliament prior to the presentation of a proposed Bill.
An important aspect of the White Paper is the recommendation 
that an independent Statutory Licensing Authority (SLA) be
oocestablished. The functions of the proposed body are
28 6outlined in the document, eg issuing of licences and the
duty of compiling codes of practice for the regulation of
287infertility services.
288Surrogacy is dealt with in detail in the White Paper.
From the discussion, it seems clear that no consensus could 
be reached on a number of issues, such as permitting or 
prohibition of private surrogacy arrangements, the extent of
285 At par 11.
286 At par 20 and 21.
287 At par 26.
288 At par 64 - 75.
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liability of the parties and professionals involved and
290the role legislation should play.
The most important aspects which emerged from the responses 
to the Consultation Paper, and which were to be included in 
a Bill on Human Infertility, regulating surrogacy, were the 
following:
1 Legislation should not encourage any form of 
surrogacy, whether it is privately arranged or on a 
non-commercial basis. A proposed bill should therefore 
contain no provision for the licensing of such 
practices and surrogacy agreements should be
291unenforceable in all respects in the U K courts.
The practice of surrogacy - other than by commercial 
agencies, already prohibited under the Surrogacy 
Arrangements Act 1985 - should not be brought within 
the scope of the criminal law and the bill should not 
add to the criminal sanctions contained in the 1985 
Act.
2 Sums paid to a surrogate mother should not be 
recoverable by the commissioning parents and the 
surrogate mother should not be permitted to recover
2 89
289 At par 70 - 71.
290 At par 72.
291 At par 73.
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expenses she incurred if the commissioning parents 
changed ; .leir minds about the agreement.
The SLA should be given the task of studying the practice of
surrogacy in Britain and reporting to the Ministers
involved, so that Parliament may review the situation
292periodically. The bill should furthermore contain a
provision empowering the Secretary of State to make
regulations extending the scope of activities controlled by
the SLA. Should non-commercial surrogacy, for instance, at
a later stage, be considered a viable option, it may be
293brought within the framework of the law.
Two years after the the White Paper was published in 1988, 
the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill was introduced. 
This Bill represents the Government's response to the 
recommendations made in 1984 by the Warnock Committee.
Issues addressed in the bill include the status of children
torn as a result of assisted conception and specifically
294 295 296AID GIFT and embryo transfer.
292 At par 74.
293 At par 75.
294 Artificial insemination with donor sperm.
295 Gamete intra-Fallopian transfer.
(Footnote Continued)
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Provision is also made for adults who were born as a result
of such techniques, to obtain information about their
2 0 7genetic heritage. ' The Bill proposes the establishment of
2 9 8the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority.
The Bill contains comprehensive provisions regarding
research on live embryos and storage of gametes and
299embryos.
The Bill also proposes direct regulation of surrogacy.
Clause 33 provides for the amendment of the Surrogacy 
Arrangements Act 1985. In terms of s 1(a) of the proposed 
Act "no surrogacy arrangement is enforceable by or against 
any of the persons making it". This was recommended to place 
the legal position of such agreements beyond doubt. ^ 00
As a result of a surrogacy case, described to the House of 
Commons by one of the members, a new clause was added to the 
Bill under the heading "parental orders in favour of gamete 
donors'*. The case discussed was one of full surrogacy. The
(Footnote Continued)
296 Clauses 26 - 28.
297 Clause 29.
298 Clause 5.
299 Clauses 11, 12, 13, 14, and 16.
300 This amendment was included in s 36 of the Human
Fertilisation and Embryology Act 19 90.
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facts were briefly that the intended parents concluded an
agreement with the surrogate, as the intended mother had no
uterus and was incapable of bearing children. She could,
however, produce ova, which were inseminated with her
husband’s sperm and a number of embryos were transferred to
the host/surrogate mother. In due course the surrogate gave
birth to twins and handed them over to the genetic parents.
The couple were then informed that they needed to adopt the
twins to secure their status. They were unwilling to do so
301as they regarded the twins as their own children.
Wardship proceedings were subsequently instituted by the 
local authority for the area in which the couple resided. 
They advanced the argument that the couple were not the 
legal parents, but merely foster parents to the twins and 
should therefore comply with the provisions of the Foster 
Children's Act 1980. In terms of s 2(2)(a) of this Act, 
notification and other regulations are applicable to the 
situation. As the issue had at that stage been raised in 
Parliament and direct legislation was expected, the local 
authority agreed to the application being adjourned. The 
children remained wards of the court, but were left in the 
care and control of their parents.
301 For a discussion see "Current Topics” 1990 Pract Child 
L Bull 107; 1991 Pract Child L Bull 7 - 8 .
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When the Bill returned to the House of Lords during October
1990, the specific clause was approved without opposition
and included in the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act
3021990. * Special provision is made for full surrogacy cases.
The Lord Chano tlor said: "It seems to us that there must be
some legal means available, including proper safeguards for
the child, whereby courts can order a child to be treated in
law as the child of those who contributed the embryos or
303eggs or sperm which are placed in the carrying mother."
In a discussion of the case^^ it was explained that the new 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act will contain the 
provision that the gestational mother is the mother of a 
child born as a result of assisted procreation. If she was 
married at time of the placing of the embryo(s) in her womb, 
but ’the creation of the embryo was not brought about with 
the sperm of her husband, the husband shall be treated as 
the father unless it is shown that he did not consent to the 
treatment".
302 S 30 under Parental orders in favour of gamete donors. 
See the discussion infra.
303 House of Lords Debate Vol 522 c 1115 cited in 1991 Pract 
Child L Bull 8 .
304 1991 Pract Child L Bull 8 .
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In terms of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act,
which was subsequently enacted, the court may make an order
providing that the a surrogate child is the legal child of
305the intended parents. The couple must apply within six
30 6months after the birth of the child for such an order, 
which the court will only make if it is satisfied that: at 
the time of the application and making of the order
1 the child's home is with the husband and the wife; and
2 the husband or the wife or both of them are domiciled
307in the UK or the Channel Islands or the Isle of Man.
The parents must be eighteen years or older at the time of
308the application and order and the surrogate mother and
her husband must have unconditionally agreed to the
309order. The court must be satisfied that no compensation
(over and above necessary expenses) has been given or 
received by any of the parties. 3 1 0
305 S 30(1)(a).
306 S 30(2) .
307 S 30(3)(a) and (b).
308 S 30(4) .
309 S 30(rj) .
310 S 30(7)(a) and (b).
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The Infertility (Medical Procedures) Act was enacted in
1934, based on the recommendations of the Waller
311Commission appointed by the Victoria government in 19 82 
to examine the legal, social and ethical issues resulting 
from in vitro fertilisation. In terms of this Act, 
surrogacy is prohibited, whether the arrangement is “formal
or informal, and whether or not for payment or
312 313reward...". Such contracts are void. Agencies as well
as parties to such contracts will be held criminally liable
314if compensation is involved. The recruiting of women to
become surrogates is prohibited as is any form of
315advertising m  regard to surrogacy arrangements.
This Act is therefore a step ahead of the British Act in
316discouraging surrogacy agreements. According zo Kennan, 
Attorney General for Victoria, ad hoc legislation such as
10.2 AUSTRALIA
311 See discussion supra on the Waller Commission. See in 
general "Current Topics" 1985 Austl L J 306.
312 S 30(1) of the Act.
313 S 30(3) of the Act.
314 S 30(2) of the Act.
315 S 30(2) (a).
316 "Science and the Law - Lessons from the Experience of 
Legislating for the New Reproductive Technology" 1985 
Austl L J 490.
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the Infertility (Medical Procedures) Act, is, however, not 
ideal. On the one hand, infertility specialists in Victoria 
have obtained excellent results with in vitro programmes and 
would like to continue with their research. The public, on 
the other hand, do not adequately understand such relatively 
new technological advances and are often in principle 
opposed to it. Legislation on modern birth technology, can, 
according to Kennan, be regarded only as an interim measure 
to provide the minimum level of regulation.
The Act is also criticised as not being comprehensive
317enough. It is suggested that the Act will serve no
purpose in preventing persons from advertising outside the
state of Victoria or from travelling to another country
318where surrogacy is legal. The Act is also criticised for
merely stating that surrogacy arrangements are "void",
instead of "void and illegal". It is concluded that the Act
is to a large extent ineffective and that regulation,
control and supervision of the procedure, may represent a
319better alternative.
317 "Current Topics" 1985 Austr L J 306 - 307.
318 1985 Austr L J 307.
319 Ibid.
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It is believed that the Infertility (Medical Procedures Act) 
may be amended in the near future.
10.3 THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
It is important to keep in mind that health matters are 
regulated separately by each of the states of the USA.
Since the Baby M case in the state of New Jersey, the issue 
of legislation on surrogate motherhood has enjoyed 
considerable attention in several states.
The legislative position in the United States as it was at 
the end of 1990 is discussed.
Artificial insemination is at present regulated by thirty
320states while only a few states have enacted legislation
321that touches on surrogacy. The majority of states are
still considering bills, ranging in complexity from a
322blanket authorisation to a detailed regulation of the
320 Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, 
Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, 
Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, 
Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North 
Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Tennessee, Texas, 
Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming as cited by 
Andrews 1987 Hastings Center Rept 40 n 3.
321 See the discussion infra.
322 An example of the detailed regulation approach is
(Footnote Continued)
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entire process, closely parallel to the regulation involved 
in adoption of children.According to Andrews^^ the 
proposed bills range from "horrified prohibition to cautious 
facilitation" of surrogacy.
It is impracticable to discuss the detail of all the 
proposed bills as the legislative scene is constantly 
changing. Only the main features are, therefore, examined, 
particularly those dealing with legality and enforceability 
of surrogate motherhood contracts. The finer points such as 
termination of parental power, informed consent, 
advertising, and breach of contract are considered 
separately when specific legal problems are addressed.
(Footnote Continued)
proposed legislation in South Carolina H R 3491 (1982); 
Hawai HR 1009 12th Leg (1983); Conn Assembly 5316 Jan 
ScS s (19 8 3) •
323 For a detailed discussion of the various models, see 
Katz "Surrogate Motherhood and the Baby Selling Laws" 
1986 Colum J L & Soc Probs 1-53.
324 1987 Hastings Center Rept 31.
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10.3.1 SURROGACY LEGISLATION325
In the aftermath of the Baby M case, at least six states 
readily enacted legislation banning commercial surrogate
motherhood. Florida, 326 Indiana, 327 Kentucky, 328
329 330 331Louisiana, Michigan and Nebraska enacted
legislation rendering surrogacy contracts void and
unenforceable if compensation is involved. During 1989
325 Information obtained from: Andrews 19 87 Hastings Centr
Rept 31 - 40; Adams M "Status of State Legislation 
Proposed or Enacted through 5 October 1988" in 
Surrogate Motherhood 1990 Gostin (ed) 261 - 269; 
"Developments in the Law - Medical Technology and the 
Law" 1990 High Tech L J 224 - 225. Russel "Within the 
Best Interest of the Child: The Factor of Parental 
Status in Custody Disputes Arising From Surrogacy 
Contracts" 1988 - 1989 J Fain Law 585 - 671.
326 1988 FI S-9 (same as H-1633) coded as 1988 Fla Laws
143.
327 IN S-98 (Johnson) 317/232-9400 (1988) coded as Ind Stat 
Ann par 31-8-2-1 Burns Supp (1989,.
328 KY BR-219 S-4 (Travis) 502/564-8100 (1988) coded as Ky
Rev Stat Ann par 199.590 3 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill) Supp 
(1988). "Developments in the Law - Medical Technology
and the Law" 1.990 Harv L Rev 1548.
329 La HB 327 Act No 583 (1987) codified as R S 9:2713; Nev 
Rev Stat CH 773 Sec 6(5) (1987) cited by Andrews 1987 
Hastings Center Rept 31 and 40 n 7.
330 MI S-228 (Einsfield) 517/373-2413 (1988) coded Mich 
Comp Laws Ann par 722.851-722.863 West Supp (1989);
1990 Harv L Rev 1548.
331 NE LB-674 402/471-2612 (1988) coded as Neb Rev Stat par 
25-21 200 Supp (1988).
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Arizona enacted legislation prohibiting surrogacy
contracts. During the same year legislation was enacted in
333Utah declaring it a misdemeanor to enter into a surrogacy
contract for profit and which renders all such agreements
334void. Washington approved legislation whereby it is a 
misdemeanor to enter into a surrogacy contract for profit 
and which renders all such agreements void.
3 32
10.3.2 SIGNIFICANT ASPECTS OF LEGISLATION ON SURR0GAC7 IN 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Arkansas legislation provides that the gestational mother of
a child born by artificial insemination, is the legal
mother, except in the case of surrogate mothers, where the
intended mother is considered the legal mother cf the child.
If a couple contracts with an unmarried surrogate, the
couple is the legal parents of the child and not the
335surrogate.
332 Act approved 28-04-1989 Ch 114 1989 Ariz Sess Laws 393 
codified at Ariz Rev Stat Ann Par 25-218 and as amended 
at Ariz Rev Stat Ann par 36-322 (1989); See 1990 High 
Tech L J 224.
333 Act approved 13-05-89 No 647 1989 Ark Act codified as 
amended at Ark Stat Ann par 9-10-201 (1989).
334 Act approved 13-05-1989 ch 404 Wash Laws 2178 codified 
at Wash Rev Code par 26.26.210 to 26.26.260 (1990).
335 Ark Rev Stat Ann Sec 34-720 - 21 3 Supp (1985) which 
simply provides in relation to surrogate motherhood 
that: "A child born by means of artificial insemination 
to a woman who is unmarried at the time of birth of the
(Footnote Continued)
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If an anonymous donor's sperm is used for the insemination, 
the child is the child of the woman intended to be the 
parent.
In Arizona the surrogate mother is declared the legal 
mother, and, if she is married, her husband is the presumed 
father.
The Florida Act provides for "pre-planned adoption".
Informal surrogacy arrangements are not completely 
prohibited. If an agreement provides for compensation - over 
and above actual expenses and fees for adoption - such an 
agreement is unenforceable. The agreement will, however, 
stil1. be evidence of the intent of the parties.
"Pre-planned adoption" agreements must contain certain 
minimum terms. Non-compliance with such agreements carries a
(Footnote Continued)
child, shall fcr all legal purposes be the child of the 
woman giving birth, except in the case of a surrogate
mother, in which event the child shall be that of the
woman intended to be the mother (My emphasis). For 
birth registration purposes in cases of surrogate 
mothers, the woman giving birth shall be presumed to be 
the natural mother and shall be listed as such on the 
certificate of birth, but a substituted certificate of 
birth can be issued upon orders of a court of competent, 
jurisdiction. See Special Project "Legal Rights and 
Issues Surrounding Conception, Pregnancy and Birth”
1986 Vand L Rev 638 n 183 - 4. The Arkansas statute is 
also cited by Andrews 1987 Hasting Center Rept on -1
and 40 n 6 and 1990 Harv L Rev 1549 and n 161.
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fine not exceeding $5 000 ana/or imprisonment of up to five
336years.
In the Indiana legislation, surrogacy as such is not 
prohibited, but once compensation, over and above necessary 
expenses, is involved, the agreement is void end 
unenforceable. Violation of surrogacy legislation carries a 
penalty of up to two years imprisonment and/or a $ 1 0 000 
fine. Penalties for violations are contained in the “child 
selling" statutes, ’ire-planned adoptions" are unlawful and 
such agreements may only be concluded after the birth of the 
child.
3 37Kansas legislation does not actively oppose surrogate 
motherhood. Compensation to the surrogate is not directly 
addressed. Advertising of surrogate services is excluded 
from the ban on advertising for the adoption or placement of 
children.
3 38In Kentucky surrogacy agreements are prohibited and 
unenforceable if compensation to the surrogate, or surrogacy 
agencies is involved. Non-commercial surrogacy agreements
336 1990 Surrogate Motherhood Gosten (ed) 262.
337 Kan Stat Ann par 65-509(d) (1985); 1990 Harv L Rev 1549 
and n 161.
338 Ky Rev Stat Ann par 199.590(3) (1988).
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are permitted. Penalties for non-compliance are contained in
339the "child selling" statutes. Fines are set at not less
than $500, but not more than $2 000 and/or six months 
imprisonment.
340In terms of the 1988 Michigan Act, it is a crime to enter 
into, or assist in the formation of a surrogacy contract for 
compensation. Surrogacy brokers can face fines of up to 
$50 000 and/or imprisonment of up to five years.
Participants in commercial surrogacy contracts, where 
compensation over and above actual medical expenses are 
paid, may face a fine of up to $ 1 0 000 and/or imprisonment 
of up to one year.
341The Nebraska legislation declares surrogacy contracts 
involving compensation void and unenforceable. No penalties 
are provided for violation and non-commercial surrogacy 
agreements are not prohibited.
339 KRS 199.590.
340 Mich Comp Laws Ann par 722.851-722.863 (1989).
341 Neb Rev Stat par 25-21.200 Supp (1988).
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New Hampshire permits surrogacy agreements, but grants 
the surrogate mother a period of seventy-two hours after the 
child's birth within which she may lawfully decide to keep 
the child. The legislation is comprehensive. It includes 
provisions requiring judicial pre-authorisation of surrogacy 
contracts, careful screening and home studies of the parties 
prior to judicial approval. The legislation restricts 
surrogacy to married couples.
343In the Utah legislation the surrogate mother, if she is 
married, and her husband, are deemed the child's legal 
parents.
344The Washington legislation provides no presumption 
regarding parenthood of the surrogate child but requires a 
court to determine who should have custody based on certain 
enumerated factors.
342
342 1990 N H House Bill 1426 F N par 168-B codified N H Rev 
Stat Ann par 168-B (effective Jan 1991); 1990 Harv L 
Rev 1548.
343 Utah Code Ann par 6-7-204 (1990).
344 Wash Rev Code par 26.26.210 to 26.26.260 (1990).
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Proposed legislation related to surrogate motherhood has 
been introduced in over half the state legislatures since
10.3.3 SIGNIFICANT ASPECTS OF PROPOSED LEGISLATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
10.3.3.1 LEGALITY
346Some states have proposed bills banning surrogacy
altogether. Some bills3 ®^ are specifically aimed at
prohibiting commercial surrogacy (where third parties and
349the surrogate make large profits). Some will allow only 
unpaid or altruistic surrogacy, whereas compensation of the 
surrogate for necessary expenses and under a regulatory
345 Charo R A in 19 9 0 Surrogate Motherhood Gostin (ed) 9 6 
and references cited at 116 n 34.
346 Alabama, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland and Wisconsin.
347 Alabama H 2 Sec 1 (Rains); Illinois H B 2101 Sec 3 
(Granberg); Iowa S F 358 (Hannon); Maryland HB 613 Sec 
A (Mitchell); Wisconsin Proposal (Rep Merkt); cited by 
Andrews 1987 Hastings Center Rept 40 at 8 .
348 For instance Florida, Kentucky, Michigan, New Jersey, 
New York, Oregon and Pennsylvania.
349 Florida S B 1081 Sec 63.212(1)<i) (Ros-Lehtinen); 
Kentucky 88 R S BR 219 Sec 3 (Travis); Michigan SB 228 
Sec 9(1) (Binsfeld et al); New Jersey NJ A 4138 sec 2 
(Kavanaugh et al); New York AB 5529 55-801 (1) 
(Schmidt); Oregon Or S B 456 Sec 2 (Hill and
Kerans)(Felonv) and Pennsylvania Pa H B 570 Sec 4305 
(by Markosek) cited by Andrews 1987 Hastings Center 
Rept 4 0 n 9.
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scheme, ranging in complexity, is provided for by others.
Statutes proposed in at least twelve states: California,
Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania and




In the majority of proposed bills and legislation already
enacted, commercial surrogacy agreements are considered
352unenforceable. In some legislation or proposed
350 District of Columbia (D C Consumer Protection and 
Regulation of Surrogate Parenting Centers Act of 1987, 
Bill 7-176 s 6 (e) (Ray)) and alternative bills in 
Florida (Fla S B 1297 Sec 1(3)(a) (Frank) in which 
payment may not be conditioned on the termination of 
parental rights. See also New York (A B 2403 sec 65-a 
(by Halpin) cited by Andrews 1987 Hastings Center Rept 
40 n 10.
351 Cal A B 1707 (Duffy et al); 111 S B 1510 (D’Arco); 111 
S B 1111 (Marovitz); Md HB 759 (Athey); Mass HB 5314 
(Morin); Mich H B 4753 (Clack et al); Minn H F 1647 
(Bishop et al); Mo H B 480 (Committee on Children,
Youth and Families); N.J Assembly No 3038 (Kern); N J
S 767 (DiFrancesco); N Y  S B  1429 (Dunne et al); Or HB 
3307 (Bunn et al); Or S B 384 (Hamby); Pa HB 776 
(Reber); also Pa S 742 (Lewis), which is identical to 
HB 776 except that it does not allow the surrogate to 
change her mind; S C  S 626 (Thomas) cited by Andrews
1987 Hastings Center Rept 40 n 22.
352 Alabama Ala H 1113 (Me Kee et al); Minnesota Minn S F 
1167 (Brandi et al) and Minn H F 1584 (Kelly et al); 
Nebraska (Neb L B 674 (Chambers) and New York (NY S B  
4641 (Marchi); H B 6277 (Barnett et al) cited by 
Andrews 1987 Hastings Center Rept at 40 n 12.
137
legislation, all forms of surrogacy agreements are
353considered unenforceable. A surrogacy agreement is
generally branded as a "commercial agreement" if the
surrogate mother receives compensation over and above
necessary expenses or where surrogacy h.okers make large 
354profits.
35510.3.3.3 REGULATION
In several states proposed bills will regulate all forms of
35 6surrogacy. Some favour the "contract law model" also 
referred to as the “streamlined approach", whereby the
353 Thus the Louisiana legislation La Stat Ann par 9:2713
West (1987), which became effective on 01-09-1987 
provides that: "(A) contract for surrogate motherhood 
as defined herein shall be absolutely null and shall be 
void and unenforceable as contrary to public policy". A 
surrogate motherhood contract is defined as: "(A)ny
agreement whereby a person not married to the 
contributor of the sperm agrees for valuable 
consideration to be inseminated, to carry any resulting 
fetus to birth, and then to relinquish to the 
contributor of the sperm the custody and all righs and
obligations to the child". See Stern 1988 - 1989 J of
Fam L 589 - 590; See also proposed bills in Connecticut 
(Conn H B 5398 Sec 1 (b) (Tulisano); Illinois 111 S B 
499 (Barkhausen); North Carolina N C S B  305
(Johnson); N C H 1205 (Miller) and Rhode Island R I
87-S-386 (Carlin) cited by Andrews 1987 Hastings Center 
Rept 40 n 11.
354 See the discussion supra.
355 The different forms of regulating surrogate motherhood 
are discussed in chapter 6 .
356 Rhode Island - RI Assembly 83 - H 6132 Jan sess (1983) 
and Alaska HR 498 12th Leg 1st Session (1981).
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legality of the contract is recognised as well as
35 7compensation to the surrogate mother. Automatic
termination of the parental rights of the surrogate mother
upon birth is provided for and sometimes also the subsequent
358adoption of the child by the commissioning couple, A
moderate regulatory approach, designed to establish the
legal status of the child, to ensure informed consent and
limit the possible abuses of the surrogacy practice, is
provided for in the "moderate approach" or "informed consent 
359model".
10,3.4 PROPOSED UNIFORM STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED 
CONCEPTION ACT
With the exception of the proposed Uniform Status of
Children of Assisted Conception Act drafted by the National
3 60Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, little
357 An example is the Arkansas legislation, discussed 
supra.
358 The Florida "pre-planned adoption" procedure discussed 
supra provides a good example of this model.
359 The California Bill Cal Assembly 1707 1985 - 1986 reg 
session (1985) which Tager "Surrogate Motherhood, Legal 
Dilemma" 1986 SALJ 381-404 at 403 recommended for South 
Africa, was based on this model. Other examples are 
Washington D C Council 6 - 152 (1985) and Michigan H B 
4554 (1985) and HB 4555 (1985).
3 60 This document was approved and recommended for
enactment in all the states at the Annual Conference 29 
July - 5 August 1988 in Washington D C.
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has been done by state legislatures to combine efforts 
regarding unification.
The Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act 
was designed primarily to regulate the status of children 
born by assisted conception and is child-oriented. The 
Committee is neutral on the issue of surrogacy and 
alternative legislative options regarding surrogacy, are 
provided for in the document. The procedure may either be 
judicially regulated or considered void. The proposed Act 
contains useful definitions of the "surrogate", "intended 
parents" "donor" and "assisted conception". The most 
important issues addressed in the proposed legislation are 
screening, informed consent, status of the child, and the 
option of obtaining approval by a court prior to entering 
into a surrogacy agreement.
10.3.5 EVALUATION OF UNITED STATES LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY
It is difficult to sum up the legislative position in the 
United States briefly because of the diversity of enacted 
and proposed legislation. It seems that most enacted and 
proposed legislation allow some forms of surrogacy - albeit 
under careful regulation and sometimes the careful scrutiny 
of a family court, similar to adoption applications. The 
Baby M case, as with the Baby Cotton case in Britain, 
unleashed considerable antagonism towards commercial or paid
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surrogacy. The concern about ”commercial surrogacy" is more 
pronounced in states where the courts have been confronted 
with surrogacy or related issues, for instance, Kentucky, 
Michigan, New York and New Jersey where "commercial 
surrogacy" is specifically prohibited. The Michigan 
legislation which forbids commercial surrogacy and is 
specifically opposed to "surrogacy brokers", provides a 
clear example of the legislature's concern about such 
practices. The $50 000 (maximum) penalty contained in the 
Act is the highest yet in any surrogacy legislation.
Court decisions on surrogacy and related matters, have
demonstrated the need for legislatures to take a stand on
surrogacy issues. It should not be left to the courts to
provide guidelines in this regard. The courts can, however,
play an important role in approving the contract prior to
insemination and determining whether the parties are
3 61adequately informed and have consented voluntary.
10.4 ISRAEL
361 This is provided for in proposed bills in Illinois, 
Massachusetts, Missouri, New Jersey, Nerf York, 
Pennsylvania, and South Carolina and probably 
originated from the recommendations of the Ontario Law 
Reform Commission in their Report on Human Artificial 
Reproduction and Related Matters Vol II 281 - 285. See 
the discussion and recommendations in chapter 6 .
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Subsequent to the Baby M decision in the U S A ,  it was 
reported that Israel had outlawed surrogate motherhood.
This step was taken by the Health Ministry on the grounds 
tnat "the practice was just unacceptable" and that it
3 62creates uncertainty regarding the parents of the child.
10.5 GERMANY
During April 1987 it was reported that Germany was preparing
363legislation to prohibit surrogate motherhood agreements.
Towards the end of 1989, it was again announced that the
364legislature intended banning surrogacy m  Germany. In a
discussion of this legislative prohibition ot surrogacy in
3 65Germany, important aspects were emphasised.
3 66The prohibition applies to commercial surrogacy only. The 
surrogate mother is considered the legal mother of the child 
and is under no obligation to hand the baby over to the
362 Reported in 1987 Amercian Medical News 23.
3 63 1907 Bulletin of Legal Developments 56.
364 Ad VermG 30 November 1989 in BGB1 I S 2017 ff,
365 Liermann, Prof Dr S "Ersatzmutterschaft und das Verbot 
ihrer Vermittlung" 1990 MDR 857 - 863.
366 134 BGB; 1990 MDR 861.
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367intended parents after birth. If she is willing to do so,
the intended parents may adopt the child and such adoption,
368once approved by the court, is irrevocable.
Commercial surrogacy agencies are prohibited from operating
in Germany or from assisting childless couples to conclude
agreements in other jurisdictions. Such agencies could face
369fines of up to DM50 000.
370During October 1990 it was again reported that the German
Parliament was to enact legislation banning human embryo
research, surrogate motherhood and posthumous artificial
371insemination. This Act, described as the strictest yet,
came into effect on 1 January 1991 The Act permits in vitro
fertilisation only when the ova comes from the woman who is 
to have the baby. No criminal sanctions are imposed on the
parties to a surrogacy arrangement, but medical
367 1990 MDR 860.
368 1754 1755 BGB and 1752 B G B; 1990 MDR 861.
369 1990 MDR 863.
370 The Daily Telegraph 25-10-1990; Pretoria News 29-10-90.
371 Bundesgesetzblatt Jahrgang 1990 Teil 1 Gesets zum
Schutz von Embryonen (Embryonenschutzgcsetz - ESchG) 
13-12-1990.
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practitioners performing illegal in vitro fertilisations can
372face up to three years in jail.
11 CONCLUDING NOTES
Although medical indications for utilising surrogate 
motherhood exist, this procedure of obtaining a baby 
contains a multitude of medical, legal, ethical and other 
problems. The experience in several countries has proved 
that commercial surrogacy, where large profits are made by 
the surrogate and third parties are regarded as being 
against public policy - an aspect which is dealt with in 
detail under public policy considerations (boni mores) in 
chapter 3.
There appears to be a tolerance towards surrogate motherhood 
in the absence of commercialisation and in the presence of a 
clear medical indication. The medical profession in both 
Britain and the United States seem hesitant as to the 
viability of the procedure and doctors who commit 
themselves, do so on tneir own conscience. In the absence of 
clear legislative guidelines, they are best advised to 
adhere strictly to guidelines provided by their individual 
societies or other representative bodies. It is clear that
372 S 4.
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more research is needed on psychological aspects affecting 
all the parties involved. The most important issues are 
so-called "bonding”, psychological effects on the surrogate 
child in later life and on the other children of a married 
surrogate mother.
The courts, faced with surrogacy issues, have had a 
frustrating task in general, due to few available 
guidelines. The decisive criterion has been the welfare of 
the child and in most instances the courts have endeavored 
to give a fair and equitable decision. The courts have 
generally followed a casuistic approach and have decided 
each case on its merits.
Some countries such as Britain and Australia (Victoria) have 
hastily condemned commercial surrogacy as immoral by 
enacting legislation prohibiting such practices. In Victoria 
the parties to surrogate agreements even face criminal 
prosecution. This is not the case in Britain and Germany 
where the possibility of tainting the child wich the 
criminal actions of the parents is acknowledged and avoided. 
This is commendable as the child is an innocent party and 
should not suffer for the actions of its parents. Unlike 
Britain and Australia, the U S states, have not hastily 
condemned surrogacy. The controversial Baby M case, has, 
however, rekindled the surrogacy debate and a number of
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states have subsequently enacted legislation and many states 
are at present considering legislation.
It is unlikely that a total prohibition of surrogacy will be 
effective and it is preferable for legal systems to take on 
the challenge and provide adequate guidelines.
Specific legal aspects are considered in the next four 
chapters in an attempt co evaluate the possible ways of 




Surrogate motherhood involves consideration of several 
fields of both public and private law. In the private law 
sphere important issues are regulated by the law of contract 
as there is an agreement between the parties which may be 
embodied in a formal written contract. However, the 
enforceability of such a contract is at present still 
uncertain. The law of persons is particularly important when 
the legitimacy of e. child is at issue or when aspects of 
parental power are involved. The law of delict is relevant 
when accountability for wrongful actions causing damage to a 
person arises, for instance when the wrongfulness of acts by 
medical practitioners or health-care workers has to be 
established.
In the sphere of public law, and specifically criminal law,
the breach of statutory requirements may result in criminal
liability. Several statutes, relevant to surrogate
. \>therhood, such as the Human Tissue Act* and the
2Regulations thereunder, the Registration of Marriages,
CHAPTER 3 CONTRACTUAL AND DELICTUAL ASPECTS
1 63 or lb 83.
2 No R 1132 No 10283 GG 20-06-1986.
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3 4Births and Deaths Act and the Child Care Act , contain
penal provisions. Administrative law plays an important role
in adoption proceedings, or where the court is called upon
to act in its capacity as upper guardian in the assessment
of parental power.
1.1 CONTRACTUAL ASPECTS
Two separate agreements are involved in surrogacy
arrangements - one between the doctor(s) and the patient(s)
based on a mandate, and cne between the parties themselves.
The doctor/patient relationship is discussed under delictual
and criminal liability of medical practitioners in assisted
5reproduction. In this chapter the discussion focuses on the 
agreement between the parties to the surrogacy arrangement.
Our legal system with its unique Roman-Dutch background, 
will not necessarily view the practice of surrogacy in the 
same light as many other jurisdictions, although there is 
undoubtedly much to be learnt from the history of surrogate
3 81 of 1963.
4 74 of 1983.
5 The doctor-patient relationship is discussed in chapter
6 .
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motherhood practices in jurisdictions such as the United 
States of America and Britain. 6
As the surrogacy agreement is affected by principles that 
form part of several legal fields, the most basic need for 
present purposes is to determine to what class or category 
of contract such agreements belong. If and when a South 
African court is called upon to decide a conflict of 
interests arising form a surrogacy arrangement, it will - in 
the absence of legislation - approach the issues on the 
basis of established common law principles. No doubt a 
court would also bear in mind the complexity presented by 
advances in modern-day birth technology.
The difficulty in applying "pure1* contractual principles to 
surrogacy arrangements, has forced courts in other 
jurisdictions faced with problems arising from breach of a 
surrogacy contract, to treat the matter as a custody suit 
rather than applying the usual principles of the law of 
7contract. In so doing, the child's Lest interest was 
regarded as overriding the contract entered into by the
6 As discussed in chapter 2.




parents and the surrogate mother. Although the criterion of 
the child’s best interest is undoubtedly of the utmost 
importance, it is submitted that ordinary principles of the 
law of contract also have a role to play in the settlement 
of disputes involving surrogacy arrangements.
9Clark, for instance, suggests the use ot paternity suit 
settlement contracts in surrogacy agreements, as these 
s~telement contracts are not a novelty to the legal system 
and may facilitate the decision of the courts in surrogacy 
cases.
Surrogacy agreements as we know them today, were entered 
into for the first time during the past decade or so. The 
cor^lex issues which have arisen around these agreements in 
the past few years cannot at first glance be “slotted into'1 
established legal categories. However, although it is 
perhaps convenient to classify any "new” or "different" 
social phenomenon which presents unique challenges to the 
legal system as sui generis and so open the door to creative 
lawmaking, South African courts have traditionally been
b See in general Clark N L “New Wine in Old Skins: Using
Paternity Suit Settlements to Facilitate Surrogate 
Motherhood” 1986 - 1987 J Fam Law 483 - 527. See a.1 so 
the New York case Matter of Adoption of Baby Girl 
discussed in chapter 2.
9 1986 - 1987 J Fam Law 504.
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reluctant to follow the path of judicial activism. The 
principles of jus est dicere sed non dare is still 
predominant in the minds of our judges. It is therefore 
necessary to endeavour to establish a sound theoretical 
basis for surrogacy agreements in our system. Should a 
surrogacy agreement be classified as a contract merely 
because it is usually contained in a written agreement 
signed by the parties, or is it merely a "gentleman’s 
agreement” which is legally unenforceable?
In search of answers to these questions, one is compelled to 
revert to the roots of our law. As a surrogacy agreement is 
based on consensus between the parties, important aspects of 
the law of obligations, especially during the classical 
period, may prove helpful in the resolution of disputes 
arising from surrogacy agreements. In particular, light may 
be shed on the juristic nature of such agreements.
Although an in-depth examination of the law of obligations 
falls outside the scope of this work, aspects which could be 
relevant to the surrogacy agreement will be examined 
briefly. Having determined the nature of the agreement, the 
content will then be analysed in the light of these findings 
with due regard to statutory and other relevant 
considerations, and submissions will be made regarding the 
enforceability or otherwise of such agreements.
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As the surrogacy agreement has, in legal literature, 
sometimes been referred to as a "gentleman's agreement", and 
therefore unenforceable, one must consider whether we are 
dealing with a pactum or nudum pactum. The phrases ex nudo
pacto non oritur actio^ 0 and ne ex pacto actio nascatur1 1
12are not unknown to present-day South African law.
The system of pacta in Roman and Roman-Dutch law is complex 
and only those aspects which may bear some relevance to 
surrogate motherhood agreements are discussed.
In Roman law agreements which could not be classified under
contracts, were referred to as pacta. In early Roman law
pacta were informal agreements for redemption from
13liability. Initially these pacta were unenforceable and 
did not give rise to an action (*ctio). Later, however, some
2 SOCIAL AGREEMENTS AND CONTRACTS
10 Ulpianus D 2 14 7 4. According to the translation by 
Van Zyl D H 1977 Romeinse Privaatreg 446, it means that 
when a cause (causa) is absent, it is clear that there 
can be no obligation: a mere agreement (nuda pactio) 
does not give rise to an action, although it provides 
an exception (exceptio) and according to C 2 3 10, no 
action can be maintained from a (mere) agreement.
11 Ulpianus D 2 14 7 5.
12 Jajbhay v Cassini 1939 AD 537 at 542. See also Van Zyl
1977 Romeinse Privaatreg 322 n 290.
13 See Dannenbring R 1980 Roman Private Law 199.
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pacta were made actionable by the Praetor - for instance 
the pacta praetoria - and others only by post-classical
15imperial legislation - for instance the pacta legitima. In
the t"j. a f ;ui5tinian16 almost all forms of pacta were
17enforceable and actionable.
14
In Roman-Dutch law, under the influence of Canon law, the ex
nudo pacto non oritur actio principle was still recognised
and a contract could only be enforced if the parties had a
18serious and deliberate intent to be legally bound.
In present day South African law it is still a requirement 
for the formation of a contract that the transaction must be 
entered into seriously and deliberately with the intention
14 The Praetor, an officer with wide powers in legal
administration, was first appointed in 367 BC; see Van 
Zyl 1977 Romeinse Privaatreg 15 - 16. Although his 
powers were initially more limited, the Praetor 
peregrinus, appointed in 242 BC to deal with peregrini 
or foreigners "could use an equitable power, and 
frequently equitable fictions, to extend the narrow 
limits of the old civil law**; Sandars T C 1917 The 
institutes of Justinian 11.
x5 runnenbri.ig 1980 Roman Private Law 199.
16 Roman Emperor 527 - 565 AD who played an important role
in the preservation of Roman law in the Eastern Empire.
17 Van Zyl 1977 Romeinse Privaatreg 322.
18 My emphasis. See Conradie v Rossouw 1919 AD 279 at 289
and the authorities cited. According to Voet the 
agreement must have been entered into serio ac 
deliberato animo.
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to be legally bound. Mere promises or social agreements,
2 0where this intention is absent, are not contracts. Kerr,
in confirming this requirement refers to the following
21quotation from Pothier: "There are ... promises made with
fairness and a real design of accomplishing them, but 
without any intention of giving the person to whom they are 
made a right of demanding their performance. This is the 
case where a person makes a promise, intimating at the same 
time that he does not mean to engage himself; or when such a 
reservation can be implied from the circumstances of the 
case, or the relative characters of the person making the 
promise, and the person to whom it is made,"
Where a surrogate mother thus merely promises to carry a 
baby for the commissioning couple without the parties having 
the intention to be legally bound, there can be no valid
contract. Should the parties, however, agree on the
22fundamental aspects of a surrogacy arrangement and
19
19 Conradie v Rossouw supra. Joubert D J 1987 General
Principles of the Law of Contract 33 - 34; Lubbe G and
Murray C 1988 Farlam & Hathaway Contract 2 37; Kerr A J
1982 The Principles of the Law of Contract 21 - 22.
20 1982 Principles 21 - 22.
21 The quotation is from the final paragraph of para 3 of 
his treatise on Obligations.
22 See the discussion infra under the Content of a 
Surrogacy Agreement and the Analysis of a Proposed 
Surrogate Mother Agreement Model in chapter 4.
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thereafter, with the intention that a lawful obligation 
should be established, sign an agreement in which their 
intent is seriously and deliberately stated, it is not 
merely a "gentleman's agreement".
Unless the causa in such an agreement is, for instance,
iniusta, illicita, inhonesta or turpis, (an aspect which is
dealt with in greater detail under the discussion of the
23 .boni mores), it is submitted that the agreement is 
binding.
It is further submitted that a surrogacy agreement cannot be
classified as a nudum pactum. The mere fact that the
enforceability of such contracts is not entirely beyond
doubt at this stage, does not mean that there is no binding
agreement. As discussed in the surrogate motherhood contract 
24model, the written contract should preferably contain a 
clause in which the parties unequivocally state their intent 
to be legally bound.
3 HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: CLASSIFICATION OF
CONTRACTS IN ROMAN LAW AND THE APPLICABILITY 
THEREOF TO SURROGACY AGREEMENTS
23 See the discussion infra.
24 See chapter 4.
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The classification of contracts in Roman law depended 
largely on the manner in which the contract was concluded, 
for instance, re, verbis, litteris and consensu 
contractae. 2 5
In this discussion the focus is on the so-called consensu
contractae which, as a result of their consensual basis, may
provide a familiar background to our understanding of the
unique agreement between a commissioning couple and a
surrogate mother and which, today, forms the basis of all
contracts. The consensu contractae, which were enforceable 
J fiex fide bona, include sale (emptio venditio), rent
(locatio conductio), partnership (societas) and mandate
(mandatum). Moreover, these specific forms of contract today
have the same requirements in South African law and are thus
27relevant to the present position. Because surrogacy is 
often conceptualised as a form of rental, either of the body
25 Dannenbring 1980 Roman Private Law 198 with reference
to Gaius 3 89.
26 Although the binding effect of the consensual contracts 
rested solely on fides, they were later, in the early 
classical period, accepted in the ius civile. See 
Dannenbring 1980 Roman Private Law 198 - 199. On the 
aspect of fides in Roman law, see also Schulz F 1936 
Principles of Roman Law 224 - 245.
27 See G 3 135; Inst 3 22 pr; Dannenbring 1980 Roman
Private Law 198. See also Kahn E (ed) 1985 Contract
and Mercantile Law Through the Cases 3 et seq, 9 et
seq; De Wet J C and Van Wyk A H 197 8 De Wet en Yeats - 
Die Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktereg en Handelsreg 313 et 
seq, 278 et seq.
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of the surrogate or of her services, the Roman law contract 
of lease, the locatio conductio, may provide a starting 
point for a possible classification. The mandate (mandaturn) 
plays an important role in the doctor/patient relationship, 
but needs no further discussion in this section. A 
discussion of partnership (societas) similarly falls outside 
the scope of this discussion.
The generic locatio conductio of Roman law, was subdivided
into locatio conductio rei (rental of a thing in commercio),
locatio conductio operis and locatio conductio operarum. The
locatio conductio rei, or rental of a thing in commercio is
clearly inapplicable to the surrogacy arrangement and will
not be further considered. However, the locatio conductio
operarum or contract for services, and the locatio conductio
operis, or contract for work are, it is submitted, not
without possible relevance because they still exist in
2 8present day South African law.
The distinction between a contract for services and a 
contract for work is not always easily ascertainable. 
Considering the locatio conductio operis, or contract for 
work, one finds that in these agreements compensation was
2 8 Christie 1981 Law of Contract 510; Kahn (ed) 19 85




for the intended end-result of the agreement. In the case
of surrogacy, this would mean that compensation would be
rendered to the surrogate mother for the end result of her
work, ie, for the baby resulting from the agreement. As
this comes dangerously close to the unacceptable concept of
"baby buying" which is most certainly contra bonos mores, it
is submitted that the locatio conductio operis is not a
suitable bridge between our Roman law background and the
present needs of a developing society. On the other hand,
the locatio conductio operarum does not have this
disadvantage. Although seldom used in a society in which
the institution of slavery rendered it unlikely that a free
man would find it necessary to offer his services to
30another , this well-established agreement, when it was
used, provided that any compensation due was for the
services rendered and is still prevalent in South African
31law today. Translated into present day surrogacy terms, 
this would in effect mean that the surrogate would be
29
29 De Wet and Van Wyk 1978 Kontraktereg en Handelsreg 339.
30 Van Oven J C 1948 Leerbcek van Romeinsch Privaatrecht
27 9 - 280; Van Zyl 1977 Romeinse Privaatreg 302 n 205; 
Thomas Ph J 1980 Essensialia van die Romeinse Reg 129. 
See also Dannenbring 1980 Roman Private Law 223, who 
points out that although even professional services 
were rendered gratuitously, those who received the 
services thus rendered became morally obliged to make a 
presentation (honorarium or salarium) in return.
31 De Wet and Van Wyk 197 8 Kontraktereg en Handelsreg 3 38 
et seq; Christie 1981 Law of Contract 510 - 511.
158
compensated for her services, ie, for carrying the baby to
term and giving birth to it. The contract for services is
consequently in this sense a contract for personal services/
as amongst the most important undertakings by the surrogate
mother are to act as a host mother - or as it has been
32expressed to "rent her womb" for the full period of 
pregnancy - to give birth to the baby, and to relinquish 
whatever parental power she may have to the child.
An important point of difference between a surrogacy
agreement and an ordinary contract for personal services, is
the lack of control which a surrogate mother possesses over
the performance of the entire contract, ie, the inability to
stop the performance in the middle of the contract, the
inability to control the quality of her performance and the
inability to avoid emotional bonding between herself and the
33foetus. Furthermore, surrogate mothers are often motivated
34by altruistic considerations and compensation which was a
32 See Sly K M "Baby-Sitting Consideration: Surrogate 
Mother's Right to "Rent her Womb" for a fee." 19 82 -
1983 Gonz L Rev 539 - 565. This terminology is more 
appropriate in cases where the surrogate is merely a 
"carrier" or "host” mother and does not make any 
genetic contribution to the child - the so-called 
"full" surrogacy cases.
33 Cunningham K J ’Surrogate Mother Contracts: Analysis of 
a Remedial Quagmire“ 1988 Emory L J 721 - 753.
34 Parker Philip J “Motivation of Surrogate Mothers: 
Initial Findings'* 1983 Am J Psychiatry 118. One must
(Footnote Continued)
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prerequisite for the traditional contract for services or
35sale is not necessarily present.
In the light of these considerations, it would appear that 
the surrogacy agreement (explicitly as a contract for 
services), cannot comfortably fit into the mould of the 
Roman law agreements governing rent - locatio conductio - 
although their are some similarities.
Should the surrogate mother be compensated, surrogacy is
3 6sometimes also equated with the sale (emptio) of a child. 
Briefly, the requirements for emptio and venditio in Roman 
law were consensus between the parties to buy and sell an 
object (res or merx) which had to be in commercio (of 
commercial value). The parties also had to reach consensus 
on the price (pretium). Although it was possible for a 
person to sell something which belonged to another, it was
(Footnote Continued)
bear in mind that the data were collected in the USA 
where most surrogacy cases are commercial.
35 Van Zyl 1977 Romeinse Privaatreg 30.
36 Annas G J and Elias S "In Vitro Fertilization and
Embryo Transfer: Medicolegal Aspects of a New Technique 
to Create a Family" 1983 Fam L Q 221. See the British
decision A v C (1987) 8 Fam Law 170 and 19 84 Fam Law
241 C A where Comyn J considered the contract contra
bonos mores and stated that “the purported contract 
(was) for the sale and purchase of a child1'. See also 
the dissecting opinion of Vance J in the USA in 
Surrogate Parenting Associates v Kentucky 7 04 S W 2d 
209 (1986).
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(and still is) impossible for someone to buy something which
37already belongs to him. This principle still applies 
today.
Although the buying and selling of slaves was common
practice in the Roman Empire and during the time of the
Republic, this practice has long been abolished and any
contract resembling slavery undoubtedly contravenes public
39policy. It is of course altogether unacceptable to regard
40a baby as an object of commercial value and the equation 
of surrogate motherhood with "baby selling" shows a lack of 
understanding of the motivations and intent behind this 
agreement.
A second point for consideration is the relationship between 
a parent and child. Although children were considered to ne 
the "possessions" of the paterfamilias in Roman law in the
37 Thomas 1980 Essentialia 118; Van Zyl 1977 Romeinse 
Privaatreg 288 with reference to D 18 1 28 (Ulpianus 
libro quadragensimo primo ad Sabinum): Rem alienam 
distrahere quem posse nulla dubitatio est; nam emptio 
est et venditio; sed res emptori auferri. potest.
38 Cawcutt v Teperson and Saacks 1916 CPD 406.
39 Christie 1981 Law of Contract 374 and the cases cited 
in n 2 1 2 .
40 For a discussion of the commercial aspects of surrogate 
motherhood, see O'Brien S “Commercial Conceptions: A 
Breeding Ground for Surrogacy* 1986 N C L Rev 127 - 
153.
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sense that he could decide, for instance, whether to sell
them, give them away in marriage, have them adopted or
41emancipated, this is no longer the case. One can claim
42only parental power over a child. Spiro defines parental 
power as "the sum total of rights and duties of parents in 
respect of minor children arising out of parentage'*. One of 
the most important rights is custody, while duties include 
support, but not "ownership” in the sense of absolute power 
over the child.
The question of "ownership" in a surrogate motherhood
arrangement was specifically addressed by Sorkow J in the
American state court trial when the Baby M case was first
43heard m  New Jersey. He stated that a person cannot
44purchase something which already belongs to him/her. In 
casu the intended father was also the genetic father of the 
child. Not all decisions are equally clear, as is strikingly 
illustrated by the decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court 
in- the Baby M case, which concluded that surrogacy involves 
either an impermissible "purchase" of a child, or payment
41 See Spiro E 1985 Law of Parent and Child 1 and the
references cited in n 1 and 42.
42 1985 Law of Parent and Child 36.
43 For a discussion of this case see chapters 2 and 5.
44 This is also the case in South Africa. See De Groot 3
14 9; Cawcutt v Teperaon and Saacks supra.
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for relinquishing parental rights to the child. In the
4 6English decision A v C, Comyn J, having found the contract 
contra bonos mores, stated baldly that "the purported
47contract (was) for the sale and purchase of a child". In
48Surrogate Parenting Assoc v Kentucky ex rel Armstrong, the
Kentucky Supreme Court distinguished clearly between
surrogate motherhood contracts and the buying and selling of
children as prohibited by statute. According to the court
the rationale of the prohibition on compensation for
adoption is "to keep baby brokers from overwhelming cin
expectant mother or the parents of a child with financial
inducements to part with the child". The court further said:
"In surrogate motherhood, the central fact of the procedure
is that the agreement is entered into prior to conception on
a voluntary basis and free from coercion." The court
therefore found that the agency, Surrogate Parenting
Association, did not operate in contravention of the statute
which prohibits the sale or purchase of a child for 
49adoption.
45
45 Baby M 109 N J at 437 - 438, 537 A 2d at 1248.
46 Discussad in chapter 2 under English Court Decisions.
47 At 457 of the report.
48 Discussed in chapter 2 under USA Court Decisions.
49 Ibid.
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Despite the fact that opponents of surrogate motherhood are 
inclined to refer to the arrangement as the sale of a child, 
this must be disputed. From an analysis of sale (emptio) it 
seems clear that the surrogacy contract cannot be classified 
as a contract for the sale of a child.
From the historical analysis, it appears that surrogate 
motherhood agreements have more in common with lease 
(locatio conductio) than with sale (emptio). These consensu 
cortractae, however, offer no satisfactory solution to the 
controversy surrounding the classification of the surrogacy 
agreement. Attention will therefore be turned to other 
forms of agreements which may bear some relevance to 
surrogate motherhood.
3.1 NATURAL OBLIGATIONS (OBLIGATIONES NATURALES) 50
Although in form, natural obligations have the same 
characteristics as other obligations, for instance those 
emanating from a contract, there is one important 
difference: they are unenforceable or cannot be executed. 
Examples in Roman law are, for instance, an agreement 
between a paterfamilias and someone in his power and
50 As opposed to civil obligations which are enforceable. 
See Joubert 19 8 7 General Principles of the Law of 
Contract 12.
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■ - 51agreements concluded by the filiusfammas. This probably
prompted Sandars to remark that natural obligations most
52probably always emanated from pacts (pacta).'
Natural obligations were known not only to Roman and
53Roman-Dutch law but also to South African law. Although
natural obligations are not enforceable as such, this does
54not imply that they are totally without legal force. The
law allows some effect, possibly because of the moral claim
55to recognition they involve. The parties were bound by a
tie which the jurists ascribed to the sphere of the lex
56naturae or jus gentium. Sandars provides the example of a 
slave, who could not bind himself contractually. Should he 
be freed, however, he was bound by natural obligation and a
51 For a more detailed description see Van Zyl 1977 
Romeinse Privaatreg 249 and 249 n 7; Sandars 1917 The 
Institutes of Justinian 323.
52 1917 The Institutes of Justinian 323.
53 De Wet and Van Wyk 1978 Kontraktereg en Handelsreg 1. 
Examples are gambling contracts.
54 Sandars 1917 The Institutes of Justinian 323.
55 Sandars 1917 The Institutes of Justinian 323. See also 
Lee R W and Honore A M et al 19 50 The South African Law 
of Obligations 17 0.
56 The Romans divided their law in the ius civile which 
was only applicable to Roman citizens and the ius 
honorarium which was applicable to citizens and 
non-citizens. Sandars 1917 The Institutes of Justinian
323 with reference to D 1 17 84 1 in this regard: "Is 
natura debet quem jure gentium dare oportet, cuju3 
fidem secuti sunnis.1*
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suretyship could be created to give effect to sucli an
5 7 . .obligation. In Van Oven's opinion natural obligations have 
always played an important role in the history of private 
law. Their equitable characteristics help to alleviate the 
sometimes harsh results of the application of "strict law" 
and in the grey area between lav; and morals, they help to 
satisfy our Genre of justice, especially in a changing 
society, a.g a general rule performance rendered could not be 
reclaimed, but the claim could be raised by set-off.
5 8Joubert points out that, with the exception of common-law 
wagers, natural obligations in present day South African law 
"is something of a rarity". He, however, explains that the 
term "natural obligation" is used to describe cases wn^re a 
normal obligation does not come into existence, as a result 
of the absence of a specific requirement for liability. It 
is then sometimes argued that a moral obligation arises. The 
term also refers to duties which car.not be enforced in the 
normal way, ie for which no remedies such as specific 
performance or damages exists. The obligation, however
retains the characteristic of a duty, wnich cannot be
u. 9enforced." Joubert further indicates that there have been
t i ’i 4'J 1 j-«< •. n-r:;ek van Romeinsch t  r i.vaatrecht 3 85 .
■ n !,-‘rtf' £vrincxpitfp of tiie Laiu of Contract 14 * 15.
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attempts to extend the term to cases where a statutory 
provision makes the contract unenforceable, but a more 
equitable solution would be to provide some relief to the 
party who has suffered harm. This extension is, according to 
him, not universally recognised.^
A modern day example of a natural obligation is found in the 
decision of Allison v Massel and Massel. 61 In casu an 
agreement was concluded between a client and his attorney, 
whereby the latter agreed to represent the former for an 
amount agreed upon, but a bill of costs had not been taxed. 
The court found the agreement to be a natural obligation, 
with the result that the attorney may not sue for his fees 
until a bill of costs had been taxed. The debt cannot be 
recovered by action such as the condictio indebiti, but a 
set-off between the debt owed to each other was still 
possible.
3.2 INNOMINATE CONTRACTS
Innominate contracts also form a complex system in Roman law 
and cannot be dealt with adequately within the scope of this 
discussion. There are, however, some characteristics, which
60 Ibid.
61 1954 4 SA 560 T.
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also apply to surrogacy arrangements which will be 
discussed.
Contracts which fell outside the sphere of the recognised
forms of contract such as sale and locatio conductio, were
6 2termed innominate contracts. The contract came into
existence by a thing having been done or given by one party,
6 3who then expected the other to perform. Although such
agreements were, strictly speaking, not contracts, the
Praetor would, if one of the parties had already performed
in terms of the agreement, force the other party to do so as
64well. These were referred to as actiones in factum.
Innominate contracts in the meaning explained above have 
little significance in our present day legal system since 
all contracts are consensual. There is, however, one
62 For a discussion of innominate contracts see Sandars 
1917 The Institutes of Justinian 322; Van Zyl 1977 
Romeinse Privaatreg 321; Dannenbring 19 80 Roman Private 
Law 200.
63 See Paulus D 19 5 5 pr (Paulus libro quinto 
quaestionum): describes it as follows: u... aut do tibi 
ut des, aut do ut facias, aut facio ut des, aut facio 
ut facias" - I give something to you so that you must 
give something to me, or I give so that you are bound 
to do something for me, or I do something for you so 
that you are bound to give me something or I do 
something for you so that you are bound to do something 
for me.
64 For a more detailed discussion see Van Zyl 1977 
Romeinse Privaatreg 322; Sandars 1917 The Institutes of 
Justinian 322.
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important analogy between innominate contracts and surrogacy 
agreements. Neither is a standard form of contract, as they 
fall outside the sphere of recognised contracts. In this 
wide sense of the word, surrogacy can be regarded as a 
modern day innominate contract.
4 THE CONTENT OF A SURROGACY AGREEMENT65
In a basic surrogacy agreement, the surrogate mother agrees
to undergo artificial insemination either by AID66 with
sperm from the commissioning husband or, in full surrogacy,
by transfer of the embryo resulting from in vitro
fertilisation to her uterus. She agrees to carry the baby to
full term and to relinquish all parental rights after the
birth of the child. In partial surrogacy, the commissioning
husband agrees to the insemination of the surrogate with his
sperm, to be identified as the genetic father at birth, to
accept financial responsibility for the child, and to take
6 7custody of the baby at birth. Beyond the basic agreement,
65 The full content of a surrogacy agreement is discussed 
in chapter 4.
66 Artificial insemination with donor sperm.
67 Greenberg L J and Hirsh H L "Surrogate Motherhood and 
Artificial Insemination: Contractual Implications" 1982 
Med Trial Tech Q 15 3.
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additional terms may be agreed upon and included in the 
written contract. 68
The intent in a surrogacy agreement is unique, and although 
surrogate motherhood contracts have characteristics in 
common with some well-known specific contracts such as 
locatio conductio operarum or contract for services, it is 
submitted that the surrogacy agreement is an agreement sui 
generis for the reasons already discussed and should be 
treated as such. Having reached this conclusion, the 
legality of the agreement must be considered.
4.1 REQUIREMENTS FOR THE VALIDITY OF CONTRACTS
If an agreement is to be of legal force and effect as a 
contract the requirements laid down by law must be met.
The parties must have the legal capacity to contract, the 
object of the agreement must be physically possible and must 
be legally possible, ie must not be prohibited by law.
Requirements regarding contractual formalities need not be 
discussed in depth, since, with the exception of 
hire-purchase contracts, sales of land and contracts of 
suretyship, no formalities are required for the conclusion
68 See the details in the discussion of the Terms of the 
Contract in chapter 4.
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of contracts. Where the parties themselves have laid down
rules for future conduct in a written contract, these must 
70be adhered to.
Regarding the requirement of physical possibility, it should 
not provide an obstacle in surrogacy agreements, but it is 
strongly advised that surrogacy should only be made 
available to adult, married persons over the age of 2 1 and 
for whom there are no other alternatives of having a child.
A surrogate mother who offers her services to a 
commissioning couple, should herself not be infertile or 
physically incapable of undertaking the pregnancy and 
delivery of the child.
The requirement of legality, however, provides an obstacle 
and needs to be fully discussed.
4.2 LEGALITY
A requirement for the validity of all contracts, is that the 
conclusion of the contract and object or purpose of the
69
69 Kerr 1982 Principles 135 and n 271, 272 and 273.
70 Kerr 1982 Principles 96 - 97 and 141.
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contract must not be contrary to a legal rule, whether
7 1contained in a statute or common law.
A surrogacy agreement will only be valid and enforceable if
it does not contravene an Act of Parliament or other
statutory provision, and is not considered as contra bonos
72mores. Although the contract itself may not be illegal m
the sense that it is not concluded in contravention of a
statutory provision, some writers are of the opinion that it
is immoral per se or contra bonos mores and therefore null 
7 3and void. This is specifically the case in commercial
7 4surrogacy agreements. Others argue that it may not be 
illegal but merely unenforceable.
71 This is sometimes comprised within the so-called iusta 
causa requirement. Joubert 19 87 General Principles of 
the Law of Contract 129. See also Conradie v Rossouw 
supra 279; Kennedy v Steenkamp 1936 CPD 17; Froman v 
Robertson 1971 1 SA 115 A; Saambou-Nasionale 
Bouvereniging v Friedman 1979 3 SA 978 A.
72 1978 De Wet and Van Wyk Kontraktereg en Handelsreg 80; 
Christie 1981 Law of Contract 373.
73 O'Brien S 1986 N C L Rev 127 at 148; SapDideen C "The 
Surrogate Mother - A Growing Problem" 1983 U New S 
Wales L J 90.
74 Furrow B R “Surrogate Motherhood: A New Option for 
Parenting?" 1984 Law, Med & Health Care 112; Erickson E 
A "Contracts to Bear a Child" 1978 Cal L Rev 621 - 622; 
Mady T M "Surrogate Mothers: The Legal Issues*’ 1981 Am 
J L & Med 345.
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A complex question in surrogacy agreements is whether the 
agreement is "a good and legitimate one, and not one
7 5contrary to law or morality or public policy".
Furthermore, it must be established whether surrogate 
motherhood arrangements conflict with any existing statutory 
enactments.
Attention must consequently be given, first, to an 
evaluation of the boni mores and, secondly, to legislation 
presently affecting surrogacy agreements.
75 Rood v Wallacn 1904 TS 187 212; Froman v Robertson 
supra at 120 H.
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4.2.1 PUBLIC POLICY AND BONI MORES
7 fiThe boni mores principle was acknowledged in Roman law and
is also recognised in modern Dutch law, which recognises
that a contract is void if statutory requirements are not
complied with or if its purpose is immoral or the public
77order is contravened. Similarly, a contract contravening
legislation or public policy is invalid and unenforceable in
7 8English law. The harmful tendency must be clear and the
injury to the public must be a probable and not merely a
79possible consequence. The same principles apply in South 
African law. 80
7 6 Pacta quae contra leges constitutionesque, vel contra 
bonos mores fiunt, nullam vim habere indubitati juris 
est. C 2 3 6 (Imp Antoninus); Van Zyl 1977 Romeinse 
Privaatreg 25 3 n 19.
77 Art 1373 B W (strijdig met die goede zeden of openbare 
orde); Rutten L E H C Asser's 1975 Handleiding t_ot de 
Beoefening van het Nederlands Burgerlijk Recht: 
Verbintenissenrecht: Algemene Leer der Overeenkomsten
180.
7 8 Treitel G H 197 9 The Law of Contract 32.
79 Treitel 1979 The Law of Contract 32 n 80 citing
Fender v St John Mildnay (19 38) AC 1 13.
80 197 8 De Wet and Van Wyk Kontraktereg en Handelsreg 80;
Christie 1981 Law of Contract 373; Kerr 1982 Principles 
9 9 et seq.
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4.2.2 MEANING OF THE BONI MORES IN SOUTH AFRICAN LAW
4.2.2.1 GENERAL REMARKS
The concept of the boni mores i.s a very wide one reflecting
the juristic convictions of the community. It is founded on
ethical, moral and social perceptions and differs from
community to community, from country to country, and from
time to time. In countries like South Africa with
heterogeneous populations, it is often difficult to
generalise on the precise content of prevailing societal
perceptions although broad consensus can be identified in
81certain instances.
O 94.2.3 THE BONI MORES - LAW OF CONTRACTS
In deciding whether a contract is illegal it is usually
accepted that this is the case where it is contrary to
8 3public policy or contra bonos mores. Although it has been 
argued that the former concept has a wider meaning than the
81 See Strauss S A and Strydom M J 19 67 Die 
Suid-Afrikaanse Geneeskundige Reg 185.
82 See in general Lubbe G “Bona Fides, Billikheid en die 
Openbare Belang in die Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktereg" 
1990 Stell L R 7 - 25.
83 For a discussion of this aspect see Joubert 1987 
General Principles of the Law of Contract 132 - 133; 
Lubbe and Murray 19 88 Farlam & Hathaway Contract 240.
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latter, the concepts are utilised interchangeably in this 
thesis.
It is a general principle of the law of contracts that all
agreements seriously entered into are to be enforced by the
courts, unless they are against public policy or good
84morals. Although the court is empowered with a discretion 
in this regard, it should be exercised with caution and 
utilised only if the "harm to the public is substantially 
incontestable’.
The boundaries of what is contrary to public policy have
never been expressly delineated. Over the years, the courts
have established categories of such contracts by means of
8 6judicial precedent. There is, however, not a nuinerus
84 Christie 1981 Law of Contract 375 with reference to a 
dictum by Innes J in Eastwood v Shepstone 1902 TS 294 
at 302; Kerr 1982 Principles 118; Edouard v 
Administrator, Natal 1989 2 SA 368 D & CLD at 378 I - 
J.
85 Christie 1981 Law of Contract with reference to 
Williamson A J's judgment in Kuhn v Karp 1948 4 SA 825 
T at 838 - 840. Aquilius "Immorality and Illegality in 
^^ntract" 1941 SALJ 346 is of the opinion that (a) 
contract against public policy is one stipulating a 
performance which is not per se illegal or immoral bit 
which the Courts, on grounds of expedience, will not 
enforce, because performance will detrimentally affect 
the interests of the community"; Edouard v 
Administrator Natal supra 378 J - 379 C.
3 6 Kerr 19 82 Principles 9 8 et seq; Christie 19 81 Law of
Contract 341 et seq; Joubert 19 87 General Principles of 
the Law of Contract 132 et seq.
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clausus of contracts which may be considered against public
8 7policy. Included in established categories are, inter alia 
contracts encouraging crime, delict and other unlawful acts
Q Qand contracts injurious to the institution of marriage. 
Whether surrogacy agreements fall into any of these 
categories is considered infra.
4.2.4 THE BONI MORES - LAW OF DELICT AND CRIMINAL LAW
8 9The boni mores criterion is utilised in the law of delict
90and criminal law to determine the wrongfulness of an act.
Although a single act may constitute a delict as well as a
crime, it is not necessarily the case and one may therefore
assume that the application of the boni mores criterion will
91differ m  these fields.
87 Magna Alloys & Research (SA) (Pty) Ltd 1984 4 SA 874 A 
891.
88 Christie 1981 Law of Contract 347 et seq; Lubbe and 
Murray 1988 Farlam and Hathaway Contract 236 et seq.
89 See in general Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 1950 Law 
of Delict 31 et seq.
90 Snymaii C R 1986 Strafreg 99.
91 Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 1990 Law of Delict 34 
n 27 with reference to Strauss S A 1961 Toestennning tot 
Benadeling as Verweer in die Strafreg en die Deliktereg 
LLD Unisa 1961; Van der Merwe N J and Olivier P J J 
1989 Die Onregmatige Daad in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 4 9
- 51.
\In adjudicating legal conflicts resulting in civil suits or 
criminal prosecutions, it is the task of the court to 
interpret what the convictions of society are in relation to 
the issue before it.
An act is wrongful in the law of delict if a legally
recognised interest has been factually infringed in a
legally reprehensible or unreasonable i anner - there must
thus be factual infringement coupled with violation of a
92legal norm. The general norm or criterion which is used to
determine whether the infringement is unlawful is the legal
93convictions of the community - the boni mores.
9 4 95On the strength of Roman law, Joubert states that the 
boni mores concept in the law of delict - specifically
9 6injuria - does not refer to "goeie Bedes" (good morals) as 
such, but rather to “die gemeenskap se opvattings aangaande 
wat behoorlik is" (society's notions as to what is 
proper).
177
92 Neethiing, Potgieter and Vis^er 1990 Law of Delict 29.
93 Neethiing, Potgieter and Visser 1990 Law of Delict 31 -
32.
94 D 47 10 15 6 .




It is said that in utilising the boni mores as a delictual
criterion for wrongfulness, it is not important what the
community regards as socially, morally, ethically or
religiously right or wrong, but rather whether or nob the
98community regards the act as delictually wrong. It is
99thus a legal criterion. This view is supported by several
100writers.
The courts have adopted the boni mores or general
reasonableness criterion on a number of occasions as a
juridical yardstick*which gives expression to the
prevailing convictions of the community regarding right and
wrong. Thus it was stated in O'Keeffe v Argus Printing and
102Publishing Co Ltd: ‘'Whether an act is to be placed
amongst those that involve an insult, indignity, humiliation 
or vexation depends to a great extent upon the modes of
98 Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 1990 Law of Delict 34 
with reference to Strauss 1961 Toestemming 422; Van der 
Wait 1979 Delict 23 n 9, who acknowledges that the 
legal convictions are influenced by ethical, moral and 
legal convictions.
99 My emphasis.
100 Neethling 1985 Persooulikheidsreg 6 6; Van der Walt J C 
1979 Delict: Principles and Cases 22 - 23; Boberg P Q R 
1989 The Law of Delict Vol I Aquilian Liability 33 et 
seq; Van der Merwe and Olivier 1989 Die Onregmatige 
Daad in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 5 8 et seq.
101 My emphasis.
102 1954 3 SA 244 C.
179
thought prevalent amongst any particular community or at any
period of time, or upon those of different classes or
103grades of society, and the question must to a great 
extent therefore be left to the discretion of the court 
where an action on account of the alleged injury is 
brought."
The boni mores as a criterion for reasonableness has been
104utilised in several court decisions. The advantage of 
this criterion is that it is flexible. It enables the court 
to adapt the law to reflect the changing values and needs of
the community. Thus it was stated in Universiteit van
105Pretoria v Tommie Meyer Films (Edms) Bpk* "Deur die 
maatstaf van die ’regsoortuiging van die gemeenskap' ... toe 
te pas, verkry die regstelsel die voordeel van die 
wisselwerking tussen die ethos en geregtelike voorbeeld, en 
' n soepelheid wat by meer presedentgebonde stelsels 
ontbreek."
In the well-known case Minister van Polisie v Ewels106 which 
dealt with delictual liability for an omission or failure to
103 My emphasis.
104 For a list of cases on this aspect, see Neethling,
Potgieter and Visser 1990 Law of Delict 31 - 32 n 17.
105 1977 4 SA 376 T at 387.
106 1975 3 SA 590 AD.
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act, reference was also made to the juristic convictions of
the community. It was held that an an omission to act is
wrongful and actionable when, in the circumstances, the
omission is not merely one which gives rise to moral
indignation, but one which is required, in accordance with
the juristic convictions of the community, to be regarded as
a wrongful omission for which the person who failed to act
107should be liable in damages. The determination of the
juristic convictions of the community is not an easy task
108for a court. Boberg with reference to the Ewels case,
concluded that the legal conscience of the community is but
a thin veil covering the naked truth that judges will apply
their personal view on the question whether a particular
omission ought to support a claim or not. Boberg's view is
109 .supported in another discussion of the Ewels's case, m  
which the writer expresses doubts as to whether the 
community has any legal convictions, as opposed to moral 
ones. He continues to state that if such convictions do 
exist, they are not easily determined. Strauss and 
Strydom* 10 express an opposing view. According to them, 
judges are, in fact, well equipped to determine the
107 597 A - B.
108 “The Wrongfulness of an Omission" 1975 SALJ 361.
109 Amicus Curiae "The Actionable Omission - Another View 
of Ewels's CaseM 19 67 SALJ 85.
110 19 67 Suid-Afrikaanse Geneeskundige Reg 185.
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(juristic) convictions of society as they are daily 
confronted with different kinds of human relationships and 
conflicting interests.
Although the boni mores criterion undoubtedly plays a 
crucial role in determining wrongfulness in the law of 
delict, the boni mores or reasonableness criterion is not 
the only criterion utilised in practice. Thus Van der 
Walt1 * 1 states that it is unnecessary to apply it in every 
case, especially where other common law and statutory norms 
apply# ie grounds of justification or statutory authority.
It is basically reserved for application and the provision 
of guidance in borderline and novel situations. It is 
applied as a supplementary test for wrongfulness where:
(i) there is no clear legal norm or ground of justification 
and
(ii) for purposes of refinement, ie to distinguish between
1 1 2right and wrong in borderline cases.
The applicability of the boni mores as a criterion for 
wrongfulness is considered infra under specific delictual 
actions.
111 1979 Delict 22; See also Neethling, Potaieter and
Visser 19 90 Law of Delict 33 et seq.
112 1990 Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Law of Delict 38.
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For the sake of interest it may be mentioned that in some
113African tribes, the so-called "seed-raisers" are
114recognised to ensure a male heir for the "kraalhead". The 
"seed-raiser" plays the role of an auxiliary wife to the 
kraalhead under certain circumstances, such as the inability 
of the “main wife" to bear children, or if she dies without 
having borne a son. Amongst the Sotho-Tswana group, the 
"kraalhead" may acquire a sehantlo wife, who he marries for 
the express purpose of raising seed where the "main wife" is
1 1 5 ,unable to produce an heir. Similar practices are
recognised amongst the Venda1 1 6 and the Tsonga. 1 1 7
4.2.5 THE BONI MORES - AN AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE
113 This is for instance the case amongst the Zulu and
Swazi, see Seymour S M 1970 Bantu Law in South Africa
260 and the authorities cited in n 39.
114 Seymore 1970 Bantu Law in South Africa 258 - 262.
115 Seymour 1970 Bantu Law in South Africa 261.
116 Ibid.
117 Seymour 1970 Bantu Law in South Africa 262.
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As the criterion of the boni mores is general and assessment
may be difficult to make, differences of opinion may be
118expected. In the case of surrogate motherhood there is 
certainly no unanimity as to whether such an agreement 
conflicts with the juristic convictions of the community and 
whether it should be considered against public policy.
The churches in South Africa have taken a cautious but
mostly negative stance towards surrogate motherhood, because
119of the involvement of third parties in the procedure. The
birth of the Tzaneen triplets in 1987 sparked a controversy
amongst church leaders, medical practitioners and other
120interested groups. It was reported that those absolutely
1 2 1opposed to surrogacy included the Roman Catholic Church, 
Muslim and Hindu leaders, the National Council for Child and 
Family Welfare and the Medical Association of South Africa.
4.2.6 THE BONI MORES AND SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD
118 See Strauss and Strydom 1967 Suid-Afrikaanse 
Geneeskundige Reg 185.
119 De Bruyn P J "Surrogaatmoederskap: *n Teolcgies-Etiese 
Beoordeling" 1991 Instituut vir Reformatoriese Studies 
{Potchefstroom); "Kunsmatige Voortplanting vanuit 
Etiese en Juridiese Hoek Bekyk" 1986 Instituut vir 
Reformatoriese Studies (Pctchefstroom)
120 Sunday Times 12-04-1987.
121 Although the Tzaneen triplets were baptised and 
accepted into the Catholic Church. See the report in 
BeeId 04-01-1988.
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The In Vitro Support Group, an organisation consisting of
childless couples were in favour of the procedure. Some
leaders of the Dutch Reformed Church were not opposed to the
122Tzaneen case as it was a family arrangement, whereas
123others condemned the entire procedure. In a recent
124sensitive article, a prominent theologian stated that 
there should be no objections to "full" surrogacy, where a 
family member or friend is willing to carry a foetus for a 
childless couple. Commercial surrogacy and the use of donor 
gametes remain, according to him, unacceptable.
125In its statement, the Federal Council of the Medical 
Association of South Africa concluded after a meeting held 
during May 1586, that surrogate motherhood was undesirable. 
Apparently the decision was taken on the strength of 
information and views requested and received from the legal, 
social welfare professions and theologians. A broad 
consensus, however, seems to exist in legal circles that
122 See the statements by Prof Johan Heyns in Beeld
09-04-1987 and Beeld 22-11-1988; Dr Willie Botha in Die 
Kerkbode 15-04-1987 and Die Vaderland 23-04-1987. See 
also the Sunday Times 12-04-1987.
123 Prof Dani.e du Toit of Stellenbosch Theological Faculty
was specifically opposed to assisted conception with 
gametes from third parties. See Die Vaderland 2 3-04-87.
124 Prof H Pieterse (Department of Practical Theology at
Unisa) ’Surro-ma's en My Gewete" in 1991 Die Voorligter
26 - 27.
125 MASA dated 08-04-19H7 ref 709 468.
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only commercial surrogacy is undesirable. As I shall
endeavour to prove, there seems to be no reason to conclude
12 7that all forms of surrogate motherhood are undesirable.
126
An analysis of the proposed surrogacy legislation in the
128USA, shows the-range of societal attitudes prevailing in
that country. While surrogate motherhood is accepted in a
number of American states, it is limited to non-commercial
129surrogacy in certain states. Commercial surrogacy is 
statutorily outlawed in Britain, Germany, some states of the 
USA and in the state of Victoria, Australia, where it at 
present constitutes a criminal offence. 130
126 Strauss S A in 19 82 Die Proefbuisbaba Pieterse (ed) 21;
Strauss S A "Triplets to a Surrogate Grandmother in
South Africa: Legal Issues" 1989 Intern Legal Prac 71. 
Lupton M L "Surrogate Motherhood: The Advantages and 
Disadvantages" 1968 TRW 151 - 152; Lupton M L "The 
Right to be Born: Surrogacy and the Legal Control of 
Human Fertility" 1988 DJ 44; Tager L "Surrogate 
Motherhood, Legal Dilemma" 1986 SALJ 402 - 404; 
Pretorius R "A Comparative Overview and Analysis of A 
Proposed Surrogate Mother Agreement Model" 1987 CILSA 
275; but see Schutte M Die Hervorming van die 
Regsposisie van Buite-Egtelike Kinders met Besondere 
Verwysing na die Status van Kinders deur Kunsmatige 
Bevrugting Verwek LLD Unisa 1986 298 and Van der Walt A 
J Instituut vir Reformatoriese Studies 1988 29.
127 See chapter 7.
128 See chapter 2.
129 For instance in Kentucky, Michigan and Nebraska 1990 
Surrogate Motherhood Gostin (ed) Appendix II.
130 See chapter 2.
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The boni mores are also particularly relevant when questions 
of "trading in babies" arise. There is no doubt that the 
notion that a person can be treated as a chattel that can be 
bought and sold, conflicts with the boni mores of most 
societies. Likewise there is a conflict with the boni mores 
when needy persons are exploited or undue restraints are 
placed upon human conduct and liberty. Agreements to 
interfere with the natural bond between parent and child and 
the random transfer of parental power may also be considered 
contra bonos mores, as may agreements to interrupt the 
relationship between husband and wife. For instance, a 
promise of marriage when one of the parties is already
married at the time of the proposal is null and void.
Similarly, contracts to interfere with or terminate the 
marriage relationship would be void. Most surrogacy 
agreements contain an undertaking by the surrogate mother to 
refrain from sexual intercourse with her husband two weeks 
prior to the artificial insemination with donor semen as 
well as the two weeks following the insemination. 1 3 1 This
term is included to ensure that the child conceived is that
of the donor and not of the husband of the surrogate. On 
account of the personal nature of this term, enforcement is 
practically impossible. It is nevertheless submitted that 
should the commissioning father be able to prove that the
131 See the Proposed Contract in chapter 4.
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child is not his genetic child, the parental rights will 
vest in the surrogate and her husband as the child will not 
have been conceived as a result of artificial insemination 
and they will, in all respects, be the genetic parents of 
the child. Most medical practitioners performing artificial 
insemination or in vitro fertilisation, also advise their 
patients to refrain from sexual intercourse for a certain 
period as it may result in failure of the procedure.
The question to be answered is whether in South Africa, 
surrogate motherhood agreements should be regarded as 
violating the boni mores. Is a turpis causa not perhaps 
present in such an agreement? Are such agreements not 
perhaps immoral or ethically repugnant? There are obviously 
no easy answers to these questions and a careful analysis of 
each aspect of the agreement is required. The most 
problematic areas are probably compensation of the surrogate 
mother for her services and the agreement to transfer 
parental power. Each of these is discussed separately.
4.2. 6.1 COMPENSATION OF THE SURROGATE MOTHER
The question whether the surrogate mother should be 
compensated for her services, is central to the question of 
whether the agreement should be regarded as contra bonos 
mores or against public policy.
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A clear distinction should be drawn between commercial and
altruistic surrogacy. In the latter case, the surrogate
mother acts purely from altruistic motives and the profit
motive is wholly lacking. There is little doubt that our
courts will regard the so-called "commercial surrogate
motherhood", where large amounts of money are involved, as
132repugnant and immoral. The involvement of so-called
"surrogacy brokers" who make large profits in the process is
133 •also totally unacceptable. How should altruistic
surrogacy or compensation of the surrogate mother for
necessary expenses be viewed?
The line between commercial and non-commercial or altruistic
surrogacy is not always well defined. Does compensation for
medical and maternity costs qualify as commercial surrogate
motherhood? It is submitted that this is not the case, as
was recently demonstrated by the first case of its kind In
134 .re Adoption Application (payment for adoption) in 
England. Latey J allowed the adoption of a surrogate baby by 
the "commissioning" parents, despite “compensation for loss
132 Strauss in 1982 Die Proefbuisbaba Pieterse (ed) 21; 
Lupton 1986 TR 151 - 152.
133 In a interview during May 1989 with the controversial 
attorney Noel Keane, who initiated surrogate motherhood 
contracts in Michigan in the United States, it was 
established that Mr Keane is paid approximately $10 000 
for each contract.
134 3 WLR (Family Division) 1987.
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of wages and expenses during pregnancy". The court held that
135there had been no commercial transaction and therefore 
that payments made did not contravene s 50(1)(3) of the 
Adoption Act of 1958 (as amended). If the payments had been 
made as a reward for placing a child for adoption, the court 
found that it had jurisdiction subsequently to authorise 
those payments and would do so since an adoption order was
235in the child’s best interest. Latey J concluded that if 
the section were to be interpreted as an absolute 
prohibition against adoption, "it would mean, for example, 
that any payment, however modest and however innocently 
made, would bar an adoption and do so however much the 
welfare of the child cried aloud for adoption with all the 
security and legal rights and status it carried with it: and 
that, be it said, within the framework of legislation whose 
first concern is promoting the welfare of the children 
concerned".
In an obiter dictum the judge remarked that surrogacy
137arrangements are not against the law as it stands. He 
concluded with the following statement: “One cannot sit in
135 In this instance the parties concluded a private 
arrangement and the baby was born as a result of sexual 
intercourse between the “commissioning" father and the 
surrogate mother.
136 At 36 D.
137 At 37 F.
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these courts and hear all the multitude of professionals and 
others without knowing well the depth of longing in couples, 
devoted to each other, who cannot have a child through no 
fault of their own, but before they go down the path of 
surrogacy they should know and know fully what it may 
entail. It is not a primrose path."
It is a well-established that society in general considers 
having children necessary and desirable. Even where many 
modern societies actively encourage family planning to
138combat overpopulation by limiting the size of families, 
the right to have a child of one's own is still highly 
regarded and respected. It is submitted that rather than 
over-reacting to surrogacy agreements and viewing a 
surrogate mother and/or a commissioning couple as people who 
pose a threat to the moral standards of the community, the 
issue should be viewed with greater sensitivity. As Latey J 
stated, there are certainly pitfalls that couples should be 
made aware of. However, those opposed to surrogacy should 
not try to prevent others from utilising this option. A lack 
of sensitivity - it must regrettably be noted - is to be
138 See the dictum by Thirion J in Edouard v Administrator, 
Natal supra at 376 A where it is stated that: "The 
state is conducting a campaign of family planning, the 
aim of which is to curb the growth of the popi. ation.
It is in the interests of society that the size of a 
family should not exceed the limit beyond which it 
would not be possible for it to maintain * reasonable 
standard of living."
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detected in the suggestion inherent in a question posed by a 
South African jurist: "Die vraag is of 'n persoon wat nie in 
staat is om onvrugbaarheid te verwerk nie, *n ouer behoort 
te kan word? ' ' 1 3 9
It is submitted that surrogacy agreements, even where the 
surrogate mother is compensated for expenses, should not be 
branded as immoral provided they are properly regulated by 
law. low this regulation should be achievea is set out 
beloc/ . 140
4.2.6 .2 AN AGREEMENT TO TRANSFER PARENTAL POWER1 4 1
As a general rule, an agreement to transfer or delegate
parental power permanently is invalid as being contra bonos
142mores, and will not be enforceable. Parental power may 
however, be transferred or delegated by way of adoption and 
upon divorce or in special circumstances, by a court order. 
The court, in its capacity as upper guardian of all minors, 
has the power to deprive a parent of all, or specific 
incidents of, parental power if it is considered as being in
139 Schutte 1986 Hervonning 298.
140 See the Recommendation in chapter 7.
141 See also chapter 5 under the Law of Persons.
142 See in general Spiro 1985 Law of Parent and Child 4 3 - 
45.
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the best interest of the child to do so. In Ex parte Van 
144Dam an agreement to transfer custody of an illegitimate 
child from the mother to the biological father was, for 
instance, allowed because it was held to be in the best 
interest of the child.
143
The common law rule that an agreement to transfer parental 
power is contra bonos mores became part of our law long 
before anyone could possibly have anticipated that 
procreation technology would become so advanced that in some 
instances at least five people could claim parental rights 
to one child. Moreover, it seems anomalous to allow a woman 
to consent to adoption when she is pregnant with an unwanted 
child, but not allow the same for the surrogate mother.
It seems clear that the boni mores is a dynamic concept that 
can be used to justify different conclusions, depending on
143 Spiro 1985 Law of Parent and Child. Calitz v Calitz 
1939 AD 56 at 63 and 64; Goodrich v Botha and Another 
1952 4 SA 175 T 180 F where Roper J states: “It is 
clear that in South Africa the upper guardianship once 
exercised by the Courts of Holland is vested in the 
Supreme Court, and in 1911 in the case of Oliver v 
Hugo, the Cape Provincial Division in its capacity as 
upper guardian, made an order for the personal custody 
of a minor orphan...". See also the dictum of 
Henochsberg J in Short v Naisby 195 5 3 SA 57 2 D and 57 2 
B discussed in chapter 5 under the role of the Supreme 
Court as Upper Guardian of All Minors.
144 1973 2 SA 182 W. See the discussion in chapter 4 on the 
Contract.
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the circumstances. It is submitted that surrogacy agreements 
do not pose any threat to public policy as long as they are 
concluded with the bona fide intent to help an infertile 
couple and fall within socially acceptable parameters.
The next issue for consideration is whether the practice of 
surrogate motherhood contravenes present legislation.
4.2.7 LEGISLATION PRESENTLY AFFECTING SURROGACY
ARRANGEMENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA
4.2.7.1 HUMAN TISSUE ACT 65..of 1983 AND REGULATIONS
IN TERMS OF THE ACT
The definition of artificial insemination in the Human 
146Tissue Act is wide enough to include the practice of 
surrogate motherhood. The Act defines "artificial 
insemination of a person" as:
"the introduction by other than natural means of a male 
gamete or gametes into the internal reproductive organs of a 
female person for the purpose of human reproduction, 
including
(a) the bringing together outside the human body of a male 
and female gamete or gametes with a view to placing the
145 GN 1182 GG 10283 of 20-06-1986.
146 S 1 of che Human Tissue Act 65 of 1983. In 1989 the 
words “artificial insemination" were substituted in the 
English text with "artificial fertilization". See s 27 
of Act 51 of 1989.
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product of a union of such gametes in the womb of a female 
person; or
(b) the placing of the product of a union of a male and a 
female gamete or gametes which have been brought together 
outside the human body in the womb of a female person".
In vitro insemination is defined ir. the Regulations 
as "the bringing together outside the human body of a male 
and a female gamete and the placing of the zygote in the 
womb of a female person".
The procedures of artificial insemination and in vitro 
fertilisation are lawful in South Africa, provided that the 
relevant sections of the Act and \rtificial Insemination 
Regulations are complied with.
The Regulations, with the exception of reg 11 (specifying 
that the medical practitioner who effects artificial 
insemination must be registered with the Director-General of 
National Health and Population Development and that the 
premises on which the procedure takes place must be 
officially approved), are not applicable in respect of a 
married couple where the use of donor gametes is not 
involved. In other words, where the requesting couple's own 
genetic material is used as in the typical AIH (artificial 
insemination husband) situation, the Regulations do not 
apply.
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Artificial insemination may only be effected by a medical
practitioner or a person acting under his/her supervision
1 4  8on a married woman with her husband's written consent.
Furthermore, gametes withdrawn from a living person may only
149be used for "medical purposes". These aspects are
discussed in Chapter 6 under Criminal Liability in Terms of
the Human Tissue Act and Regulations.
A woman who, with the intent to become a surrogate mother,
performs artificial insemination on herself by using a
syringe filled with donor semen, will clearly act in
contravention of the Act and Regulations and will be guilty
150of a criminal offence. A South African case of an
unmarried female who did this and subsequently gave birth to
151a child was reported in the press. Apparently no 
prosecution was brought against her. It is highly unlikely 
that insemination of this kind will be resorted to otherwise 
than in very exceptional circumstances and the
147
147 S 23(2) of the Act and reg 3.
148 Reg 8(1).
149 S 19 of the Human Tissue Act.
150 Penalties for non-compliance with the Act are a maximum 
fine of R2 000 or a maximum of one year imprisonment or 
both (s 34), while non-compliance with the Regulations 
carries a fine of R1 000 or six month's imprisonment
(reg 14).
151 Sunday Times 13-03-1988.
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law-enforcement agencies will - for obvious reasons -
probably be reluctant to put the criminal process into
action in isolated cases of this nature. There is nothing
in the Act or the Regulations which prohibits a private
agreement between the surrogate and the commissioning father
to have sexual intercourse for the purpose of procreating a
surrogate child, although such an agreement, it is
submitted, will be contra bonos mores. In the British case
152In re Adoption Application (payment for adoption) the
adoption of a surrogate baby was allowed although it was
born as a result of saxual intercourse between lihe
commissioning father and a surrogate mother. The court was
unwilling to address issues of morality and ethics and
suggested that policy issues should be formulated by
15 3Parliament and not the court. Irrespective of the method 
used, the result will be the birth of a surrogate child 
which requires legal protection.
The provisions regulating artificial insemination in the Act 
and the Regulations are extensive. The detail of these 
requirements is discussed in chapter 6 where the Liability 
of Medical Practitioners in Assisted Reproduction Technology 
and Surrogate Motherhood is examined.
152 3 WLR (Fajnily Division) 19-06-1987 discussed supra.
153 At 34 C - H.
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The Act came into operation during 1987. Certain provisions 
that may possibly be relevant to surrogacy agreements are 
contained in s 24(1) and (2) in terms of which compensation 
for adoption is prohibited.
S 24(1) provides as follows: “No person shall, save with the 
consent of the Minister, give, undertake to give, receive or 
contract to receive ar.y consideration, in cash or kind, in 
respect of the adoption of a child".
S 24(2), again, provides as follows: "Any person who 
contravenes any provision of eubsection (1 ) shall be guilty 
of an offence and on conviction liable to a fine not 
exceeding R2 000 or to imprisonment for a period not 
exceeding two years or both such fine and such 
imprisonment".
If the surrogate mother is compensated for medical, hospital
or attorney fees, an arrangement which normally forms part
154of a surrogacy agreement, it could be construed as 
indirect compensation for adoption, should adoption after 
the birth of the child be sought by its genetic parents, in
4.2.7.2 CHILD CARE ACT 74 OF 1533
154 See chapter 5.
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order to secure their rights to the child and the status of
the child. It would seem that in the light of the Children's
155Status Act, discussed infra, the genetic parents might 
well resort to an adoption application.
15 6In Commissioner of Child Welfare v Wynberg no weight was 
attached to the natural mother's consent to adoption, where 
the adoptive parents paid her confinement fees. From the 
dictum by Steyn R, it appears that the judge considered such 
compensation as payment for the child. The judge stated:
"In fact our Children’s Act (referring to Act 33 of 1960) 
which is highly commendable legislation, has been designed 
to discourage bartering of children whether directly or 
indirectly."
The prohibition of compensation in the Children's Act of 
1960,*^7 and also in the Child Care Act of 1 9 8 3 , serves 
as protection to the child as well as the adoptive and 
natural parents. It specifically provides protection to 
young, inexperienced, unmarried women who may be subjected
155 82 of 1987.




to undue pressure and be persuaded to give up their children 
ana terminate their parental power essentially for financial 
considerations.
It is submitted that it would be wrong to construe
compensation for loss of income and necessary expenses in a
surrogacy arrangement as the giving of consideration for
adoption. The intent of the parties, after all, is to
compensate the surrogate mother for a direct financial loss
159and for expenses directly incurred. It is, in my view,, 
not consideration for adoption that may ultimately be 
considered as a legally necessary step to regularise the 
legal status of the child. In any event, it is to be noted 
that s 24(1) of the 1983 Act does not absolutely prohibit 
payment for adoption since compensation may take place with 
the consent of the Minister.
4.2.7.3 CHILDREN’S STATUS ACT 82 OF 1987160 AND THE
REGISTRATION OF BIRTHS, MARRIAGES AND DEATHS ACT
81 OF 1963.
159 See also Lupton's discussion of the payment to the 
surrogate in 1988 DJ 47. He concludes that it is 
entirely justifiable to reimburse the surrogate for all 
her legitimate expenses and losses.
160 See chapter 5 under Common and Statutory Law Issues 
Affecting Surrogacy Arrangements.
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The relevant sections of these two Acts are discussed 
jointly as the status of the child and the registration of 
the birth are closely linked.
Prior to 14 October 1987, children born in consequence of 
artificial insemination with donor sperm (AID) were 
considered as illegitimate in our law. * 61 This position was 
rectified by the Children's Status Act. In terms of s 
5(1)(a) children born as a result of artificial insemination 
with donor sperm and ova (which includes in vitro
162fertilisation embryo transfer to a surrogate mother) are 
now considered to be the legitimate children of the woman 
giving birth and her husband, provided that the husband 
consented to the artificial insemination. The consent need 
not be in writing; there is, however, a presumption that 
consent was given.*6**
Section 5(2) of the Act provides for the termination of the 
rights, obligations and duties of the donors of semen and or
161 V v R 1979 3 SA 1006 T.
162 S 5(3)(b).
163 S 5(1)(a) and (b). For a discussion of the consent 
requirement see Van der Walt L "Toestemming en die 
Vestiging van Ouerskap oor die Kunsmatig Verwekte Kind" 
1987 Obiter 1-15.
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ova towards the child. It will therefore not be possible 
for a donor to claim any parental rights to the child and 
the child will likewise not be able to claim maintenance 
from a donor.
The notion of mater semper certa est and the presumption of 
paternity (pater is est quem nuptiae demonstrant) are now 
statutorily entrenched in the case of both artificial 
insemination with donor sperm and/or embryo transfer. 
Children born by artificial insemination with donor sperm 
will have to be registered as the children of the woman 
giving birth and her husband, who are considered the legal 
parents of the child.
Failure to provide the correct information on a birth 
registration form constitutes a criminal offence in terms of 
s 46 of the Births, Marriages and Deaths Registration Act. A 
married couple who commissioned a surrogate mother and who 
endeavour to register the child born to the surrogate as 
their own, will therefore risk criminal prosecution in terms 
of the Act.
164
164 For a discussion of s 5 see Van Wyk A H “Mater Hodie
Semper Incerta Est? 'n Evaluasie van Artikel 5 van die 
Wet op die Status van Kinders van 1987“ 1988 TSAR 465 - 
476.
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The combined effect of the Children's Status Act and the 
Child Care Act has complicated contractual surrogacy 
arrangements in South Africa considerably. 1 65 The effects of 
the termination of parental rights of gamete donors in s 5 
of the Children's Status Act on surrogacy are discussed in 
chapter 5.
4.2.8 DETERMINATION BY THE COURTS WHETHER A CONTRACT 
CONFLICTS WITH STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS
The application of a specific statutory enactment to a 
contract may affect the validity thereof. In South Africa 
where there is no direct regulation of surrogacy at present, 
validity of the contract will have to be determined with due 
regard to legislation indirectly affecting surrogacy, as 
discussed supra.
Statutes, in general, prohibit certain activities or 
behaviour, but very seldom expressly prohibit a certain form 
of contract. 166 In most instances the statute in question 
provides penalties for non-compliance. In deciding whether a 
contract is valid and enforceable, the statute is 
interpreted by the court and conflicting issues of public 
policy and private interests assessed. In reaching a
165 See Strauss 1989 Intern Legal Prac 70; Strauss 1988 S A 
Prac Man 5; Pretorius 1988 DR 82.
16d Lubbe and Murray 19 88 Farlam and Hathaway Contract 2 37.
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decision the courts will, inter alia take into consideration 
the object of the statute, the harm it is directed against, 
the consequences of a particular interpretation of the 
statute, whether criminal sanctions are contained in the 
statute and whether these provide sufficient protection 
against the harm it is aimed at, whether the provision is 
pro fiscum and does not deal with validity as such and 
whether it affords protection to individuals or the public 
in general. 1 6 7
With reference to the various statutory provisions discussed 
supra my submissions are as follows:
(i) Human Tissue Act 65 of 1983 and Regulations in terms of 
the Act
The aim of the Act is, inter alia to regulate and govern the
removal of tissue, blood or gametes from the bodies of
16 8living persons for therapeutic and other uses. The Act 
furthermore extensively regulates tiss* transplantation and 
removal of tissue from dead bodies. The latter bea**s no 
relevance to the present discussion.
167 For a discussion, see Joubert 1987 General Principles 
of the Law of Contract 131 who provides a
classification of different statutory provisions.
168 For a detailed discussion of the aim of this Act, see 
Strauss S A 1984 Doctor, Patient and the Law 147 et 
seq.
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This Act is of particular importance for medical 
practitioners effecting artificial insemination or in vitro 
fertilisations. This aspect is discussed in more detail in 
chapter 6 under Criminal Liability in Terras of the Homan 
Tissue Act and Regulations. The Act bears little relevance 
to surrogacy agreements as such, apart from the fact that 
the procedures by which gametes are removed and utilised, 
are extensively governed by the Act and Regulations.
It is to be noted that in terms of s 19 of the Act, minors 
and anyone who has been declared a habitual criminal in 
terms of s 286 of the Criminal Procedures Act 51 of 1977, or 
who is mentally ill within the definition of the Mental 
Health Act 18 of 1973, may not donate gametes.
As already discussed above, a woman who, with the intent to
become a surrogate mother, performs artificial insemination
on herself, will clearly act in contravention of the Act and
Regulations as only medical practitioners may perform such
procedures. Furthermore, a penalty is provided for in the
169Act as well as the Regulations. It is submitted that any 
agreement entered with regard to such an insemination will 
be illegal and void.
169 S 34 of the Act and reg 14 of '.ne Regulations.
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(ii) Child Care Act 74 of 1983
As discussed supra, compensation for adoption is prohibited 
in terms of s 24(1) and (2) of the Act, which also contains 
criminal sanctions. It is, however, submitted that the 
object of this provision was specifically to protect young 
and inexperienced women from (financial) coercion by third 
parties to give up their children for adoption. It was never 
intended to regulate surrogate motherhood and compensation 
to the surrogate mother for legitimate expenses (and even 
loss of income) should, in the light of this, not be 
construed as payment for adoption and should not render the 
contract illegal.
(iii) Children's Status Act 82 of 1987
The aim of this Act is to provide legitimacy to children who 
were previously considered illegitimate in our law. The Act 
contains no penal clauses as it merely regulates the status 
of children.
(iv) Registration of Births, Marriages and Deaths 
Act 81 of 1963
This Act regulates the procedures regarding, inter alia 
registration of births. Persons registering the birth of a 
child must provide the correct information in all respects 
so that registration of the child may be effected.
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Intentional, false declarations of particulars is a 
punishable offence in terms of s 46 of the Act.
4.2.9 THE EFFECT OF ILLEGALITY - CONTRACT VOID OR 
UNENFORCEABLE?
In the presence of a statutory enactment which could have 
some bearing on the contract, albeit indirectly, the court, 
in consideration of policy aspects, and with reference to 
the other considerations discussed supra, may declare the 
contract invalid. Contracts concluded against good morals or 
public policy are void and therefore unenforceable. Where 
the agreement is concluded bona tide and no statutory 
requirement is infringed upon and it is also not considered 
contrary to public policy or contra bonos mores, the 
contract should be enforceable - either in its entirety are 
partially. The doctrine of severability is important in this 
regard.
4.2.10 THE DOCTRINE OF SEVERABILITY AND THE RELEVANCE OF 
RESTRAINT OF TRADE AGREEMENTS170 TO SURROGACY.
Interesting developments have occurred regarding restraint 
of trade agreements in our law over a long period of time.
170 Kerr 1982 Principles 109 defines a restraint of trade
agreement as follows: "An agreement or a covenant in an 
agreement, is said to be in restraint of trade when it 
restricts the liberty of one or both of the parties to 
engage in one or more specified commercial activities".
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Although many restraint of trade agreements may be lawful,
it was argued thet if the agreement is unreasonable, it was
prima facie \/oid, unless the party who wanted to enforce the
171covenant could prove its reasonableness. It is a
principle of the lav; of contract that the courts will not
formulate a contract for the parties. To ensure that
contracts which contain unreasonable terms are not merely
regarded as void, the so-called “doctrine of severability or
divisibility” was developed. Thus the unreasonable terms,
if they are severable, may be severed by the court and the
17 2remainder, which are considered reasonable, enforced. The
test of reasonableness plays a crucial role in a decision
whether the contract is enforceable - not only inter partes
173but also with regard to public interest. Public interest 
is determined at the time enforcement is sought.
17 4Kerr, after an m-depth discussion of the Magna Alloys 
case, poses the question whether the principle in Magna
171 Kerr 1982 Principles and the cases cited at 111 n 92.
172 See Christie 1981 Law of Contract 352 et seq; Kerr i982 
Principles 109 et seq; Kerr A J “Restraint of Trade 
After Magna Alloys" in 1989 Essays in Honour of Ellison 
Kahn Visser C (ed) 186 - 198.
173 See Magna Alloys and Research (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Ellis
1984 4 SA 874 A and the discussion of the case by Kerr 
in 1989 Essays in Honour of Ellison Katin Visser (ed)
186 et seq.
174 1989 Essays in Honour of Ellison Kahn Visser (ed) 198.
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Alloys, namely that enforcement of restraints depends upon
the public interest at the time of enforcement, has a wider
application. Relying on the recent case of J Louw and Co
1 n 5(Pty) Ltd v Rxchter and Others and Rentokil (Pty) Ltd v
1 7 fiAppollis, the enforcement of any contract is dependent 
upon the court’s finding concerning the public interest at 
the time of action. According to him, this also applies to 
other fields of law such as property or family law.
17 7It is submitted that the "restraint of trade" decisions 
and in particular the Magna Alloys case are thus relevant to 
surrogacy agreements. Should the court consider a part of 
the surrogacy agreement unreasonable, not only inter partes 
but also with regard to public interest, when an action is 
instituted, the unreasonable part could be severed from the 
rest and only the reasonable part enforced. In this way the 
terms - especially those protecting the child - could be 
severed from an otherwise invalid contract. Such terms may 
include those determining custody of the child in cases of 
breach, death or divorce of any of the parties, the creation 
of a trust for the child and even a decision by the court to 
grant the intended parents parental rights to the child.
175 1987 2 SA 237 N.
176 1987 2 PH A41.
177 See Kerr 1982 Principles 109 et seq.
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A clear distinction should be drawn between commercial 
surrogacy where third parties and/or the surrogate mother 
make a large profit, and altruistic surrogacy. In South 
Africa the former will probably lead to the conclusion that 
an agreement to that effect is null and void, as being 
contra bonos mores. The same conclusion cann. t be reached 
regarding the latter. Altruistic surrogacy poses no threat 
to the public or the public morals, especially since it is 
montly utilised in a family relationship or a relationship 
between close friends. Altruistic surrogacy should thus be 
permitted and tne contract enforced.
A commercial surrogacy agreement would probably be without 
legal effect in South Africa, Those who enter into such 
agreements may suffer considerable financial losses and even 
the loss ol their genetic child, bhould the surrogate fail 
to comply with the terms of the agreement.
Courts faced with surrogacy issues in other jurisdictions, 
have therefore generally preferred to disregard the contract 
and rely on the criterion of what is in the best interest of 
the child in reaching a decision.
It is, nevertheless submitted that the surrogate mother 
should be entitled to receive compensation for necessary
4.3 CONCLUSION WITH REGARD TO LEGALITY
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expenses, such as medical, hospital and maternity costs 
reasonably incurred, and possibly also loss of income. To 
that extent an agreement to reimburse the mother should, in 
my view, be enforceable.
There is no legislation at present barring surrogate
motherhood in South Africa, although the Children's Status
1 V 8Act complicates the procedure considerably. It is
therefore submitted that this Act should be amended to
179exclude the practice of surrogate motherhood.
5 BREACH OF CONTRACT AND AVAILABLE REMEDIES
5.1 INTRODUCTION
Although there is an inherent risk of breach in any 
contract, the surrogate motherhood contract presents special 
difficulties. Most cases of breach of contract before the 
courts in England and the USA, have involved refusal on the 
part of the surrogate nether to hand over the baby to the 
intended parents after birth. In such instances the courts 
have, so far, preferred to disregard the contract and rely
178 See Strauss S A “Regstatus van K.I. - Kinders en 
Kinders Gebore uit Surrogaatmoeders" 1988 S A 
Praktyksbestuur 5; Strauss S A 1989 Intern Legal Prac 
70; Pretorius R 1988 DP 81.
179 See the Recommendation in chapter 7.
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on the criterion of the best interest of the child in 
deciding who should be awarded custody. The reported cases 
of breach have arisen predominantly from commercial 
surrogacy arrangements.
Although a court may disregard the whole or part of the
contract, depending on its view regarding the boni mores, it
is nevertheless advisable to draft the contract in a way
180that anticipates the possibility of breach. This will 
provide a clear indication to the parties of their rights 
and obligations.
5.2 FORMS OF BREACH OF CONTRACT
181Breach of contract in general include the following: 
mora debitoris, mora creditoris, positive malperformance, 
prevention of performance and repudiation.
Breach of the contract by the surrogate mother or the
contracting couple can present itself in various forms, but
18?is usually in the form of repudiation.
180 See the Proposed Contract in chapter 4.
181 See De Wet and Van Wyk Kontraktereg en Handelsreg 14 2 
et seq; Kerr 1982 Principles 333 et seq; Joubert 1987 
General Principles of the Law of Contract 201 et seq; 
Lubbe and Murray 1983 Farlam and Hathaway Contract 471
182 See the discussion infra.
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Having regard to the court cases reported so far, the 
most probable form of breach is refusal by the surrogate 
mother to hand over the baby after birth. It is proposed in 
this thesis to discuss other forms of breach as well, and to 
examine possible remedies available to the parties in such 
instances. Since most forms of possible breach of a 
surrogacy agreement have, so far, not received the attention 
of the courts, my discussion will of necessity be largely 
speculative. It goes without saying that if a court were to 
be called upon to adjudicate a concrete dispute, its 
decision would depend on whether it regarded the contract as 
valid, either in its entirety or partially, and what the 
exact facts of the case before it were.
5.3 REMEDIES
If surrogacy is to be legislatively regulated at a future
stage, it is nece'stfary to establish a sound theoretical
basis for the possible remedies available for breach of
contract. Three broad categories of contractual remedies may
be distinguished. First, those aimed at enforcement of the
contract, secondly, those aimed at rescission/cancellation
184and thirdly those aimed at compensatjon. Remedies aimed
18 3
183 See chapter 2.
184 Van Aswegen A Die Samelojp van Eise uin Kontrakbreuk en
(Footnote Continued)
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at enforcement of the contract are specific performance and 
the exceptio non adimpleti contractus; rescission combined 
with restitution is aimed at c; 'icellation; and a claim for 
damages is aimod at compensation.
As the same act may, in certain circumstances, constitute 
both a breach of contract and a delict, claims based on 
breach of contract could, conceivably, be instituted 
together with delictual claims for compensation or in the
1 p calternative. If the contract is invalid or unenforceable, 
the only available remedy for recovering patrimonial loss, 
would be a delictual claim, provided all the requirements 
had been met.
The acts from which various claims arise, give rise to
1 ft 6different remedies. The contractual action for damages is 
aimed at putting the plaintiff in the position which he/she 
would have enjoyed had the contract been properly performed
(Footnote Continued)
Delik LLD Unisa 1991 116 - 117. See also Lubbe and 
Murray 198C Farlam & Hathaway Contract 530 et seq.
185 See in general Van Aswegen 1991 .Sameloop van Eise;
Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 1990 Law of Delict 215
et seq; Van der Walt J C 1979 Delict 7 - 11; Van der
Merwe and Olivier 1989 Die Onregmatige Daad in die 
Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 463 et seq.
186 Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 1990 Law of Delict 215
- 216; Van der Walt 1979 Delict 8; Van der Merwe and
Olivier 1989 Die Onregmatige Daad in die
Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 4 63 et seq.
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(positive interesse). The object of an award for damages in
a delictual action, on the other hand, is to put the
plaintiff in the position which he/she would have enjoyed
187had the delict not been committed (negative interesse).
It is submitted that in surrogacy arrangements, especially 
if the contract is considered valid and enforceable, the 
claim will most likely be based on contract, although a 
delictual claim cannot be ruled out, especially since the 
practice of surrogacy is not regulated at present.
5.3.1 REMEDIES AIMED AT ENFORCEMENT OF THE CONTRACT
1 op5.3.1.1 SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
This remedy is in principle always available to the innocent 
party who wants to secure performance of the contract. The 
court, has, however a discretion in giving such an order.
The remedy of specific performance in South Africa was 
examined by the court in the case of Schierbout v Minister
187 Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 1990 Law of Delict 220.
188 See De Wet and Van Wyk 197 8 Kontraktereg en Handelsreg
188 et seq; Joubert General Principles of the Law of 
Contract 229 et seq; Kerr 19 82 Principles 39 7 et seq.
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of Justice and a precedent set for the view that specific
performance should not be granted if breach of contract is
190 . . .of a personal nature. However, in more recent decisions,
the courts have indicated a greater willingness to grant
specific performance under certain circumstances. This was
the case in National Union of Textile Workers v Stag
191Packings (Pty) I.td and ADother and even more recently m
192Benson v SA Mutual Life Assurance. No surrogate
motherhood cases have been decided by South African courts
a& yet., but it is uncertain whether our courts will grant an
order for specific performance ex contractu. In any event,
courts faced with problems cf breach of a surrogacy
agreement will, prior to granting an order for specific
performance, carefully consider the advantages and
193disadvantages of c?:ch an order for the parties.
5.3.1.2 EXCEPTIO NON ADIMPLETI CONTRACTUS1 94
189
189 1926 AD 99 at 107.
190 See Christie 1981 Law of Contracts 510 - 511.
191 1982 4 SA 151 T.
192 1986 1 SA 776 A.
193 See Joubert 19 87 General Principles of the Law of 
Contract 224 et seq; De Wet and Van Wyk 197 8 
Kontraktereg en Handelsreg 188 et seq.
194 For a discussion, see De Wet and Van Wyk 1978
Kontraktereg en Handelsreg 177 - 188; Joubert 19 7 8 
General Principles of the Law of Contract 229 - 236.
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This defence is utilised where the performances by the 
parties are related in the sense that one performance is a 
quid pro quo for the other. For instance, if the surrogacy 
agreement is considered as a form of lease or rendering of a 
service, it could be utilised by either party, who has 
performed, or who insist on simultaneous performance by the 
other, as a defence.
Although this is often considered a remedy for breach of 
contract, the opinion has also been expressed that it serves
as a mechanism to effect specific enforcement of the
 ^ 195 contract.
5.3.2 REMEDIES AIMED AT CANCELLATION
5.3.2.1 RESCISSION1 9 6
Rescission is considered a drastic step in the law of 
contract and can only be taken under exceptional 
circumstances. A rescission clause may be incorporated in 
the contract which provides the parties with either an 
unfettered choice of rescission or the possibility of
195 Van Aswegen 1991 Sameloop van Eise 121.
196 See Joubert 1978 General Principles of the Law of 
Contract 236 et seq; De Wet and Van Wyk 197 8 
Kontraktereg en Handelsreg 194 et seq.
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rescission should certain events take place. Material breach
of the contract may also provide a party with such a right.
Notification of rescission is required, but it can be given
expressly or tacitly as long as it leaves no doubt in the
197mind of the other party to the contract. The most 
important effect of rescission is that the right to 
performance, as specified in tie contract is dissolved and 
the parties may claim back their respective performances.
The innocent party is also entitled to damages suffered as a 
result of the breach of contract.
5.3,3 REMEDIES AIMED AT COMPENSATION
i g o5.3.3.1 DAMAGES AS A REMEDYA?
Any breach of contract resulting in damages, provides the 
innocent party with a right to recover such damages.
The question that begs an answer is whether a court will 
award any form of damages to either of the parties involved 
in a surrogacy agreement which has been breached. May the
197 Joubert 1987 General Principles of the Law of Contract 
243.
198 See Joubert 19 87 General Principles of the Law of 
Contract 246; De Wet and Van Wyk 197 8 Kontraktereg en 
Handelsreg 200 et seq.
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couple for instance, apart from patrimonial loss, 
institute a claim for damages for the loss of the child or 
intangible loss caused by emotional shock, pain and 
suffering resulting from the surrogate's nonperformance of 
the contract?
A claim for damages based on breach of contract can only 
succeed if patrimonial loss is proved. This will be the case 
if the couple has already compensated the surrogate mother 
for her services and/or medical and legal expenses. It is 
not possible to recover intangible loss, such as damages for
discomfort, pain and suffering and loss of amenities of life
4. 200 ex contractu.
If the contract is considered null and void in its entirety, 
and accordingly unenforceable, no remedies will of course be 
available to the parties on the ground of contractual 
liability. It is, however, submitted that a non-commercial 
agreement concluded in good faith and with the intent to be 
legally bound, should be valid and enforceable. This is in 
line with the view that the courts will enforce contracts if 
all the formal requirements have been met, unless they
199
199 ex contractu, or ex delicto by means of the Lex 
Aquilia.
200 Administrator of Natal v Edouard 1990 3 SA 581 590 A 
and 595 E.
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contravene public policy. The discretion of the court with
regard to public policy should be exercised with caution and
utilised only if the harm to the public has been clearly
established, which, it is submitted, is not the case with
non-commercial surrogacy agreements. As stated by Thirion J
2 01in the Edouard case: "Courts of law will be reluctant to
discover new principles of morality or considerations of 
expediency and policy on which to invalidate contracts which 
on accepted legal principles would be valid, because it is a 
fundamental principle of our law as well (a principle which 
is itself based on public policy) that contracts which have 
been freely and seriously entered into should be enforced."
5.3.4 SPECIFIC PERIODS DURING WHICH THE SURROGACY
AGREEMENT MAY BE BREACHED AND AVAILABLE REMEDIES
Three periods may be distinguished during which the contract 
may be breached
1 before and immediately after artificial insemination;
2 during pregnancy; and
3 after the birth of the child.
Each of these possibilities is discussed separately.
5.3.4.1 BREACH BEFORE AND IMMEDIATELY AFTER ARTIFICIAL
INSEMINATION
201 At 378 I.
202 Dodd Bette J "The Surrogate Mother Contract in Indiana” 
1982 Ind L Rev 820.
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This is the case where the surrogate mother refuses to be
inseminated with sperm of the contracting husband, or in
full surrogacy, refuses transfer of the intended parents'
zygote to her womb. In such instances there is a repudiation
of the contract before the date for performance which
203constitutes anticipatory breach. The commissioning couple 
may elect to institute an action claiming damages for 
financial loss.
In the first instance financial loss is restricted to the 
cost of the medical procedures already performed, which will 
not be substantial. In the latter incidence, however, a 
considerable financial loss may be experienced by the 
surrogate's refusal to have the zygote transferred to her 
reproductive organs. In full surrogacy the female donor of 
ova (intended mother) and the surrogate mother's menstrual 
cycle must be synchronised, utilising hormonal treatment 
prior to insemination. This is followed by a procedure 
commonly referred to as an “egg pickup" which is performed 
under anaesthetic, and in vitro fertilisation, both of which 
are expensive procedures.
203 Kerr 1982 Principles 342.
22 1
Under certain circumstances specific performance of a
contract is available as a remedy for breach. It is,
however, extremely unlikely that any court will order
20 4specific performance under these circumstances. If the 
contract is considered unenforceable for whatever reason, a 
claim for patrimonial damages ex contractu will fail.
The surrogate mother could also breach the contract by 
having sexual intercourse with her husband two weeks prior 
to or two weeks after artificial insemination contrary to a 
specific stipulation in the contract. This creates the 
possibility of the baby not being genetically related to any 
of the intended parents. In the light of the general 
principles regarding legality, this stipulation in the 
contract may be contra bonos mores and void. If the intended 
parents are able to prove that the child is not genetically 
related to them, but the child of the surrogate mother and 
her husband, they should be able to rescind from the 
contract as the child has been conceived in the natural way 
and is in all respects the child of the surrogate mother and 
her husband. They should also not be held liable for
205compensation of the surrogate mother or child support.
204 See the discussion infra.
205 By the enactment of the Children's Status Act, the 
presumption of paternity in cases of artificial and in 
vitro fertilisation was statutorily entrenched so that
(Footnote Continued)
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Breaches of contract envisaged here, are inadequate medical 
care and having an abortion without consulting the 
contracting couple.
Inadequate medical care is difficult to monitor. Unless the 
intended parents can prove damages as a result of the 
inadequate medical care, they will not have any recourse.
In an ordinary surrogacy agreement the surrogate mother
undertakes to carry the foetus to term and not to have an
abortion unless the legal requirements have been met in
2 0 6accordance with the Abortion and Sterilization Act.
Should the surrogate have a legal abortion without
consulting the contracting couple, this incident does not
constitute breach of the contract but rather supervening
impossibility of performance which terminates the obligation 
207to perform. Thus the couple will have no recourse as the
5.3.4.2 BREACH DURING PREGNANCY
(Footnote Continued)
there is no question of any possible legal duties 
towards the child by donors of sperm and/or ova. The 
surrogate mother and her husband, if he consented to 
the insemination, are considered the legal parents of 
the child and are legally obliged to support the child 
unless their rights are terminated by adoption or by a 
court order for some reason.
206 2 of 1975.
207 See the discussion of De Wet and Van Wyk 1978
(Footnote Continued)
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surrogate is released from her duty and the personal right 
of the commissioning couple extinguished. Although it is 
recommended that such a decision should be discussed with 
the couple, it is nevertheless submitted that the surrogate 
should have the autonomy to reach her own decision in this 
regard.
If the surrogate has an illegal abortion with the intent to 
terminate the contract, it would constitute positive 
prevention of performance of the contract. The intended 
parents, may, under these circumstances claim damages for 
patrimonial loss.
5. 3.4.3 BREACH AFTER THE BIRTH OF THE CHILD
The most obvious way in which the surrogate mother may 
breach the contract is refusal to hand over the child after 
birth. Failure to perform constitutes either mora or can 
indicate repudiation of the contract for which damages may 
be claimed.
(Footnote Continued)
Kontraktereg en Handelsreg 156 et seq with regard to 
the differences between supervening impossibility and 
repudiation.
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Whether specific performance as an alternative remedy is 
available is at present uncertain. 208
When a surrogate mother refuses to hand over the baby after 
birth, the issue is, at present, mostly treated as a custody 
suit between the parties, in which reliance is placed on the 
best interest of the child. It is, however, suggested that 
some of the problems can be eliminated by enforcing the 
terms of the contract subject to the careful screening of 
the parties to the contract and prior scrutiny of the 
contract by a court as discussed xn more detail in chapter 
7 .
Interestingly enough, in most cases of custody disputes in 
regard to surrogacy agreements, the intended parents have 
been awarded custody on the grounds of the welfare of the 
child. Although these decisions were l.ot based on principles 
of the law of contract, an argument could be raised that 
specific performance was indirectly ordered and the required 
result obtained.
If the intended parents are awarded custody of the child, 
the question remains whether the surrogate mother will have 
any rights to the child, for instance, visitation rights.
208 See the discussion supra.
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The question of parental power and in whom it vests is a
highly emotional issue, as was clearly demonstrated by the
209Baby M case in New Jersey and there seem to be no easy
answers. In Baby M the contracting couple, in whose care the
child had been at the beginning of the judicial proceedings
was awarded custody. The surrogate mother was granted
2 1 0visitation rights by the New Jersey Supreme Court. As the 
child was already living with the intended parents, the 
court based its decision on the criterion of the best 
interest of the child. Despite this order, the court 
emphasised that the contract was invalid and unenforceable 
as payment of money is not permissible in adoption cases.
The court in casu thus relied on ordinary principles of 
family law in granting custody to the contracting couple.
Generally speaking, the courts seem reluctant to take a 
child of tender age from a mother and ^ward custody to the 
(biological) father, although each case should be considered 
on its merits and special circumstances may be present. 
Another possible option for the court is tc award custody 
jointly to the parties involved in a surrogate motherhood 
dispute. Thu.5-; joint custody was awarded by an Illinois court
209 See chapters 2 and 6 .
210 For an in-depth discuss ' on : i tae Baby M case, see 1937
330 especially v v« 'a ; eaa; < t tc visitation rights.
S e e a 1 s c chapters 2 a • ■
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m  the United States m  the case of Wagner v Erber.
Custody of a five year old girl was awarded jointly to the 
girl's mother, the mother's ex-husband and the girl's 
biological father. It is submitted that such an award has 
the potential of creating a tug-of-war for the child and
212would probably not serve the best interest of the child.
5-3.5 BREACH BY THE COMMISSIONING COUPLE
Breach by the commissioning couple in surrogate motherhood 
arrangements is less likely to occur, especially in the case 
of altruistic surrogacy. Inducement to commit a breach of 
contract, may, however occur where the child is born with a 
physical or mental defect or where the couple simply change 
their minds. Breach of contract may also occur if artificial 
insemination resulted in multiple births and the parents 
desired a single child. Another possibility is where the 
child is born from a different ethnic group. This actually 
happened in New York, USA, where a white woman gave birth to 
a black baby after the sperm of her dying husband had
211
211 85 D 6382. Discussed by O'Brien S “Commercial 
Conceptions: A Breeding Ground for Surrogacy" 1986 N C 
L Rev 149 - 150 n 193.
212 Hahlo H R 1985 The South African Law of Husband and 
Wife 392; Heimann v Heimann 1948 4 SA 926 W; Edwards v 
Edwards 1960 2 SA 523 D; Schlebusch v Schlebusch 1988 4 
SA 548 at 552 D contra Kastan v Kastan 1985 3 SA 235 C.
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allegedly been mislaid in an unfortunate incident at a sperm 
laboratory.21^
A failure to accept performance properly tendered or a 
refusal to accept performance for inadequate reasons 
constitutes mora creditoris. Indications by the intended 
parents that they do not intend honouring the contract, may 
also constitute repudiation. The surrogacy contract usually 
also contains a stipulation to the effect that the intended 
parents will assume full legal responsibility for any child 
born as a result of the agreement, irrespective of 
congenital or other abnormalities. In entering the agreement 
with the surrogate and with the awareness that artificial 
insemination could result in multiple births or the birth of 
a handicapped child, the commissioning couple assume the 
risk of such an incident occurring.
Apart from the financial effects of breach of contract, 
legitimate concerns have also been raised about the 
potential of psychological harm to a child who is not wanted 
by either party to the contract. The possibility of this 
happening was clearly demonstrated by the Malahoff/Strivers 
incident in 1983 in the USA where the baby was born 
microcephalic and neither Mr Malahoff nor the Strivers
213 Reported in Sunday Star 10-03-1990.
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wanted it . 2 1 4 It is submitted that the intent of the parties
to a surrogacy agreement is to obtain a child for the
intended parents, of which one is alsc the genetic parent.
It is therefore submitted that the intended parents should
not be permitted to refuse to accept a child which suffers
from a physical or mental handicap, unless they can prove
that the child is not their genetic child and that they are
therefore not the parents of the child. Another incident was
reported in 1987 in the New England Journal of Medicine
where a surrogate mother passed HIV infection to the foetus,
and neither the surrogate not the natural father wanted
215custody of the infant. In this particular case the
surrogate mother, who had been an intravenous drug user, had
216not been screened prior to conception.
Another form of breach of contract is nonpayment by the 
contracting couple (if payment has been agreed upon 
contractually). As commercial surrogate motherhood and 
payment for termination of parental power will probably be 
regarded as contra bonos mores and unenforceable in South
214 Discussed in chapter 2. See also Cappuccio "Surrogate 
Motherhood in Ohio: A Dangerous Game of Baby Roulette"
1985 Cap U L Rev 104 - 105.
215 For a discussion see Rothenberg K H "Surrogacy and the 
Health Care Professional Baby M and Beyond" in 1990 
Surrogate Motherhood Gostin L (ed) 214.
216 At 220 n 117.
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Africa, it seems doubtful that the surrogate mother will be 
successful in securiny any form of payment for her services, 
except compensation for necessary expenses, which in my 
view, she would in any event be entitled to claim if 
provided for in the contract.
6 DELICTUAL LIABILITY
Should the surrogacy agreement for some reason be considered
unenforceable in either its entirety or partially, the
parties should still be permitted to recover patrimonial and
217non-tangible loss by the institution of the appropriate 
delictual claim, provided all the requirements have been 
met. Delictual and contractual actions may also concur under 
certain circumstances and the injured party may then choose
whether he wants to institute his claim ex contractu or ex
. i. . 218 delicto.
6.1 ACTIO LEGIS AQUILIAE, ACTIO INIURIARUM AND ACTION
FOR PAIN AND SUFFERING
217 Non-tangible loss eg a claim for pain and suffering 
can, at any rate, only be claimed with a delictual 
action. See in this regard Edouard v Administrator, 
Natal supra and Administrator, Natal v Edouard supra.
218 See in general Van Aswegen 1991 Sameloop van Eise; 
Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 1990 Law of Delict 215 
et seq; Boberg 1989 The Law of Delict 1 et seq.
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In principle a distinction is drawn between delicts which
cause patrimonial loss (damnum iniuria datum) and those
which cause injury to personality (iniuria). Damages for a
wrongful and culpable act causing patrimonial loss are
claimed with the Actio Legis Aquiliae, whereas the Actio
Iniuriam is used to claim satisfaction (solatium) for a
wrongful and intentional injury to personality. Apart from
these two actions, compensation for injury as a result of
the wrongful and negligent (or intentional) impairment of
the bodily or physical-mental integrity may be claimed with
the Action for Pain and Suffering. These three actions form
219the pillars of the law of Delict.
6.1.1 THE MOST LIKELY FORMS OF BREACH IN SURROGACY 
ARRANGEMENTS AND APPLICABLE DELICTUAL CLAIMS
6 .1.1.1 REFUSAL TO HAND OVER THE CHILD AFTER BIRTH
AND OBTAINING AND ILLEGAL ABORTION OF THE CHILD
The most common form of breach of the surrogacy contract is 
the refusal by the surrogate mother to hand the baby over to 
the intended parents after birth and obtaining an illegal 
abortion of the child.
219 See Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 1990 Law of Delict 
5 - 17; Van der Walt J C 1979 Delict 17 - 20.
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1 The actio iniuriarum and a contractual action may
concur in circumstances where the breach of contract also
constitutes an iniuria against the party who has suffered
220harm, but this will not necessarily be the case. An
example is provided with reference to breach of promise. It
is accepted that breach of contract (in casu a promise to
2 2 1marry) does not per se constitute an xniuria. This will
only be the case if the plaintiff can prove that the breach
was not only wrongful, but "injurious or contumelious". This
222view was supported in Guggenheim v Rosenbaum, where 
breach of a promise to marry, was found not per se to 
constitute an iniuria. If the actio iniuriarum, which is the 
appropriate action in this case, is instituted, it is a 
separate action.
Whether the refusal of the surrogate mother to hand over the
baby to the intended parents also constitutes an iniuria -
especially in full surrogacy - seems uncertain. For the 
actio iniuriarum to succeed, wrongfulness and intent (animus 
iniurandi) must be proved. The contracting couple are thus
220 See Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 1990 Law of Delict 
217/ Van der Walt 1979 Delict 8; Van der Merwe and 
Olivier 1989 Die Onregmatige Daad in die 
Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 468 - 48 3.
221 See Guggenheim v Rosenbaum 1961 4 SA 21 W for breach of 
an engagement promise.
2 2 2 supra.
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required to prove that the refusal of the surrogate mother,
22 3apart from patrimonial loss, constitutes an intentional *
infringement of a right of personality, ie the wounded
feelings of the couple (possibly their feelings of
piety) . 224 The problem created by rapid advances in modern
birth technology, is that rights to zygotes and embryos have
not yet been crystallised. Even where the surrogate carries
the genetic child of the intended parents, it is not yet
clear whether the intended parents have rights of
personality to such a "child". Therefore it is not certain
whether the surrogate's refusal to hand the child to the
intended parents after birth, constitutes an iniuria,
although to my mind such an action could not be ruled out as
the wounded feelings of the couple should be taken into 
225account.
The actio iniuriarum succeeded in a case where there was an 
intentional and willful violation of the feelings of
223 Intent may possibly be present in the form of dolus 
eventualis as the surrogate mother could have foreseen 
that her refusal to hand over the child to the intended 
parents could cause injury, but nevertheless decided to 
keep the child.
224 Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 1990 Law of Delict 296 
and examples at 296 n 252 where the courts have taken 
cognisance of the feelings as a personality interest in 
assessing the amount of satisfaction to be awarded.
225 See in this regard Neethling 1985 Persoonlikheidsreg
197 et seq.
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another. Thus in E Els v Bruce; J Els v Bruce where the 
plaintiff suffered injury to her health as a result of
threats and insults by the defendant, the court ordered
. . . 227compensation with the actio lniuriarmn.
2 The actio legis Aquilia may concur with a contractual 
claim or be instituted separately if all the requirements 
are met. In breach of contract by the surrogate mother 
(despite the fact that the contract may be invalid), damages 
for patrimonial loss may be claimed with this action. It is
submitted that in most instances the action will be
228instituted for pure economic loss and in rare instances,
229negligent misrepresentation. These are forms of damnum 
iniuria datum which have, in practice, emerged under 
different names. Pure economic loss may be claimed where 
patrimonial loss does not result from damage to property or 
injury to personality of the person instituting the
2 2 6
226 1922 EDL.
227 See Neethling 1985 Persoonlikheidsreg 93.
228 See Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 1990 Law of Delict
246 et seq. Van Aswegen 1991 Sameloop van Eise 172 et 
seq.
229 Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 1990 Law of Delict 250 
et seq; Administrateur van Natal v Trust Bank van 
Afrika Bpk 1979 3 SA 824 A; Kern Trust (Edms) Bpk v 
Hurter 1981 3 SA 607 C.
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action. It is thus an ideal action for the recovery of
damages resulting from medical expenses in surrogacy
231cases. To prove wrongfulness it must be established that
2 32there has been an infringement of a subjective right or
breach of a legal duty. In most of the cases before our
courts for pure economic loss, wrongfulness was found in the
23 3breach of a legal duty. The question posed is whether 
there was a legal duty to avoid pure economic damage in the 
circumstances - thus the general criterion of reasonableness 
or boni mores. Applying this criterion, the courts will
230
230 Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 1990 Law of Delict 246; 
Van Aswegen 1991 Saraeloop van Bise 172 et seq.
231 The courts approach such claims circumspectly for fear 
of creating indeterminate liability, but there is no 
reason to refuse this remedy in casu. In Arthur E 
Abrahams & Gross v Cohen and Others 1991 2 SA 301 312 B 
it was stated by Marais J that: "The persons to whom 
the duty is owed are not members of a large and 
indeterminate class. They are few in number and 
immediately identifiable. The nature of the loss they 
may suffer is not indeterminable. On the contrary, it 
is obvious what it will be. The time when such loss may 
be suffered is similarly not indeterminate; it is also 
known.*' See in this regard Boberg 1989 Law of Delict
104 - 105; Neethling J "Die Onregmatigheidsvereiste by 
Deliktuele Aanspreeklikheids Weens die Nalatige 
Veroorsaking van Suiwer Ekonomiese Veriies" 1983 THRHR
205 - 211 for a discussion of the role of the courts in 
determining policy issues in cases of pure economic 
loss.
232 The contract between the parties, if it is valid, 
provides a personal right (right of performance), which 
is a legally recognised interest.
233 See Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 1990 Law of Delict
247 and the cases cited in n 109. See also Arthur E 
Abrahams & Gross v Cohen and Others supra.
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carefully weigh up the interests of the parties involved.
Factors which may be considered by a court in determining
the reasonableness of conduct, are inter alia the nature and
extent of the harm and of the foreseeable or foreseen loss;
the possible value to the defendant or to society of the
defendant's harmful conduct; the nature of the relationship
between the parties; the motive of the defendant; the legal
position in other countries; ethical and moral issues as
234well as other considerations of public interest. Tne
criterion of the boni mores in establishing wrongfulness is
of particular importance in two instances:
(i) where no established category of wrongfulness or
justification is involved and (ii) for the purposes of
235refinement m  borderline cases.
In a surrogacy situation where the contract is breached by 
the refusal to hand the child over to the intended parents 
after birth,, the element of wrongfulness, may be construed 
from the breach by the surrogate mother of a legal duty to 
avoid damage. Certain factors, such as a special 
relationship between the parties or the existence of a 
contract between them, whether enforceable or not, are
2 34 Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 1990 Law of Delict 33 
and cases cited in n 2 2 .
235 Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 1990 Law of Delict 39.
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indicative of the existence of a legal duty. By 
instituting one of these actions the intended parents may 
claim legal, medical and other expenses.
3 A claim may, under certain circumstances, also be
instituted for pain and suffering, should the requirements
237be met. It may also coincide with another delictual
action, such as the actio legis Aquiliae, or even with an
238action for patrimonial damages ex contractu. The action
for pain and suffering aliows for the recovery of a solatium 
from someone who has negligently caused another pain as a 
result of bodily injury suffered. The interest protected by 
this action is the corpus (physical integrity). Forms of 
injury compensated include pain and suffering, loss of 
amenities of life, shock, shortened expectation of life and
236
236 Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 1990 Law of Delict 247 
with reference to Coronation Brick (Pty) Ltd v Strachan 
Construction Co (Pty) Ltd 1982 4 SA 371 D 379 - 380;
Van Aswegen 1991 Sameloop van Eise 174 and n 283.
237 Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 1990 Law of Delict 17; 
Van der Walt 1979 Delict 19; Hoffa v S A Mutual Fire 
and General Insurance Co Ltd 1965 2 SA 944 C 951 - 952.
238 Edouard v Administrator, Natal supra at 394.
237
2 39 .disfigurement. The plaintiff may claim for physical pain
240as well as mental anguish with this action.
Specific attention should be afforded to an action for
emotional shock. This action is of particular importance as
the effect of breach of contract in surrogacy cases may
241result in severe trauma.
This action protects the whole physical and mental integrity
of a person and usually falls under the action for pain and
suffering. The general requirements for delictual liability
also apply here. Compensation is granted for patrimonial
loss or sentimental damage caused by intentional or
242negligent infliction of emotional shock. In an action 
based on emotional shock, the event must cause a "sudden, 
painful emotion or fright resulting from the realisation or
239 Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 1990 Law of Delict 208 
- 209; Van der Merwe and Olivier 1989 Die Onregmatige 
Daad in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 242 et seq.
240 Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 1990 Law of Delict 218 
et seq; Van der Merwe and Olivier 1989 Die Onregmatige 
Daad in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 47 6 - 47 7.
241 The leading case in this regard is Bester v Commercial 
Union Versekeringsmaatskappy van S A Bpk 1973 1 SA 769 
A. See also Van der Walt J C "Skoktoediening: "Wie Sal 
die Aftreksom Maak?" in 1988 Hulcigingsbundel vir W A 
Joubert Strauss S A (ed) 247 - 260.
242 Intent is therefore not required, which is a 
prerequisite for the action iniuriarum. Potgieter J M 
“Emotional Shock" 1979 LAWSA W A Joubert (ed) 2 et seq.
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perception of an unwelcome or disturbing event which
involves an unpleasant mental condition such as fear,
243anxiety or grief".
244 .Van der Walt, on the strength of Bester v Commercial Union
245Versekermgsmaatskappy van SA Bpk, remarks that
compensation will undoubtedly be awarded under this action
if clear psychiatric damage is present, whether it is in the
form of a neurosis or an hysterical reaction, as long as it
246is not merely a temporary outburst.
It is submitted that should a surrogate mother refuse to 
hand over the baby after birth, which may be genetically 
linked to one or both pare.its, such an event could spark 
severe emotional trauma for the intended parents. If this 
results in serious physical or mental injury and all the 
other requirements of this action are met, there is no 
reason why such an action should not be permitted.
243 Ibid.
244 1988 Huldigingsbundel vir W A Joubert Strauss (ed) 249.
245 1973 1 SA 769 A.
246 The de minimis non curat lex principle is applicable.
See Lutzkie v SAR & H 1974 4 SA 396 W; Muzik v Canzone
de' Mare 1980 3 SA 470 C.
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Similarly, where an illegal abortion is performed without 
the consent of the commissioning couple;, the argument could 
possibly be raised that the requirements for delictual 
liability in the form of shock or pain and suffering may be 
present and that the couple should receive some 
compensation.
In considering the degree of pain and suffering, the courts
will pay particular attention to factors which are capable
of objective assessment such as age, sex, status, culture
247and mode of living.
6 .1.1.2 POSSIBLE DEFENCES AGAINST DELICTUAL CLAIMS
It may be argued that the surrogate mother is under no legal
obligation to hand the child over to the intended parents at
birth. One must bear in mind that acts which were performed
in the exercise of a right or duty were not wrongful in
Roman-Dutch law unless the person abused his right or duty
by acting contra bonos mores, with improper motives or
248immoderately. This principle applies to all delictual 
claims.
247 See in this regard Neethling, Potgiecer and Visser 1990
Law of Delict 206 - 207.
248 Van der Walt 1979 Delict with reference to Voet 47 10
2 .
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To my mind, a distinction should be drawn between full and
partial surrogacy. It is submitted that in partial surrogacy
the decision of the surrogate mother to keep the baby which
is genetically linked to her, constitutes the exercise of
249her common law (and now also statutory right) to the
child. Seen in this light, her act, despite her promise or
contractual agreement to hand the child over after birth,
cannot be seen as an impairment of the physical integrity of
the contracting couple. The natural father (donor of semen)
could prove paternity prior to the Children’s Status Act.
The presumption of paternity (pater is est quem nuptiae
demonstrant) is, however, now statutorily entrenched in the
250Children's Status Act and all the rights of the donor are 
2 Mterminated. “ As the commissioning couple have no rights to 
the child in terms of the Children's Status Act it may be 
difficult to prove that the decision of the surrogate mother 
not to hand over the baby after birth, constitutes an 
infringement of a subjective right of the commissioning 
couple.
As argued supra the breach of her promise by the surrogate 
mother, may cause moral suffering and a possible




infringement of the intended couple's feelings of piety. * 
Courts confronted with such a dilemma will probably consider 
each case on its merits.
In the light of the above discussion, it is uncertain 
whether the contracting couple will succeed in a delictual 
action. Since Roman-Dutch Law does not recognise the loss of 
life as a loss for which compensation may be claimed, the 
loss of a child will not be delictually actionable - with 
the exception of the possibilities set out in the previous 
paragraphs.
7 CONCLUSION
It has been said that the procreation of a child in the
framework of a contract is "like trying to fit a square peg
25 3into a round hole". The simple fact is, however, that the 
child is not procreated by the contract, but the contract 
serves as a statement of the intent of the parties. It 
furthermore provides the parties with some guidelines 
regarding their rights and duties and, most importantly, it 
serves to protect the interest of the child. The argument is
2 5 2
252 See Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 1990 Law of Delict 
296.
253 O'Brien 1986 N C L Rev 151 quoting a Jefferson County 
Kentucky circuit court judge.
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sometimes advanced that it is illogical to initiate a
potentially harmful situation for the child and then later
resolve difficulties by implementing the best interests of
254the child to resolve the situation. There are, however, 
no guarantees of any kind for any child coming into this 
world - irrespective of how it was conceived. A potentially 
harmful or unstable situation, such as divorce or death of a 
parent in later life, can never be discounted, not to 
mention a variety of potential social, health or other 
problems. The fact that some infertile couples choose 
surrogacy as a final option despite inherent uncertainties, 
serves as a confirmation of their determination and courage.
Our law of contract with its Roman-law background, is a
well-developed and flexible system. Although some contracts
255have their own rules, parties are as a general rule free
to decide how and with whom they wish to conclude a
contract. There are, of course, the limitations on freedom
256to contract already discussed.
254 O'Brien 1986 N C L Rev 146.
255 Kerr 1982 Principles 135 and n 271, 272 and 273. Hahlo 
H R and Kahn E 1960 The South African Legal System and 
its Background 123 gives the examples of sale, lease, 
suretyship, master and servant, and some mercantile law 
contracts.
256 For instance that it must not contravene statutory 
requirements, public policy, boni mores and the 
requirement of a iusta causa. See discussion supra.
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Instead of disregarding well-established principles of the
law of contract in the surrogacy situation, these should
rather be implemented to provide guidelines, not only to
those wishing to enter into surrogacy agreements, but also
to courts called upon to adjudi'ite on disputes flowing from
surrogacy issues. It is submitted that the child's interest
could be well protected in a written contract. In Basetti v
257Louw, for instance, Margo J was willing to grant an order 
validating an agreement between the father and mother of an 
illegitimate child, regulating maintenance, custody and 
access. In casu the parties did not wish to marry and 
entered into a type of "settlement“ agreement. The father, 
for instance, made provision for support of the child 
through an insurance policy.
In chapter 4 a proposed surrogacy agreement contract is 
described and analysed.
257 1980 2 225 W.
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CHAPTER 4 ANALYSIS OF A PROPOSED SURROGATE MOTHER
AGREEMENT MODEL
X INTRODUCTION
As there is no legislation regulating surrogacy in South
Africa at present, a surrogacy contract can take the form of
a short written contract, addressing the most important
issues or it can be a detailed document with provisions
anticipating as many potential pitfalls as possible and
attempting to regulate these in a sarisfactorv way. The
contract should also be drawn up in such a way that the best
interest of the child is protected. The legal problems
surrounding surrogate motherhood have enjoyed the attention
of several South African jurists, 1 of which only a few have
2addressed the contract as such.
1 Strauss S A 1982 in Die Proefbuisbaba: Toekomsskok of 
Nuwe Burger? Pieterse (ed) 20; Strauss S A "Regstatus 
van K. I.-Kinders en Kinders Gebore Uit
Surrogaatmoeders" 1988 S A Praktyksbestuur 5; Strauss S 
A "Triplets to a Surrogate Grandmother in South Africa: 
Legal Issues" 1989 Intern L Prac 70 - 71; Lupton M L 
"The Status of Children Born by Artificial Insemination 
in South African Law-' 1985 TSAR 277 - 295; Lupton M L 
"Surrogate Parenting: The Advantages and Disadvantages" 
1986 TRW 148 - 157; Lupton M L “The Right to be Born: 
Surrogacy and the Legal Control of Human Fertility"
1988 DJ 36 - 58; Tager L "Surrogate Motherhood, Legal 
Dilemma" 1986 SALJ 381 - 404; Pretorius R "Surrogaat- 
Moederskap: Implikasies in die Suid-Afrikaanse 
Regstelsel" 1987 DR 270 - 278. See also the discussion 
in chapter 3 under the Boni Mores.
2 Lupton M L The Legal Consequences of Artificial 
Insemination and Embryo Transplantation in Humans D
(Footnote Continued)
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As stated in the previous chapter, the contract will only be 
valid and enforceable to the extent that no statutory 
provisions are contravened and the contract as such is, or 
certain of its provisions are, not considered contra bonos 
mores or against public policy. The issue of the boni mores 
was dealt with in detail in chapter 3 and for the purpose of 
this discussion, it is assumed that the contract is not 
contra bonos mores or against public policy, particularly in 
the absence of a commercial objective and after careful 
screening of the parties.
The surrogate mother agreement model discussed in this 
chapter, is based on one used by an American agency,
3Surrogate Family Services, in Kentucky. Similar contracts 
are also used by the Infertility Center of New York, run by 
Noel Keane, who pioneered commercial surrogacy arrangements 
in Michigan USA. The contract discussed here has been 
adapted to suit local conditions and in particular to be in 
accordance with our common law and to meet existing 
statutory requirements. The implications and complications 
surrounding certain provisions are discussed in footnotes.
(Footnote Continued)
Phil University of Natal 1982 104 et seq; Pretorius R 
"A Comparative Overview and Analysis of a Proposed 
Surrogate Mother Agreement Model" 1987 CILSA 275 - 293.
3 Brophy K M "A Surrogate Mother Contract to Bear a 
Child" 1982 J Fam L 263 - 291.
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As there are a number of variations possible in surrogacy 
contracts, each contract should be framed to suit the needs 
of the parties thereto. In the first known surrogacy case in
4South Africa, the Anthcny/Ferreira-Jorge surrogacy, the 
intended parents (the Ferreira-Jorges) contributed 
genetically to the child. In vitro fertilisation was used 
and the embryos were transferred to the grandmother, Mrs 
Anthony, who acted as a host mother or human incubator. In 
the USA partial surrogacy is used more frequently than 
complete surrogacy and probably in a majority of cases the
5women are compensated for their services. In the USA it is 
also not uncommon for a woman to act as surrogate several 
times for the same couple, so that the children resemble 
each other. 6 Another form of surrogacy is where the intended 
parents enter into two surrogacy agreements with different 
surrogate mothers simultaneously with the result that they
7receive two surrogate babies at approximately the same time 
A relatively rare form of surrogacy is where the child is
4 See also the discussion in chapter 5 under law of
persons.
5 See Parker P J "Motivation of Surrogate Mothers:
Initial Findings" 1983 Am J Psychiatry 117 - 118, where 
research revealed that 89% of the women interviewed are 
motivated by the prospect of compensation.
6 Personal communication with Noel Keane, the Michigan
attorney who pioneered surrogacy in the USA, during a 
study tour May 1989.
7 Personal communication with Noel Keane 1989.
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not at all genetically related to the commissioning couple. 
In these situations neither of the intended parencs is 
capable of producing gametes. The situation envisaged for 
instance, is where the intended mother's uterus and ovaries 
have been removed surgically and the husband suffers from 
azoospermia (absence of sperm) or oligospermia (a low sperm 
count). In such instances, family members may wish to assist 
the couple by providing sperm and ova so that the child may 
be indirectly genetically related to one or both of the 
intended parents.
Despite the various forms of surrogate motherhood, there is
one common purpose when the agreement is signed, namely to
provide a means whereby the prospective parents may become
the legal parents of the child, born as a result of
artificial insemination. The purpose is not for the
surrogate mother and her husband to obtain a child for
themselves. It is, however, exactly this part of the
agreement which has in some instances caused considerable
problems, for instance, the Baby M case. The main reason is
that it is practically impossible to predict exactly what
the surrogate mother's emotions will be once the child has 
9oeen born. The risk of eventual breach of contract is
8 Pretorius R 1991 De Jure 52 - 62 59 - 56.
9 Personal discussion with American psychiatrist, Dr Phil 
Parker in Michigan - May 1989
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perhaps greater where the surrogate mother is also the 
genetic mother of the child and where there is a profit 
motive.
Brophy suggests1 0 that in partial surrogacy, the wife of the 
intended (biological) father should not be a party to the 
surrogacy agreement as she will later have to adopt the 
child. The reason advanced by her is that if the surrogate's 
hospital and attorney costs are paid by the couple, it could 
be construed as payment for a child11, which is statutorily 
prohibited in most countries and also by our Child Care
To exclude the intended mother from the agreement merely to 
avoid the obstacles in the Act which prohibits compensation 
for adoption, is unsatisfactory. There is a vast difference 
between surrogacy and so-called "baby-selling". In the
10 1982 J Fam Law 264.
11 Case law on this point is also not consistent. In Doe v 
Attorney General discussed in chapter 2 under court 
decisions in the USA, compensation of the surrogate 
during adoption proceedings was considered unlawful. 
This was also the opinion of the lower court in 
Kentucky v Surrogate Parenting Associates Inc, but the 
Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed the decision of the 
lower court in Surrogate Parenting Assoc v Kentucky ex 
rel Armstrong in 1986 and clearly distinguished between 
surrogacy agreements and the buying and selling of 
children as prohibited by the statutes in question - 
see discussion chapter 2 .
12 S 24 of Act 74 of 1983.
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former the parties enter into the agreement with the intent
that the child born as a result of the agreement, will be
the child of the intended parents and not of the surrogate 
13mother. It is submitted that there should be no objection 
to making the intended husband and wife parties to the 
contract as it is after all the commissioning mother who 
will bear the primary responsibility for the emotional and 
physical needs of the baby after its birth.
Since at present complete or full surrogacy seems more 
acceptable to the South African society than partial 
surrogacy, the model in the discussion is designed to 
regulate such a situation. With a few adaptations, however, 
it could also serve as a model for other forms of surrogacy.
Compensation of the surrogate, apart from necessities, is 
also not included in the model, as it is unlikely that 
commercial surrogacy will be acceptable to our society at 
present. In full surrogacy, ova of the intended mother are 
fertilised with semen from her husband or a sperm donor 
outside the human body in a laboratory, ie in vitro - the
13 See the discussion in chapter 7 under Compensation of
the Surrogate Mother. See also Lupton 1988 DJ 42 et seq
for the differences between surrogacy and payment for
adoption.
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so-called "test tube babies". Some writers prefer to use 
the term SET or surrogate embryo transfer for this 
procedure. If the in vitro fertilisation is successful, the 
embryo is transferred to the womb of the surrogate mother, 
who, in this case, is a hostess mother with no genetic 
contribution to the child. The parties to such an agreement 
will be the intended parents as well as the surrogate mother 
and her husband. Full/complete surrogacy is used in cases 
where the intended mother cannot carry the foetus to term 
either because of some physical abnormality or the absence 
of a uterus. Healtny ovaries are, however present in these 
women and they are therefore capable of producing ova.
Despite the fact that the enforceaoility of surrogate 
motherhood agreements may still be uncertain in many 
countries, it remains preferable to have the agreement in 
writing as this can at least provide some indication to the 
parties of their rights and obligations as well as potential 
pitfalls. 1 5
14
14 Mallory T E and Rich K E “Human Reproductive 
Technologies: An Appeal for Brave New Legislation in a 
Brave New World" 1986 Washburn L J 490.
15 See also the discussion in chapter 6 under Liability of 
Medical Practitioners in Assisted Reproduction 
Technology and Surrogate Motherhood under Informed 
Consent.
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A proposed Surrogate Parenting Agreement is presented in the 
next section.
2 SURROGATE PARENTING AGREEMENT
THIS AGREEMENT is entered into this ...... day of 19...
by and between:
(hereinafter referred to as "surrogate") and
her husband,
(hereinafter referred to as "husband") and
the natural/genetic father and
the natural/genetic mother
(hereinafter referred to as the ’intended parents")
252
1
THIS AGREEMENT IS MADE WITH REFERENCE TO THE
FOLLOWING FACTS:
1.1 The intended parents are married to e^ch other, over 
the age of twenty-one (2 1 ) years and unable to have a 
child of their own without assisted conception.
The intended parents desire to have a child, carried by 
the surrogate mother and which wilJ be genetically 
related to them.
161.2 The surrogate and her husband are a married couple 
each over the age of twenty-one (2 1 ) years who desire 
to assist the intended parents in obtaining a child who 
is biologically related to at least one of them.
16 In terms of Regulation 8(1) of the Human Tissue Act
supplementary Regulations, artificial insemination may 
be performed only on a married woman.
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2
PURPOSE AND INTENT OF THE AGREEMENT
2.1 The sole purpose and intent of the agreement is to 
provide a means for the intended parents to become the 
legal parents of a child/children who is/are 
genetically related to at least one of them, through 
assisted conception.
2.2 The sole purpose and intent of the surrogate mother and 
her husband is to assist the intended parents to obtain 
a child who is genetically related to at least one of 
them. The purpose of the agreement is not for the 
surrogate and her husband to obtain a child for 
themselves and to become the parent/s of any child 
conceived through assisted conception.
2.3 The parties fully understand and are in full agreement 





3.1 "Assisted conception" means a pregnancy resulting from
(i) fertilising of ova of a woman with sperm of a man 
by means other than sexual intercourse and
(ii) implanting the resultant embryo in the s of the 
surrogate mother.
1 R3.2 "Physician" means a registered medical doctor/s who 
will be responsible for evaluation, artificial 
insemination or treatment of the surrogate relating to 
conception and pregnancy.
3.3 "Surrogate" means an adult, married woman who enters 
into an agreement to bear a child conceived through 
assisted conception for the intended parents.
17 These definitions are, to a large extent, obtained from 
the United States of America proposed Uniform Status of 
Children of Assisted Conception Act drafted by the the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws, approved and recommended for enactment in all the 
States, Washington D C July 29 - August 5 1988; See the 
discussion in chapter 2 under USA legislation.
18 In terms of S 23(2) of the Human Tissue Act 65 of 1983 
as well as reg 3 of the Regulations, artificial 
insemination may only be affected by a medical 
practitioner or a person acting under his/her 
supervision.
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3 . 4 "Intended parents" means a man and woman, married to
19each other , who enter into a surrogacy agreement, 
providing that they will be the parents of a child born 
to the surrogate mother through assisted conception 
using ova or sperm of one or both of the intended 
parents.
3.5 "Child" means the surrogate child or children born from 
a surrogate mother as a result of assisted conception.
3.6 "Donor" means an individual (other than the surrogate) 
who produces eggs or sperm used for assisted 
conception. (*Optional if donor is involved)
In consideration of the mutual promises contained 
herein and with the intention of being legally bound, 
the parties hereby agree as follows:
19 It is preferable for the surrogate mother to have had at 
least one child prior to this agreement as she may then 
better understand the implications and possible 
complications of the pregnancy. Psychologically it 
should be easier for her hand the child over at birth.
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4
ASSISTED CONCEPTION AND PREGNANCY
4.1 The surrogate agrees to the placement of the embryo(s), 
resultant from the assisted conception with sperm from 
the intended/genetic father and the ova from the 
intended mother in her uterus.
4.2 The surrogate and her husband agree, in the best 
interest of the child born as a result of the 
procedure, not to form or attempt t;o form a
parent-child relationship with any child the surrogate 
may conceive pursuant to the provisions of this 
contract.
4.3 The surrogate and her husband agree that it is the 
exclusive and sole right of the intended parents to 
name the child. 20
20 This clause in the agreement is a result of the Baby M 
case in the United States where the child was given 




TERMINATION OF PARENTAL POWER
(conferred on the surrogate and her husband 
in terms of s 5 of the Children’s Status Act 
82 of 1987)
5.1 The surrogate and her husband agree to freely and 
readily, in conformity with applicable statutory 
regulations, sign any/all documents or affidavits 
necessary for termination of their parental power and
to assist in the adoption of the child by the intended
*. 2 1  parents.
21 See the detailed discussion on Parental Power in 
chapter 5, the Law of Persons. As a general rule, an 
agreement to transfer or delegate parental power 
permanently, is invalid and contra bonos mores and will 
not be enforceable. Parental power may, however be 
transferred or delegated by adoption, divorce or
258
5.2 The surrogate and her husband agree to assist the
intended parents in obtaining adoption of the child by
22 . . .  23the intended parents by providing written consent
to such adoption as required by Section 18(4)(d) of the
24Child Care Act.
5.3 The husband of the surrogate agrees to do all or any 
acts necessary to rebut the presumption of paternity 
should it be required by a court of law or otherwise.
5.4 The intended parents agree to initiate adoption
proceedings within a reasonable time after the birth of 
the child.
22 It is submitted that the status of the child should be 
determined prior to insemination and that adoption 
should not be necessary as is presently the case. See 
the recommendations in this regard in the proposed 
Surrogacy Arrangements Act in chapter 7.
23 Should adoption be necessary, the consent of the 
surrogate mother's husband must be obtained before she 
is artificially inseminated in order to comply with reg
8 of the Regulations. See the discussion of the effect 
of the Children's Status Act on Parental Power and the 
Status of the Child in chapter 5 under the Effect of 
the Termination of Parental Rights of Gamete Donors in
s 5 of the Children's Status Act on Surrogacy.
24 74 of 1983.
25 This is a necessary step to ensure that there is no 
violation of s 10 of the Child Care Act which 
specifically provides that a person may not receive a 
child for the purpose of adoption, and maintain it 
apart from the parents for longer than 14 days, unless 
an adoption application has been filed.
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5.5 The surrogate mother agrees to hand the child over to
the intended parents and they, in turn, agree to accept
the child as soon as the medical practitioners caring 
for the child and surrogate mother, declares the baby 
fit to leave the hospital.
6
MEDICAL AND HEALTH CARE
6 .1 The surrogate agrees to keep the intended parents
informed through the physicians attending her,
regarding expected assisted conception, medical testing 
and delivery dates as well as the results of the 
assisted conception and medical tests.
6.2 The surrogate agrees to notify the intended parents, 
through the physicians attending her, of her expected 
delivery date as soon as it is known as well as the 
actual delivery date within twenty-four (24) hours 
after the birth, if medically possible.
6.3 The surrogate and her husband agree not to have sexual 
intercourse for the duration of the assisted conception 
as advised by the physicians responsible for the
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6.4 Should the artificial insemination prove to be 
successful, the surrogate agrees to carry the 
embryo/foetus (hereinafter referred to as "child") for 
the full term of the pregnancy, until delivery to the 
intended parents.
6.5 The surrogate agrees that she will not try to abort the
child once conceived, except, if the requirements of
27the Abortion and Sterilization Act have been met, 
namely when it is the opinion of the physicians 
attending her that such an action is necessary because 
the pregnancy might endanger the physical or mental
26 See also chapter 3 under Breach of Contract. Although 
this term may be considered contra bonos mores, it is 
nevertheless important as was demonstrated in the 
unreported case of Mahlahoff/Strivers in the USA in 
1983. Judy Striver, a surrogate mother from Michigan, 
agreed to bear a child for Alexander Malahoff, who was 
separated from his wife at that stage. In casu the 
contract contained a clause which prohibited the 
surrogate and her husband from having intercourse two 
weeks prior to insemination. However, no mention was 
made of the period after artificial insemination. A 
child suffering from microcephaly was born and Mr 
Malahoff contested paternity on the ground that he was 
not the father. The surrogate, Striver, and her husband 
had intercourse in the period after the insemination 
and paternity tests proved that Mr Striver was indeed 
the father of the child. For a discussion of this case 
see “Surrogate Motherhood in Ohio: A Dangerous Game of 
Baby Roulette" 1985 Cap U L Rev 104 - 105.
27 2 of 1975.
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health of the surrogate or child as envisaged by the
2 8provisions of the Act.
6 . 6  The surrogate agrees not to participate in any
activities which could be harmful to the life and
29health of the child.
6.7 The surrogate undertakes to follow the normal prenatal 
medical examination schedule i e at least one (1 ) visit 
per month during the first seven (7) months of 
pregnancy, two (2 ) visits during the eighth (8 ) month 
and four (4) weekly visits during the ninth (9) month 
of pregnancy.
6 . 8  The surrogate agrees to adhere to all medical
28 See also the discussion in chapters 3 and 7. The most 
equitable way to regulate the situation where one of 
the parties wants an abortion, but not the other/s is 
to let the final decision rest with the surrogate or 
“carrier". The situation envisaged is where the 
doctors might discover through amniocentesis or other 
tests, that the child suffers from a severe defect. The 
pregnancy could be at an advanced stage and the 
surrogate might not be prepared to have an abortion, 
while that is what the commissioning couple requests.
29 The parties to the contract are free to regulate the 
activities of the surrogate mother in greater detail.
It is, however, hardly possible for the natural father 
effectively to regulate such activities. Should the 
surrogate mother breach any provisions of the 
agreement, it is uncertain whether a court would order 
specific performance of the contract. See the 
discussion in chapter 3.
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instructions given to her by the attending physicians 
involved in the procedure and not to take any form of 
non-prescriptive drugs.
7
COMPENSATION, EXPENDITURE AND INSURANCE
7.1 It is agreed that the surrogate mother will not receive
any compensation other than necessary expenses relating
to medical procedures, legal expenses, maternity
30clothes, transport and loss of income.
7.2 The intended parents will be responsible for all 
medical expenses incurred as a result of the pregnancy 
not covered or allowed by the surrogate and her 
husband's present medical scheme or insurance, 
including:
* physical and psychological screening?
* the assisted conception process/processes and regular 
follow-up examinations after conception;
* the birth itself;
* post-partum examinations, continuing for at Jeast one
30 The most controversial part of the agreement is the
matter of compensation, which is dealt with under the 
Boni Mores in chapter 3. See also the Recommendations 
in chapter 7 under Compensation.
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(1 ) month after the birth of the child;
* hospitilisation;
* pharmaceutical expenses;
* laboratory and pathology costs;
* therapy.
7.3 The intended parents shall take out and pay the 
premiums of a term-life insurance policy payable to a 
named beneficiary of the surrogate with a policy amount
of R ........ and the policy shall remain in effect for
six (6) months subsequent to the birth of the child.
7.4 In addition the intended parents shall make appropriate 
arrangements in a will for the support of the infant 
child, should one of the intended parents die prior to 
the birth of the child.
7.5 In the event of the death of one or both of the 
intended parents, prior to the release of custody to 
them, the surrogate and her husband agree to assist the 
survivor in adopting the child.
In the event of the death of both of them, the 
surrogate and her husband agree to place the child with 
a guardian designated by the intended parents.
7.6 The intended parents shall cake out and pay the 
premiums of a term-life insurance policy on their
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lives, payable in trust to the unborn child and shall 
maintain such policy for three months (3) after the 
birth of the child. The intended parents shall be 
jointly and severably liable for the payment of the 
said premium.
7.7 The parties agree that should any of their respective 
marriages end in divorce prior to the birth of the 
child, this will not affect the rights and 
obligations of the parties under the agreement or the 
purpose of the agreement in any way. It is understood 
that in divorce proceedings, the court will decide who 
should have custody of the child, once it har been 
bom, on the basis of what will be in the best interest 
of the child. 31
31 This provision is included in the agreement to protect 
the surrogate child should any of the parties divorce 
prior to its birth. Although careful screening of the 
parties should limit the incidence of divorce to a 
minimum, one must consider support of the surrogate 
mother, should she and her husband get divorced prior 
to the birth of the child. One can either rely on 
support by her spouse, if statutory requirements are 
met. See in general Van der Vyver J D and Joubert D J 
1985 Persone- en Familiereg 69 0 - 694; Cronje D S P  
1990 Barnard Cronje and Olivier Die Suid-Afrikaanse 
Persone- en Familiereg 380 et seq. An indemnity clause 
may be added to the agreement in which the natural 
father undertakes to provide reasonable support to the 
surrogate for six months prior to the birth of the 
child and three months after the birth, subject to the 




PHYSICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION
328.1 The surrogate agrees to undergo a complete physical
33as well as a psychological assessment prior to 
assisted conception and to make the results of these 
examinations available to the intended parents. The 
surrogate hereby authorises the doctor/s and 
health-care worker/s attending her to disclose these 
results to the intended parents.
8.2 The intended parents agree to undergo complete physical 
as well as psychological assessment prior to assisted 
conception and to make the results of these available 
to the surrogate. The intended parents hereby 
authorises the doctor/s and health-care worker/s
32 In terms of reg 5 of the Human Tissue Act supplementary 
Regulations, medical practitioners performinq the 
artificial insemination, must ascertain that the donor 
has had medical tests for sexually transmitted diseases 
(reg 5(a)(i)) as well as sperm analysis (reg 5 (a)(ii)) 
at least one year prior to the donation. The results of 
these must also be filed. See also the discussion in 
chapter 6 under Criminal Liability in terms of the 
Human Tissue Act and Regulations.
33 See also reg 10(a)(iii) and (iv) of the Regulations in 
terms of which the medical doctor performing the 
artificial insemination must record certain details on 
the recipient's file, amongst other things, 
psychological and social suitability as well as the 
results of certain medical tests.
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attending them to disclose these results to the 
surrogate.
8.3 The parties to the contract agree to undergo any 
pathology tests, deemed necessary by the 
doctor/s attending them.
8.4 The husband of the surrogate agrees to submit to a 
paternity blood test (HLA type) and to do all other 
acts necessary to rebut the presumption of paternity, 




9.1 The surrogate and her husband understand and agree to 
assume all risks including the risk of death which are 
incident to conception, pregnancy, childbirth and 
post-partum complications.
9.2 The intended parents assume full legal responsibility 





10.1 The surrogate and he:: husband agree not to institute
any action or bring ciny claim against the intended
parents, should any permanent disability or death of
35the surrogate result from the pregnancy.
10.2 The parties to this agreement shall not institute any 
action or bring any claim against the physician/s 
with regard to any of the medical procedures referred
to in this agreement performed in good faith and with
, 36due care.
34 See the discussion in chapter 6 on the Liability of 
Medical Practitioners in Assisted Reproduction 
Technology and Surrogate Motherhood.
35 Should the surrogate suffer any disability or even 
death, the husband will still be able to institute a 
claim against the insurance company.
36 See chapter 6 under Liability of Medical Practitioners 
in Assisted Reproduction Technology and Surrogate 
Motherhood under Criminal Liability in terms of the 
Human Tissue Act and Regulations.
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10.3 The parties to this agreement shall not institute any 
action or bring any claim against the legal advisers 
involved in the drawing up of this contract 
or any other assistance or services rendered by them 
(including in respect of legal proceedings), in good 
faith and with due care.
11
EXECUTION OF THE AGREEMENT
11.1 Each party acknowledges that he or she fully
understands the agreement and its legal effects and
that he or she is signing the agreement freely and
37voluntarily and that neither party has any reason to 
believe that the other did not freely and voluntarily 
execute the said agreement.
11.2 The parties agree to comply with the prescribed
3 8procedures contained in the Human Tissue Act
39and the supplementary Regulations to that Act as well
37 See the discussion in chapter 6 under Informed Consent 
in Assisted Reproduction and Specifically Surrogacy.
38 65 of 1983.
39 GN R 1182 GG 10283 of 1986-06-20.
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as the Births, Marriages and Deaths Registration Act.
12
TERMINATION OF CONTRACT
12.1 If the pregnancy has not occurred within a reasonable 
time after insemination, and in consultation with the 
medical practitioners, the agreement can be terminated.
13
CONFIDENTIALITY
13.1 The parties qgree to maintain complete confidentiality 
with regard to the subject matter of this contract and 
agree that no information shall be provided to the news 
media, the public or any individual or group which 
could disclose the identity of the parties involved,
or the identity of the child.
4 0
40 81 of 1963.
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SEVERABILITY CLAUSE41
14.1 In the event of any of the provisions of this agreement 
being held invalid or unenforceable by a court of law, 
the same shall, subject to such court's discretion, be 
deemed severable from the remainder of this agreement 
and shall not cause the invalidity or unenforceability 
of the entire agreement, especially where enforcement 
of certain sections is sf 2cifically aimed at protecting 
the best interest of the child. Should certain 
provisions however be deemed invalid, due to their 
scope or breadth, then the provision/s shall be valid 
to the extent permitted by law, subject to the court's 
discretion.
14
41 See the discussion in chapter 3, under The Doctrine of 




15.1 This surrogate parenting agreement sets forth the 
entire agreement between the parties with regard to the 
subject matter hereof.
15.2 This agreement or any clause thereof, may only be 
amended with the written consent of all the parties 
involved.
We have read the foregoing pages of this agreement and it is 
our intention by affixing our signatures below, to enter 








Although it is impossible to anticipate all the possible
forms of breach which may occur in a surrogacy arrangement/
it is hoped that such a basic written agreement may alert
42the parties to potential legal and medical pitfalls.
Because of the complexity of surrogacy agreements, it is
admittedly difficult to regulate the agreement adequately by
a written contract alone. It is however submitted that the
interest of the child can to a large extent be protected in
the contract. A court faced with a surrogacy dispute or
application should at least enforce those parts of the
contract which are included for the benefit of the child -
43should it be unwilling to enforce the entire contract.
42 See chapter 6, under Informing the Intended Parents and 
the Surrogate and her Husband.
43 See chapter 3/ under Specific Performance in South 
Africa and under The Doctrine of S3verability and the 
Relevance of Restraint of Trade Agreements to 
Surrogacy.
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CHAPTER 5 OTHER PRIVATE LAW ASPECTS
1 LAW OF PERSONS AND THE FAMILY
1.1 COMMON AND STATUTORY LAW ISSUES AFFECTING 
SURROGACY ARRANGEMENTS
1 . 1 . 1 INTRODUCTION
The object of a surrogacy agreement is to obtain a baby for 
a childless couple who are unable to have one the "natural 
way'1 . In this chapter the legal relationship between the 
child and the surrogate mother and her husband, as well as 
the intended relationship between the child and the 
commissioning couple, are examined. Common law principles 
are analysed to determine whether they still adequately 
protect a child born through assisted birth technology 
especially in surrogacy arrangements.
The principles embodied in the common law maxims, mater 
semper certa est and pater is est quem nuptiae demonstrant, 
respectively, are analysed in the light of the South African 
view that consanguinity is the determining factor for legal
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parenthood. A conclusion is reached as to whether this 
principle promotes the best interest of the child.
2The relevant provisions o£ the Children's Status Act are 
evaluated on the same grounds.'
Social, psychological, moral, religious and other aspects 
undoubtedly play a significant role in surrogacy 
arrangements since the family unit of the surrogate and her 
husband as well as the commissioning couple are profoundly 
affected. Although these aspects cannot be ignored, the 
focus throughout the chapter will/ nevertheless, remain
4primarily on legal aspects of surrogate motherhood.
tine status of children born through assisted reproduction is 
also examined and a comparison is drawn between the common
1 See South African Law Commission's Report: Verslag oor die Ondersoek na die Regsposisie van Buite-egtelike Kinders Project 38 October 1985 127.
2 82 of 1987.
3 See also the discussion in chapter 3 under Legislation • Presently Affecting Surrogacy in South Africa.
4 The social/ psychological/ moral/ ethical and religious issues of surrogate motherhood are addressed in most major reports on modern birth procreation/ such as the1984 Warnock Report (Britain) the 1989 Glover Report (to the European Commission), the 1985 Benda Report (West-Germany), the 1985 Ontario Law Reform Co— i ssion Report (Canada) and the Australian Reports mentioned in chapter 2.
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law situation prior to the Children's Status Act, when such 
children were regarded as illegitimate, and the present 
situation under the Children's Status Act.
Although the legislature did not intend to address surrogacy 
in the Children's Status Act,6 possibly because more urgent 
issues captured its attention at that stage, the Act is 
nevertheless indirectly applicable since artificial or in 
vitro fertilisation techniques are generally utilised. The 
question posed is whether the Children's Status Act does not 
have an unduly detrimental effect on the well-being of 
surrogate children? Since the welfare of the child has 
always been a paramount consideration/ it is questionable 
whether such children should be treated differently from
5 V v R 1979 3 SA 1004 T. See also the discussion of Strauss S A 1984 Doctor, Patient and the Law 187 - 189; Schutte M Die Hervoraing van die Regsposisie van Buite-Egtelike Kinders met Besondere Vervysing na die Status van Kinders dear Kunsmatige Bevrugting Verwek LLD Unisa 1986 135 - 148; Lupton M L The Legal Consequences of Artificial Insemination and Embryo Transplantation in Humans D Phil Univ of Natal 1982 215- 267.
6 See the Law Commission's Report 137; see also the statement of the Minister of Health and Population Development during the 2nd reading of the bill in the House of Assembly Debates 10 September 1987 6160 - 6161.
7 An agreement to physical intercourse is of course also possible - see the British case, In re Adoption Application (payment for adoption) discussed in chapter 
2 .
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others merely because of the way they were conceived. As
gOrmrod J stated in the English case, A v C, dealing with a 
surrogate child: HBy far the best thing that can happen to 
this child is that he should become a member of a family 
just like other children. This will give him as normal a 
life as possible. 119
1.1.2 GXKETIC AMD LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS BETNEEN PARENT AND CHILD
A distinction is often drawn between genetic and legal 
relationships between parent and child* Whereas the genetic 
relationship refers to the "biological bond", the legal 
relationship embraces the rights and duties as between 
parent and child. This is sometimes referred to as parental 
power or natural guardianship. In most instances the genetic 
parent is also the legal parent of a child, but this is not 
necessarily the case. Although the genetic relationship 
cannot be altered, legal rights and duties may reside in or 
be awarded to someone who is not the genetic parent of the 
child. Familiar comnon law principles have in the past 
provided assistance in establishing legal parenthood, but 
with the advances in modern birth technology, some of these
8 See the discussion in chapter 2.
9 At 457 E of the report.
277
no longer reflect absolute truths and can no longer provide 
the solution to all problems. Earlier in the twentieth 
century, matters of a personal nature such as family 
planning and birth control were generally left alone by 
legislatures and policy-makers.10 This standpoint * which 
was followed by most governments - prompted President 
Eisenhower to make the following statement in 1959: NBirth 
control ... is not our business. I cannot imagine anything 
more emphatically a subject that is not a proper political 
or governmental function or responsibility". From the time 
of President Eisenhower's statement, the picture has changed 
considerably. Many governments have been forced to take note 
of advances in the field of modern birth technology and to 
enact legislation which affects the legal relationship 
between parents and their children.
2 CCHMOtt LAW STATEMENTS AMD MAXIMS
2.1 MATER SEMPER CERTA EST
The mater seaper certa est statement precedes the following 
well-known statement in D 2 4 5 of the Corpus Iuris Civilis:
10 Exceptions to the general rule are countries such as
China and Rumania.
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"mother" warrants a definition in any Act purporting to deal 
with matters concerning parents and children.
The uncertainty of legal motherhood may be illustrated by a 
simple example. If a woman is, for instance, unable to 
produce ova herself, an ova donor may be included in the 
assisted reproduction programme. The ova can be combined 
with semen from the infertile woman's husband or a donor and 
the embrio transferred to a surrogate mother who carries the 
foetus to term. The GIFT method, which has become 
increasingly popular, may also be used.14 In this procedure 
mixed male and female gametes are placed in the Fallopian 
tube of a host mother.
Who should legally be the mother of the child? Should it be 
the ova donor, who is genetically linked to the child, the 
commissioning or intended mother, who is socially linked to 
the child, or the surrogate, who has a gestational (birth) 
link to the child?3,5
Where the mater semper certa est has previously provided 
certainty in this regard, this is no longer the case.
14 See the discussion in chapter I.
15 Lupton 1982 Legal Consequences 108; Schutte 1986 Hervorming 146 - 147 and 149 - 150.
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Advances in modern birth technology have gained ground and 
in certain respects have caught the legal system unprepared. 
This is not only true of our country, but applies worldwide.
On 1 October 1987, the historic birth of the Tzaneen 
surrogate triplets focussed the country's attention on the 
relatively new procedure of surrogate motherhood. The 
triplets were carried by their married grandmother for her 
own daughter and son-in-law, who were also the genetic 
parents of the child. Apart from the public debate on the 
moral, ethical and religious issues involved, some important 
legal questions were raised prior to the birth of the 
triplets, namely:
1 who are the legal parents of the children, and
2 in whose name should they be registered?16
It was uncertain whether the mater semper certa est approach 
should apply in so unique a situation, since the gestational
grandmother merely acted as a host mother with no direct
17 18genetic link with the children. Both Lupton and Schutte
suggest that the application of the mater seaper certa est
16 Strauss S A “Triplets to a Surrogate Grandmother in South Africa: Legal Issues" 1989 Intern L Pract 71.
17 1982 Legal Consequences 108.
18 1986 Hervorming 146 - 147 and 149 - 150.
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would be inappropriate in such circumstances. It is 
submitted that this is the correct approach, since the 
triplets are undeniably the direct descendants of their 
genetic parents (the Ferreira-Jorges) and not of their 
grandparents. The registration of the children by the 
Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths in the name of
their genetic parents was therefore in the best interest of
19all the parties. It appears that the decision is in line 
with the traditional view that consanguinity determines 
legal parenthood. The genetic and not the gestational mother 
was therefore considered the legal mother of the child.
20In recent years several jurisdictions have responded 
hastily with legislation in an effort to clear up the 
uncertainty of motherhood created by modern birth technology
and aggravated by an inconsistency in court decisions on
21this aspect. In October 1987, approximately two weeks
19 Strauss 1989 Intern L Prac 71; Strauss S A "Regstatus van K.I.-Kinders en Kinders Gebore Uit Surrogaatmoeders” 1988 S A Praktyksbestuur 5;Pretorius R 1988 DR 82.
20 For instance the USA, the UK and the Nether lands. See Anon *Surrogate Parenthood - An Analysis of the Problems and a Solution: Representation for the Chi IdM 1985 Mi Mitchell L Rev 143 - 182 at 149 n 32 and 151 43 with regard to legislation in the USA; in the Britain Family Law Reform Act 1987 s 27(1) and in the Netherlands Burgsrlijk ffetboek s 201.
21 See the discussion of Court Decisions in chapter 2.
after the birth of the Tzaneen triplets, the South African
legislature followed suit with the enactment of the
22Children's Status Act which was aimed at providing 
legitimacy to children who had previously been considered 
illegitimate. This Act followed the recommendations of the
23South African Law Commission in its report on this matter.
Although the Act was aimed at improving the status of 
illegitimate children in general, only the section dealing 
with the status of children born by artificial insemination 
or in vitro fertilisation is discussed here as it is of 
particular relevance to surrogacy arrangements.
In s 5(1)(a) of the Act, the mater ssnper certa est
principle is legislatively entrenched in respect of the
situation where the baby was conceived by artificial
insemination or in vitro fertilisation. Surrogate motherhood
falls within the ambit of this section as the definition of
24artificial insemination in the Human Tissue Act and the
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22 82 of 1987, published in GG 10974 14-10-1987.
23 Project 38 October 1985.
24 65 of 1983 (as amended by Act 106 of 1984). See also s27 of Act 51 of 1989 which replaced the term "insemination" in the English text with "fertilization".
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Children's Status Act is wide enough to cover in vitro 
fertilisation and transfer of the gamete/s to a surrogate 
mother.26
S 5(1)(a) of the Children's Status Act stipulates that the
gestational or birth mother and her husband are the legal
parents of the child. In most instances the husband's
consent is a prerequisite for artificial insemination or in
vitro fertilisation, although in terms of s 5(1)(a) of the
27Act, consent need not be in writing. There is, however, a
28presumption that consent was given. Section 5(2) of the 
Act provides for the termination of the rights, obligations 
and duties of the donors of semen and/or ova towards the 
child. A donor may, therefore not claim any parental rights 
to the child and the child will likewise not be able to 




27 See van der Walt L "Toestemming en die Vestiging vanOuerskap oor die Kunsmatig Verwekte Kind” 1987 Obiter 1- 15/ who suggests that informal consent could create numerous problems and that formal written consent is preferable.
28 S 5 (1)(a) and (b).
Since certainty on the aspect of legal motherhood is 
undeniably in the interest of the child, the effects of 
legislation such as the Children's Status Act on children 
born in surrogacy arrangements, can be very unfortunate.
Full surrogacy (such as the Ferreira-Jorge's) is affected 
more drastically than partial surrogacy, since the parental 
rights and duties of both genetic parents are terminated, 
despite their pre-natal intent and desire to have the child. 
This is unfortunate as this form of surrogacy, provided it 
is non-commercial, seems to be morally more acceptable than 
partial surrogacy, where the genetic material is provided by 
the surrogate mother.
Legislation providing that the gestational mother is, the
legal mother of the child in all forms of artificial
insemination or in vitro fertilisation could lead to absurd
results. The birth of the Tzaneen triplets preceded the Act
by a mere thirteen days. Should the Children's Status Act
for instance have been operative at the birth of the
triplets, they would have been considered the legal children
of their grandmother, Mrs Anthony and the brothers and
29sister of their own genetic mother.
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29 Strauss S A 1989 Intern L Prac 61 - 88; Pretorius R 1988 DR 81 - 82.
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As the Act was not intended to regulate surrogacy, it is not 
surprising that it takes no cognisance of the intent of the 
parties to a surrogacy arrangement. Since the Act is, 
however, applicable to surrogacy, it seems unfair and 
unnatural to impose parenthood on a surrogate mother and her 
husband who have entered into the agreement for 
non-commercial reasons and certainly not to keep the child 
for themselves. It is furthermore unjust that a child should 
suffer negative consequences merely because the parents 
decided to utilise the option of surrogate motherhood.
30In the Warnock Report in Britain, it was conceded that
private surrogacy agreements will continue to exist despite
31legislation prohibiting some forms of surrogacy. It was
suggested that in the (rare) instances of a baby being
handed over to the intended parents in accordance with the
agreement, adoption laws could be made more flexible to
facilitate adoption by the genetic mother in cases of full
32surrogacy. This is a sensible approach to the problem and 
one which should also be considered in South Africa.
30 On Human Fertilisation and Ejnbryology 1984, discussed in chapter 2 under British Reports.
31 At 8.19 of the Report.
32 At 8.20 of the Report.
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In the only reported case which could be traced dealing with
the question of motherhood in full surrogacy, a lower
33Michigan court held in Saith v Jones that the woman who 
provides the ova - the genetic mother - is the legal mother 
of the child and not the gestational or birth mother.
The most pressing question in this regard is whether one
should allow some forms of surrogacy while prohibiting
others. As a Bill of Rights is envisaged for South Africa in
the near future, this question is more complex than under
the present constitutional system. It could be regarded as
discriminatory to permit some women the option of surrogate
34motherhood while denying others this option.
Public policy in South Africa is undoubtedly in favour of 
restricting surrogate motherhood to married couples in a
33 85-532014 DZ 3rd Jud Dist Mich (14 March 1986), discussed in chapter 2 anr* cited by Eaton T A "Comparative Responses to 'arrogate Motherhood" 1986 Neb L Rev 686 - 727 at 69^ n 10 and 695 n 34, 723 and 724 n 156f first reported by Annas 6 J "The Baby Broker Boom" 1986 Bastings Center Rept 30.
34 "Reproductive Technology and the Procreation Rights of the Unmarried" 1985 Harv I* Rev 669 - 685; Kritchevsky B "The Unmarried Woman's Right to Artifical Insemination: A Call for an Expanded Definition of Family" 1981 Harv Wfcaens1 L J 1 - 41; Wikler N J "Society's Response to the New Reproductive Technologies: The Feminist Perspectives" 1986 S Cal L Rev 1043 - 1057.
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stable relationship/ which is, to my mind, the correct
36view. It must, however be borne in mind that it creates ail
anomaly to allow single people to adopt children in terms of
37the Child Care Act, but to refuse them the option of 
artificial insemination.
Following the birth in South Africa of the Tzaneen triplets,
the predominant opinion seems to be that full eurrogacy in a
family arrangement without any commercial gain for any of
38the parties, is generally acceptable.
It is doubtful whether a South African court will invariably 
order specific performance of the terms of a surrogacy
39contract. Should the surrogate mother refuse to hand over 
the baby in terms of the contract, the court may consider 
the contract void on grounds of public policy. The court may 
nevertheless decide to enforce those parts of the contract
35
35 See the 1985 South African Law Commission1 s Report 133where it is clearly stated that artificial insemination of unmarried women is unacceptable. See also Lupton 1982 Legal Consequences 377.
36 See the Recommendations in chapter 7.
37 S 17(b).
38 See the discussion in chapters 3 and 4.
39 See the discussion in chapter 3.
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which are in the best interest of the child40 and is, 
furthermore empowered to grant the intended parents
guardianship, if this is in the child's best interest. It
is submitted that the uncertainty in this regard should be
42cleared up by direct legislation. There is no reason to
regard non-commercial surrogacy as a threat to society,
since it contains a "self-limiting” factor. Very few women
would be prepared to undertake the risks of pregnancy for
purely altruistic reasons, but the few who are willing to do
so, should not be prevented from making their own decisions
43in this regard - as long as these are informed decisions.
The legislature should also reconsider the legal position of 
surrogate children.44 To place (indirect) legislative 
obstacles in the way as a deterrent to those who wish to 
utilise surrogate motherhood is unrealistic and 
unsatisfactory.
41
40 See chapter 3 under The Doctrine of Severability and the Relevance of Restraint of Trade Agreements to Surrogacy.
41 See chapter 3 under Specific Performance in SouthAfrica.
42 See the Recoamendations in chapter 7.
43 See chapter 6 under Informed Consent.
44 See the Recommendations in chapter 7.
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In South Africa the criterion for determining legal 
parenthood has always been consanguinity. Statutory 
provisions allow for exceptions in certain circumstances, 
for instance adoption, where the courts are empowered to 
terminate the parental rights of the genetic parents. The 
Supreme Court as upper guardian of all%minors is also in a 
position to terminate parental power in special 
circumstances and if it is in the best interest of the 
child.45
If consanguinity is applied strictly to determine 
motherhood, the genetic mother would be favoured as the 
legal mother of the child.Prior to the enactment of the 
Children's Status Act this- approach would have been 
favourable for the intended parents in full surrogacy, since 
they are undeniably the genetic parents of the child and the 
children their direct (genetic) descendants.
2.1*1 CONSANGUINITY AND MOTHERHOOD
45 See infra under the Role of the Supreme Court as Upper Guardian of All Minors.
46 1985 S A Law Commission Report 127; Lupton 1982 Legal Consequences 98; Pretorius 1987 DR 273.
\
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In the first two surrogacy cases in Britain, the genetic
link between the parents and the child was not accorded much 
47significance. Montgomery states in this regard: "Parental
rights exist in order to promote the function of bringing up
a child. The blood tie does not guarantee that this function
will be well performed." In both instances the courts
preferred to adopt a functionalist approach with the
48interest of the child as paramount criterion.
With regard to paternity, the consanguinity criterion has
49been questioned by several writers, since strict adherence
may lead to impractical results. The same is true of
maternity. To consider an ova donor, for instance, as the
legal mother of the child merely because she provides • the
genetic material, would not serve the child's best interest.
Consanguinity as a criterion for legal parenthood has been
50questioned by some writers. Thomas, after a careful 
analysis of the Roman and Roman Dutch Law, concludes that
47 Montgomery J "Constructing A Family - After A Surrogate Birth" 1986 Mod L Rev 637.
48 1986 Mod L Rev 638.
49 Thomas Ph J "Paternity: Legal or Biological Concept?" 1988 SALJ 239 - 248; Jordaan R "Biologiese Vaderskap: Moet dit Altyd Seevier? F v L 1987 4 SA 525 (W)" 1988 THRHR 392 - 398.
50 Thomas ibid; Jordaan ibid.
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paternity is (for instance) a legal and not a biological 
concept. This is, to my mind, an interesting statement as 
there are undoubtedly a large number of children whose legal 
fathers are not necessarily their biological fathers. If 
suitable parents desire parental rights towards a child, it 
would be detrimental to award such rights to a couple or a 
mother who does not want them. We have reached a stage where 
the consanguinity criterion as well as the mater semper 
certa est approach should be reconsidered,51 especially in 
surrogacy. Any Act purporting to deal with artificial 
procreation and adoption should also contain a clear 
definition of "mother-•
Several courts in foreign jurisdictions have been faced with
legal actions occasioned by the so-called "do-it-yourself"
52artificial inseminations. Some unmarried women, or even 
those involved in Lesbian relationships, may prefer this 
option. Such an incident reached newspaper headlines in our
51 See in this regard Stumpf A "Redefining Mother: A Legal Matrix for New Reproductive Technologies" 1986 Tale L J197.
52 See the Recommendations in this regard in chapter 7.See also Garrison M "Surrogate Parenting: What Should Legislatures Do?" 1988 Fam L Q Special Issue on Surrogacy 151 with reference to the cases C K v C C 170 H J Super 586 407A 2d 849 (1979); Jhordan C v Mary K 179 Cal App 3d 386 224 Cal Rptr 530 (1986).
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own country recently. As neither the Regulations in terms
of the Human Tissue Act, nor the Children's Status Act,
addresses the situation of an unmarried woman's artificial
insemination - apart from a blanket prohibition in terms of
the former Regulations - uncertainty remains in this
regard.54 Can such a woman, for instance, claim maintenance
55from the donor of the semen?
Private surrogate motherhood arrangements will always be a 
reality despite any legislation prohibiting some or all 
forms of surrogacy. In my view, one should rather strive to 
protect the interests of children at all costs. If a total 
prohibition were to be placed on all forms of surrogacy, it 
is not unlikely that "do-it-yourself" arrangements would be 
encouraged. This will leave the parties without the benefit 
of professional help and counselling.56 It is submitted that 
minimal regulation could provide better protection for 
children who may face legal uncertainty with regard to the
53
53 Sunday Times 13-03-1988. See also chapter 7 under Limiting "Self-Inseminations".
54 The effect of this omission in legislation is discussed in greater detail under Legitimacy infra.
55 It is hardly conceivable that a court of law would order the donor to pay maintenance in such a situation.
56 Wright M "Surrogacy and Adoption: Problems and Possibilities" 1986 Faa L 109.
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identity of and legal relationship to their parents. The
Children's Status Act, should preferably be amended to
provide for the legitimacy of children born as a result of
57surrogacy agreements.
2.2 PATER IS EST QOEM NUPTIAE DEMOHSTRANT
The presumption of paternity is embodied in the maxim pater 
is est quem nuptiae denonstrant: "the father is he to whom 
the marriage points". Thus a child born to or conceived by a 
married woman is considered legitimate and there is a 
presumption that the wooan's husband is the father of the 
child.58 It is not necessary for conception to have taken 
place during the subsistence of the marriage/ nor is it 
necessary that the children are conceived from the husband 
of the mother. The prerequisite is however the subsistence 
of a marriage. The fact that a child is conceived with the 
assistance of modern birth technology/ such as in vitro
57 See the Recommendations in chapter 7.
58 Grotius 1 12 3;' Voet 16 6; Boberg P Q R  1977 The Lawof Persons and the Family 323 and 323 n 16; Hahlo H R and Kahn E 1960 The Union of South Africa: The Development of its Laws and Constitution 352 - 353; Hoffmann L H and Zeffertt D 1981 The South African Law of Evidence 424; Lupton H L "The Status of Children Born by Artificial Insemination in South African Law"1985 TSAR 282 - 283; Spiro E 1985 Law of Parent andChild 20 - 22; Van den Vyver J D and Joubert D J 1985 Persone- en Familiereg 181.
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fertilisation/ should make no difference to the presumption. 
Prior to the Children's Status Act an interesting question 
which could have been raised is whether the marriage 
referred to is that of the surrogate and her husband or that 
of the intended parents? Especially in full surrogacy where 
the genetic material is provided by the intended parents and 
the surrogate mother merely acts as a host mother, the 
argument could have been raised that the child is conceived 
during the subsistence of the intended parents' marriage and
egis therefore their legitimate child.
Several writers60 are of the opinion that the presumption of
61 62paternity is rebuttable by any interested party. Others
restrict this privilege to the mother and her husband, or in
63some instances, to the husband alone. In F v L Harms J 
refused an application by X to be declared the legal father 
of the child where the mother, despite her admission of
59 See the discussion under Legitimacy infra.
60 Spiro E "Legitimate and Illegitimate Children" 1964 Acta Juridica 57 - 58; Jordaan 1988 THRHR 392 - 398.
61 Cronje D S P  1990 Barnard Cronje and Olivier - Die Suid-Afrikaanse Persone- en Familiereg 63; Spiro 1985 Law of Parent and Child 21; Jordaan 1988 THRHR 395.
62 Van den Vyver and Joubert 1985 Persone- en Familiereg 207.
63 1987 4 SA 525 W.
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having had intercourse with both X and the other man (her
present husband) at a time when conception was possible,
64married another man, after her relationship with X,
The pater is est quern presumption may be rebutted at any
65stage on a balance of probabilities. The presumed state of 
affairs exists nisi contrariua evidenter const iter it. In 
other words, the facts are accepted as being proved unless 
and until there is a rebuttal.66
3 THE EFFECT OF THE TERMIMATIOM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS OF GAMETE DONORS IK S 5 OF THE CHILDRENS STATUS ACT ON SURROGACY
The entrenchment of the pater is est quea presumption in the 
Children's Status Act, has provided an additional obstacle 
to surrogacy arrangements. The result - that the surrogate 
and her husband are considered the legal parents of the 
child * is contrary to the expectations and intention of all 
the parties to the agreement. A man, who has played a minor 
role in the proceedings, is awarded the parental rights and 
duties to a child, while the rights and duties of the
64 Jordaan 1988 THRHR 392 - 398; Boberg P Q R  "The Would Be Father" 1988 Businessauui's Law 112 - 115.
65 Van Lutterveld v Engels 1959 2 SA 699 AD.
66 Voet 16 6 and 7 quoted by Spiro 1985 Law of Parent and Child 21.
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genetic parent/s are terminated* This result seems unjust 
and unreasonable. To award paternal rights to a man who 
does not want a child and who, in any event, played a minor 
role in the agreement, can surely not serve the best 
interest of the child. Should the surrogate mother hand the 
child over to the intended parents after birth, her 
husband's consent is furthermore a prerequisite for adoption 
by the intended parents. It would seem unreasonable that the 
surrogate's husband, who is not the biological father of the 
child, should be in so strong a position to hinder an 
adoption by the intended parents if all the other parties 
have consented to adoption.
If one accepts that any interested party is in a position to
rebut the presumption of paternity, it would have been
possible for the commissioning father to do so before 15
October 1987, when the Children's Status Act became 
67operative. This is, however, no longer the case. His 
position is equated with that of a sperm donor and his 
rights towards his natural offspring are terminated by s 
5(2)(a) of the Act. Although it is in the child's best
67 The date of publication in the Government Gazette is normally the date on which a statute become effective, unless a clear stipulation in the Act provides otherwise. See s 13 of the Interpretation Act 33 of 1957 and Steyn L C 1981 Die uitleg van Wette 180.
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interest that the rights of a sperm donor be terminated, 
the effect is unreasonable for a commissioning father in 
surrogate motherhood. Since he may no longer be in a 
position to rebut the presumption of paternity, he is in 
peril of losing his child.
It appears that, at present, the only available option would
be for the intended parents to adopt the child, provided
that the required consent is obtained from the surrogate and
her husband.6** Unfortunately the requirements for adoption
70as set out in s 17 of the Child Cara Act place another 
legislative obstacle in their way. Unlike its predecessor, 
the Children's Act71, which contained no prohibition in this 
regard, s 17 of the Child Care Act seemingly prevents a 
biological parent from adopting his/her own child. S 17(a) 
prevents the adoption of a child if the child is "born of 
one of them” • A child may, however, be adopted by a married
68
68 The termination of parental power safeguards donors against later claims, for instance, maintenance.
69 Subsections 18(4) (d) and (e) of the Child Care Act 74of 1983 require that the consent to adoption be givenby both parents of the child if he/she is legitimate, or by the mother of the child if he/she is illegitimate and by the child if he/she is older than ten years and understands the nature and import (sic) of consent.
70 74 of 1983.
71 33 of 1960.
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person of whose spouse the child is born - a typical
72stepparent adoption. The question that needs to be 
answered is whether the child born as a result of a 
surrogacy arrangement is a child "born of one of themM • Does 
this refer to the act of birth or the genetic link between 
the child and its parents? Since a man is unable to give 
birth, it prima facie refers to the genetic link. This is 
strengthened by the wording of s 17(b) which permits a 
widower/widow or an unmarried/divorced person to adopt a 
child with the consent of the Minister if "the child is not 
a child born of him or her”. On the other hand the argument 
could be raised that since the natural father's parental 
rights were (legislatively) severed by s 5(2) of the 
Children's Status Act there is no link whatsoever between 
him and the child and therefore no obstacle to the adoption 
of the child. The uncertainty created by the combined effect 
of the Children's Status Act and the Child Care Act demands 
the urgent attention of the legislature. This aspect is 
dealt with in chapter 7.
Before turning to the puwer of the Supreme Court as upper 
guardian of all minors, the concept of parental power and an 





The content of parental power is complex and involves the 
authority as well as the rights and duties of parents in
73respect of their minor children arising out of parentage.
74It is sometimes also referred to as natural guardianship.
/ 75Cronje refers to the relationship between parent and child 
as a consortium oanii minoritatis and mentions several ways 
in which this relationship is protected from infringement by 
others.76
While both parents are alive, parental power vests in both 
unless the child is illegitimate, in which case it will vest
73 Spiro 1985 Law of Law of Parent and Child 42 - 43.
74 Spiro 1985 Law of Law of Parent and Child 39.
75 Barnard, Cronje and Olivier 1990 Die Suid-Afrikaanse Persona- en Familiereg 365.
76 For instance the possibility of obtaining an interdict to prevent a third party from getting in touch with a minor child as acknowledged in several cases. See Meyer v Van Hiekerk 1976 1 SA 252 T; Coetzee v Meintjies 19761 SA 257 T; Gordon v Barnard 1977 1 SA 887 C; H v I 1985 3 SA 237 C. There are also several criminal offences to protect the relationship between a parent and child, for instance, abduction. See S v F 1983 1 SA 747 0; S v Hoffman 1983 4 SA 564 T.
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only in the genetic/birth mother of the child, Spiro
78suggests that the power is not equal, in that the father's
79authority is superior to that of the mother.
4.2 AGREEMENT TO TRANSFER PARENTAL POWER
77
4.2.1 GREAT BRITAIN
80Bromley and Lowe prefer to refer to "parental authority 
and responsibility", which is probably a better description 
than "parental rights" or "parental power" since it 
emphasises the two major aspects of parental power - rights 
and duties.
In Britain, the parent of a child nay not conclude an 
agreement to transfer parental power permanently to another
77 According to the philosophy: "Eene moeder maakt geen bastaard" Boberg F Q R  1977 The Lav of Persons and the Family 333; Spiro 1985 Law of Parent and Child 41 450; Dhanabakitm v Subraaanian 1943 AD 160 166.
78 1985 Law of Parent and Child 41; Landman v Mienie 1944 OPD 59 62.
79 Van Rooyen v Werner 1892 9 SC 425, 429 as interpreted by Tindall J A in Calitz v Calitz 1939 AD 56 62 - 63; Fisher v Fisher 1956 1 PH Bl? SR quoted by Spiro 1985 Law of Parent and Child 40 n 25.
80 Bromley P M and Lowe N V 1987 Bromley's Family Law 254 et seq.
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or to relinquish it as such an agreement is contrary to
81 82public policy and therefore void. Eaton in a
comparative analysis of the British and American response to
surrogate motherhood, concludes that courts in the United
Kingdoni are more stringent in declaring agreements to
transfer parental power void, as a violation of public
policy, than is the case in the United States. The
restriction on the transfer of parental power is statutorily
83entrenched in Britain, with the exception of agreements m
respect of children when the parents are contemplating
84separation during their marriage. Such agreements were 
only valid whilst the parties wers married and the court had 
a discretion in enforcing them with due regard to the best 
interest of the child.85 Bromley discusses the situation 
prior to the coming into operation of the Family Law Reform
81 1987 Bromley's Fam Law 264 and 264 n 6 with referenceto Vansittard v Vansittard 1858 2 De 6 & J 249; Walrondv Walrond 1858 John 18 and Huaphrys v Polak 1901 2 KB 385, CA. See also Cusine D J "Womb-Leasing: Some Legal Implications1 1987 Mew L J 824 - 825.
82 "The British Response to Surrogate Motherhood: An American Critique" 1985 Law Teacher 169.
83 S 1(2) of the Guardianship Act 1973; s 85(2) of the Children Act 1975 which prevents anyone (whether or not a parent) from transferring parental rights to another.
84 1987 Bronley's Fam Law 264.
85 1987 Bromley* s Fam Law 265.
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Act of 1987, where, in terms of the proposed 8 3, the
exception mentioned above was to be broadened. It was
recommended that in terms of the Act, "(a)ll mothers and
fathers, whether or not they have ever been married and even
if they are divorced, should be able to conclude binding
agreements as to the exercise by either of them, at any time
when they are not living together in the same household, of
any of the parental rights and duties with respect to the 
87child..." . The court, however, would still have a 
discretion to refuse the enforcement of such an agreement if 
it is not in the child's interest. This section deals with 
binding agreements to the exercise of parental power of 
parents in general. In terms of this section, parents who 
are not married to each other may, subject to the court's 
discretion, conclude binding agreements regarding parental 
rights and who should exercise than * an aspect which could 
have had an important effect on transfer of parental power 
in surrogacy arrangements. Subsequently, however, a new s 
1(2) of the Guardianship Act of 1973 was enacted. This 
section provides that the parents (father and mother) may 
agree actually to transfer or to surrender their parental
86 My emphasis.
87 1987 Bronley's Fan Law 264 - 265. See also Montgomery J "Assisted Reproduction after the Family Law Reform Act 1987" 1988 Faa L 24.
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rights and duties - but only amongst themselves, when they
88are living apart.
4.2.2 SOUTH AFRICA
The situation in South Africa is similar to that in 
Britain.89 An agreement permanently to transfer parental is
onconsidered contra bonos mores. Parental power or incidents 
thereof may be transferred by the courts only if it is 
justified by the circumstances/ or if the courts are 
empowered to do so under certain statutory prov isions such 
as the Matrimonial Affairs Act91 or the Child Care Act.92 A 
distinction should, therefore be drawn between the common 
law and the statutory power, respectively, of the courts to 
transfer parental rights or to deprive a parent of such 
rights.
88 Stevens R and Legge A " * llle<p-imacy Obscured but notObliterated1 An Analsysis of the Family Law Reform Act 1987" 1987 Fam Law 409 - 413.
89 Spiro 1985 Law of Parent and Child 43.
90 Van der Nesthuizen v Van Wyk 1952 2 SA 119 GW; Ex partevan Daa 1973 2 SA 182 W. See also the discussion under the Boni Mores in chapter 3.
91 37 of 1953.
92 74 of 1983.
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The Supreme Court/ may, in its capacity as upper guardian of
all minors, deprive a parent of all or incidents of his/her
93parental power (guardianship) over a child. Xf a parent is
not fit to have custody of a child, it may also be awarded
94to a third person. As a result of the far-reaching 
effects such a decision may have, the Supreme Court will 
exercise this power cautiously and only in protection of the
Q Cinterests of the child.
5 THE ROLE OP THE SUPREME COURT AS UPPER GUARDIAN OF ALL MINORS
It seems that should the court refuse adoption on the ground 
that adoption of a child by a genetic parent is not 
permitted in terms of the Child Care Act,96 the only 
alternative for the commissioning couple would be to 
approach the Supreme Court as upper guardian of all minors
93 See the discussion supra.
94 Spiro 1985 Law of Parent and Child 263.
95 Calitz v Calitz 1939 AD 56 63 - 64; Blume v van Zyl and Another 1945 CPD 48; Baa v Bhabha 1947 4 SA 798 AD 806 809; Spence-Liversedge v Byrne 1947 1 SA 192 N; Short v Naisby 1955 3 SA 572 D 575 B; Goodrich v Botha and Another 1952 4 SA 175 T 180 F.
96 74 of 1983. For a discussion of s 17 of the Child Care Act, see Eckard M M M Geldigheidsvereistes in Kinderhofondersoeke by Versorgingsverrigtinge ingevolge Artikel 13 en Aanneaingsaansoeke ingevolge Artikel 18 van die Wet op Rindersorg 74 van 1983 LL M Unisa 1988163 et seq.
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for an order terminating the parental power of the surrogate 
and her husband, accorded them by the Children's Status Act, 
and conferring guardianship upon the commissioning couple. 
The Court has the power to do so in certain circumstances, 
on special grounds, and when it is in the best interest of 
the child.*7
98In Short v Naisby Kenochsberg J made the following
99statement with reference to a number of previous cases:
MIt seems to me, however, that the Court has no jurisdiction 
to deprive a surviving parent of her custody at the instance 
of third parties, except under its power as upper guardian 
of all minors to interfere with their custody, but then only 
on special grounds. Such special grounds include danger to 
a child's life, health or morals, but those are not the only 
grounds on which a Court will interfere. Good cause must be
97 Calitz v Calitz supra at 63 and 64; Goodrich v Botha and Another supra 180 F where Roper J states:"It is clear that in South Africa the upper guardianship once exercised by the Courts of Holland is vested in the Supreme Court, and in 1911 in the case of Oliver v Hugo, the Cape Provincial Division in its capacity as upper guardian, made and order for the personal custody of a minor orphanM• » * •
98 1955 3 SA 572 D 575 B.
99 Woods v Woods 1922 NPD 267; Calitz v Calitz supra;Lynch v Lynch 1946 OPD 85 at 95; Baa v Bhabha supra at809; Spence-Liversedge v Byrne supra and Bluae v VanXyl and Another supra .
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shown before a Court will interfere, but good cause is not 
capable of precise definition. Each case aust, therefore, be 
considered on its Merits.1,100
This view was reiterated more recently in Petersen en 'n
Ander v Kruger en 'n Ander.101 In this unusual case, two
102boys were, erroneously switched in a maternity ward in a 
particularly unfortunate incident. Gradually differences 
between the child they had received and their other 
children, became more obvious to the Petersons. They tried 
to establish contact with the Krugers, but the latter were 
not in favour of returning the child they had received.
Blood tests, however, confirmed the suspicion that a switch 
had indeed occurred and the court was placed in the 
unenviable position of deciding whether the Petersens could 
have their child returned to them. They were also willing to 
maintain custody of the Kruger's child if the latter did not 
want him. The court carefully considered several important 
issues, for instance the rights and duties of natural
100 My emphasis.
101 1975 4 SA 171 C.
102 From the facts of the case and the court's reaction to the incident, it appears that the personnel acted negligently. The court pointed out that more discretion on their part could have saved several people considerable pain - 172 H.
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(genetic) parents towards their children, the best interest 
of the child and the role of the Supreme Court as upper 
guardian of all minors. In a sensible and sensitive 
decision, the court granted the Petersens their application 
on the ground that it would not be detrimental to the 
child's physical, moral or psychological welfare if he were 
to be returned to his genetic parents (although the 
respondents were also perfectly acceptable custodians).
This case is testimony to the competence of our courts to 
handle complex and sensitive family matters. Although the 
court acknowledged the welfare of the child as the paramount 
consideration, it nevertheless also considered the rights of
the parties as an important factor in reaching its
103decision. The competence of the family to provide a
secure home (on material, moral, psychological and religious
grounds) had to be established. The possible immediate and
104long-term effects of the decision were also considered, 





5.1 GUARDIANSHIP106 (OR CUSTODY) AWARDS AND THE ISSUE OF PARENTAL PREFERENCE
107From Petersons case it is clear that the welfare of the
child is the paramount criterion in guardianship cases, but
108the suitability of the parents must also be considered.
In most surrogacy arrangements, should a dispute regarding 
custody or guardianship arise, it will be between parents 
and non-parents of the child. Here, again, the suitability 
of the parents is of the utmost importance. Several 
possibilities regarding the litigants exist. They could be:
1 a commissioning couple whose gametes were used for 
artificial insemination or in vitro fertilisation - 
thus there is a genetic link from both parents with 
the child (full surrogacy) and no genetic link with 
the surrogate and her husband. Zn terms of the 
Children's Status Act the surrogate and her husband 
are considered the legal parents of the child.
2 A commissioning couple where gametes of either the
106 Parental power is sometimes also referred to as Msole guardianship" or "natural guardianship" Spiro 1985 Law of Parent and Child 47 and 337.
107 Supra.
108 174 B and 176 A with reference to the British case Re R (M) (an infant) 1966 3 All ER 58 Ch D.
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husband or the wife were used - thus there is a 
genetic link between one parent (husband or wife) and 
the child* A genetic link exists between the child 
and surrogate and in terms of the Children's Status 
Act, the surrogate and her husband are also 
considered the legal parents of the child.
3 A commissioning couple with no genetic link to the
child/ for instance where donor sperm is used and the 
child is carried by a surrogate mother whose own ova 
are used. The surrogate and her husband are 
considered the legal parents of the child.
Although the Children's Status Act provides that the woman
giving birth and her husband are the legal parents of the
child/ this situation is far fro« ideal in surrogate
motherhood. In common law a court faced with a guardianship
or custody suit between genetic and non-genetic parents
would undoubtedly have considered the parental status of the
litigants towards the child. This brings one to the issue of
109so-called "parental preference”.
109 Russell I "Within the Best Interests of the Child: The Factor of Parental Status in Custody Disputes Arising from Surrogacy Contracts" 1988 - 1989 J Fan L 620.
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Although parental preference is generally encountered in 
divorce proceedings where a court must determine the 
guardianship or custody of children, it also features 
prominently in surrogate motherhood, as was clearly 
illustrated by the the Baby M cases in Hew Jersey. The New 
Jersey Supreme Court treated the issue as a custody dispute. 
In both cases (Baby K I and II)110- express references are 
encountered in support of the best interest of the child
criterion as the controlling issue in determining who should
111 112 have custody. Russell, however, points out that
neither of these courts acknowledged the significance of the
classification of parental status in application of the best
interest test. In other words, the courts did not expressly
113examine the parental status of the litigants. It 
therefore appears that the welfare of the child was the more 
important consideration. The trial court in Baby M I held 
that Mary Beth Whitehead was a fit parent but that she would
110 In re Baby M 217 N J Super 313 323 525 A 2d 1128 1132 Ch Div (1987) rev*d in part, 109 N J 396, 537 A 2d 1227 (1988).
111 Russell 1988 - 1989 J Faa L 616 n 98 and references cited.
112 1988 - 1989 J Fa* L 616.
113 In Britain the tie of fatherhood has influenced thecourts in determining custody under certaincircumstances. See Wright M "Surrogacy and Adoption:Problems and Possibilities'1 1986 Faa Law 110 - 111 andthe cases cited.
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not be the best parent for the child. 114 The Supreme Court, 
in the (Baby M II) case, treated it as a custody dispute 
between the genetic parents, William Stern (commissioning 
~ 
father) 115 and Mary Beth Whitehead (surrogate mother), 
without any notable preference for either. 
The courts of England are not consistent in their treatment 
of this aspect. 116 The facts of the cases discussed below117 
differed considerably which may also have contributed to the 
inconsistency. In Av c, 118 a case of partial surrogacy, the 
surrogate refused to hand the child over to the genetic 
father. Although this arrangement took place in 1978, it was 
only reported in 1985, when surrogacy became recognised as a 
possible alternative to adoption. The court, in condemning 
the arrangement, ordered that the child remain a ward of 
court until majority or further order and that care and 
control be granted to the surrogate mother of the child as 
this would be in the child's best interest. On appeal the 
genetic father was even denied access to the child as the 
114 See Russell 1988 - 1989 J Fam L 619 and n 109. 
115 Russell 1988 - 1989 J Fam L 617 with reference to Baby 
M (II) 109 N J at 453, 537 A 2d at 1256. 




court found that there would be no advantage for the child 
to maintain contact with the father. The biological bond was 
insufficient to found such an order. The court found that 
the father acted in a selfish and irresponsible manner and 
that the mother should be allowed to carry on with her life 
without interference from him. 
With reference to J v c119 the court emphasised that 
"(t)he first and paramount consideration was the welfare of 
the child, bearing in mind, of course, the wishes and 
feelings and so on of the respective parents and other 
people concerned with the child, but always bearing in mind 
that the decision must rest in terms of the best interests 
of the child, having taken all these other factors into 
account". 
In the Baby Cotton case in 1985 120 , the surrogate, Kirn 
Cotton was willing to hand the child over to the intended 
parents. The couple wanted permission to take the baby home 
with them to the USA. In this case the commissioning couple 
were qualified professionals who were, according to the 
judge, excellently equipped to meet the baby's emotional and 
119 (1970) AC 668 in the House of Lords. 
120 See chapter 2 under Court Decisions. 
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financial needs and he rejected the notion that they were
unsuitable as parents merely because they had entered into a
121surrogacy agreement. Custody was granted to the natural 
father as it was considered to be in the child's best 
interest.
In June 1987 In re Adoption Application (payment for
122adoption) was heard by Latey J. In this case the main
question was whether payments made to a surrogate constitute
payment for adoption, which is unlawful in terms of s 50(1)
the Adoption Act 1958 (as amended) and if so, whether the
court could authorise the payments made under s 50(3) of the
Act. The court, after careful consideration, found that
adoption of the child by the intended parents was in its
best interest and that the arrangement was one of trust
which had been fully honoured on both sides. The court did
not consider compensation for basic expenses a commercial
123transaction since it did not constitute a reward.
121 At 848 - 849 of the report.
122 See chapter 2 under Court Decisions.
123 Ibid.
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In Germany124 two courts have had the opportunity of ruling
on surrogacy related issues. Although the contracts were
declared void, custody was awarded to the surrogate mother
in the one instance. In the other, where the father turned
out to be the surrogate's husband, the court ordered
125repayment to the intended father.
Although we have no judicial precedents on the issue of 
custody in surrogacy in South Africa, it appears from early 
case law that the courts seemed to favour the father as 
custodian of legitimate children.126 Boberg127 draws a 
distinction between the situation where the couple are 
living together (no divorce or judicial separation) and 
where the parents are divorced or judicially separated. In
124 See chapter 2. See also Garrison H "Surrogate Parenting: What Should Legislatures Do?" 1988 Fam L Q158 ~ 159 n 38 who mentions these cases, without discussing them; Feinerman J V "A Comparative Look at Surrogacy" 1988 Geo L J 1841 also refers to a court case in Germany in which it was stated that commercial surrogacy arrangements violate adoption law as well as "basic moral principles". The only reference provided is an article which appeared in the N T Tines 07-01-1988 "German Court Shuts Center for Surrogate Motherhood".
125 Garrison with reference to News Notes 1987 Fam L Rep BNA 1260.
126 Van Rooyen v Werner 1892 9 SC 425; Calitz v Calitz supra 56 at 61.
127 1977 The Law of Persons and the Family 412 460.
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the latter case, the father has no better claim than the 
mother and the best interest of the child is always
128paramount, prevailing over all other considerations. The
present tendency seems towards an equal treatment of the
parents in custody suits. When, for instance, a custody
129order is made in terms of s 6 of the Divorce Act or s 5
130of the Matrimonial Affairs Act parents are, theoretically
131 132at least, treated equally. According to Boberg, there
remains a tendency to allow a father to retain guardianship,
irrespective of whether custody is awarded to the mother.
133Hahlo in discussing this issue and citing several cases, 
is of the opinion that the mother will be awarded
128 Boberg 1977 Lav of Persons and the Vasily 416 - 417 with reference to Fletcher v Fletcher 1948 1 SA 130 AD and the cases cited in 417 n 13; Spiro 1985 Law of Parent and Child 285.
129 70 of 1979.
130 37 of 1953.
131 Heaton J The Meaning of the Concept "Best Interest of the Child" as Applied in Adoption Applications in South African Law LL M Unisa 1988 8 n 33.
132 1977 Parent and Child 420 citing Fletcher v Fletcher 
supra.
133 1985 Law of Hnaband and Wife 462 - 463 in discussing this issue and citing several cases, is of the opinion that the mother will only be awarded guardianship under 
exceptional circumstances. These include an irresponsible father who fails to perform his functions 
as guardian properly or one who is about to leave the country. See also Boberg 1977 Law of Persons and the 
Family 426 n 43 and the cases cited.
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guardianship under exceptional circumstances only. These
include an irresponsible father who fails to perform his
134obligations as guardian properly, one who assaults his
wife,135 who drinks excessively,136 has promiscuous
117 138habits or who is about to or might leave the country.
Here again, one should bear in mind that the introduction of 
a Bill of Rights into South African law could have a 
significant influence on the proceedings as there should be 
no discrimination based on gender.
5.2 BEST INTEREST OF THE CHIU)
5.2.1 BACKGROUND
Although several references have been made to the "best
interest of the child", the precise meaning has, as yet, not 
been considered.
134 Hornby v Hornby 1954 1 SA 498 0 at 500 E; Van Aswegen v Van Aswegen 1954 1 SA 496 0.
135 Van den Berg v Van den Berg 1959 4 SA 259 W.
136 Walkinshaw v Walkinshaw 1971 1 SA 148 NC.
137 Walkinshaw supra; Leibrancy^v Leibrandt 1946 2 PH B 78
138 Leibrandt supra; Williams v Williaas 1946 CPD 49 Devpster v Deapster 1953 4 SA 515 N.
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The best interest of the child is to a large extent linked
to the perception in society of the nature and meaning of
139the family and family relations.
From being within the absolute power (patria potestas) of 
the paterfamilias in Roman law,140 children gradually gained 
acceptance as having some ”rights".
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries children 
were accorded a more important role as human beings in need 
of protection. Concern for their development, especially in 
the field of education, health and hygiene was paramount and 
during the eighteenth century their emotional welfare also 
became an important issue.141
5.2.2 MEANING OF THE "BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD"
In a purely literal sense, the meaning seems to be 
self-evident. Whatever is to the advantage, benefit or gain 
of a child is in its "best interest". A precise definition
139 Heaton 1988 Best Interest 4.
140 Dannenbring 1980 Roman Private Law 304 et seq; Van Zyl D H 1977 Rooeinse Privaatreg 81 et seq; Thomas Ph J1980 Essentialia van die Rooeinse Reg 161 165.
141 Heaton 1988 Best Interest 7 with reference to MaidmentS 1984 Child Custody and Divorce 91 - 92.
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of the "best interest" of the child, however, remains
1 A Oelusive. As Heaton points out, the problematic aspect of
the concept is that it is indeterminate* This is primarily
due to the fact that there are too many variables present in
each situation to determine precisely what is in the child's
143best interest. It is said that the following requirements 
must be met to enable a court to determine what is in the 
child's best interest:
1 all the options must be known;
2 all the possible outcomes of each option must be known;
3 the probabilities of each outcome occurring must be 
known; and,
4 the value attached to each outcome must be known.
Although the first requirement can sometimes be met, it is 
impossible to comply with all four requirements. Since human 
nature is not predictable and situations may change, any 
conclusion must at best be speculative. What is in the best 
interest of the child will, therefore, to a large extent 
depend on the view of the judge presiding over the case, 
based on the facts before him and in adherence to the stare
142 1988 Best Interest 11.
143 Heaton 1988 Best Interest 11 with reference to Elster 1987 UCLR 12.
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decisis or judicial precedent system. Precisely because
of the uniqueness of each case, it is submitted that a judge
has a wide discretion in this regard. Thus it has been
145stated by a South African court in its capacity as upper
guardian in a custody case that M(g)ood cause must be shown
before a court will interfere (with parental power), but
good cause is not capable of precise definition". Each case
146must, therefore, be considered on its merits. In Petersen
147en ' n Ander v Kruger en 'n Ander the court emphasised its 
wide discretion in terminating the parental power of a 
couple in favour of another couple by stating: M(E)nige 
grond wat op die welsyn van die kind betrekking het kan as 
rede vir die hof se inmenging dien" and further M(b)y 'n hof 
weeg die belange van die kind die swaarste, maar die regte 
van die ouers moat nie buite rekening gelaat word nieM.
148The British writers, Bromley and Lowe, in their 
discussion of what they refer to as the "welfare principle"
144
144 The historical development and contents of the principle is discussed by Hahlo H R and Kahn E 1973 The South African Legal System and its Background 240 et seq.
145 Short v Naisby supra 575 B.
146 See also September v Karriea 1959 3 SA 687 C.
147 Supra.
148 1987 Bromley's Fam Law 317.
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reach some interesting conclusions. They support a practical
approach and to my mind, correctly point out that Na judge
is not dealing with what is ideal for the child but simply
149with what best can be done in the circumstances". They
furthermore point out that the discretion of judges is not 
unlimited in determining what is in the child's best 
interest since they must adhere to the views as applied in 
the court*, which "are in turn influenced both by knowledge 
and understanding of child development and by the prevailing 
societal views of child rearing".150 They hasten to add that 
both the views of society and those of the courts are 
subject to change.
The theoretical basis of what is in the child's best 
interest therefore, can never be precisely determined since 
it is linked to the views of society and the courts, which 
are subject to change. In this respect the criterion of the 
best interest of the child contains similar intrinsic 
obstacles as the criterion of the boni sores or public 




151 See chapter 3 at under Boni Mores.
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Maidment supports a broadening of the criterion to a more 
holistic approach namely what is in the interest of the 
family rather than just the individual child. Although the 
basis is theoretically broadened in this approach, it is 
submitted that to determine what is in the best interest of 
the family could prove equally difficult. If one considers, 
for example, the possible application of this criterion in 
the Baby M case, which has proved the most controversial and 
publicised surrogacy case in the USA so far, some serious 
conflicting interests emerge. Surely to award custody to the 
Sterns (the intended parents) would be in the best interest 
of their family, especially since Hr Stern was the 
biological father of the child. Similarly, to award custody 
to the surrogate (genetic) mother, Mrs Whitehead, who had 
two other children from her marriage, would be in the 
interest of their (the Whiteheads') family. The interest of 
the family criterion therefore, does not seem to provide a 
more equitable or easier solution to the problem of custody 
* especially in surrogacy. It is subnitted that the Mbest 
interest" criterion should remain the only one in custody 
issues, but that due regard be given to family relationships 
as well.
152
152 Child Custody and Divorce 160 cited in 1987 Broaley's Fan Law 318.
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It is submitted that although the courts refer to the best 
interest of the child, they nevertheless (albeit sometimes 
unconsciously) consider the family background in its 
totality.
153Maidment states that: "When a court makes a custody 
decision it may attempt to heed the child's needs but it is 
essentially making a decision as to which available adult 
... is to care for the child ...". This is clearly 
demonstrated by the court's deliberations in the Baby M I 
case. The court, in applying the best interest criterion in 
the case, considered the following questions:
1 Was the child wanted and planned for?
2 What is the emotional stability of the people in the
child's home environment?
3 What is the stability of the families involved?
4 What is the ability of the subject adults to recognise
and respond to the child's physical and emotional 
needs?
5 What are the family attitudes towards education and 
their motivation to encourage curiosity and learning?
6 What is the ability of the adults to make rational
153 Child Custody and Divorce 149 cited in 1987 Bromley's Fan Law 318.
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judgments?
7 What is the capacity of the adults in the child's life
to instill positive attitudes about matters concerning 
health?
8 What is the capacity of the adults in the baby's life
to explain the circumstances of origin with least 
confusion and greatest emotional support?
9 Which adults would better help the child cope with her
own life?
These questions cover a broad spectrum and it is submitted 
are more a test of suitable parenthood - thus adult-oriented
- than a determination of the child's best interest. From 
the outset, if one considers the social, educational and 
psychological background of the two couples involved, it is 
not surprising that the court found the Sterns (intended 
parents) to be in a better position to care for the baby.
A brief consideration of the social, educational and 
psychological background of the Whiteheads (surrogate mother 
and her husband) leaves one with a feeling of unease. The 
family had moved home at least twelve times between 1973 and
1981 and had stayed with family menubars on several 
occasions. They had filed for bankruptcy at one stage and 
were also separated for a while in 1978, during which time 
Mrs Whitehead received public financial assistance. Hr
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Whitehead was an alcohol abuser who had had his driver's
licence suspended on two occasions for alcohol-related
accidents. Mrs Whitehead was found by the court (Baby MI)
to be manipulative, impulsive and exploitative and for the
most part, untruthful. From the court records, the Sterns,
on the other hand, appear to be a very stable couple with a
positive attitude to life and well equipped to provide a
secure home for the child. In the light of Mr Stern's
background, it is understandable that the couple opted for
154surrogacy as a final solution to their problem.
Although it is expected of judges to be unbiased and 
objective, it is not impossible that some personal facts 
regarding the genetic parents (Mr Stern and Mrs Whitehead) 
might have influenced the court in reaching its decision. 
Surely the fact that Mr Stern was the sole survivor of his 
family and that his wife suffered from multiple sclerosis 
which could be exacerbated by pregnancy must have affected 
the decision, although these are not directly related to the
154 Mr Stern and his parents were the sole survivingmembers the Holocaust. The family settled in the USA shortly after the birth of Mr Stern. Mr Stern lost his father when he was 12 years old and his mother in 1983, leaving him as the only surviving member of the family. Mrs Stern, a 41 year old paediatrician, suffers from multiple sclerosis, which could be exacerbated by pregnancy.
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child's best interest, but rather to what would benefit this 
couple.
Sorkow J has been accused of several biases in his decision
in the Baby M I case, not only in the popular press, but
155also in legal literature, despite his declaration that
his decision was reached entirely with regard to the best
156interests of the child. The New Jersey Supreme Court m  
Baby M (XI) also added that Mary Beth Whitehead was judged 
"rather harshly" by Sorkow. The court did not regard 
interest in the education of the child as an all-important 
aspect in deciding who should have custody. The court 
explained that the best interest criterion is "designed to 
create not a new member of the intelligentsia but rather a 
well-integrated person who might reasonably be expected to 
be happy with life".157 After a careful examination of all 
the facts, the court concluded that the Whitehead family 
could not provide the necessary security for the child and 
also relying on the best interest criterion, awarded custody 
to William Stern.
155 Areen J "Baby M Reconsidered" 1988 Geo J Fam L 1741 1758.
156 Baby M I 217 N J Super at 323 525 A 2d 1132.
157 109 N J at 460 537 A 2d 1260.
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A question not addressed by the court was whether a custody 
award in surrogacy cases could have a detrimental effect on 
the marriages of either party. In the light of the reported 
separation of the Whiteheads after the trial, this aspect 
should have enjoyed some attention, since Mrs Whitehead was 
awarded substantial visitation rights.
The question may also be asked whether the child's best
interest should be viewed from the short, medium or
158long-term prospects. Although the short-term situation 
can possibly be more accurately assessed than the medium or 
long term situation, Heaton must be supported in her view 
that one should not merely look to short-term consequences, 
but also to medium and long-term consequences of the 
decision, although the latter are admittedly not easily 
determinable.15®
5.2.3 LEGITIMACY
It is generally accepted that children are legitimate if 
they are conceived and born during the subsistence of the
158 Heaton 1988 Best Interest 13.
159 Heaton 1988 Best Interest 14.
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marriage of their parents.160 Prior to the enactment of the 
Children's Status Act, the question could be posed whether 
the marriage referred to is that of the surrogate and her 
husband or that of the commissioning couple. Especially in 
full surrogacy where genetic material is provided by the 
commissioning couple, one could argue that since they have 
provided the genetic material during the subsistence of a 
legitimate marriage between them, they should be considered 
the legal parents of the child. The Act has resolved the 
uncertainty which existed in this regard as "the marriage" 
clearly refers to that of the surrogate and her husband.
The Children's Status Act was enacted specifically to afford 
protection to children against the detrimental effects of 
illegitimacy in general. The view advanced is that it seems
unfair to punish children for the misdeeds of their
161parents. The aim of s 5 of the Act is to provide 
legitimacy to children conceived by artificial insemination 
or in vitro fertilisation with donor gametes, who were
160 Spiro 1985 Law of Parent and Child 20 with reference to Grotius 1 12 2; Van Leeuwen CF 1 13 5; Van Leeuwen HRHR 17 2 and Schorer Ad Grotiua n 47(1).
161 Memorandum on the Objects of the Children's Status Bill 1987 8. See also in general Lupton 1985 TSAR 277 - 295; Strauss 1984 Doctor, Patient and the Law 189.
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previously considered illegitimate. In this respect the
Children's Status Act is to be welcomed. Unfortunately some
uncertainties remain regarding the status of the child
conceived by the artificial insemination or in vitro
163fertilisation of an unmarried woman.
The Artificial Insemination Regulations164 in terms of the
Human Tissue Act restrict artificial insemination and in
vitro fertilisation to a married woman, provided her husband
165has consented to the agreement in writing. This 
restriction fails to provide certainty regarding the 
relationship between the child and its genetic father,
166should an unmarried woman be inseminated artificially.
The legislature merely discounted such a possibility.
162
162 V v R supra.
163 Van Wyk A H "Mater Hodie Seaper Incerta Est? 'n Evaluasie van Artikel 5 van die Wet oo die Status van Kinders 1987” 1988 TSAR 467.
164 R 1X82 GG 10283 20*06-1986. See also Schutte M "Artificial Insemination and In Vitro FertilisationM 1985 DR 347.
165 Reg 8(1).
166 This restriction also applies to a widow whose husband died before artificial insemination could be effected as she is no longer a married woman in terms of the Act, since marriage is dissolved by the death of one of the spouses.
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Furthermore, if a surrogate child is conceived as a result 
of physical intercourse with an unmarried surrogate mother, 
who honours the agreement and hands the child over to the 
commissioning couple, the child will be the illegitimate 
child of the surrogate mother and commissioning (genetic)
father. If the latter can prove his paternity, his wife can
16 7apply for a stepparent adoption with few legal barriers.
This situation is unsatisfactory as it could encourage 
infertile couples to revert to extramarital intercourse, 
which is surely a more substantial threat to the stability 
of a marriage than the use of artificial insemination or in 
vitro fertilisation.
6 CONCLUSION
The flexibility of our common law is clearly demonstrated by 
the application of the welfare principle or best interest of 
the child criterion by our courts. The best interest of the 
child is considered not only in divorce or adoption
167 As the child is illegitimate, the parental power rests 
wivh the surrogate mother, who has to consent to the 
transfer of parental power. See Eckard 1988 
Kinderhofondersoeke 163 who interprets s 17(a) and (b) 
as a total prohibition to adoption by a natural parent. 
If the child is therefore the illegitimate child of the 
surrogate and the commissioning father, he and his wife 
are a^iil prevented from jointly adopting such a child. 
There is nothing, however, which prevents the 
commissioning wife from adopting such a child.
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proceedings, but is also applied by the Supreme Court in its
capacity as upper guardian of all minors in sensitive issues
such as the termination of incidents of parental power or
parental power in general. The best interest test should
provide a familiar guideline to any court faced with
surrogacy issues. Unfortunately, some familiar common law
statements such as the mater semper certa est statement or
the application of consanguinity as a criterion for legal
rights and responsibilities to a child no longer provide
certainty. These aspects should be settled by legislation.
Surrogacy should further not be indirectly regulated by
legislation which was not enacted -!or the purpose of
t fi Rregulating surrogacy. Anomalies created by the combined
effect of the Children*s Status Act and the Child Care Act
should also be cleared up by an amendment to the Children's
169Status Act to exclude surrogate motherhood.
168 See the Recommendations ir. chapter 7.
169 Ibid.
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CHAPTER 6 LIABILITY OF MEDICAL PRACTITIONERS IN
ASSISTED REPRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY AND 
SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD
1 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter the possible civil and/or criminal liability 
of medical practitioners, providing professional assistance 
during assisted reproduction and surrogacy arrangements is 
examined. Although a clear distinction exists between crimes 
and a delict, they also share certain common features in 
that both are forms of unlawful conduct. 1
2The role of medical practitioners and the grounds on which 
they may be held liable are examined. The informed consent 
doctrine is examined with regard to potential liability in 
surrogacy arrangements. The assisted reproductive techniques 
utilised in most: surrogacy arrangements, are often of a
3highly specialised nature. Although not directly addressed,
1 A single act may constitute a delict as well as a
crime, for instance theft, fraud and assault. For the 
distinction between a crime and delict see Neethling 
Potgieter and Visser 1990 Law of Delict 7; Van der Walt 
J C 197 9 Delict: Principles and Cases 5.
2 See also chapter 3 with regard to the principles of
contractual and delictual liability.
3 In vitro fertilisation and embryo transfer as forms of
artificial insemination are usually utilised.
Artificial insemination of a person is defined in s 1 
of the Human Tissue Act as amended as: “(T)he 
introduction by other than natural means of a male
(Footnote Continued)
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the definition of artificial insemination in the Human 
Tissue Act is wide enough to cover surrogacy. Obtaining the 
informed consent of all the parties to the procedure is of 
the utmost importance.
Recent developments and prevailing views on liability in 
assisted reproductive technology in :ccreign jurisdictions 
are compared with the situation in South tea at present. 
Recommendations are put forward as to hew liability could 
reasonably be enforced, whilst protecting the fundamental
4rights of the parties in assisted reproduction as well as 
the interest of the child.
(Footnote Continued)
gamete or gametes into the internal reproductive organs 
of a female person for the purpose of human 
reproduction, including: (a) The bringing together 
outside the human body of a male and a female gamete or 
gametes with a view to placing the product of a union 
of such gametes in the womb of a female person or (b) 
the placing of the product of a union of a male and a 
female gamete or gametes which have been brought 
together outside the human body in the womb of a female 
person”.
4 See the dictum in Sayed v Potgieter 1979 3 SA 354 N at 
356 where it was stated with reference to a dictum 
regarding the patient's rights in Stoffberg v Elliot 
1923 CPD 148 and Esterhuizen v Administrator of 
Transvaal 1957 3 SA 710 T at 718 B that "(t)he 
individual has the right, perhaps best described as a 
basic or fundamental right, to complete bodily security 
and infringement of it is an actionable wrong".
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The medical team may consist of scientists, reproductive
biologists, embryologists, nurses or other health-care
workers. Members of the team may be employed by an
institution, for instance an academic hospital (linked to an
university) or by the State or a particular province. Other
teams work in private clinics. It should be noted that the
Regulations in terras of the Human Tissue Act provide that
artificial insemination and in vitro fertilisation may only
5be performed on approved premises. In South Africa 
infertility clinics exist in all the major provincial and
gacademic hospitals.
Apart from liability under common law or statutory law, 
medical practitioners, health care-workers, psychologists
and nurses are also subject to the disciplinary control of
7 .their own professional bodies. Medical practitioners and
2 THE MEDICAL TEAM
5 The premises must be approved by the Director-General
of National Health and Population Development in terms 
of Reg 11 of the Regulations in terms of the Human 
Tissue Act.
6 For a list of these hospitals see chapter 1; Bernstein
J 1989 Yes We Can Have a Baby 48.
7 See the Medical, Dental and Supplementary Health
Service Professions Act 56 of 197 4 and the Nursing Act
50 of 1978.
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gpcychologists are subject to the control of the South
gAfrican Medical and Dental Council. Furthermore, if they
are employed by the state or a provincial hospital, they are
also subject to administrative regulations. The Medical
Council perforins the active function of peer-review over
medical practitioners. It excercises disciplinary powers
over all registered practitioners. The Council may institute
an enquiry into any complaint, charge or allegation of
improper or disgraceful conduct by medical practitioners or
10other persons registered in terms of the Act. It is
therefore in a position to decide whether a certain practice
11meets the ethical standards of the profession or not.
12The South African Medical Research Council is a statutory 
body protecting patients’ rights in medical research. The 
Council also has a duty to "exercise proper control over the 
use of human or animal material in experimentation in
8 Amongst other important powers exercised, the Council 
has, inter alia, established a Board governing the 
psychology profession. The role of psychiatrists and 
psychologists is discussed in chapter 2 .
9 First established by Act 13 of 1928 and now governed by 
Act 56 of 1974, hereinafter referred to as the Medical 
Council.
10 S 41(1).
11 Pretorius v S A Geneeskundige en Tandheelkundige Raad 
1980 2 SA 354 T; Meyer v S A Medical and Dental Council
1982 4 SA 450 T.
12 Established by Act 19 of 1969.
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connection with any matter of which the Council has
13charge”. Updated guidelines in the form of Ethical 
Considerations were published in 1987. Their aim is to 
provide assistance to medical practitioners, researchers and 
health-care workers in their difficult task in dealing with, 
inter alia, in vitro fertilisation and experimentation with 
embryos.
In most instances the delictual liability of medical
practitioners, researchers or other health-care workers can
be readily established by applying the general principles of
14the law of delict. Thus a medical practitioner, researcher
or other health-care worker who intentionally or negligently
by his/her wrongful conduct causes an individual to suffer
either pecuniary loss or an infringement of his rights of
personality, may be held liable. A causal connection must
15exist between the act and the resulting damage.
13 S 17.
14 Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 1990 Law of Delict 4
defines a delict as: “The act of a person which in a
wrongful and culpable way causes harm to another". The
five elements therefore are, an act, wrongfulness, 
fault, harm and causation; See also Van der Walt 1979 
Delict 1.
15 Strauss S A and Strydom M J 1967 Die Suid-Afrikaanse
Geneeskundige Reg 111; Strauss S A "Genetic
Manipulation: The Legal Liability of the Practitioner" 
in 1980 Genetics and Society Oosthuizen G C, Shapiro H 
A and Strauss S A (eds) 63.
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In a civil action, damages may be claimed by the injured 
party and/or an interdict granted, restraining the doctor, 
scientist or health-care worker from continuing on the 
wrongful course of action on which he/she has embarked.
When the same act also constitutes a criminal offence, such 
as assault or iniuria, the elements of the specific crime 
must be found to exist in order to establish liability.
In certain circumstances liability may prove difficult to 
establish. 1 6 Can a medical practitioner who utilises 
assisted reproductive technology be held liable if the donor 
sperm carries a genetic defect or the AIDS virus? Is a 
medical practitioner responsible for the quality of the 
sperm or ova used in an in vitro fertilisation programme?
Is he/she responsible for placing a defective embryo in the 
uterus of the mother during an embryo transfer? Can a 
scientist or other health-care worker in an in vitro 
fertilisation programme be held liable for a laboratory 
accident whereby a healthy embryo is damaged or destroyed? 
May frozen sperm or embryos be destroyed or given to other 
childless couples without the consent of the donors or 
natural parents? May an in vitro or surrogate child who, 
after birth, suffers psychological damage as a result of the
16 See in general Furrow B R, Johnson S H, Jost T S and 
Schwartz R L 1987 Health Law - Cases Materials and 
Problems 824.
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way in which it was born, hold the doctor liable in a 
so-called "wrongful life" or "birth" action?
These are just some of the many question which may present 
themselves in this field and which are addressed in this 
chapter.
2.1 ASSISTANCE BY AND LIABILITY OF MEDICAL SPECIALISTS
2.1.1 MEDICAL PRACTITIONERS AND GYNAECOLOGISTS
As a general rule, couples who experience some form of 
infertility, will usually first consult their family doctor. 
He/she may then refer them to a gynaecologist or an 
infertility specialist or clinic where special 
investigations are performed to determine why conception has 
not taken place.
One should bear in mind that independently practising
medical practitioners are under no duty to treat a patient
17 . . .with one exception. Should a potentially life-threatening
situation exist of which the medical practitioner is aware,
but nevertheless unreasonably refuses to commence treatment,
18he may face delictual liability. It is difficult to
17 Strauss 1984 Doctor, Patient and the Law 20 et seq.
18 Strauss 1984 Doctor, Patient and the Law 20 et seq;
(Footnote Continued)
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envisage such a situation in the field of assisted 
reproduction. The possible exception might be that of a 
patient whose infertility is so stressful to his/her mental 
health, that he/she may threaten to commit suicide or where 
the future of the marriage is seriously imperiled. Whether 
such a patient should be admitted to an assisted 
reproduction programme is certainly debatable as infertility 
treatment may cause additional stress. 
In vitro fertilisation and embryo transfer require 
specialised equipment and advanced professional skill and 
experience and should therefore be performed only by someone 
who is specifically trained in this field. 19 The 
f . 1 f d f d" 1 . . 20 pro essiona rules o con uct or me ica practitioners, 
clearly state that it is improper for medical practitioners 
to perform professional acts for which they are inadequately 
trained and/or insufficiently experienced (except in an 
emergency). 21 
(Footnote Continued) 
Strauss S A 1987 Legal Handbook for Nurses and Health 
Personnel 8 et seq. 
19 For a description of the procedures see Bernstein 1989 
Yes We Can Have a Baby - a Positive Guide to 
Infertility 42 - 45; Fishel S and Symonds E M 1986 In 
Vitro Fertilisation - Past Present Future 135 - 146; 
Wolf D P and Quigley M M Human in Vitro Fertilization 
and Embryo Transfer 327 - 364; Wood C W and Westmore A 
1983 Test Tube Conception 59 - 88. 
20 Published in GG R2278 of 3 December 1976. 
21 Reg 25(1). 
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Lupton submits that "the skills required for a successful 
in vitro fertilisation and subsequent embryo transplant 
places the technique beyond the scope of the average general
practitioner" and that "a practitioner who does attempt
23 . . .ET without the necessary research and training, would, (it
is submitted), be misleading his patients and his actions
would certainly be negligent, unless he measured up to the
standard of the reasonable practitioner with that
(specialised) training".
The infertility specialists should further determine whether
the problem is one of male infertility, female infertility
or a combination of both. This is possible through a
physical examination of the woman as well as extensive
infertility tests and procedures performed on both spouses.
Their consent to these procedures, like any other medical
24procedure, should obviously first be obtained.
Once the cause of infertility has been established, the 
infertility specialists should explain and discuss the 
proposed or optional treatment available to the couple. This
22
22 The Legal Consequences of Artificial Insemination and 
Embryo Transplantation in Humans D Phil Univ of Natal 
1982 132.
23 Embryo transfer.
24 This is also stipulated in Reg 9(d) of the Regulations 
in terms of the Human Tissue Act.
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Such interventions could constitute an infringement of the
2 8patient's physical integrity or dignitas. It could, in
appropriate circumstances, also constitute civil or criminal
29 30iniuria. Van Oosten points out that in South Africa
there seems to be a preference for an action for negligence
31in delict rather than assault. In practice, it appears
furthermore that there is a preference for an action for
negligence in delict rather than an action based on breach
32of contract.
(Footnote Continued)
Malpractice Law 265 et seq; Van Oosten F F W The 
Doctrine of Informed Consent in Medical Law LLD CJnisa
1989 31 et seq. Rosoff A J 1981 Informed Consent - A 
Guide for Health Care Providers 1 et seq.
28 Although the writers are not ad idem abGUth the term 
•dignitas1’, it is eloquently described by Neethling J 
1985 Persoonlikheidsreg 55 n 53, with reference to De 
Villiers 1899 The Roman and Roman Dutch Law of Injuries
24 19 as "(t)hat valued and serene condition in (a 
person’s) social or individual life which is violated 
when he is, either publicly or privately, subjected by 
another to offensive and degrading treatment, or when 
he is exposed to ill-will, ridicule, disesteem or 
contempt".
30 1989 Informed Consent 51.
31 See Strauss and Strydom 1967 Die Suid-Afrikaanse 
Geneeskundige Reg 111. Exceptions to the rule are two 
important South African cases: Stoffbisrg v Elliott 
supra and Esterhuizen v Administrator Transvaal supra, 
where damages were awarded on the grounds of assault.
32 Lupton 1982 Legal Consequences 142 et seq; See, however 
Administrator, Natal v Edouard supra.
342
Obtaining the informed consent of the patient is therefore
of the utmost importance for any lawful medical
33intervention. Should a medical practitioner or other 
health-care worker be accused of negligence, the consent may 
be raised as a ground of justification (regverdigingsgrond)
excluding the element of unlawfulness or wrongfulness of a
34 . . .crime or delict. The volenti non fit iniuria principle is
35 .important in this regard. If a person willingly consents
to an act in the form of either a specific procedure, for
3 6instance a surgical operation, or an activity involving a
risk of harm, eg consent to the risk of side-effects of an 
37operation, that person can generally not complain that a 
delict or crime has been committed against him/her.
It is not necessary for the medical practitioner to inform 
the patient of all conceivable details pertaining to and
33 Strauss 1984 Doctor, Patient and the Law 3; Van Oosten
1989 Informed Consent 31 et seq.
34 Van Oosten 1989 Informed Consent 15 and references 
cited in n 7 and 8; Strauss S A Toestemming tot 
Benadeling as Verweer in die Strafreg en die Deliktereg 
Unisa 1961 272 and 311.
35 See in general Strauss 1961 Toestemming; Strauss and 
Strydom 1967 Die Suid-Afrikaanse Geneeskundige Reg 182
- 183; Van der Walt 1979 Delict, Principles and Cases 
50; Neethling Potgieter and Visser 1990 Law of Delict
84 - 8 6; Van der Merwe and Olivier 1989 Die 
Onregmatige Daad in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 89.
36 Strauss 1961 Toestemming 7.
37 Strauss 1961 Toestemming 50.
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consequences of the proposed procedure. It is sufficient
to inform the patient in general terms about Jrhe proposed
39treatment and material risks involved. This should be 
explained to him/her in clear, understandable and 
unambiguous language.
40Van Oosten highlights the twofold purpose and function of
informed consent. First, it enables the patient "to
consider, weigh and balance the benefits and disadvantages
of the proposed intervention in order to make a rational
choice either to undergo or refuse it". Secondly, it
"encourages rational decision-making and ensure patient
self-determination". Van Oosten further distinquishes
between self-determination information or consent
information on the one hand, and therapeutic or preventive
41information on the other hand. The former enables the 
patient to reach a rational decision. The latter contains 
information which makes the procedure possible. It further 
contains information about the preparation for the procedure
3 8
38 See Strauss and Strydom 1967 Die Suid-Afrikaanse 
Geneeskundige Reg 221.
39 See also Van Oosten 1989 Informed Consent 61 and the 
references quoted in n 77 and 78.
40 1989 Informed Consent 58, 448.
41 Van Oosten F F W “Die Leerstuk van Ingeligte 
Toestemming in Surrogaatmoederskapsgevalle" 1990 DJ 
343.
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and the behaviour of the patient prior to, during and after
42the procedure has taken place. According to him the
"self-determination" information is the more important. It
places a duty on the medical practitioner to inform the
patient inter alia of the diagnosis, the treatment, the
advantages, the disadvantages, the expected results, risks
and possible complications and if applicable,
43alternatives.
It is said that common sense requires that patients are
provided with all relevant information to allow them to make
44a rational choice. The question of what is relevant, is 
often difficult to ascertain. When too much information is 
provided, even the most intelligent patient may refuse to
4 5undergo treatment or urgent operations. Too little 
information, on the other hand, can lead to litigation.
Medical practitioners in the USA, who are perpetually under
46the threat of malpractice suits follow more complex and
42 Van Oosten 1990 DJ 343.
43 van Oosten 1989 Informed Consent 295 et seq 438 - 439
440 - 449; “Van Oosten 1990 DJ 343.
44 Powers M and Harris N 1990 Medical Negligence 801.
45 1990 Radical Negligence 801; Van Oosten 19 89 Informed
Consent 50 - 51.
46 Strauss S A “Geneesheer, Pasient en die Reg: 'n
Delikate Driehoek 1987 TSAR 3.
345
time-consuming procedures in an effort to obtain informed
47 .consent. In the currently leading English case of Sidaway
48v Bethlem Royal Hospital Governors the court/ m  a
majority decision, declared that the doctrine of informed
consent, based on a full disclosure of all the facts to the
49patient, does not form part of the English law. It has
also been stated that in the United Kingdom, the doctrine of
50informed consent is not considered a legal concept. In
fields of medicine which carry a definable risk of
complications, the approach is one of sensible, realistic
51and full discussion.
In South Africa it is accepted that the medical 
practitioner's duty is confined to providing the patient 
with a general idea of the serious or dangerous risks
47 See for instance the detailed consent forms in "New 
Guidelines for the Use of Semen Donor Insemination: 
1990" published by the American Infertility Society in
1990 Fertility and Sterility Vol 53 No 3 Appendix C. 
They are, however, under no obligation to inform the 
patient of all the facts in order to obtain informed 
consent.
48 1985 1 All ER 643 HL.
49 See the discussion in Van Oosten 1989 Informed Consent
99 et seq.
50 1990 Medical Negligence 801.
51 Medical Negligence or cit 801. For a detaile-i 
discussion of English lav, Van Oosten : 3 ,’rslomod 
Consent 70 ~ 165.
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attached to the proposed treatment or procedures. There is
no obligation to disclose in detail all the complications
that may arise or to disclose rare, idiosyncratic,
unforeseeable, uncommon, unusual or remote adverse
53consequences that may result from the treatment. The
medical practitioner must give the patient a general idea in
broad terms of the nature, scope, administration,
importance, consequences, risks, dangers, benefits,
disadvantages and prognosis of, as well as the alternatives
54to, the proposed intervention.
55Strauss, with reference to some prominent German
56authors, refers to the modern view that "over informing" a 
patient, may be tantamount to not informing him at all. The 
situation envisaged is where the medical practitioner 
furnishes his patient with such a massive amount of
52
52 Strauss and 'trydom 1967 Die Suid-Afrikaanse 
Geneeskundii” Reg 221; Van Oosten 1989 Informed Consent 
61, 448.
53 Van Oosten 1989 Informed Consent 46 et seq in a
discussion of South African case law; Lymbery v
Jefferies 1925 AD 236; Bsterhuizen v Adminstrator 
Transvaa1 s upra.
54 Van Oosten 1989 Informed Consent 448.
55 1984 Doctor, Patient and the Law 8 ; Strauss 1987 TSAR
5 .
56 Deutsch E 1983 Artzrecht und Arztneimittelrecht 53 and 
Jescheck H-H 1978 Lehrbuch des Strafrecths 228 in 1984 
Doctor, Patient and the Law 11 n 31 33.
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technical information that the latter is unable to digest 
it. The medical practitioner may be held delictually liable 
if excessive information has the effect of causing the 
patient psychological or physical harm.
57Another view is voiced by Sxmanowitz who states that
"(t)he more information that is given to a patient before
treatment, the less likely legal advice is going to be
5 8sought when something untoward takes place".
The doctrine of informed consent has undergone considerable
59changes over a period of time. The requirements for valid 
consent have become more stringent in many jurisdictions, 
although there has been little change in South Africa and 
England. According to the former view, it was the duty of 
the medical practitioner to inform the patient about the 
nature of the proposed treatment, the results as well as the 
risks in such a manner as the reasonable practitioner would 
have done.^ In some jurisdictions the courts have recently
57 A British solicitor and executive director of Actions 
for Victims of Medical Accidence.
58 1990 Medical Negligence 87.
59 See Shult2 M M "From Informed Consent to Patient 
Choice: A New Protected Interest" 1985 Yale L J 219 - 
299.
60 Rosoff A J 1981 Informed Consent A Guide for Health 
Care Providers 34 et seq; Strauss TSAR 4; For a
(Footnote Continued)
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adopted a new approach - the so-called reasonable patient 
61criterion. This approach focuses on the infonnational 
needs of an average, reasonable patient. Under this rule a 
physician can be held liable if the court finds that the 
patient did not receive the information material to the 
decision to accept the proposed treatment. The criterion is 
no longer a medical one. It is a matter that the court
6 2should decide upon and no longer the medical practitioner.
6 3The emphasis has therefore shifted to patient autonomy 
and, as I understand it, with the court having the ultimate 
discretion.
(Footnote Continued)
detailed discussion of the English cases, Hills v 
Potter 1983 3 All ER 716 (QB) 721 - 722 727 - 728; 
Freeman v Home Office 1984 1 All ER 1036 CA; Sidaway v
Bethlem Royal Hospital Governors 1984 1 All ER 1018 CA;
See also Van Oosten 1989 Informed Consent for a 
discussion of the leading English case: Sidaway v 
Bethlem Royal Hospital Governors 1985 1 All ER 643 HL.
61 Rosoff 1981 Informed Consent 38; Giesen 1988 
International Medical Malpractice Law 271 et seq.
62 Strauss TSAR 4 citing Natanson v Kline 186 Kan 393, 350
P2d 621 1946. See Lord Scarman's dissenting judgement
in Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital Governors 1985 1 
All ER 643 HL, discussed by Van Oosten Informed Consent
1 1 0  et seq.
63 For examples of this approach by the courts see
Canterbury v Spence 464 F 2d 772 780 D C Cir (1972)
USA. See van Oosten*s discussion of the German caselaw
1989 Informed Consent 194 et seq.
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2.2.1 INFORMED CONSENT IN ASSISTED REPRODUCTION WITH
SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO SURROGACY
Although much has been said and written on the subject of
informed consent in general, the informed consent doctrine
in relation to surrogacy arrangements has received scant
64attention in legal literature. In most instances the
general principles of consent are applied to surrogacy
arrangements. Van Oosten in his exposition of the doctrine
65of infomed consent m  surrogacy arrangements, has 
provided a valuable point of departure, which merits 
consideration in this complex field of assisted 
reproduction.
For obvious reasons the doctrine of informed consent does
not play a role where the parties fail to seek professional
assistance and revert to so-called “self help" 
fi fiarrangements. Two possibilities exist in this regard. 
First, artificial insemination may take place as a result of 
an agreement between the intended father and a surrogate 
whereby she inseminates herself with semen obtained from the 
former. Secondly, the intended father and a surrogate could
64 For the first publication directly addressing informed 
consent in surrogacy in South Africa, see Van Oosten
1990 DJ 340 - 447.
65 Van Oosten 1990 DJ 340 - 347.
66 For the discussion of a South African incident, see 
chapter 3 and the Recommendations in chapter 7.
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agree to extra-marital intercourse. Such an agreement falls
outside the scope of artificial insemination as defined by
the Human Tissue Act and Regulations. The child will be
illegitimate and the agreement will for obvious reasons be
6 7contrary to public policy.
In the first instance, the parties could theoretically be
6 8criminally liable for contravening statutory requirements , 
but in most instances prosecution is unlikely. This can in 
the main be attributed to the lack of control over such 
arrangements. This practice is undoubtedly risky and 
unsatisfactory. When the donor semen is not screened, the 
recipient exposes both herself and the child to serious 
risks. Some of these include contracting AIDS, sexually 
transmitted diseases or the birth of a genetically 
handicapped child. An attempt should be made to limit these 
"self help" arrangements, although this is admittedly not an 
easy task.
Under common law, as well as under certain statutory 
provisions, medical practitioners have a duty to inform the
67 Pretorius R “Surrogaat-moederskap: Implikasies in die 
Suid-Afrikaanse Regstelsel“ 1987 DR 273.
68 For instance Reg 3 and Reg 14 of the Regulations and s 
23(2) of the Human Tissue Act which only permits a 
medical practitioner or someone acting under his/her 
supervision to perform artificial insemination.
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patients of the possible consequences of any procedures or
treatment undertaken to alleviate the problem of
. . 69infertility.
In South Africa the procedure for obtaining the patient (and 
her husband's) informed consent for artificial insemination 
or in vitro fertilisation is set out in Reg 9 of the 
Regulations in terms of the Human Tissue Act.
A medical practitioner may not proceed with an artificial 
insemination before he/she has ensured that
"(t)he recipient and her husband have received advice and 
information from appropriate experts concerning - 
(aa) the possibilities, if any, of the recipient's being 
able to conceive in another manner;
(bb) all the implications of artificial insemination 
including the problems that exists (sic) with regard to the 
technique of artificial insemination, the chances that the 
artificial insemination will be successful, the financial 
aspects, the consequences to the marriage, and the ethical, 
psychosocial and educational implications of artificial 
insemination, the risks attached to the genetic properties 
of a gamete, the prognosis regarding the child, and legal
69 See the discussion infra.
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advice which may be obtained with regard to artificial 
insemination".
The Regulations place a heavy burden on the medical 
practitioner who performs artificial insemination and in 
vitro fertilisation. This is slightly alleviated by the 
requirement that the medical practitioner should only ensure 
that the patient and her husband have received the required 
information. For information regarding ethical, psychosocial 
and educational implications, the couple may consult the 
appropriate experts, eg social workers, psychiatrists and 
clergymen. Advice on the legal aspects, should be obtained 
from attorneys or legal advisers. A serious disadvantage of 
this procedure is that an already costly procedure may 
become totally out of reach for the average patient.
As the doctor-patient relationship is of a consensual
nature, it is often not in writing. In more complicated
medical procedures it has become customary to provide the
70patient with detailed advice and consent forms. It is 
submitted that in vitro fertilisation and embryo transfer 
fall into this category and that an adequate agreement 
should exist between the patient and the medical
70 Strauss 1984 Doctor, Patient and the Law 9; Strauss and 
Strydom 1967 Die Suid-Afrikaanse Geneeskundige Reg 105.
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71 •practitioner. It has furthermore become routine, in
certain infertility clinics, to provide the patients and
their spouses with selected literature and visual material.
Anatomical models or sketches are often used to explain the
proposed procedure to the patients. Some infertility
72specialists use slides or video recordings.
As in vitro fertilisation and embryo transfer have primarily 
developed during the last decade, it is submitted that the 
patients can only benefit from exposure to selected 
literature and the utilisation of visual material apart from 
written consent forms.
Based on the general principles of informed consent, Van
7 3Oosten, recommends that the parties involved m  a 
surrogacy arrangement should receive adequate knowledge and 
information to appreciate the nature of the proposed
71 See also the advice of Strauss 1984 Doctor, Patient and 
the Law 33 that medical practitioners who are involved 
in drastic or unusual surgery, should inform the 
patients in writing of the essential nature of the 
procedure and the risks involved. A detailed written 
consent should also be obtained if possible.
72 This information was obtained during interviews with 
infertility specialists in various centres around the 
country.
73 1990 DJ 342 - 346.
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74 tprocedure. He emphasises the two most important aspects,
namely:
1 protection of the patient's right to self-determination 
and freedom of decision, and
2 the promotion of rational decision-making about the 
proposed procedure. This implies that the patient 
should:
(a) Receive sufficient information to enable him/her to 
weigh the positive consequences against the negative 
ones, and
(b) to reach a decision whether to go ahead with the 
procedure or not.
With regard to (b), it should be borne in mind that in 
surrogacy arrangements, the parties are in a unique 
situation. As opposed to most infertile couples who turn to 
infertility specialists for medical assistance, they have 
already decided to include a third party - the surrogate 
mother - in the proceedings. Instead of having to cope with 
one couple, there are two couples involved (assuming that 
the surrogate mother is married). This aspect places the 
medical practitioner in a unique situation. He/she must 
ensure that all the parties receive adequate and appropriate
74 1990 DJ 343.
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information to enable them to appreciate the medical, legal,
sociological and psychological aspects so tnat they may
75 • .reach a rational decision. This is undeniably a difficult
task, especially since surrogacy is an extremely emotive
experience. It has even been questioned whether a surrogate
can make a rational choice as she commits herself to the
agreement before she knows how she will feel about the child
. . . 7 6she is carrying.
The help of professionals, such as psychiatrists, social
workers or legal consultants could alleviate the burden on
the medical practitioners and provide additional assistance
77to the parties in reaching a rational decision.
For practical purposes a distinction is drawn between the 
information which should be conveyed to the intended parents
75 Van Oosten 1990 DJ 343.
76 See the Baby M II case 109 N.J at 437, 537 A 2d 1248,
where the court questioned whether a surrogate could
ever grant "informed consent" to the terms of the 
contract even with sufficient evaluation and 
counseling; contra Macklin R "Is There Anything Wrong
With Surrogate Motherhood? - An Ethical Analysis" in
1990 Surrogate Motherhood Gostin (ed) 136 - 150 142 -
143 and Andrews L ‘’Surrogate Motherhood: Th*' A’hallenge 
for Feminists" in 1990 Surrogate Motherhood Kostin (ed)
167 - 182 at 172 who supports the view that informed 
consent is possible.
77 See the discussion infra.
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and that which should be conveyed to the surrogate and her 
husband, although to a large extent there is an overlap.
2.2.2 INFORMING THE INTENDED PARENTS
The following information should in broad terms be conveyed 
to the intended parents:
1 The fact that the intended mother is unable to
conceive, carry, or give birth to a baby and the
7 8reasons for the condition.
2 The possibilities available in assisted reproduction
technology, eg the use of donor gametes/surrogacy. If
donor gametes are used, the rights of the parties
79concerned to such gametes or embryos.
3 The applicable form of surrogacy, eg partial or
complete surrogacy. 80
4 If alternatives are available (such as adoption), the 
advantages and disadvantages of each.
5 The possibility of success or failure of the proposed
78 See chapter 1 under Reasons for Infertility. See also 
Lupton 1986 TRW 148; Tager 1986 SALJ 391; Pretorius 
1987 DR 270.
79 See the discussion infra under Proprietary Rights to 
Gametes.




6 The possible risks and dangers involved in the proposed
procedures.
2.2.3 INFORMING THE SURROGATE AND HER HUSBAND
The surrogate and her husband should be informed of;
1 The psychological and physical consequences of 
surrogacy, especially regarding the pregnancy, birth of 
the child, and of handing over the child to the 
intended parents after birth.
812 The risks attached to the proposed medical procedure,
including the hormonal treatment (fertility drugs) 
which induces super-ovulation and could result in
8 2multiple births and, occasionally, ovarian cysts.
3 The possibility of the birth of a physically
handicapped child and the possible consequences of such 
a birth. 83
4 The possiblity that the procedure could result in the
81 The laparoscopy and egg pick-up (if it is used) and the 
artificial insemination/in vitro fertilisation and 
embryo transfer (if it is used).
82 See the discussion in chapter 1; Lupton 1982 Legal 
Consequences 1 4 0 .
83 For instance that the child is not wanted by either 
party. See the discussion of the Malahoff/Strivers 
incident in chapters 3 and 4.
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birth of more than one child and the consequences of
84such a birth.
855 The rights of the parties to gametes and enibryos .
All the parties should be informed of the legal consequences
of a surrogacy arrangement. The most important aspect which
should be explained, preferably by a legal adviser, is the
effect of the Children's Status Act on the status of the 
p fichild. The intended parents should, at least, be alerted 
to the fact that there are at present legal obstacles in 
securing parental rights to the child.
87Van Oosten suggests that as a result of the nature of
surrogacy, there may be room for the so-called "therapeutic
information" duty. The surrogate mother should be informed
about behaviour expected of her during the pregnancy.
Although this is usually carefully specified in the written 
88contract, it should nevertheless be discussed with the 
surrogate and her husband.
84 For instance the financial consequences for the
intended parents.
85 See discussion infra under Proprietary Rights to
Gametes.
86 See the discussion in chapter 5 under Law of Persons.
87 1990 DJ 343 - 344.
88 See the discussion of the Contact in chapter 4.
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Although some of the risks have already been highlighted,
the parties to a surrogacy arrangement should be made aware
of all the foreseeable risks and complications that could
occur. These are usually contained in the written contract
89but also merits discussion.
2.2.4.1 RISKS AND COMPLICATIONS FOR THE INTENDED PARENTS
For practical purposes a distinction is drawn between the 
situation where:
1 the surrogate mother is also the genetic mother of the 
child (partial surrogacy), and
2 where donor gametes are used (either from donors or the 
intended parents) (full surrogacy).
Here again, there is an overlap as certain information is 
relevant to both couples, whereas other details are relevant 
to the specific form of surrogacy used.
2.2.4 RISKS AND COMPLICATIONS IN GENERAL
89 Ibid.
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2.2.5 INFORMED CONSENT: PARTIAL SURROGACY
1 Where the surrogate mother is also the genetic mother 
of the child, the intended parents should be alerted to 
the fact that the surrogate may refuse to hand over the 
baby after birth. Since she is also the genetic mother, 
such a decision is probably more likely than where she 
is a host-mother with no genetic link to the child.
2 If the surrogate refuses to hand over the child, the
legal, social and psychological consequences - eg that
legally, the intended father (if he is also the genetic
father) may take steps to prove paternity and claim
90custody to the child.
3 The fact that either marriage could end in divorce and 
even the death of one of the parties to the contract 
prior to completion.
2.2.6 INFORMED CONSENT: FULL SURROGACY
1 Even if the intended parents are also the genetic
parents, they should nevertheless be alerted to the 
possibility of the surrogate refusing to hand over the 
baby and the legal, social and psychological
90 A decision which the court will have to make. See the 
discussion in chapter 5.
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consequences of such a decision.
2 Where donor gametes or a donor embryo is used, the
risks are similar for the intended parents. There is, 
however, an exception in that if they are themselves 
the gamete donors, a court will probably be more 
sympathetically disposed towards them in awarding 
guardianship or allowing them to adopt the child.
2.2.7 WHO SHOULD CONSENT?
Should artificial or in vitro fertilisation be performed on 
a woman without her consent - a situation which is unlikely 
to occur in practice - the practitioner would undoubtedly be 
liable for assault.
Consent should be obtained from a person who is legally
91competent to consent. As a general rule spouses may
individually consent to treatment. When treatment of a
married person may affect his/her procreative functions, it
92is advisable, but not always compulsory for the medical 
practitioner to obtain the consent of the other spouse
91 See Strauss 1984 Doctor, Patient and the Law 4 et seq.
92 Strauss S A "Unsuccessful Sterilisation of Woman: 
Doctor Liable for Child-Raising Costs" 1990 S A Prac 
Man 16.
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9 3 9 4before proceeding with treatment. The Regulations in
terms of the Human Tissue Act, however, require the written
consent of the husband prior to artificial insemination or
in vitro fertilisation of his wife. The gamete donor, if it
is applicable, should also sign a written consent for the
95withdrawal of the gametes.
As a result of the complexity of surrogacy it is advisable 
to use written consent forms for artificial insemination or 
in vitro fertilisation. The medical practitioner should 
further ensure that:
1 the consent of the parties be obtained for the entire
procedure; 96
2 no guarantee or assurance be given that a pregnancy
will result from the treatment;
3 no guarantee or assurance be given that the
treatment will result in the birth of a single child;
4 no guarantee or assurance be given that the
93 See in this regard Sonnekus J C "Sterilisasie -
Toestenuning deur Nie-pasient-gade?" 1986 DR 369 - 378 
373 377 who strongly supports the autonomy of women to 
make their own procreative decisions.
94 Reg 8(1).
95 S18 of the Human Tissue Act.
96 The parties should, under specified circumstances,
retain the right to terminate the contract, for 
instance after several failures to conceive.
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treatment will result in the birth of a child free from 
any mental or physical handicaps;
5 no guarantee or assurance be given that the 
pregnancy and childbirth will be free of any 
complications.
Despite obtaining adequate consent and carefully explaining
the proposed procedures to the patients, the physician
cannot free him or herself from the obligation to use due
care and skill in the performance of any of the proposed
9 7procedures. The well-known principles to ascertain
negligence are also applied in assisted reproductive 
98technology.
2.3 LIABILITY OF INFERTILITY SPECIALISTS IN
ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY WITH REFERENCE TO 
SURROGACY
If artificial insemination and in vitro fertilisation are 
performed with due care and in compliance with the Human 
Tissue Act and Regulations, medical practitioners will not 
readily incur delictual or criminal liability.
97 Morris R C and Moritz A R 1971 Doctor and Patient and 
the Law 101.
98 See chapter 3 and infra under Negligence.
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Lupton provides a detailed and useful discussion of the
liability of medical practitioners performing artificial
insemination, in vitro fertilisation and embryo transfer.
His discussion is, however, based on the Anatomical
Donations and Post-Mortem Examinations Act , 100 which has
since been repealed by the Human Tissue Act and Regulations.
The latter changed the legal situation considerably.
Noteworthy changes have also occurred in the practice of
assisted reproduction in South Africa and abroad, which
101warrants discussion. Lupton's classification of the 
grounds of liability is, however maintained in the present 
discussion. Under liability, he distinguishes between strict 
liability, negligence and iniuria.
2.3.1 STRICT LIABILITY
Strict liability is clearly not favoured in South African
102medical malpractice suits. The medical practitioner is 
therefore by implication relieved of liability for 
non-negligent and non-intentional damage arising from in 
vitro fertilisation and embryo transfer. Liability rests on
9 9
99 1982 Legal Consequences 142 et seq.
100 24 of 1970.
101 Lupton 1982 Legal Consequences 142 et seq; See, however 
Administrator, Natal v Edouard supra.
102 Strauss 1984 Doctor, Patient and the Law 285.
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fault - culpa (negligence) or dolus (intent). The maxim,
104res ipsa loquitur which if applied m  the law of delict
may result in strict liability, was rejected by the
Appellate Division in a medical malpractice suit, Van Wyk v
105 •Lewis. Although the rule is not restricted to medical
10 6malpractice suits, it developed in certain jurisdictions
as a rule of sympathy to combat the so-called "conspiracy of
. . 107silence" amongst medical practitioners.
103
2.3.2 NEGLIGENCE
Negligence in this discussion refers to an element of fault, 
which is a prerequisite for delictual liability.
103 Strauss 1984 Doctor, Patient and the Law 285; Lupton 
1982 Legal Consequences 142.
104 The literal translation is "the thing speaks for 
itself". Strauss 1984 Doctor, Patient and the Law 283 
explains it thus: "Mere proof by a plaintiff of an 
injurious result caused by an instrumentality which was 
in the exlusive control of the defendant, or following 
upon the happening of an occurence solely under the 
defendant's control, gives rise to a presumption of 
negligence on the part of the latter. The damage or 
injury must be of such a nature that it would 
ordinarily not occur except for negligence".
105 1924 AD 438; See also Blyth v Van den Heever 1980 1 SA
191 A; Buis & Ano v Tsatsarolakis 1976 2 SA 891 T; Duke
v Administrator, Transvaal 1957 3 SA 710 T.
106 See Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 1990 Law of Delict
127 * 128 for other examples.
107 For a discussion of the doctrine, see Strauss 1984
Doctor, Patient and the Law 283 et seq; Lupton 1982 
Legal Consequences 143 n 72.
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Breach of contract and possible delictual damages, such as 
patrimonial damages (actio legis Aquiliae), iniuria, claim 
for pain and suffering and claim for emotional shock are 
discussed in chapter 3.
As already pointed out, patients who have suffered pecuniary 
loss or infringement of their rights of personality, 
generally prefer to institute an action for negligence in 
delict rather than assault*^® or breach of contract.
The onus of proof in a negligence suit rests on the
plaintiff. He/she must lay sufficient evidence before the
court to convince it on a balance of probabilities that
110negligence was indeed present and that damage arose as a 
consequence t h e r e o f . A  medical practitioner who fails to 
inform the patient adequately of the risks involved, could 
be held accountable for negligence.
108 See Strauss and Strydom 1967 Die Suid-Afrikaanse 
Geneeskundige Reg 111. Exceptions to the rule are two 
important South African cases: Stoffberg v Elliott 
supra and Esterhuizen v Administrator Transvaal supra, 
where damages were awarded on the grounds of assault.
109 Lupton 1982 Legal Consequences 142 et seq; See, however 
Administrator, Natal v Edouard supra.
110 Pecuniary loss or infringement of personality.
111 Strauss 1984 Doctor, Patient and the Law 281 et seq; 
Lupton 1982 Legal Consequences 144.
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The standard used in South African courts to determine
medical negligence is at present still that of the
. . 112reasonable practitioner. It must be proved that the
medical practitioner failed to exercise the degree of care
and skill that is ordinarily used by the profession under
113similar conditions and circumstances. Factors which are
taken into account are the branch of the profession to which
the practitioner belongs, the general level of skill and
diligence possessed and exercised at the time by the members
of such branch and the nature of the duties the medical
114practitioner has carried out.
112 Thus it was stated in Buis and Another v Tsatsarolakis 
supra at 893-4 that "the standard of care required of a 
medical practitioner who undertakes the treatment of a 
patient is not the highest possible degree of 
professional skill, but reasonable skill and care". See 
also Van der Walt 1979 Delict 71; See Van Oosten 1989 
Informed Consent, who is in favour of a 
patient-autonomy oriented approach 447, 449, 456 - 457 
and 459.
113 In Van Wyk v Lewis supra it was for instance stated 
that:"We must place ourselves as nearly as possible in 
the exact position in which the surgeon found himself 
when he conducted the particular operation and we must 
then determine from all the circumstances whether he 
acted with reasonable care or negligently. Did he act 
as an average surgeon placed in similar circumstances 
would have acted or did he manifestly fall short of the 
skill, care and judgment of the average surgeon in 
similar circumstances? If he falls short he is 
negligent."
114 Van der Walt 1979 Delict 721.
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As assisted reproductive medicine, particularly in vitro
fertilisation and embryo transfer require specialised skills
and knowledge, the standard applied by the courts will be
that of the reasonable practitioner within the field of
115assisted reproductive technology. As is the case with
negligence suits in general, this poses a problem of proof
for the patient who suffers damages. Since assisted
reproductive technology is a field of super-specialisation,
there are relatively few infertility specialists in the
country. It may therefore be extremely difficult, if not
impossible, for the patient to find an expert witness
116willing to give evidence of negligence in court. On the
other hand, infertility specialists are subject to the 
disciplinary code of the Medical Council and should work in 
strict compliance. with the Human Tissue Act and Regulations. 
From interviews with infertility specialists in South 
Africa, it appears that many comply with the 1986 Ethical 
Considerations of the New Reproductive Technologies supplied
115 See in general Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 1990 Law 
of Delict 117 - 118 and cases cited at 117 n 79; Boberg 
P Q R 1989 The Law of Delict 346; Van der Walt 1979 
Delict 71. See also the specific discussion of Lupton 
regarding the qualifications of a medical practitioner 
performing in vitro fertilisation and embryo transfer 
in 1982 Legal Consequences 131 - 134 and 144 - 145.
116 For a possible solution to this problem Strauss 1984 
Doctor, Patient and the Law 287 suggests the 
institution of a medical ombudsman, who amongst other 
duties, may constitute a panel of medical experts to 
assist him/her.
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by the ethics committee of the American Fertility Society
and the 1990 New Guidelines for the Use of Semen Donor
118Insemination published by the same society.
Furthermore,the Southern African Society for Reproductive
Biology was recently founded to enhance the standard of
119assisted reproductive technology m  South Africa.
Compliance by a practitioner with these standards will 
ordinarily avoid an allegation of negligence. The reputation 
and success rates of each clinic are also important as only 
those which provide proper services will ultimately remain 
active.
It is submitted that the requirements for the qualifications
of medical practitioners performing in vitro fertilisation
120and embryo transfer, proposed by Lupton (during 1982) are 
unrealistic. He submitted that these procedures should be 
performed only by medical practitioners who had studied at 
the two world renowned infertility centres at Bourn Hill
117
117 1986 Fertility and Sterility 46 3.
118 1990 Fertility and Sterility Supplement 1.
119 Information obtained from the chairman of the Southern 
African Society of Reproductive Biology.
120 1982 Legal Consequences 145.
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Clinic in Oldham, Britain or the Faculty of Medicine at 
Monash University, Melbourne, Australia.
From interviews with several infertility specialists, it 
appears that the standard of practice is particularly high 
in South Africa and that excellent training facilities are 
available at certain academic hospitals, such as Tygerberg 
Hospital in the Cape Province.
2.3.3 INIURIA1 2 2
If damages are claimed from a medical practitioner on the
ground of iniuria, the appropriate delictual action is the
123actio lniuriarum. For this action to succeed wrongfulness
and intent (animus iniurandi) must be proved, which may be
difficult in assisted reproductive technology. The plaintiff
must prove that the actions of the medical practitioners
124(apart from an infliction of pecuniary loss), also
121
121 Where Steptoe and Edwards developed in vitro 
fertilisation and became world famous with the birth of 
Louiso Brown in 1978.
122 See also the discussion in chapter 3.
123 Ibid.
124 Damnum iniuria datum which is instituted by the actio 
legis Aquiliae.
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constitutes an infringement of a subjective right.
Lupton, to my mind correctly, states that a medical 
practitioner who performs artificial insemination/in vrtro 
fertilisation or embryo transfer on a woman without her 
husband's consent, commits an iniuria against the 
husband. 1 2 6
In some jurisdictions the question arose whether a child 
born as a result intercourse resulting in illegitimacy,
could hold the medical practitioner liable for an iniuria or
127the so-called "wrongful life"
2.3.4 WRONGFUL CONCEPTION, BIRTH AND LIFE
In Illinois, in the USA, a child born as a result of an
adulterous relationship, instituted an action against his
biological father as he averred that he had been born an
128"adulterine bastard." The father, who was already
married, persuaded the mother, on a promise of marriage, to
125
125 Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 1990 Law of Delict 272; 
Neethling J 1985 Persoonlikheidsreg 75 - 78 and Van der 
Walt 1979 Delict 8 .
126 Lupton 1982 Legal Consequences 163 et seq. See, 
however, Sonnekus 1986 DR 377.
127 See the classification infra.
128 Zepeda v Zopeda 41 111 App 2d 240 190 N E 2d 849 (1963) 
discussed by Boberg P Q R "An Action for Wrongful Life” 
1964 SALJ 498 - 502.
4have intercourse with him, which resulted in the birth of a 
child. In his action (instituted through a friend) the child 
claimed compensation for the stigma and legal disabilities 
caused by his illegitimacy. The court, in denying the claim, 
made the following noteworthy statement:
"Encouragement (of such actions) would extend to all others
born into the world under conditions they might regard as
adverse. One might seek damages for being born of a certain
colour, another because of race, one for being born with a
hereditary disease, another for inheriting unfortunate
family characteristics; one for being born into a large and
destitute family, another because a parent has an unsavoury
129reputation.“
Although the action was referred to as a "wrongful life"
action, the judicial outlook has changed over the years.
whilst legal terminology is not quite settled at this stage,
130three broad claims can be distinguished:
1 The "wrongful life" claim, generally refers to a claim 
where a handicapped child is born. The claim is usually
372
129 At 260.
130 Strauss "First S A Claim Against Doctor for ‘Wrongful 
Conception'Fails" 1988 S A Prac Han 6 .
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brought by the child himself.
2 "Wrongful conception" refers to cases where conception 
ought to have been medically prevented, for instance in 
the case of a failed vasectomy.
3 "Wrongful birth" refers to the situation where the birth 
of the abnormal child should have been prevented. The 
claim is usually instituted by the parents of the 
abnormal or disabled child.
As yet, we have had only decisions on "wrongful conception" 
in South Africa. Although these decisions may not strictly 
relevant to surrogacy, it is important to discuss them 
briefly. 1 3 2
The first decision on "wrongful conception" in South Africa
133was handed down in Behrmann and Another v Klugman. This
131
131 Schedler G 1986 "Women's Reproductive Rights: Is There 
a Conflict With a Child's Right to be Born Free From 
Defects?" 1986 J Legal Med 357 - 358; Pretorius R in 
1988 The Right to Life - Issues in Bioethics 71.
132 For a detailed discussion of the Behnnan and Edouard 
Cases, see Strauss S A "Voluntary Sterilisation for 
Convenience: The Case of the Unwanted Child" 1990 
Consultus 93 - 97.
133 1988 WLD (Unreported). For a detailed discussion of the 
cases, see Strauss 1988 S A Prac Man 6 - 7 ;  Strauss 
1990 Consultus 94 - 95.
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was a case of a failed vasectomy which resulted in the birth 
of a normal child. The claim was based on breach of contract 
and alternatively negligence. The plaintiffs claimed that, 
from the statements made by the doctor, they believed that 
the vasectomy was irreversible and would render the husband 
sterile after ten weeks following the operation. They 
nevertheless waited 16 to 20 weeks before commencing 
intercourse. Finding in favour of the medical practitioner, 
Melamet J concluded that the appellants, on a balance of 
probabilities had failed to establish that the contract 
between themselves and the medical practitioner contained an 
express or implied term or warranty as to the permanent 
success of the operation.
134Edouard v Administrator, Natal followed shortly after the 
Behrman case. The facts in Edouard’s case differ from the 
Behrman case in that the medical practitioner simply failed 
to perform a tubal ligation on Mrs Edouard at the birth of 
the couple’s third child despite an agreement between the 
appellants and the provincial administration for the 
performance of such an operation. In the provincial court 
the Edouards were successful in their first claim for the 
cost of maintenance of the child from the date of her birth 
to the age of 18 years. The court however disallowed damages
134 Supra. See the discussion in Strauss 1990 Consultus 95 
et seq.
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on the second ground, namely discomfort, pain and suffering 
and loss of amenities of life, suffered by the wife as a 
consequence of her pregnancy and the subsequent birth of tie 
child.
On appeal this decision was unanimously upheld by a full
bench of the the Appellate division in Administrator, Natal
135v Edouard. Thus a "pregnancy claim" - as Van Heerden J A 
referred to it - or wrongful-conception claim was 
acknowledged for the first time by the Appellate Division.
In the Appellate Division the first claim for patrimonial 
loss was allowed on the ground of breach of contract but the 
second claim, for intangible loss, was denied. In allowing 
the first claim, the court pointed out that the award in no 
way transfers the support obligation from the father to the 
doctor or hospital, but that; in a case like this, where the 
sterilisation was requested for socio-economic reasons, the 
award could help the father to fulfill the support 
obligation. The court further stressed that different 
considerations could apply where sterilisation was sought 
for other reasons than socio-economic.
135 Supra; See the discussion by Strauss 1990 Consultus 96
- 97.
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From this decision it is clear that our courts now recognise 
a claim for "wrongful conception". The socio-economic 
position of the couple will, however, play a prominent role 
in the decision.
2.3.5 LIABILITY UNDER THE NASCITURUS FICTION1 3 6
The general rule in South African law is that legal
subjectivity commences when a child is born alive. At that
moment the child attains the capacity and status of a person
and becomes the bearer of juridical competencies, rigths and
137legal obligations. There is, however, one exception to
138this rule by virtue of the so-called nasciturus fiction
in terms of which legal protection can be backdated to
conception when, to do so, would be to the benefit of the
139child, on the condition that the child is born alive. In
136 See, however, Van der Vyver J D and Joubert D J1985 
Persone-en Familiereg 68 et seq who refers to the 
nasciturus rule. In their opinion the rule means that 
legal subjectvity is, under certain circumstances, 
pre-dated to conception.
137 Boberg 1977 Law of Persons and the Family 8 - 9 ;  Van 
der Vyver "The Legal Status of the Homo Novus" in 1980 
Genetics and Society Oosthuizen, Shapiro and Strauss 
(eds) 92 - 3; Christian League of Southern Africa v 
Rail 1981 2 SA 821 0 at 829 - 830; Pinchin & Ano N O v 
Santam Insurance Co Ltd 1963 2 SA 254 W at 260.
138 Nasciturus pro iam nato habetur quotiens de commodo 
eius agitur (Digesta 1 5 7 s 1 5 26).
139 Cronje D S P  1990 Barnard Cronje and Olivier - Die 
Suid-Afrikaanse Persone- en Familiereg 29.
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terms of this fiction, the court will allow a child who
suffered injuries in utero through the negligence of a third
party, the right to sue for damages, provided causality and
140negligence can be proved. There is no reason why this
fiction should not apply in the field of assisted
reproductive procreation. If a zygote or foetus is injured
during assisted reproductive procreation, but is not born
alive, the nasciturus fiction will, however not apply. The
only remedy available to the couple, if they can prove
negligence and causality, is damages for hospital expenses.
If the child is still-born, they may also claim funeral
141expenses. One cannot claim for the loss of a potential
child as our law c’oes not recognise a right of "ownership"
142in children nor does it put a value on life per se.
140 Pinchin v Santam supra. For a discussion of this case 
see: Van der Merwe N J and Joubert W A Vonnisbespreking 
(Twee benaderings) 1963 (26) THRHR 291 - 2°>7.
141 See Strauss 1984 Doctor, Patient and the Law 198;
Lupton 1982 Legal Consequences 155.
142 Strauss 1984 Doctor, Patient and the Law 198; Lupton
1982 Legal Consequences 155.
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2.4 "OWNERSHIP” IN GAMETES AND ZYGOTES/EMBRYOS?
2.4.1 INTRODUCTION
The question of "ownersnip" is relevant to a discussion of 
liability, since pecuniary loss and/or the infringement of a 
right of personality are essential elements in a claim for 
damages. The nature of the rights is therefore important.
The question of "ownership" in gametes or embryos -
particularly frozen embryos - leads to a myriad of legal
145problems. The question is closely linked to the 
controversial question of when life begins. There is no 
consensus on this issue, which is largely of a philosophical 
and religious nature. From a legal perspective the question 
is rather ‘’how and when should life be protected?"
If one cannot claim "ownership" of a child, can one claim
146"ownership" of gametes, zygotes cr embryos? Although
145 Examples are the recent case in Knoxville (Tennessee) 
where a couple who had seven embryos in 
cryopreservation decided on a divorce. The wife wanted 
“custody" of the embryos, whereas the husband wanted to 
prevent his wife from obtaining the embryos for 
implantation. Information obtained from The Pretoria 
News 08-08-1989.
146 1989 Crimes against the Foetus The Law Reform 
Commission of Canada Working Paper 58 at 8 defines the 
gamete as a germ cell - in the male, a sperm and the 
female an egg or oocyte. The zygote is the fertilised 
egg - resulting from the fusion of sperm and egg. The 
embryo refers to the stage of development between
(Footnote Continued)
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there is no "ownership” of a child, children are 
nevertheless protected as legal subjects. Should the same be 
true of the foetus, which is a potential child?
Gametes differ from other human tissue which may be donated 
or transplanted in the important respect that they contain 
readily utilisable genetic information - a gamete has the 
potential of becoming a human being. 1 4 7 Although most legal 
systems do not recognise proprietary rights in a human body 
as such, a person has the right to decide what to do with 
his/her body, tissues, organs or gametefc after death or once 
they have been removed from the body as long as such a 
decision is not contra bonos mores or in conflict with the 
provis'^ns of statutory requirements, such as the Human 
Tissue Act . 1 48
(Footnote Continued)
fertilisation and completion of basic organ 
development. The foetus refers to the stage of 
development following the embryonic period and 
continuing until birth or abortion. In a discussion of 
this kind, a clear distinction should be drawn between
gametes (sperm and ova/oocyte) on the one hand and the
zygote, embryo or foetus on the other hand.
147 Jansen R P S “Sperm and Ova as Property" 1985 J Med
Ethics 123 - 126.
148 See Strauss 1984 Doctor, Patient and the Law 163 et 
seq.
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As a general rule, solid organs may not be sold whereas 
it is not uncommon for donors of blood or gametes to receive 
compensation. This is not for the blood or tissue as such, 
but rather for the inconvenience and necessary expenses.
149
2.4.2 AN OVERVIEW OF FOREIGN JURISDICTIONS
2.4.2.1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
In 197 3 the question of ownership arose in the case of Del
150Zio v Manhattan's Columbia Presbyterian Medical Center.
In this case medical practitioners attempted in vitro 
fertilisation of a woman's ova with her husband’s sperm. 
While the culture was in the incubator, the chairman of the 
department, without consultation with the physicians or the 
couple, destroyed it. The couple sued the chairman and the 
hospital's trustees with conversion of personal property and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. The property
149 Our Human Tissue Act, however, provides for the import 
and export of human tissue, blood, blood products or 
gametes under strict regulation. An authorised 
institution, in terms of the Act, or the importer 
concerned may receive payment in respect of the import, 
acquisition or supply such tissues and gametes. See s
28 of the Act.
150 No 74-3558 S D N Y (1978) - discussed by Andrews L "My 
Body, My Property" 1986 Hastings Center Rept 29; 
Wadlington W "Artificial Conception: The Challenge for 
Family Law" 1983 Va L Rev 505 n 147; Wurmbrand M J 
"Frozen Embryos: Moral, Social, and Legal Implications" 
1986 S Cal L Rev 1092.
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claim was rejected by the jury, but damages of $50 000 were
151allowed for emotional distress.
152In the more recent case of Davis v Davis, which has
153received wide media attention, an estranged couple 
battled for "ownership" of seven frozen embryos. The 
classification of the embryos was vital to the case. Are 
they life or property? Mrs Davis considered them "potential 
life" whilst her estranged husband considered them "property 
jointly owned0. Young J ruled that human life begins at 
conception and awarded temporary "custody" to the mother. 
This ruling was, according to him, in the best interest of 
the "children". It was decided that child support, 
visitation and final custody would be decided if birth 
resulted from the embryo transfer. Ironically, Mrs Davis 
remarried and changed her mind, saying she wanted to donate 
the embryos anonymously to an infertile couple. The 
Tennessee Court of Appeal overturned the ruling of the court 
a quo and referred the case back to Young J to enter a
151 Andrews 19 8 6 Hastings Center Rept 29 - 30.
152 E-14496 Blount County Circuit Court in Maryville,
Tennessee 1989.
153 See for instance Time 27-03-1989 28; USA Today 
17-05-1989; New York Times 22-09-1989; Pretoria News 
08-08-1989.
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judgment giving the parties joint control over the seven
154embryos and "equal voice over their disposition".
Shortly after the Davis case, another dispute over control
of a "pre-*zygote” was decided in the USA. In the case of 
155York v Jones, a couple sued the in vitro fertilisation
156programme for control of a frozen "pre-zygote". After
having moved to California and several unsuccessful attempts
in a Virginia Institute for Reproductive Medicine, the
couple requested the transfer of the only remaining zygote
to an in vitro fertilisation clinic in Los Angeles. There
was a written contract between the institute in Virginia and
157the couple which stipulated several options, should the 
couple decide to discontinue the programme or get divorced. 
The court held that the cryopreservation agreement created a 
bailment relationship, which imposes an obligation on the 
bailee (IVF programme) if bailment has terminated, to return
154 New York Times 14-09-90.
155 York v Jones 717 F Supp 421 D C Va (1989) in the US 
District Court of Norfolk, Virginia. For a detailed 
discussion see Andrews L "Birth of a Motion" 1990 
Student Lawyer 25 - 30 and Rymer T A "Couple sues IVF 
Program for Control of Frozen Pre-Zygote" 1990 Citation 
61 - 62.
156 1990 Citation 61 - 62; Andrews 1990 Student Lawyer 25
- 30.
157 For the details see 1990 Citation 62.
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the subject matter to the bailor (couple). This judgment 
clearly favoured the view that a "pre-zygote" is the 
personal property of the couple.
2.4.2.2 GREAT BRITAIN
The Warnock Committee in Britain expressed itself firmly 
against the concept of "ownership" in gametes or embryos. 
They recommended that:
1 semen donors should have no parental right or duties
159to a child;
2 ova donors should have no parental right or duties to 
a child;
3 legislation be enacted to ensure there is no right of 
ownership in a human embryo;
4 when one of a couple dies, the right to use or dispose
162of any embryo stored, should pass to the survivor;
5 when both die, the right should pass to the storage
158
158 1990 Citation 62.
159 At 4.22 of the Report.
160 At 6 . 8 of the Report.
161 At 10.11 of the Report.
162 At 10.12 of the Report.
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16”?authority; and
6 in the event of a dispute, or the elapse of the time
of normal reproductive need, the storage institution or
authority should have the power to make decisions on
164the fate of the embryo.
165In a White Paper on Human Fertilisation and Embryology, 
presented to the British Parliament, the views expressed in 
the Warnock Report regarding control over gametes and 
embryos in storage were contested. It was recommended that 
the "storage authority" should not have the right of use or 
disposal, unless specifically granted by the donors. Their 
wishes are paramount during the permitted storage period. 
After expiry of this period, the "storage authority" may 
only use gametes or embryos for other purposes with the 
consent of the donors.
163 At 10.12 of the Report.
164 At 10.10 and 10.13 of the Report.
165 DHSS Cm 259 HMSO discussed by Parker D "White Paper on 
Human Fertilization and Embryology" 1988 Fam Law 303 - 
305; Morgan D "The Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Bill: Regulating Clinical Practice" 1990 Fam Law 122 - 
123.
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This recommendation has been followed in the proposed Human
Fertilisation and Embryology Bill1 66 which upholds patient
autonomy. The Bill contains strict consent requirements.
Amongst others, the maximum period for storage should be
specified, it should be clearly stated what is to happen to
gametes or embryos in storage in the event of disputes,
death or when a party becomes incapacitated. It is therefore
167the duty of the consent-giver to address this issue.
2.4.2.3 FRANCE168
In a case dealing with posthumous artificial insemination, a
French woman, Mrs Parpalaix, sued a government-run sperm
169bank for the frozen sperm of her deceased husband. The 
latter had to undergo chemotherapy which could have
166 Morgan D 1990 N L J 23 - 24. See also the discussion of 
the Human Fertilisation and Embryologv Bill in chapter 
2 .
167 Morgan 1990 N L J 24.
168 In 1977 a case was also reported in Britain when Kim
Casali who is best known for the creation of the "love
is...” drawings had a child 17 months after her 
husband's death; For a discussion see Van der Vyver 
"The Legal Status of the Homo Novus" 1989 Genetics and 
Society Oosthuizen Shapiro and Strauss (eds) 8 8.
169 The Parpalaix case, discussed by Atherton R
"Artificially Conceived Children and Inheritance in New
South Wales" 1986 Austl L J 374 - 386; Deutsch E 
"Parpalaix et al v C E C 0 S" 1985 Med Law 299 and 
"Current Topics" 1984 Austl L J 627 - 628; Jones D 
"Artificial Procreation, Societal Reconceptions: Legal 
Insight from France*' 1988 Am J Comp L 525 - 545.
386
rendered him infertile. Although she did not succeed in her
first attempt, the decision was later overruled by three
170judges in a suburban court m  Creteil which ordered the 
release of the sperm.
The court clearly stated that sperm is not a "thing in
commerce, but secretion containing the seed of life destined
171for human procreation". With regard to the rights and
obligations of the sperm bank, the court found that it had
an express obligation to preserve the sperm and an implied
obligation to return it to the person for whom it was 
172intended.
2 . 4 . 2 .4 AUSTRALIA
During 1984 the extremely wealthy Rios couple, who had two 
embryos in cryopreservation, were killed in a plane crash. 
This event sparked renewed controversy over the status of 
the human embryo and the fate of frozen embryos.
170 Tribulan de Grande Instance de Creteil, 1 Aug 1984 
225/84.
171 Jones 1988 Am J Comp L 529.
172 Ibid.
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. . . 173Three possibilities were considered:
1 that they are viewed as personal property and passed by
the intestate laws of succession to the heirs of the
Rios family;
2 they could be treated as human beings and a guardian be
appointed for them by a court to determine what would 
be in their "best interest" or
3 the hospital, were they were stored, could be
recognised as che trustee for the deceased couple and 
decide their destiny.
The "personal property" view created the difficulty that
embryos have no commercial value and even if they did, a
174determination was impossible to make at that stage.
There was no precedent available and no legislation
175applicable to the situation.
173 Smith G P "Australia's Frozen "Orphan" Embryos: A 
Medical, Legal and Ethical Dilemma" 1985 - 19 8 6 J Fam L 
31.
174 Smith 1988 J Fam L 31.
175 Unfortunately the ultimate fate of the embryos could 
not be determined.
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2.4.2.5.1 RIGHTS TO GAMETES
2.4.2.5.1.1 LEGISLATION AND REGULATIONS
The Human Tissue Act and the Regulations make provision for 
the donation of gametes (sperm and ova) under strict
control. A gamete is defined in the Act as either of the two
17 6generative cells essential for human reproduction, but is
17 7excluded from the definition of tissue. Excluded as 
donors of gametes are minors and anyone who has been 
declared a habitual criminal in terms of s 286 of the 
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 or who is mentally ill
17 8withing the meaning of the Mental Health Act lb of 1973.
The Regulations in terms of the Human Tissue Act provide the
179donors with a right of determination or decision making 
regarding their donations. The donor can, for instance, 
decide on the population group and religion of the
2.4.2.5 SOUTH AFRICA
176 S 1.
177 S 1(a) defines ’tissue" as "any human tissue, including 
any flesh, bone, organ, gland or body fluid, but 




recipient as well as the number of artificial
181 182 inseminations for which his gametes may be used. These
183decisions must be recorded in the donor's file.
The recipient of a donation may also "express wishes
regarding the population group and religion of the donor and
184any other wishes of the recipient concerning such donor".
The details of these wishes should also be recorded in the
. . . , 185recipient s file.
The Regulations also place a duty on the medical 
practitioners performing the artificial insemination or in 
vitro fertilisation to ensure that "the wishes of both the 
Qonor and the recipient are respected regarding the 




181 Although this refers to the male, the donor may of 
course also be a female as “gamete" is defined as 
"either of the two generative cells essential for human 
reproduction" in S 1 of the Human Tissue Act.
182 Reg 5(1)(v). The number of births resulting from 
gametes from one donor is, however, restricted five 
live births.
183 Reg 6(1)(iv) and (v).
184 Reg 10(1)(a)(v).
185 Reg 10(1) .
186 Reg 9(e)(iii).
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S 36 of the Human Tissue Act stipulates that the receiver of
gametes acquires "exclusive rights" over the gametes used
for artificial insemination or in vitro fertilisation.
These "rights" in terms of the Act, can however, not be
interpreted to include parental rights, as such an
interpretation would imply that the donor of sperm in AIH
(artificial insemination husband) would lose his parental
power by the mere act of providing sperm for the artificial
187insemination of his wife.
The terminology "exclusive rights" should also not be
interpreted as "proprietary rights" or "rights of
ownership". It is submitted that the view that the human
body - alive or dead - cannot be the object of such rights
188is correct. Human tissue falls in the category of res
18 9extra commercium and is not subject to “ownership". A
person, however, has the right of determination regarding 
his/her body, tissues, organs or gametes after death or once 
they have been removed from the body as long as his/her
187 Schutte 1986 Hervorming 79.
188 For a detailed discussion on the rights to a corpse, 
see Van der Walt A "Arti.ke.l 10 van die Wet of Menslike 
Weefsel 65 van 1983 in 'n Jaridiese, Etiese en 
Filosofiese Perspektief" 1984 TSAR 161 - 163. See, 
however, the view of Strauss 1984 Doctor, Patient and 
the Law 168 that the keeping of a dead mummy by a 
museum is a clear exception to the rule that dead 
bodies are incapable of ownership.
189 1984 TSAR 162; Van der Merwe C G 1979 Sakereg 20-
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decision is not contra bonos mores or in conflict with
190statutory requirements. The Children's Status Act, 
furthermore clearly stipulates that the donors of sperm and
ova have no rights and duties towards a child born through
. . . 191artificial insemination of a woman. This enactment
protects the child against later claims of guardianship or
custody and protects the donors against claims for
maintenance.
Although there are at present no stipulations regarding the
192storage of sperm or ova, the same principles are 
applicable.
Once the donors of gametes have relinquished their control 
to a storage institution or clinic, they should not be 
permitted to institute later claims. The exception to this 
general rule, is where gametes are donated for a specific 
purpose rather than to an anonymous recipient. Examples are 
AIH (artificial insemination husband) and surrogate 
motherhood. The intention of the parties is not to 
relinquish their gametes, but to use them for a specific
190 For an in depth discussion of the patient's rights to 
tissue removed during an operation, see Strauss 1984 
Doctor, Patient and the Law 163 et seq.
191 S 5(2). See the discussion in chapter 5 under the 
Children's Status Act.
192 The Regulations are at present under review. See GG 
13228 Notice 433 17-05-1991.
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purpose. It is therefore submitted that in surrogacy - 
particularly in complete surrogacy, where the gamete donors 
are also the intended parents and the surrogate merely acts 
as a host mother - the intended parents, and not the 
gestational mother should ret"'n parental rights to the 
child. 1 9 3
Posthumous artificial insemination or insemination of a
widow after her husband's death, provides several legal
194obstacles which are not discussed here. Her rights to the
frozen semen is, however, relevant to this discussion.
Where semen is stored for a clear and specific purpose, or
an instruction for the release of the semen is made in a
valid will, the widow should be entitled to the semen. To
protect the interest of society and other children in the
marriage - especially in the field of inheritance and
succession - a time limit should be set for the release of
1 95the sperm.x
193 See the discussion in chapter 5 under the Children's 
Status Act.
194 For a discussion, see Pretorius R in i? 88 The Right to
Life: Issues in Bioethics W S Vorster (ed) 7 5 - 76.
195 Ibid.
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The nasciturus fiction, already discussed, provides 
protection to the unborn who suffers injuries in utero 
through the wrongful act of a third party, provided 
causality can be proved and a live birth occurs.
At present the storage of embryos is not legislatively 
regulated in South Africa, but the embryo is not regarded as 
a person, neither is it the "property" of the donor or 
recipient.
The Medical Research Council has provided some ethical
guidelines with regard to embryos, which are not binding on
a court and carry no penalties for non-compliance. The
nature of the “rights" towards embryos are, however not
defined, but the guidelines contain a statement that embryo
research is not permitted without the written permission of
197the donors of the gametes or the embryo. S 39A of the 
Human Tissue Amendment Act 51 of 1989 which came into
2.4.2.5.2 RIGHTS TO EMBRYOS
196 See also Silva-Ruiz "The Legal Position of the Embryo 
and Foetus" 1988 Prague Conference Report of the World 
Association of Med Law 314.
197 At 27.
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operation on 2 May 1990 now prohibits genetic 
manipulation (outside the human body) of gametes or zygotes.
2.4.3 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING RIGHTS
TO GAMETES, ZYGOTES AND EMBRYOS
The extent and nature of the rights to gametes, zygotes and 
embryos remain largely uncertain. Court decisions in other 
jurisdictions do not provide uniform answers.
Dcnors of gametes have a right of determination, but once 
they have relinquished this right by donation, they cannot 
institute claims later. The exception, which has already 
been recognised statutorily, is when the gametes are donated 
for a specific purpose. Another exception which should be 
recognised is that of surrogate motherhood, where the intent 
of the parties should be the paramount consideration and the 
specific intent of the agreement recognised.
It is submitted that "rights" to gametes referred to in the 
Human Tissue Act and the Children's Status Act are not in 
the nature of rights of ownership (eiendomsreg), but are at 
best rights of disposition or determination 
(beskikkingsreg).
198
198 GG 12435 No 80 27-04-1990.
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The intent of the parties should also be paramount in any 
decision regarding the rights to a zygote, foetus or embryo. 
In support of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill in 
Britain, it is submitted the intended parents, should have 
the exclusive right of decision making unless they
relinquish it (in writing) to the storage facility or
. . . . 199infertility clinic.
At the time of cryopreservation, a written contract should 
be concluded between the intended parents and the storage 
facility/clinic in which the couple should provide clear 
instructions concerning the destiny of the embryos. They 
should make clear provision for events such as death, 
divorce or impossibility of completion of the process. The 
role of the medical practitioner is to assist them by 
ensuring that their decision is fully informed. The various 
options and risks should be explained to them. The time 
limit for storage - approximately four years - should be 
stipulated. On expiry, the situation should be reviewed by 
the couple in consultation with the medical practitioners, 
who are the best judges of the quality of stored zygotes or 
embryos.
199 See in general Robertson J A "Decisional Authority Over 
Embryos and Control of IVF Technology" 1988 Juriraetrics 
285 - 304 for strong arguments in favour of patient 
autonomy instead of state intervention.
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It is submitted that donation of the embryos to childless 
couples is a far better option than the destruction of the 
embryos or so-called "custody battles" as happened in Jones 
v Jones in the USA.^^ It is therefore submitted that a 
provision inserted in the contract that should the parties 
fail to come to a decision within two weeks after the date 
of expiry, the right of determination should pass to the 
storage facility/clinic.
Although protection should undoubtedly be provided for
zygotes or embryos in storage, they should not be afforded
legal subjectivity.The autonomy of the mother should be
protected at all costs. To accord the foetus equal rights
201could lead to severe conflicts of interests.
200 See discussion supra.
201 For a discussion of several court cases where an order
was granted by the court in favour of the medical
practitioners to "save" the life of.the foetus - eg
blood transfusion to the foetus of a mother who is a 
Jehovah's Witness and a Caesarian section against the 
wishes of the mother who belonged to a Laotian tribe, 
see Hirsch H L "Mother v. Fetus: The Dilemma" 1989 L 
Aspects Med Prac 5 - 8 ;  Feldiran W S “The Rights of the 
Fetus v. the Rights of the Mother" 1988 L Aspects Med 
Prac 8 - 10; Field M "Controlling the Woman to Protect 
the Fetus" 1989 L Med & Health Care 114 - 129.
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2.5 CRIMINAL LIABILITY IN TERMS OF THE HUMAN TISSUE 
ACT AND REGULATIONS
In the discussion of the legality of the contract, the 
relevant sections of the Human Tissue Act and Regulations 
were discussed. 202
From the medical practitioner's point of view it is 
imperative to work within the framework of the Human Tissue 
Act and Regulations. Failure to comply with statutory 
requirements could render him/her criminally liable.
203Although the possible fines for non-compliance are low, 
the Medical Council could of course, in a disciplinary 
hearing, impose its own penalties on the medical 
practitioner.
AIH (artificial insemination with the husband's sperm)
provides few legal obstacles. With the exception of Reg
20411, the Regulations, do not apply.
202 See chapter 3.
203 The penalty for non-compliance with the Human Tissue 
Act is a fine not exceeding R2 000 or to imprisonment 
not exceeding one year or both. Non-compliance with the 
Regulations carries a fine not exceeding R1 000 or 
imprisonment not exceeding six months.
204 Reg 11 entitles a medical practitioner v/ho has been 
registered with the Director-General in terms of Reg 
1 1 (2 ), to effect artificial insemination under 
conditions determined by the Director-General and 
premises approved by him/her.
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AID (artificial insemination with donor sperm) and ET 
(embryo transfer) are, however, more complicated procedures 
and are regulated in detail. Apart from the detailed 
requirements regarding donor and recipient files, the 
artificial insemination procedure itself, confidentiality, 
registers and notification to the Director-General, 
important policy issues are also contained in the Act and 
Regulations.
Only medical practitioners or someone acting under their
supervision may perform artificial or in vitro
205fertilisations and embryo transfer.
Artificial inseminations and in vitro fertilisations may be
performed only on married women, with the written consent of
206their husbands. “Married" in terms of the Act includes "a
marriage by way of a contract which, in terms of any Act or
by customary law, constitutes a marriage" and "husband",
"wife", "spouse" or "married couple" have corresponding
207 .meanings". This provides an opportunity for women in a
208"customary law marriage" to be artificially inseminated.
205 S 23(2) and Reg 3.
206 Reg 8(1).
207 Reg 1.
208 See Pretorius R "Practical Aspects of Surrogate 
Motherhood" 1991 DJ 52 - 62 61.
399
In terras of the Human Tissue Act, artificial inseminations
and in vitro fertilisations may be performed only for
209"medical purposes". The question posed is whether 
artificial insemination or in vitro fertilisation in 
surrogacy arrangements contravene this provision. The 
surrogate mother is a healthy person, but consents to the 
procedure for the benefit of the intended parents and not 
herself. In this sense, it is not a therapeutic procedure.
To my mind, a wide interpretation should be afforded to the 
words "for medical purposes'*. Medical practice is not merely 
directed at the relief of diseases, but to a great variety 
of forms of physical and mental suffering. An example is the 
donation of blood by a healthy person for the benefit of a 
another. If artificial insemination or in vitro 
fertilisation is therefore performed to relieve the 
suffering of the infertile couple, it is, to my mind, 
performed for "medical purposes".
Similar to the regulations regarding the screening of
2 1 0  . . . donors, detailed provisions are made for recipient files
2 1 1and information stored on such files. These include
209 For a discussion of "medical purposes" in the Act, see 
Schutte 1986 Hervorming 7 5 et seq.
210 See discussion infra.
211 Reg 9 and 10.
400
212 . . 213personal details, family history, results cC medical
examinations,21  ^previous artificial inseminations, 2 1 5 tests
o i gand informed consent papers. Thorough screening
(physically, socially and mentally) of the recipients is
217also prescribed.
218Recipient files must also be kept in safe custody and
219confidentiality maintained and certain confidential
information, such as the recipient's identification number,
the file number, date of successful artificial insemination
and the results of pregnancy, if known, must be made
220available to the Director-General annually.
A medical practitioner who has effected an artificial 









220 Reg 10(2)(c)(i) - (v).
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thirty days to the practitioner who handled the donation.
If the child is born with a genetic defect or mental
disorder, the medical practitioner must attempt to determine
the cause and if it could be traced to the donor, he/she
222must notify the practitioner who handled the donation.
The Human Tissue Act provides a safeguard against possible
civil and criminal liability to medical practitioners who
have removed tissue in "good faith" for certain procedures
described in s 19 of the Act. Artificial insemination is
included by virtue of s 19(c). If the donation made or the
consent given is subsequently found to be invalid, the
223medical practitioner will not be liable. A cautionary
measure is contained in s 35(2) where it is clearly stated
that the section should not be construed to extend existing
principles of civil and criminal liability. It is submitted
that where there is a clear duty in assisted reproductive
medicine, for instance, to ensure that the recipient is
married and that her husband has consented to the procedure,
the medical practitioner will not escape criminal liability
224by relying on this section as his actions are negligent.
22 1
221 Reg 12(1)(a).
222 Reg 13(1)(a) - (b).
223 S 35.
224 In terms of s 35(2), it is clear that existing
(Footnote Continued)
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From the above it is clear that medical practitioners and
particularly infertility specialists could be criminally and
civilly liable to the surrogate mother, her husband as well
225as the intended parents.
2-5.1 PATHOLOGISTS2 2 6
In certain instances the infertility specialists obtain 
gametes from private or hospital pathologists. They are 
responsible for the testing and possible storagj of gametes 
as well as screening for genetically transferable diseases 
and blood, urine or tissue tests. This undoubtedly places a 
serious responsibility on pathologists regarding the 
screening of donors.
Apart from the general principles of delictual liability, 
already discussed, pathologists may also be criminally 
liable for failure to comply with the Human Tissue Act 
Regulations.
(Footnote Continued)
principles of civil and criminal liability are 
nevertheless applicable.
225 As discussed supra under Liability of Infertility 
Specialists in Assisted Reproductive Technology and 
Specifically Surrogacy.
226 See chapter 2 under the Suitability of the Parties to a 
Surrogacy Agreement and Screening.
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The Regulations provide clear guidelines regarding donors. 
Amongst the most important duties of medical practitioners 
responsible for the withdrawal, screening and storage of 
gametes are:
The opening of a donor file and allocating an identification
227 .number to it. The filing of ccrtam particulars and
obtaining documents. Written consent should be obtained to a
physical examination and interview by the medical
228practitioner, the taking of samples, for the purpose of
testing, analysing or other processing, which may be
necessary. The donor should provide a written declaration of
any previous donations, if any, and where they took
229place. The written consent of the donor's spouse should
230also be obtained and filed.
Prior to obtaining gametes, the medical practitioner must 
ascertain whether the prospective donor was screened at 
least one year prior to the donation for:
1  sexually transmitted diseases;
227 Reg 4(a).




2 sperm analysis, and
3 if it is a female donor, a gynaecological
231examination.
The results of examinations and tests should be filed in the 
donor's file.
At present we are confronted with the additional possibility
of the dreaded AIDS virus being transferred by using semen
232from an HIV carrier. An incident was recently reported 
where a surrogate mother transferred the HIV infection to 
the foetus with the result that neither the surrogate nor 
the intended parents, who were related t:o each other, wanted 
the child. 2 3 3
The freezing of sperm specimens in an in vitro fertilisation 
programme, has apparently eliminated this risk. It has been 
established that one can ensure that the donor is 
disease-free by testing the semen some weeks after
231 Reg 5(a)(i)(ii) and (iii).
232 It is possible for the virus to be transmitted to a 
recipient before the donor has become seropositive - a 
phenomenon which may take up to three months or even 
longer to occur after the initial infection.
233 Rothenberg K H "Surrogacy and the Health Care 
Professional" in 1990 Surrogate Motherhood Gostin (ed)
214 and n 117 with reference to Frederick, Delaphena, 
Gray et al "HIV testing on Surrogate Mothers'* 1987 New 
Eng J Med 1351.
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collecting the specimen. Unfortunately the success rate 
with frozen semen is lower than with fresh semen. Faced with 
these alternatives, it is doubtful whether any woman would 
choose the option of a higher success rate rather than 
careful screening. Those who elect the option of 
"self-insemination" should therefore bear in mind that they 
are exposing themselves to an additional danger of sexually
transmitted diseases as well as possible genetic
. . 235abnormalities m  the child.
The Regulations provide extensively what information should
be recorded on the donor's file. Amongst the most
important, are the full names, surname, date of birth and
237identity number, the donor's age, height, mass, eye
colour, hair colour, complexion, population group,
nationality, sex, religion, occupation, highest educational
238qualification and fields of interest. Furthermore, the 
donor’s family history, with special reference to possible
234
234 See New Guidelines for the Use of Semen Donor 
Insemination: 1990 of the American Fertility Society 
March 1990 Supplement 1 7D.
235 Mastroianni L (Jr) "The Key Social Issues Posed by the 
New Reproductive Technologies: A Physician’s 
Perspective" in 1989 Reproductive Laws for the 1990s 
Cohen S and Taub N (eds) 438.
236 Reg 6 .
237 Reg G(l)(a)(i).
2 3S Reg 6 ( 1)(a ) (ii).
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genetic carrier conditions and mental disorders, and an
evaluation of psychological suitability for the purpose of
240artificial insemination must be recorded. Details of
medical tests in respect of possible communicable or
infectious diseases and genetic evaluation, where
241applicable, should also be recorded. Details of each
removal or withdrawal of gametes and the date as well as
details of each artificial insemination affected with these
242gametes should be recorded. The donor's file must be kept
in safe custody and must not be destroyed without the
243written permission of the Director-General. The
244information regarding the donor's physical features must
be made available to the recipient and her husband. Certain
information must also be made available to the medical
practitioners who perform the artificial insemination or in
245vitro fertilisation. This excludes the full names, 








245 Reg 6(1)(a)(ii) to (v), (b) and (c) as well as the 
identification number of the donor file (Reg 4)(a).
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Certain information must be made available to the
246Director-General annually on a confidential basis.
Absolute confidentiality must otherwise be maintained and
information made available only if a law makes provision
247therefor or a court makes an order to that effect.
Reg 6(2)(f) restricts the number of artificially produced 
births with one particular donor's sperm to five. Once this 
number has been reached, the fact must immediately be 
recorded in red ink on the donor's file. It is then also the 
duty of the medical practitioner immediately to destroy all 
the remaining gametes of that donor, whether they are in 
his/her possession or in the possession of other medical 
practitioners. If he/she wishes to keep such gametes, 
substantiated representations must be made to the 
Director-General, who has a discretion to consider and 
decide on the matter.
3 CONCLUSION
The medical profession in South Africa has achieved high
248standards of professionalism and technical skill and
246 Reg 6(2)(d).
247 Reg 6(2)(e).
248 Examples are the first successful heart transplant
(Footnote Continued)
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infertility treatment is no exception. Unnecessary 
interference by the legislature with over-regulation and 
additional penal sanctions should not be encouraged.
For those who have suffered harm as a result of the 
negligence of a medical practitioner in the field of 
assisted reproduction, the general principles of delictual 
liability combined with peer review from the Medical Council 
and the Southern African Society of Reproductive Biology, 
provide sufficient protection.
The principles of criminal liability are also well 
established and statutory requirements in terms of the Human 
Tissue Act and Regulations, well defined.
The rights of the parties to gametes, zygotes, embryos and 
foetuses are, however, not absolutely clear. These rights 
are not proprietary rights, but rather rights of 
determination. The rights of gamete donors are terminated by 
donation unless the donation is made for a specific purpose, 
such as AIH (artificial insemination husband). It is 
submitted that surrogacy should also be classified as a
(Footnote Continued)
operation by Prof C Barnard in 1967 and the birth of 
the surrogate Tzaneen triplets, carried by their 
grandmother in October 1987.
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donation for a specific purpose and that the intent and 
autonomy of the parties be respected in this regard.
Other health-care professionals such as pathologists and
249psychiatrists have an important role to play in surrogacy 
arrangements. Their services should be utilised so that the 
responsibility for decisions on assisted reproduction is 
shared. In this regard, interdisciplinary decision-making 
should be encouraged.
249 See chapter 2 under the discussion of Assistance by 
Psychiatrists/Psychologists.
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1 OBJECTIVES AND OUTLINE
The principal objective of this final chapter is to present 
the main conclusions of this work as recommendations 
regarding the practice of surrogate motherhood in South 
Africa.
The fundamental aspects of the surrogacy agreement are 
highlighted and recommendations put forward as to how each 
of these should be addressed in South African law.
From the outset it should be stated that recommendations are 
based on the premise that over-regulation is impractical and 
that one should rather attempt to utilise existing law 
(common and statutory) wherever possible. Only in situations 
which are uncertain at present or which contain anomalies, 
should legislation be enacted or existing legislation 




There are two broad approaches to surrogacy, 1 namely:
1 The private crdering approach, whereby the intent of 
the parties is respected; and
2 The state regulation approach, whereby the intent of 
the parties is subject to mandatory normative 
standards of conduct prescribed by the state.
In the former approach, legislation will nevertheless play
an important role - albeit not in a prescriptive form - in
facilitating the procedures or practice, where necessary.
This approach envisages a facilitative and non-judgmental
legal regime where either actively or passively, the law
2permits people to arrange their own affairs. It is
3sometimes also referred to as the laissez-faire approach.
2 THEORETICAL APPROACHES IN DEALING WITH SURROGACY
1 1985 Ontario Law Reform Commission Report Vol 1 10 6 et 
seq.
2 1985 Ontario Law Reform Commission Report 107.
3 See Lupton M L "The Right to be Born: Surrogacy and the
Legal Control of Human Fertility” 1988 DJ 48, who 
submits that it is unlikely that the South African
authorities will support an approach which may lead to
the commercialisation of surrogacy.
412
In the state regulation approach, on the other hand, 
perceived public values, which are postulated from the 
outset, are paramount and override the intent and wishes of 
the parties. Examples are the prerequisites for adoption,
4set out in the Child Care Act and the prerequisites for
5legal abortion in the Abortion and Sterilization Act.
The options inherent in the two broad approaches are:
. . 61 maintaining the status quo;
2 regulating the practice;
3 discouraging the practice; and
4 prohibiting the entire practice as such or certain 
forms thereof.
These options may also be combined so that the status quo is 
maintained in certain well-established areas whereas 
uncertainty in other areas is removed by way of legislation. 
Where loopholes or anomalies exist, existing legislation may 
be amended.
4 74 of 1983.
5 2 of 1975.
6 See Lupton 1988 DJ 48 who correctly points out that
this approach is not without drawbacks. The inadequacy 
and uncertainty which are evident at present will 
remain and the child could be the victim of the 
uncertainty.
413
Other approaches, with a similar content to those already 
discussed, are: 7
1 The static approach, which is one of inaction or
maintenance of the status quo;
2 the inducement approach, which contains a kind of quid
pro quo. If the parties agree to follow prescribed 
practices and procedures, the state will, for 
instance, respond by providing legitimacy to the 
child; and
3 the punitive approach, which is hostile to all forms
of surrogacy arrangements. Bills proposed under this 
model envisage penalties for professional matching 
services and punishment for the participants to a 
surrogacy agreement.
3 THE PRACTICE OF SURROGACY IN SOUTH AFRICA
The status quo regarding surrogacy arrangements in South 
Africa is far from satisfactory at present. There are severe 
legal pitfalls and anomalies inherent in the procedure which 
should be revised. To maintain the status quo would amount 
to turning a blind eye to developments in the field of
7 Alto Charo R "Legislative Approaches to Surrogate




assisted reproduction and as Lupton remarks "it would be to 
squander an opportunity to plan for the future".
Surrogacy is not directly regulated, but the practice is 
indirectly affected by legislation such as the Human Tissue
Act9 and Regulations, 1 0 the Child Care Act , 1 1  the Children's
12Status Act and the Births, Marriages and Deaths
13 . .Registration Act. There are certain common law principles
which are well established and which may be utilised with
good results in surrogacy, for instance the criterion of the
best interest of the child. Certain established common law
principles, which were previously helpful, such as the mater
semper certa est approach, have become inadequate in their
application in assisted reproductive technology.
4 KEY ISSUES IN SURROGACY
Each issue is first discussed followed by a recommendation 
as to how it should be addressed in South African law.
8 1988 DJ 48.
9 65 of 1983.
10 No R 1182 20-06-1986.
11 74 of 1983.
12 82 of 1987.
13 18 of 1963.
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4.1 ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION PROCEDURES
The procedures utilised in surrogacy are artificial 
insemination - performed either by the woman herself or by 
medical practitioners. In vitro fertilisation and embryo 
transfer are utilised in full surrogacy, where the donors 
are the intended parents or where male and female gametes of 
third parties are donated.
The advantages of these medical procedures are that they can 
be regulated to a large extent. The same is not true of the 
so-called "self-help" inseminations or agreements to 
physical intercourse between the requesting father and the 
surrogate mother, who may risk her life and the lives of the 
children conceived, if donors are not carefully screened for 
sexually or genetically transmitted diseases.
4.1.1 RECOMMENDATIONS
Medical practitioners, and more specifically infertility 
specialists, should be permitted to assist couples who turn 
to surrogacy as a finaJ resort. It would serve no purpose to 
prohibit medical practitioners from utilising artificial 
insemination or in vitro fertilisation for the purpose of 
impregnating a surrogate mother. Adequate historical proof 
exists that certain social issues cannot be resolved by a
416
total prohibition. 1 4 Such an action could drive the 
procedure underground and create even greater risks and 
dangers for the parties, who would then be deprived of the 
assistance of experts in this field. Jt could also 
jeopardise the child's general health and legal status.
Should an already pregnant surrogate mother consult a
medical practitioner he/she has an option to treat the
patient, unless an emergency situation exists, in which case
15he/she is obliged to treat the patient.
4.2 ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION FOR "MEDICAL PURPOSES"
It is stipulated in the Human Tissue Act that artificial
insemination should be performed only for "medical
16purposes”.
4.2.1 RECOMMENDATIONS
The words "medical purposes" in the Act, should be accorded
17 . . . .a wide meaning. Although artificial insemination is
14 A good example is the prohibition of alcohol in the USA 
in the 1920's.
15 See chapter 6 .
16 S 19.
17 See chapter 6 .
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effected on a healthy woman (the surrogate), she consents to 
the procedure for the benefit of a couple who cannot have 
children the normal way. The purpose is to alleviate 
infertility and should therefore qualify as a procedure for 
"medical purposes”.
Artificial insemination or in vitro fertilisation for mere 
convenience should not be permitted.
4.3 SCREENING OF THE SURROGATE MOTHER AND INTENDED 
PARENTS
Careful regulation and screening, which should benefit all 
the parties to the agreement, are already a well-established 
practice. Screening plays an important role in protecting 
the welfare of the child.
Detailed provisions are contained in the Regulations in 
terms of the Human Tissue Act regarding the suitability of 
donors and recipients of gametes and the procedures which 
should be followed. As the Regulations apply to surrogacy, 
the surrogate mother (recipient) should be screened for 
physical and psychological suitability. In partial 
surrogacy, semen of the natural (intended) father is 
utilised. Like any other donor, he should be screened for 
physical and psychological suitability. The same screening 
applies to the natural mother if she is the donor of ova. If 
the intended mother is not a donor, the Regulations in terms
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of the Human Tissue Act are not applicable. At present there 
is no legislative provision for the screening of the 
intended mother which is a lacuna in the present legal 
situation regarding surrogacy.
4.3.1 RECOMMENDATIONS
Screening of donors and recipients is regulated in detail by 
the Regulations in terms of the Human Tissue Act.
The intended mother should also b^ screened for physical and
psychological suitability. The Regulations could be amended
to provide for such screening. Her suitability could be
determined with the help of social workers, psychologists or
psychiatrists. To i»y rcind the welfare of cne child should be
considered in advance. Adoptive parents are carefully
screened and the same should apply to the intended parents
in a surrogacy arrangement. A report on the suitability
18should be filed with an appropriate court along with other 
relevant information.
18 In some overseas jurisdictions, such as Canada, the 
family court is the ideai place.
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Medical practitioners performing artificial insemination and 
in vitro fertilisation have a duty under both common law and 
statutory law to provide certain information to the parties 
to secure their informed consent.
The surrogacy agreement is unique in the sense that the
intended parents have already decided to include a third
person in the agreement. The medical practitioner's role
19regarding informed consent is also more specialised.
At present the Regulations require that the parties be 
informed of all the implications of artificial insemination 
including the problems that exist with regard to the 
techniques required, the chances of success, financial 
aspects, consequences to the marriage and the ethical, 
psychosocial and educational implications of artificial 
insemination. The risks attached to the genetic properties 
of a gamete should also be explained as well as the 
prognosis regarding the child. They should also be informed 
that legal advice may be obtained and be alerted to 
potential legal pitfalls.
4.4 INFORMED CONSENT
19 See the detailed discussion in chapter 6.
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The general principles and statutory provisions relating to
informed consent are, on the whole, adequate in dealing with
surrogacy. Medical practitioners involved in surrogacy
arrangements are in a unique situation since they are not
dealing with a single couple, but with two - the surrogate
and her husband and the intended parents. In addition to
common law principles and statutory requirements regarding
informed consent, a written agreement should be concluded
between the parties and the medical practitioners. This
document should contain detailed information regarding risks
and possible complications. All the parties should receive
adequate and appropriate information to enable them to
appreciate the medical, legal, sociological and
psychological aspects so that they may reach a rational
decision. The individual consent of the parties should be
obtained and each couple informed of the particular risks of
20the procedure. Informed consent should be obtained for the 
entire procedure. Medical practitioners should protect 
themselves against possible liability by:
1 not giving a guarantee or assurance that a pregnancy 
will result from the procedure;
4.4.1 RECOMMENDATIONS
20 See the detailed discussion in chapter 6.
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2 not giving a guarantee or assurance that the treatment
will result in the birth of a single child;
3 not giving a guarantee or assurance that the child will
be born free from any physical or mental handicaps; and
4 not giving a guarantee or assurance that the pregnancy
and childbirth will be free from any complications.
The agreement and relevant consent forms should be filed 
with the court along with other relevant information.
4.5 LIMITING " SELF- INSEMINATIONS "
It is undeniably difficult to regulate the so-called "self-
inseminations". This practice is presumably more popular in
Lesbian relationships, where a "couple" want a child, but
will not be accepted in an assisted reproductive programme,
in the absence of a medical reason for the utilisation of
assisted reproductive technology. The woman is further
disqualified by the fact that she is not married as required
2 1by the Regulations. The circumstances m  which the child 




Self-insemination constitutes a criminal offence in terms of 
the Regulations, which permit only medical practitioners or 
someone acting under their supervision to perform artificial 
insemination, but prosecution is unlikely in practice.
Some women fail to realise the dangers of self-insemination.
Attempting this procedure could cause a myriad of medical
problems. "Donors" are not screened and there is no
guarantee that they are not carriers of a genetic or
sexually transmitted disease. Women could even place their
lives and the lives of their children so conceived at risk
. . 22if the donor is, for instance, HIV positive.
4.5.1 RECOMMENDATIONS
Education in this field is necessary. Women should be 
alerted to the dangers of this procedure for themselves and 
their children. The importance of genetic screening and 
screening for sexually transmitted diseases should be 
emphasised and women should be encouraged rather to consult 
their medical practitioners in this regard.
22 Such an incident occurred in 1986 in the USA, discussed 




The Regulations prohibit artificial insemination being
23 •performed on unmarried women. As this is a policy issue,
it should be incorporated in the Human Tissue Act rather
24than the Regulations.
Public policy in South Africa is undoubtedly in favour of
restricting artificial insemination to married couples in
25stable relationships. If the child's natural parents were
not married to each other at the time of the child’s
conception or birth, or at any time between conception and
2 6birth, the child will be illegitimate in South Africa.
An argument which could be raised in favour of admitting 
single persons to assisted reproductive programmes, is the
23 Reg 8(1).
24 Schutte M Die Hervorming van die Regsposisie van
Buite-Egtelike Kinders met Besondere Verwysing na die 
Status van Kinders deur Kunsmatige Bevrugting Verwek 
LLD Unisa 1986 82 n 82.
25 1985 South African Law Commission Report 133; Lupton M 
L 1982 The Legal Consequences of Artificial 
Insemination and Embryo Transplantation in Humans D 
Phil Univ of Natal 1982 377.
26 Spiro 1985 Law of Parent and Child 20; Van der Vyver J
D and Joubert D J 1985 Persone- en Familiereg 20 3; Van
der Vyver J D "The Legal Status of the Homo Novus" in 
1980 Genetics and Society Oosthuizen, Shapiro and 
Strauss (eds) 102.
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fact that they are permitted to adopt children with the
27consent of the Minister. To permit adoption and not 
artificial insemination seems to create an anomaly, although 
different policy considerations may presumably apply to the 
respective procedures.
Should a Bill of Rights containing an equal-protection
clause be implemented in South Africa, limiting the
procedure to married women may prove to be unconstitutional.
Women are not treated equally if only married persons are
suitable candidates for artificial insemination or in vitro
fertilisation. There are, however, the important underlying
moral and ethical issues, namely to protect a child or
provide him/her with the best possible chances at birth. One
writer even suggests that a child is entitled to the social
2 8and financial support of two parents.
29Giesen is of the opinion that modern reproductive 
technology should be restricted to married couples in 
jurisdictions where the illegitimate child does not enjoy 
the full protection of family law. He remarks that the 
situation may be different in countries where marriage and
27 S 17(b) of the Child Care Act.
28 Krause H D "Artificial Conception: Legislative 
Approaches" 1985 Fam L Q 197.
29 1988 International Medical Malpractice Law 637 - 638.
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cohabitation are on an equal footing, with the qualification 
that the procedures should only be made available to couples 
in stable and long-term relationships, analogous to 
marriage,
4.6.1 RECOMMENDATIONS
To a large extent reliance should be placed on the 
self-regulation of the medical profession. Very few 
infertility clinics will voluntarily admit single women to 
the programme, although there are undoubtedly medical
30practitioners who have no reservations in this regard. In 
the light of the moral and ethical issues involved, I remain 
unconvinced that single persons should be permitted to 
utilise artificial insemination or in vitro fertilisation.
In this regard I support the view of the Warnock Commission
31where it is stated that:
"(W)e believe that as a general rule it is better for 
children to be born into a two-parent family with both 
father and mother, although we recognize that it is
30 In the USA only approximately 10% of physicians 
performing AID are willing to do so on unmarried women. 
See Giesen 1988 International Medical Malpractice Law 
538 n 38.
31 At 2.11 of the Report. See also Lupton M L "The Right 
to be Born: Surrogacy and the Legal Control of Human 
Fertility” 1988 DJ 53.
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impossible to predict with any certainty how lasting such a 
relationship will be".
4.7 ABORTION AND THE SURROGATE MOTHER
The written contract usually contains clauses to the effect
that the surrogate agrees to carry the child to the full
term of the pregnancy until delivery. She furthermore agrees
that she will not try to abort the child once conceived
unless the requirements of the Abortion and Sterilization
32Act have been met, namely when it is the opinion of the
physicians that such an action is necessary since the
pregnancy might endanger the physical or mental health of
the surrogate or the child as envisaged by the provisions of 
33the Act.
The situation envisaged is where the medical practitioners 
might discover through amniocentesis or other tests, that 
the child suffers from a severe handicap. The pregnancy 
could be at an advanced stage and the surrogate might not be 
prepared for termination, while that is what the intended 
parents request.
32 2 of 1972.
33 S3.
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The most equitable way to regulate the situation where one
of the parties wants an abortion, but not the other/s is to
let the final decision rest with the surrogate. She is after
all the person who is carrying the baby and who should have
the autonomy to consent to an abortion should it be
considered necessary. This aspect should be contained in an
34Act regulating the procedure.
4.8 PERMISSIBLE FORMS OF SURROGACY
By far the largest number of reported cases, especially in 
the USA, are partial surrogacy or surrogacy in its original 
form, where the surrogate mother is also the genetic mother 
of the child. In these cases the intended mother makes no 
genetic contribution to the child, but in most instances her 
husband's sperm is used for the fertilisation.
One of the most controversial issues in surrogacy is the 
agreement by the surrogate to hand the baby over to the 
intended parents after birth. This would presumably be more 
difficult for the surrogate who is genetically linked to the
4.7.1 RECOMMENDATIONS
34 See the proposed Surrogacy Agreement Bill discussed
infra.
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child than where she is a mere "host" mother who has made no 
genetic contribution to the child.
Whether only full surrogacy should be allowed and not 
partial surrogacy, is a complex question because of the 
moral and ethical issuer involved.
4.8.1 RECOMMENDATIONS
It is submitted that full surrogacy, where the intended 
parents are also the genetic parents, is morally and 
ethically a more acceptable form of surrogacy. The surrogate 
mother acts as a "host" or ‘’carrier" with no genetic link to 
the child and it should, presumably, be easier for her to 
hand over the child after birth, than in the situation where 
she is also the genetic mother of the child.
Despite this fact, it is submitted that both forms of 
surrogacy should be permitted. To my mind, it would be 
unfair and unreasonable to allow a woman who is capable of 
producing ova the opportunity of having a child, while 
denying a woman who is unable to produce ova or carry a baby 
to term, this opportunity.
The choice to have a surrogate baby is a private and 
personal one, and those who are not in favour of the 
procedure, need not utilise it, but their attitude should
429
not prevent those who have no other options from utilising 
this option.
4.9 COMPENSATION
The compensation of the surrogate mother is undoubtedly one
35of the most complex issues. The basic question is whether 
compensation is for the child or for the services of the 
surrogate mother.
Compensation for medical and legal fees, which normally form 
part of a surrogacy arrangement, could be construed ?.s 
indirect compensation for adoption which is prohibited in
*3 g
terms of the Child Care Act Since the surrogate and her 
husband are considered the legal parents in terms of the 
Children's Status Act, an adoption application is likely at 
present, since it provides the intended parents with the 
opportunity to secure their rights to the child and to 
secure the status of the child.
From the reaction of the legislatures in most countries, it 
is clear that commercial surrogacy, where the surrogate
35 See chapter 3 under the Boni Mores.
36 Section 24 of the Child Care Act. Pretorius R 
"Surrogaat-moederskap: Implikasies in die Suid 
Afrikaanse Regstelael" 1987 DR 271 - 272.
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mother or third parties make large profits, is unacceptable 
and against public policy. Concern has also been expressed 
that wealthy women may exploit those who are less fortunate 
or less advantaged, by compensating them for their services
The problem, however, remains that the procedure is
expensive and in South Africa medical schemes are under no
obligation to cover medical expenses related to infertility
37treatment and artificial insemination. Furthermore, some
women are prepared to give up their employment in order to
become a surrogate mother. This is more likely to occur
where a friend or family member offers to act as surrogate 
3 8mother. There are furthermore certain necessary expenses 
involved in pregnancy and birth. Apart from medical and 
legal expenses, the surrogate also needs maternity clothes 
and must make regular trips to the medical practitioner or 
other health care workers.
Compensation should therefore be categorised as:
1 payment in the form of profit;
2 necessary expenses; and
3 payment for lost income.
37 Reg 4(2)(e)(i) and (ii) in terms of the Medical Schemes 
Act 72 of 1967 as amended by ?,eg 3(c) of Reg No 12094 
of 15-09-1989.
38 As happened in the case of Jonker/Sanders recently 
reported in the South African press.
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4.9.1 RECOMMENDATIONS
It is recommended that no money should change hands without
39prior approval by the court.
It is submitted that a surrogate mother should be 
compensated for necessary expenses. Such compensation should 
include all expenses with regard to the pregnancy and 
hospitalisation, medical procedures and services of other 
professionals. Furthermore, she should be compensated for 
her loss of income during the pregnancy and post-partum 
period. A minimum amount could be determined by the court 
who is in the best position to assess each situation.
It is submitted that it would be wrong to construe
40compensation to the surrogate as payment for adoption.
The intent of the parties, after all, is to compensate the 
surrogate mother for a direct financial loss and expenses
39 See the recommendation by the Ontario Law Reform 
Commission Vol II 254 - 255. Although there was a 
divergence of views as to what expenses should be 
permitted, it was agreed that there should be mandatory 
judicial control over payments as it could prevent 
exploitation of the surrogate mother.
40 See In re Adoption Application reported in 3 WLR 
19-06-1987 and 1984 Fam Law 241 C A; Surrogate 
Parenting Assoc v Kentucky ex rel Armstrong 7 04 S W 2d 
2U9 211 (Ky 1986); Matter of Adoption of Baby Girl L J 
505 N Y S 2nd 813 Sur (1986), discussed by Moss D C 
"Surrogate Parenting Debate” 1987 ABAJ 25; Lupton 1988 
DJ 44-47.
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directly incurred. That, in my view, is not compensation for 
adoption, which may at present be considered a necessary 
legal step to regularise the legal status of the child. It 
is, in any event to be noted that s 24(1) of the Child Care 
Act does not absolutely prohibit payment for adoption, since 
compensation with the consent of the Minister is possible.
4.10 THE CASE FOR ALTRUISTIC SURROGACY
41In In re Adoption Application, an English case, the court 
had to decide whether payments made to a surrogate mother 
constituted payment for adoption, which is unlawful. The 
surrogate was paid 5 000 pounds sterling to reimburse her 
for loss of wages and necessary expenses. After birth the 
baby was relinquished to the intended parents who applied 
for adoption. The court concluded that there was no 
commercial transaction as there was no profit or financial 
reward. There was no written contract and no lawyers 
involved until after the birth of the baby. The arrangement 
was, according to the court, one of trust which was fully 
honoured on both sides.
41 Reported in 3 WLR 19-06-1987 31 - 38 and discussed in
1987 Fam L 259 - 260. For a detailed discussion, see 
chapter 2 under English Court Decisions.
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Apart from obtaining an adoption order, altruistic surrogacy
42seldom ends in court.
43During and after the Baby M case, certain prominent
feminists in the USA raised strong objections to the
44practice of commercial surrogacy and pleaded for its total 
ban.
The main arguments raised were that:
1 surrogate mothers are dehumanised to mere "breeders” or 
■'incubators'' or "reproductive vessels”; and
2 inherent to the practice is a symbolic harm to society,
45the woman and the child in commercial surrogacy.
42 In the latest South African case of full surrogacy
(Jonker/Sanders) an adoption order was granted on 25 
February 1991 despite compensation to the surrogate for 
necessary expenses.
43 109 N J 396 537 A 2d 1227 1253 1988, discussed in 
chapters 2 and 5.
44 According to Andrews L "Surrogate Motherhood - The 
Challenge for Feminists" 1990 Surrogate Motherhood 
Gostin (ed) 167 and 180 n 3, a brief was filed in the 
New Jersey court in the Baby M case on behalf of Amici 
Curiae, The Foundation on Economic Trends et al, (court 
docket FM-25314-86E), in which several prominent 
feminists asked for legislation banning commercial 
surrogacy.
45 Andrews in 1990 Surrogate Mootherhood Gostin (ed) 169 
et seq.
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Macklin, after a careful analysis of the ethical issues
and concerns raised by the practice of surrogacy, argues
that commercial aspects should be separated from the social
47arrangement for the purpose of an ethical evaluation.
After a careful analysis of the agreement, she concludes
that there is nothing inherently unethical about surrogacy.
This, however, does not mean that it is good and that it
ought to be encouraged or promoted. It simply means that
non-commercial surrogacy is morally permissible, and should
48therefore be permitted.
It is often argued that the surrogate child may suffer
psychological h a m  in later years upon finding out the truth
about his/her birth. The same can be said of adoption. In a
sense surrogacy may provide more security to the child,
which is related to at least one of the parents. Surrogate
49children are wanted children and are often referred to as 
"last chance babies".
46
46 "Is There Anything Wrong With Surrogate Motherhood? An 
Ethical Analysis" in 1980 Surrogate Motherhood Gostin 
(ed) 136 - 150.




To quote from the Warnock Report m  Britain:
"The bearing of a child for another can be seen not as an 
undertaking that trivialises or commercialises pregnancy, 
but on the contrary, as a deliberate and thoughtful act of 
generosity on the part of one woman to another. If there are 
risks attached - the generosity is all the greater".
4.10.1 RECOMMENDATIONS
Altruistic surrogacy, where the surrogate mother does not 
make a profit from the agreement, should be permitted. It is 
submitted that it holds no potential harm for society or the 
child and that it enhances the family unit, which is a 
priority in every society.
4.11 VALIDITY OF THE CONTRACT
The written contract in which the surrogacy agreement is
usually contained, is at present of limited value apart from
providing sufficient information to the parties to ensure
51informed consent.
50
50 At 8.13 of the Report in the discussion of arguments 
for surrogacy.
51 See chapter 4 under a Proposed Contract.
436
Rather than applying principles of the law of contract, the
courts, in dealing with aspects of surrogacy in other
jurisdictions, have preferred to view commercial surrogacy
contracts as unenforceable as being contra bonos mores.
They preferred to implement principles of family law and
treated surrogacy disputes as custody suits, applying the
criterion of the best interest of the child as the paramount
52consideration. In practically all the surrogacy cases to
53date, the intended parents were awarded custody.
An argument may be raised that, although contracts are 
rejected, the courts nevertheless indirectly order "specific 
performance" although not eo nomine by forcing the surrogate 
to hand the child over to the intended parents.
4.11.1 RECOMMENDATIONS
Principles of contract law could play an important role in 
surrogacy arrangements. Whereas the common law alone cannot
52 A recent example is the Baby M II case in New Jersey,
discussed in chapters 2 and 5. The court held that the
contract was invalid and unenforceable as it 
contravened public policy which prohibits commercial 
transactions in children. The court treated the matter 
as a custody dispute and awarded custody to the 
commissioning couple. Instead of relying on the 
contract, the court applied the principles of family 
law and based its decision on the welfare of the child.
53 See chapter 2 under Court Decisions.
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protect the child's interest adequately, this can be
achieved by including specific terms in the contract.
54In the South African case of Basetti v Louw for instance, 
Margo J was willing to grant an order validating an 
agreement between the father and mother of an illegitimate 
child, regarding his maintenance, custody and access. In 
this case the couple were not prepared to marry and 
preferred a type of "settlement" agreement. The agreement 
contained provisions by the father for support of the child 
by way of an insurance policy.
Examples of contractual terms, which could benefit the child 
in a surrogacy agreement are, for instance:
1 the creation of a trust for the child;
2 an agreement by the couple that they will accept the
child despite any mental or physical handicaps; and
3 a stipulation regarding custody in the case of divorce
or death of one or both intended parents.
It is recommended that the pre-birth contract be regarded as 
a valid and enforceable contract. The intended parents 
should be accorded full parental rights to the child at 
birth, provided the contract has received prior approval by
54 1980 2 SA 225 W.
a court. The court should ensure that all the parties are 
adequately protected and are suitable candidates on the 
strength of affidavits filed by medical practitioners and 
other health-care workers.
Once the court has given its approval, the contract should 
be a valid document regulating the entire procedure.
In this way, the parties are legally bound by the contract 
and the interests of the child are protected.
An anonymity clause should also be incorporated in the
contract to prevent a private incident from becoming a media
circus as happened in the Baby Cotton case in Britain, the
Baby M case in the USA, and our own Tzaneen triplets. The
surrogate should not be permitted to sell her story to the
media unless it is a unanimous decision by everyone 
55involved.
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55 At present, there is nothing which could prevent the
surrogate from doing so, as we are well aware from our 
experience in South Africa with the Tzaneen triplets, 
when the story was sold to a British newspaper. A 
similar incident occurred recently in the Tracy 
Jonker/Ina Sanders surrogacy. Whereas Ms Sanders tried 
to shun publicity, there was no way in which she could 
prevent Ms Jonker from keeping it from the media.
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Should one regard the contract as unenforceable and void, 
there can be no legal obligations or rights in terms of the 
contract.
For the purpose of this discussion, the basic premise is
that the contract should be enforceable, once it has been
57approved by the court.
The most common form of breach is refusal by the surrogate 
to hand the baby over to the intended parents after birth. 
The surrender of the child is the most complex issue in 
surrogacy. The notion of a woman giving up a child which she 
has carried for nine months is considered reprehensible by 
many people.
It is submitted that the surrogate mother should hand the
child over to the commissioning couple after birth. Should
the surrogate mother refuse to honour the agreement, the
58court may order specific performance.
4.12 BREACH OF CONTRACT
5 6 See chapter 3.
57 See the discussion infra.
58 See also the Ontario Law Reform Report Vol II 28 3.
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From the surrogate’s perspective this seems a harsh and 
unsympathetic suggestion. This issue, however, needs to be 
resolved in advance to secure the status of the child. If 
the surrogate is allowed to keep the child despite her 
deliberate decision and undertaking to hand it over to the 
intended parents, they may suffer similar distress and 
hardship as their hope of having a child which is related to 
one of them will be frustrated.
4.12.1 RECOMMENDATIONS
It is submitted that the surrogate who is willing to enter
into a non-commercial agreement, is aware of the risks
involved, especially if she has previously given birth to
her own children. Apart from receiving detailed information
on the possible risks and complications, surrogacy has
received considerable media attention and women who enter
into such agreements should, at this stage, be aware of the
fact that they may later regret their decision to relinquish
the baby. If they nevertheless consent, their consent is 
59informed. As long as the woman is legally competent to 
consent, she is a competent party to a contract and should 
fulfil the obligations agreed to in the contract. The fact
59 For a clear and logical discussion on this aspect see
Andrews in 1990 Surrogate Motherhood Gostin (ed) 172 et 
seq.
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that the agreement may result in hardship should not be a 
factor which negates her consent. Women have the legal
6 0capacity to enter into contracts with whom they choose.
The fact that there is no guarantee that everything will 
turn out well, does not affect the legality and 
enforceability of such contracts.
4.13 RIGHTS REGARDING GAMETES, ZYGOTES, EMBRYOS
AND FOETUSES01
Insufficient attention has been accorded to this important
topic in South Africa. The extent and nature of these
"rights" remain largely uncertain. Once a donor has
6 2relinquished his/her rights of determination to an 
institution, claims may not be later instituted. The 
exception is where gametes ore donated for a specific 
purpose, for instance by a husband for the artificial 
insemination of his wife.
An even more important consideration is the "rights" to 
embryos in storage (cryoconservation). There is no 
legislation regulating this procedure at present.
60 Provided the marital power is excluded if she is 
married.
61 See chapter 6 .
62 My emphasis.
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Surplus embryos in an in vitro programme are often kept in 
storage (cryoconservation) for later use. The intended 
parents should have exclusive rights of decision-making with 
regard to these embryos, unless they relinquish these in 
writing to the storage facility or infertility clinic.
At the time of cryoconservation a detailed written contract 
should be concluded between the storage facility and the 
intended parents. The agreement should contain clear 
instructions regarding the destiny of the embryos in the 
event of death or divorce of the intended parents or other 
unforeseen circumstances. Time limits should be set for 
storage. On expiry the situation should be reviewed by the 
couple in consultation with the medical practitioners 
involved. If the couple fail to reach a decision within two 
weeks after the date of expiry, the right of determination 
should pass to the storage facility/clinic.
Although zygotes and embryos in storage undoubtedly warrant
protection, they should not be accorded legal subjectivity.
To provide equal, rights to the embryo and the mother could
6 3lead to a severe conflict of interests.
4.13.1 RECOMMENDATIONS
63 See chapter 6.
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Pre-birth "donation" of embryos to other childless couples
could be regulated in the same way as surrogate motherhood
and where the infertility results from the inability to
64carry a foetus to term, a surrogate mother could carry the
foetus for the infertile wife.
5 EVALUATION OF THE EXISTING MODELS
The sole application of the state regulation approach is
unsatisfactory as the intent of the parties are subject to 
mandatory normative standards of conduct prescribed by the 
state. The private ordering approach, whereby the intent of 
the parties are respected, provides a better solution. It is 
submitted that the decision to have a child, with the help 
of assisted reproductive technology, is a private matter, 
with which the state should not interfere unnecessarily. 
Legislation still plays an important role in this approach, 
although not in a prescriptive form, but rather in 
facilitating the procedures where necessary. The inducement 
approach which leans more towards the private ordering 
approach provides a feasible option for the regulation of 
surrogate motherhood. This approach contains a kind of quid 
pro quo. Should the parties adhere to prescribed procedures,
64 This may be due to a congenital or other abnormality of 
the uterus, after surgical removal of the uterus, other 
health problems such as (Rh)- incompatibility, severe 
high blood pressure or diabetes.
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for instance filing an initial application containing 
certain prescribed information with the court, the state 
will respond by legitimising the agreement and providing 
legitimacy to the child.
6 SUGGESTED AMENDMENTS TO EXISTING LEGISLATION
6.1 CHILDREN'S STATUS ACT65
This Act was overdue in regulating the legitimacy of 
children conceived by artificial insemination with donor 
sperm. The definition of "artificial insemination" in the 
Act is wide enough to include surrogacy. In terms of s 
5(1)(a; children born as a result of artificial insemination 
with donor sperm and ova (which includes in vitro
6 6fertilisation and embryo transfer to a surrogate mother),
are now considered to be the legitimate children of the
woman giving birth and her husband, provided that he
consented to the procedure. This applies to full and partial
6 7surrogacy. The notion of mater semper certa est and the 
presumption of paternity or pater is est quem nuptiae
65 82 of 1987
66 S 5(3(b).
67 See chapters 3 and chapter 5.
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demonstrant are now statutorily entrenched in the case of 
artificial insemination with donor sperm or embryo transfer.
The effects of this provision on surrogate motherhood are 
totally contrary to the intsnt and expectations of the 
parties to such an arrangement and, it is suggested, 
unsatisfactory with regard to the child. Parental rights are 
accorded to a surrogate mother and her husband - whether 
they desire this or not.
Full surrogacy is affected by the Act more drastically than 
partial surrogacy end the results can be described only as 
harsh and unfair. In full surrogacy the parental power of 
both genetic parents is terminated. This is unfortunate as 
full surrogacy is, to my mind, more acceptable than partial 
surrogacy, where the surrogate is also the genetic mother of 
the child.
The Act furthermore confers parental power over the child on
the husband of the surrogate, who has played a minor role in
the procedure. If an affidavit is signed by the surrogate's
husband in which he denies having consented to the
procedure, he would not be considered the legal father of 
fi ftthe child. Such an action would, however, contravene the
68 See reg 6(1)(a) in which states that he is "deemed" the
(Footnote Continued)
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requirements in the Human Tissue Act and regulations, which 
requires his consent before a medical practitioner may 
proceed with the artificial insemination. A medical 
practitioner who wanes to safeguard himself against a claim 
based upon iniuria, would also be best advised to obtain the 
consent of the husband.
At present the Act makes provision for two exceptions to the 
termination of rights and duties of donors by means of s 
5(2)(a) and (b). If ova of the birth or gestational mother 
or semen of her husband are used for her (own) artificial or 
in vitro fertilisation, the rights, duties and obligations 
which exist under common law, will remain intact. The ratio 
behind this section is to protect the rights of 'donor 
parents" to their children, resulting from artificial 
insemination, for instance the husband who provides sperm 
for the insemination of his wife (AIH) and the woman who 
provides ova for her own in vitro fertilisation followed by 
embryo transfer.
(Footnote Continued)
father of the child if he consented t.o the artificial 
insemination and reg 6(l)(b) which contains a 
presumption of consent until the contrary is proved.
69 See chapter 6.
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The Children’s Status Act was never enacted to regulate 
surrogacy and should be amended to exclude it from its 
ambit.
At present s 5 of the Act reads as follows;
"(l)(a) Whenever the gamete or gametes of any person other 
than a married woman or her husband have been used with the 
consent of both that woman and her husband for the 
artificial insemination of that woman, any child born of 
that woman as a result of such artificial insemination shall 
for all purposes be deemed to be the legitimate child of 
that woman and her husband as if the gamete or gametes of 
that woman or her husband were used for such artificial 
insemination„
(b) For the purposes of paragraph (a) it shall be presumed, 
until the contrary is proved, that both the married woman 
and her husband have granted the relevant consent.
(2) No right, duty or obligations shall arise between any 
child born as a result of the artificial insemination of a 
woman and any person whose gamete or gametes have been used 
for such artificial insemination and the blood relations of 
that person except where
6.1.1 RECOMMENDATIONS
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(a) that person is the woman who gave birth to that child; 
or
(b) that person is the husband of such a woman at the time 
of such artificial insemination.
(3) For the purposes of this section --
"artificial insemination", in relation to a woman —
(a) means the introduction by other than natural means of a 
male gamete or gametes into the internal reproductive organs 
of that woman; or
(b) means the placing of the product of a union of a male 
and a female gamete or gametes which have been brought 
together outside the human body in the womb of that woman, 
for the purposes of human reproduction;
"gamete" means either of the two generative cells essential 
for human reproduction".
6.1.2 RECOMMENDED AMENDMENT
A subsection 5(2)(c) could be added to the existing 
exceptions as follows:
"(2) No right, duty or obligations shall arise between any 
child born as a result of the artificial insemination of a
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woman and any person whose gamete or gametes have been used 
for such artificial insemination and the blood relations of 
that person
(c) except as is otherwise provided in the Surrogate
7 0Motherhood Agreement Act
7 ALTERNATIVE APPROACH - MAINTAINING THE STATUS QUO WITH 
REGARD TO THE CHILDREN'S STATUS ACT.
An alternative to the proposed amendment to the Children's 
Status Act, is to maintain the status quo with regard to the 
Act so that the gestational mother and her husband are 
considered the legal parents of the child. Parental rights 
must then be transferred to the intended parents utilising 
adoption, provided the consent of the surrogate and her 
husband is obtained. The fact that the surrogate's husband, 
who has played a Tiinor role in the proceedings, can refuse 
to consent and thus block adoption is untenable.
The intended (natural) parents who desire to adopt the child 
jointly, could face a further possible obstacle regarding 
the requirements for adoption. S 17 of the Child Care Act 
seemingly prohibits the adoption of a child by the intended 
parents if the child is "born of one of them". It is 
uncertain whether this refers to the act of birth or the
70 See the discussion of the proposed Surrogate Motherhood 
Agreement Act infra.
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genetic link between the child and its parents. Since a man
is unable to give birth, it prima facie refers to the
genetic link. This is strengthened by s 17(b) which permits
a widower/widow or an unmarried/divorced person to adopt a
child with the consent of the Minister if "the child is not
a child born of him or her". A strong argument could,
however, be raised that the genetic parents' rights were
legislatively severed by s 5(2) of the Children's Status Act
and that there is therefore no link between them and the
71chxld and no obstacle to adoption.
If the status quo is maintained, the whole procedure is 
clouded with uncertainty. The intended parents - especially 
in full surrogacy - may risk losing their genetic child, 
should the surrogate mother change her mind or her husband 
refuse to consent to adoption. They could approach the court 
as upper guardian of all minors for help, but this is a 
costly and cumbersome procedure and success it not 
guaranteed.
71 Adoption was indeed permitted in a case of full
surrogacy on 25 February 1991 in the Jonker/Sanders 
surrogacy.
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To my mind, if the two possibilities are weighed up, the 
amendment in the Children's Status Act provides a better 
solution. The intent of the parties to tr agreement is 
respected and the surrogate child's status secured by the 
provisions of the proposed Surrogate Motherhood Agreement 
Act discussed infra.
Those who wish to enter into surrogacy agreements should 
apply to the court for prior approval of the contract and 
the suitability of the parties. The parties should be free 
to include terms of their own choice in the (written) 
contract, provided these are approved by the court. The 
court should specifically ensure that the child be 
adequately protected. The parties, particularly the 
surrogate mother, should also be adequately protected 
against possible exploitation. Affidavits regarding the 
physical and mental suitability of the parties should also 
be examined by the court.
The following terms should form the essentialia of every 
surrogacy agreement:
1 the surrender of the child and the way in which it will 
take place;
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2 compensation of the surrogate mother for necessary 
expenses and if she forfeited her employment, 
compensation for loss of income during the pregnancy 
and post-partum period.
Apart from the proposed amendment to the Children's Status 
Act, certain important aspects of a surrogacy arrangement 
should be legislatively determined to ensure legal 
certainty.
The following bill is proposed to regulate the practice of 
surrogate motherhood in South Africa.
9 PROPOSED SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD AGREEMENT BILL
Definitions
1. In this Act, unless the context otherwise indicates - 
"assisted conception" nas the same meaning as 
"artificial insemination of a person" in section 1 of 
the Human Tissue Act, 1983 (Act No. 65 of 1983);
"child" means a child born of a surrogate mother, 
conceived through assisted conception;
453
"court" means a provincial or local division of the 
Supreme court of South Africa;
"intended parents" means a male and a female person who 
are married to each other;
"married" means being in the state or condition of 
being either the husband or wife in a union at common 
law or customary law, and includes being in such a 
state or condition according to Hindu or Islamic law;
"surrogate motherhood agreement" means a written 
document purporting to be an agreement between intended 
parents and a surrogate mother whereby the parties 
agree -
(a) to assisted conception in the surrogate's 
reproductive organs - by tne bringing together of a 
gamete or gametes of the male person of the intended 
parents with a gamete or gametes of either the female 
person of the intended parents or the surrogate mother; 
and
(b) that the surrogate mother will carry the foetus so 
conceived for the pregnancy period and, after the birth 
of the child, will hand it over to the intended 
parents;
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"surrogate mother" means a married woman who has 
attained the age of majority and who has entered into 
an agreement to bear a child conceived through assisted 
conception for the intended parents.
Validity of surrogacy agreement.
2.(1) No surrogate motherhood agreement shall be valid 
unless it has been approved by the court 
within the jurisdiction of which the contract 
was concluded, prior to the initiation of assisted 
conception.
(2) The court will only approve the agreement if it is
satisfied that the provisions made or contemplated 
with regard to the child are satisfactory and in the 
best interest of the child.
(3) Once the surrogate motherhood agreement has been 
approved by the court, the court is empowered to 
enforce the terms of the contract should a breach 
thereof occur.
(4) Before approving the agreement, the court shall be
satisfied -
(a) the assisted conception will be carried out in
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accordance with the provisions of the Human Tissue 
Act, 1983 (Act No. 65 of 1983);
(b) the parties have entered into the agreement
voluntarily and received adequate guidance to enable 
them to appreciate the probable medical, 
sociological and psychological as well as the legal 
consequences of the agreement; and
(c) the surrogate mother is a married woman who has
previously given birth to at least one living child 
prior to entering into the surrogate motherhood 
agreement.
Parental rights
3.(1) A valid surrogate motherhood agreement shall have
the effect that the parental rights of the surrogate
mother and her husband, notwithstanding any other 
law to the contrary, be terminated at the birth of 
the child, and the child shall from that moment on 
for all purposes be deemed to be the legitimate 
child of the intended parents.
(2) In the absence of a valid surrogate motherhood
agreement, the child shall be deemed to be the 
legitimate child of the surrogate mother and her
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husband in terms of section 5 of the Children's 
Status Act, 1987 (Act No. 82 of 1987).
(3) Should an abortion of a foetus conceived through
assisted conception be recommended by medical 
practitioners in accordance with the Abortion and 
Sterilization Act, 1975 (Act No. 2 of 1975), the 
decision to consent to such an abortion shall rest 
with the surrogate mother exclusively.
Compensation
4.(1) No compensation shall change hands in terms of a 
surrogate motherhood agreement without the prior 
approval of the court competent to approve the 
agreemen t.
(2) Compensation over and above actual, necessary
expenditure and proven less of income as a result of 
pregnancy is not permitted.
Jurisdiction
5. The court competent to approve the surrogate 
motherhood agreement shall have exclusive and 




6 . All proceedings of the court in connection with a 
surrogate motherhood agreement shall be conducted 
behind closed doors, and the records of the 
proceedings shall not be open to inspection by any 
person unless the court so orders.
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